

POLITICS AND SOCIETY BETWEEN ELECTIONS

2019



About Azim Premji University's Work on Regional Political Economy

The Centre for Regional Political Economy (CRPE) is a research centre at Azim Premji University. Its key objectives are to facilitate theoretical and empirical inquiry in regional political economy through its focus areas: regional politics, regional economics, regional cultures, and regional histories. Overarching 'national' narratives, while useful to begin with, can be enriched by taking into account the spatial variation across India and the manifest complexities associated with regional formations. CRPE aims to expand our understanding of the analytical concept of 'region' in regional political economy, the methodological alternatives appropriate for explaining regional outcomes, and the processes that generate observed outcomes by drawing from disciplinary perspectives such as anthropology, economics, history, political science, and sociology.

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Politics and Society Between Elections

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1.

Introduction

The problems of India's development and governance are routinely linked to the logic of India's electoral democracy. As a result, a great deal is known about elections, but paradoxically our knowledge of politics and society between elections is relatively underdeveloped. As much as anything else, development and governance outcomes are shaped by how the government functions between elections; including how it relates to citizens on a regular basis, how it provides routine public services to them, and how public order is maintained. Further, governance processes are nested in the social and political relationships between citizens and government functionaries.

Since the mid-1990s, the National Election Studies have systematically researched electoral behaviour in India, covering the 1996, 1998, 2004, 2009 and 2014 parliamentary elections (see, for instance, *Asian Survey* (volume 52, issue 2, 2012), and special issues of *Economic and Political Weekly* 2004 (51), 2009(39) and 2014 (39)). In addition, numerous State Assembly election studies have also been conducted. These and other studies show that even marginal citizens of India are wooed at the time of elections (Banerjee, 2014; Ahuja and Chhibber, 2012). But what happens to state-citizen interaction once elections are over?

The normal assumption is that a great deal of distance marks state-citizen interaction between elections. What is the nature of this distance? In what way do political actors engage or disengage with citizens? In what ways does the bureaucracy step into this void? What explains the distance between political actors and citizens in everyday governance? Is the state closer to its citizens in some parts of India, but not in others? Which classes and groups are served better? Furthermore, how do different groups of citizens view the state and do such perceptions differ in different parts of the country? Our current insights into these questions are based on studies in specific parts of India and in particular aspects of citizen-state interaction (Gupta, 2012). There is an urgent need to go broader and study nationwide governance patterns across a whole range of issues.

No systematic nationwide studies have been undertaken about politics and society between elections. We still do not know enough about which social groups (castes, tribes, religious communities, classes, gender) get better public services (water, sanitation, roads, electricity, irrigation, education, medical care); which groups do the police protect in times of need and which ones it does not; in which states, marginal groups face less discrimination from government agencies and fellow citizens; which states do a better job of providing public services. These questions are at the heart of a fuller understanding of the problems of everyday governance and development in India. To generate such knowledge, we need a data gathering effort that allows a nationwide understanding of everyday development and governance.

The Key Issues

Substantively, the following sorts of issues, directly addressing governance, development and public policy, are of great relevance here. An illustrative list of enquiries is set out below:

A. Delivery of public services and public order

What communities receive what sorts of public services (for example, education, health and sanitation, power, transport, irrigation)? What are the mechanisms that promote or hinder service delivery? In what ways are services distributed? What roles do political agents and/or community engagement activities play in service delivery? What strategies do citizens deploy to engage with the state? What are the state-level and urban-rural variations?

B. Identity and consciousness

What are the primary identities – national, sub-national, religious, caste, urban-rural – in different parts of the country? Are urban identities different from rural identities? Is the South different from the North in the way caste and religious identities are experienced and expressed? How do religious, caste and linguistic identities interact? Which one becomes dominant in which part of the country and how?

C. Discrimination and violence

Which communities face discrimination from the State and/or fellow citizens? Which ones face violence from the State and/or fellow citizens? Are there State-level differences? Is there an urban-rural difference? For instance, Ambedkar had famously argued that the village is a cesspool for Dalits in particular (and, arguably, for lower castes in general) and the city would offer them a better life. Is that true? Which States provide evidence for Ambedkar's claim, and which ones do not? Similarly, in which States do minorities face acute deprivation? Is there a relationship between discrimination by state authorities and discrimination by fellow citizens?

D. Citizen perception of state Institutions:

How do citizens perceive state institutions and their capacity to govern? Does this vary by social category? To what extent do citizens trust the (a) legislature (b) executive (c) judiciary (d) bureaucracy and (e) police (f) army? Do citizens relate to parts of the state machinery – different departments and across hierarchies – differently? Is there a State level or urban-rural variation in perceptions? These questions are centrally related to the legitimacy of the state and the citizens' sense of belonging.

E. Economic process and governance:

How is economic regulation by the state experienced by citizens? Do traders, hawkers, and street vendors face harassment, by whom and of what kind? How do citizens secure building and business approvals from the state? What are citizen attitudes toward taxation? Are there varying levels of corruption in government-business and farmer-government interface in different States? Which States are better and how? How do citizens relate to global economic networks? How do they understand the impact of global forces on their lives? Does this vary from State to State and city to city? What are the emerging forms of governance as previously agricultural labour shifts to industry? In what ways do economic communities engage with the state?

This report, the third in the collaboration between Azim Premji University and Lokniti (CSDS) conducted in 2018 covers 12 States: Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West Bengal, and Delhi. The chapters below report a summary of our findings.

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2. Social Identity

2.A / Social Ties

The idea of India, especially around multi-culturalism, has moved considerably farther from how it was imagined in early years of independence. The idea of Indian secularism has been constantly challenged since the *Ram Janmabhoomi* issue. While a liberalised economy by definition should embrace openness, what we are seeing is that our social lives remain equally homogeneous and exclusive as before if not more. Urban growth which was to end casteism and other social divisions, seems to be only reinforcing these identities through modern ghettos. Technology and social media too, especially in the times of majoritarian politics, have in the last couple of years spawned an entire industry of fake news and rumours against minority communities. This section therefore, rather than 'real numbers' is more about our attitudes and our perceptions that tell us about the substantial cleavages that exist on social lines. Perceptions have a crucial story to tell with respect to our lived social universes. Perceptions in many ways become the function of social distances between these universes in any case. Given that identity is theoretically not seen as a stable category, but something that is always framed in response to socio-economic contexts, post 1990s India has witnessed a much stronger consolidation of caste and religious identities for both progressive and conservative politics¹.

Of course, these cleavages are by-products of modernity. They have been in place since precolonial times and have only exacerbated since then². Electoral politics in India feeds off social cleavages and social identities. While it can be in the form of progressive Dalit politics, it also exists in the regressive and dangerous right-wing politics which stokes majoritarian sentiments in order to consolidate Hindu upper caste votes. The heightened anxiety over 'love jihad' and the frequent resurfacing of cases of caste violence only add to these social divisions. The relationship between caste and religion and electoral politics therefore an intrinsic one.


For these 12 states, we look at the data on what we are calling a 'social universe'. Using a sample of data cutting across caste and religion, we try to understand what the social life of these communities looks like on an everyday basis. Using 'close friendship' as a marker, we attempt to see how people respond to having close friends from across caste, class and gender which gives us a sense of how these communities co-exist. We also try to understand if people's voting choices are also determined by these social relationships. Though the literature from social scientists on new social movements and right-wing politics post the 1990s shows that we have progressively moved to much stronger social cleavages, we rarely have a sense of the extent of this polarisation. Which states look more polarised than others? What are the possible caste and religion dynamics in a particular state? Does it vary between rural and urban areas? Or with literacy? Apart from giving us a sense of understanding these societies better, it is indicative of how electoral politics get shaped in each state.

1. Friendship Ties

This section represents the cumulative data on ‘social universe’ that Indians inhabit. Following the wisdom of the previous two reports, we look at friendship as a prime indicator of how inclusive or exclusive our social worlds are. In the survey, question 44 asks a rather simple, binary and straightforward question, “Is any of your close friends a...?” followed by 8 categories: Dalit, Adivasi, OBC, Upper Caste, Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Opposite Gender. The respondents could reply with either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’.


Across 12 states, quite predictably, the number of people who have close friends who are Hindu and upper caste is the highest (Figure 2A.1). This is followed by OBCs as a group, probably because several OBC groups have been the dominant caste in specific regions. Overall, on the issue of caste, this year’s report reflects the trends of the first report on Haryana, Karnataka, Gujarat and Odisha, but shows a considerable drop in comparison to last year’s report. A little over 50 percent of respondents claim to have a Dalit friend, and 35 percent of respondents claim to have an Adivasi friend. But with respect to respondents having Muslim and Christian friends, the number is significantly higher than previous years’ reports. With respect to gender too, this year’s report shows a considerably higher degree of friendships between men and women.

Figure 2A.1: Have a close friend who is a:




States like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and West Bengal reported an exceptionally high number of respondents who have Dalits as close friends (Figure 2A.2). This is probably a function of a political culture influenced by communist and Dravidian politics. In Uttar Pradesh, the number dwindles to 32 percent. But this dwindling down is not necessarily a function of invisibility. Given the political rise of Dalits, with the Bahujan Samajwadi Party in power, the acrimony and anxiety that upper castes feel for the Dalits in the social world may have exacerbated. Delhi and Uttarakhand too report a significantly high number of respondents saying they have close Dalit friends.

Figure 2A.2: Have a Dalit close friend (by State)




Across all the states, around 55 percent of Upper Castes and OBCs claimed to have close Dalit friends. This number is down to almost 20 percent when it comes to Adivasis claiming the same. Within Dalits themselves 71 per cent of Dalits had another close Dalit friend.

Figure 2A.3: Have a Dalit close friend (by Caste and Education Level)




Levels of education of the respondents show an interesting trend (Figure 2A.3). With respect to upper caste and OBC respondents, the number reporting that they have a close Dalit friend increases progressively with levels of education. This shows the impact of Ambedkar on the Dalit community, whereby entering educational spaces has become an important part of Dalit consciousness. Adivasi respondents however show an obverse trend. The more educated an Adivasi respondent is, the thinner are the chances of her having a Dalit friend.

Figure 2A.4: Have a Dalit close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)



The number of urban respondents saying they have a Dalit friend increases marginally across groups (Figure 2A.4). With urban Adivasi respondents however, the numbers echo the previous figure and show a considerable drop of 14 percent.


Figure 2A.5: Have an Adivasi close friend (by State)



With Adivasis, the numbers predictably report a significantly higher number for north-eastern states (Figure 2A.5). While Assam reports 51 percent of respondents saying they have Adivasi friends, with Nagaland and Tripura, it jumps up to 74 and 77 percent respectively. Mizoram is the only outlier in this respect with only 5 percent of the respondents claiming to have close Adivasi friends which is surprising given that the Adivasi population in the region is so high. But this is probably because the Mizo population may not necessarily identify with being 'Adivasi'. This gets substantiated when we see (Figure 2A.17), where 97 percent of Mizo respondents claim to have a close Christian friend. Southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala report 44 percent and 37 percent of respondents respectively claiming to have close Adivasi friends while northern states like Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand had only 20 to 25 percent of their respondents claiming to have the same.


Looking at a caste-wise analysis, roughly 30 to 35 percent of upper caste, Dalit and OBC respondents said they had a close Adivasi friend (Figure 2A.6). But among Adivasi respondents themselves, only 49 percent of them claimed to have a close Adivasi friend, which is highly unusual. But if our Mizoram surmise is correct, then it may be the Mizoram numbers which are bringing it down. A closer look at individual states may reveal more. But strictly from the point of view of this figure, this is a considerable drop from the numbers in previous years' reports which showed an exceptionally high degree of intermingling among the Adivasi respondents.

Figure 2A.6: Have an Adivasi close friend (by Caste and Education Level)




This figure too, shows far more revealing trends within Adivasi-Adivasi interactions rather than other groups. Education seems to have had a limited impact on the interaction of other communities with Adivasis. While it hovers between 29 percent and 37 percent across upper castes, it remains roughly stable for OBC respondents. The highest difference shows up within the Adivasi community itself which swings between 43 to 68 percent.

Figure 2A.7: Have an Adivasi close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)



Across rural or urban respondents there are very little differences except among the Adivasi community (Figure 2A.7). It is indeed important to understand to disaggregate the data further to understand what may possibly be causing such curious results, especially since this data contradicts the observation made in previous reports. Though data acquired through this survey will be able to throw some light on state-wise data for Adivasis, only a longer, closer study on Adivasis in these states can reveal the causes for these curious trends.


Figure 2A.8: Have an OBC close friend (by State)



As the OBC category is far from a unified group, with powerful dominant communities as well as considerably weaker communities within the category, it is hard to generate an overall sense of marginalisation within OBC groups. It is clearly evident that OBCs as a whole do not face the social stigma that some other marginalised communities may face. Most states report significantly high number of intermingling of OBCs with other communities. The only states to report abysmal numbers are Jammu and Kashmir and Mizoram but that may be a function of low OBC numbers in both the states (Figure 2A.8).


When the numbers are segregated as per caste, the numbers reflect similar trends. Across upper castes, Dalits and OBCs the percentage of people claiming to have OBC friends is significantly high. Its only falls significantly when we look at Adivasi respondents.

Figure 2A.9: Have an OBC close friend (by Caste and Education Level)




With education too, the numbers remain roughly within a small range for upper castes and Dalits. With Adivasis respondents, the number of people claiming to have an OBC close friend falls drastically with education (Figure 2A.9). While 47 percent non-literate Adivasi respondents say they have an OBC close friend, the number drops with Adivasi respondents educated even up to primary levels. Within OBC respondents, interestingly, it goes up with education. While only 59 percent of OBC respondents claim to have a close OBC friend, 76 percent of college educated OBC respondents claim to have a close OBC friend.

Figure 2A.10: Have an OBC close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)



Our attempt to see if the rural-urban divide has an impact on the numbers reveals the same trends as before (Figure 2A.10). Across upper caste, Dalit and OBC respondents, the numbers do not change hugely. And again, the only outliers here are the Adivasi respondents where the numbers fall drastically from 36 percent to 14 percent with urban Adivasi respondents.


Figure 2A.11: Have an Upper Caste close friend (by State)



Both Delhi and Kerala report an extremely high number of respondents claiming to have a close upper caste friend (Figure 2A.11). Most other states also report a fairly high number of respondents who have a close upper caste friend. In Assam, Kerala, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Delhi, the number of respondents claiming to have an upper caste friend is considerably lower than the numbers reported for a close OBC friend. With Mizoram, the numbers for both remain roughly the same and extremely low.


Quite like the figures on OBCs, this figure also reflects a significantly high number of upper caste, Dalit and OBC respondents who have a close upper caste friend. The numbers again, drop considerably when we look at Adivasi respondents. This may be a function of the fact that this report has Assam, Tripura, Nagaland and Mizoram where the upper caste population is far lower.

Figure 2A.12: Have an Upper Caste close friend (by Caste and Education Level)




With education, the intra upper caste interactions go up by 10 percent between non-literate and college educated respondents (Figure 2A.12). When it comes to Dalit respondents and OBC respondents, these numbers increase by 23 percent and 20 percent respectively. It is only with Adivasis that the numbers actually fall by 10 percent with college education.

Figure 2A.13: Have an Upper Caste close friend (by Caste and Rural-Urban)



Across the rural urban divide too, the numbers are predictable. For urban respondents from Dalit, OBC and upper caste groups, the numbers increase significantly (Figure 2A.13). Given the ubiquity of upper castes in all kinds of institutions, workplaces and offices, this is not surprising. It is only with urban Adivasi respondents that they fall by 11 percent in comparison with rural Adivasi respondents.


Figure 2A.14: Have a Muslim close friend (by State)



When it comes to looking at numbers of Muslims, clearly Jammu and Kashmir and Kerala report significantly high numbers of friendships with Muslims (Figure 2A.14). Delhi and West Bengal report close to 66 percent and 59 per cent of respondents who claim to have close Muslim friends. In Assam, despite the communal polarisation around National Registration of Citizens, the numbers are close to 57 percent. Interestingly, 38 percent of respondents from Nagaland respond positively to having a close Muslim friend.


Across the states, while 49 per cent of Hindu respondents said they have a close Muslim friend, with Sikh and Christian respondents it falls to 36 and 29 percent respectively. Quite predictably, given increasing communalism and religious polarisation, close to 90 percent of Muslim respondents report that they have a close Muslim friend.

Figure 2A.15: Have a Muslim close friend (by Religion and Education Level)




Education seems to have had a limited impact on friendships with Muslims (Figure 2A.15). There could be two reasons for this. While education has hardly proved to be an antidote to communalism, the presence of Muslims, going by the Sachar Committee Report, in middle class occupations, neighbourhoods and educational institutions owing to lower social mobility, has been thin. Amongst Hindus, while 41 percent of non-literate respondents claimed to have a close Muslim friend, the numbers only increase to 57 percent with respondents with college education. For Christian respondents too, the numbers only increase from 28 to 38 per cent between non-literate and college educated respondents.

Figure 2A.16: Have a Muslim close friend (by Religion and Rural-Urban)



When we take a closer look at the data based on the rural-urban divide, the numbers do not reveal anything particularly different apart from the fact that with urban respondents overall, the social interaction with Muslims is slightly higher (Figure 2A.16). While both urban Sikh and Hindu respondents report a higher number of Muslim friends than their rural counterparts, with Christian respondents the number barely changes.


Figure 2A.17: Have a Christian close friend (by State)



Both Nagaland and Mizoram have an extremely high number of respondents claiming to have Christian friends owing to their extremely high concentration in these states (Figure 2A.17). Kerala too comes quite close with 85 per cent of respondents acknowledging to have a Christian friend owing to the strong Syrian Christian population. States like J&K, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Punjab have reported a considerably low number of intermingling with Christians but again, that may be a factor of population. In Tamil Nadu and Tripura, 61 and 53 percent of the respondents respectively, claim to have a close Christian friend.


Figure 2A.17 shows that when we look at respondents from other religions claiming to have a close Christian friend, we see only 37 percent of Hindus and 26 percent of Muslims respond in the affirmative. With Sikhs, the number falls to 21 percent, probably because we have Punjab as one of the states for the survey, a Sikh dominated state with only 1.1 per cent Christian population. The intra-Christian friendships are predictably as high as 95 percent.

Figure 2A.18: Have a Christian close friend (by Religion and Education Level)




When we look at the numbers across education levels, the numbers increase for respondents in all religions, but only marginally (Figure 2A.18). For Hindu respondents, it increases from 29 percent among non-literates to 41 percent among college educated respondents. For Muslim respondents too, the number jumps up from 17 percent to 32 percent. Among Christian respondents it increases from 83 per-cent to 97 percent. However, the sharpest jump, as other tables on education would also reveal, is seen between the non-literate to the primary educated ones.

Figure 2A.19: Have a Christian close friend (by Religion and Rural-Urban)



Across the rural-urban divide too, there is an increase in the number of urban respondents claiming to have a close Christian friend (Figure 2A.19). This is different from their rural counterparts, where the numbers do not increase considerably. For Hindu respondents it goes up from 35 to 41 percent, while for Muslim respondents, it goes up only from 25 to 28 percent. For Sikhs though, the increase is relatively higher - 9 percent.


Figure 2A.20: Have a Hindu close friend (by State)



Respondents in most states report an exceptionally high number of Hindu friends. Mizoram is the only state which reports very low levels (19 percent) of Hindus as close friends because of very low Hindu populations (Figure 2A.20). In Jammu and Kashmir however, 45 percent of respondents speak of close friendships with Hindus, but that may be reflective of the differences across Jammu and Kashmir as separate regional identities. The puzzling finding is from Nagaland which reports 52 percent of respondents claiming to have close Hindu friends. With an 88 percent Christian population, it is indeed surprising that respondents have such a high number of Hindu friends.


In terms of religion, the numbers of Muslim respondents claiming to have Hindu friends stands at 59 percent, but for Christian respondents, it comes down to 38 percent (Figure 2A.21). Interestingly, for Sikh respondents, the number is only marginally higher (64 percent) compared to Muslim respondents.

Figure 2A.21: Have a Hindu close friend (by Religion and Education Level)




With education, the numbers hardly vary for intra-Hindu friendships. For Muslim respondents however, the number saying they have Hindus as close friends goes up from 47 percent (nonliterate) to 65 percent (college educated). For Christian respondents too, the numbers go up from 39 percent to 51 percent with college education. The numbers on Sikhs too display a similar trend with education.

Figure 2A.22: Have a Hindu close friend (by Religion and Rural-Urban)




Among rural and urban respondents, quite like the previous tables on the same question, it shows an increase with respect to urban respondents, but nothing spectacular (Figure 2A.22). The only place we see a sharp increase is with respect to Sikh respondents, with numbers jumping from 58 percent for rural respondents to 78 percent for urban respondents. The fact that the numbers across rural and urban respondents do not increase significantly is reiterative of our observations made in the previous reports - the assumption that moving to the cities essentially loosens one's ethnic and kinship ties and literally forces us into friendships with people from other ethnic, cultural and religious groups, may not necessarily be true.

Figure 2A.23: Have a close friend of Opposite Gender (by State)




In terms of gender, Nagaland and Kerala report the highest degree of friendships across gender (Figure 2A.23). While 75 percent of respondents from Nagaland say they have a friend from the opposite gender, in Kerala, 67 percent of the respondents replied in the affirmative to having a friend from the opposite gender. Between Mizoram, West Bengal, Tripura and Uttarakhand, roughly 40 to 50 percent of respondents have the same response. The lowest numbers are seen in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Tamil Nadu at 23, 25 and 28 percent respectively. Across states 43 percent male respondents acknowledged having a female friend. It was marginally lower, at 41 per cent, for women respondents.

Figure 2A.24: Have a close friend of Opposite Gender (by Gender)



An almost equal number of men and women respondents acknowledged having a friend from the opposite gender in each educational category (Figure 2A.24). With education, clearly the numbers show a clear increase in both genders. Again, there is a sharp jump in these numbers between the non-literate and primary level educated category compared to any other education level.

Figure 2A.25: Have a close friend of Opposite Gender (by Gender and Rural-Urban)



Across the rural and urban divide too, the numbers between men and women are roughly the same (Figure 2A.25). Interestingly, more number of rural men and women say that they have a close friend from the other gender.

2. Approaching a Leader


Caste has been in the eye of the storm of Indian politics since the mid-1970s. Some of the issues that have been raised are comparative resource allocations, entitlements to seats in state institutions and decision-making bodies, vote bank politics, access to education, health, and livelihood, as well as equitable opportunities in the domain of social relations—all of which are decisive factors when it comes to choosing one's political leader. Despite widespread awareness programmes, the Upper Castes are indignant about the positive discriminations made available at formal institutional levels by the Indian Constitution to alleviate the problematic conditions of lower castes and addressing problems faced by them. Instead of reducing these gaps, processes like the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report in 1992 aggravated the animosities between caste communities and raising debates on whether reservations should be made available on caste/tribe identities of individuals or their socio-economic conditions. Andre Beteille's pointed out that one significant fall-out of reservations has been the increase in difference of socio-economic conditions between individuals belonging to the same caste/tribe community, as opposed to between them and the mainstream³. Middle and Upper castes' questioning of reservation found a fresh lease of life with the rise of a right wing political environment in India since the middle of this decade. Several attacks in the last four years on the marginal communities, including the Dalits and Muslims, has compounded their vulnerabilities in the face of direct actions taken against them with the patronage of organised right-of-centre political forces. These groups have infringed upon freedom of discursive engagements in universities, and local recreational collectives such as clubs and libraries.

In this survey, we asked the respondents whether they held a preference for leaders from their own caste group or religious community. We measured this through two forced choice questions (Q55 and Q56): "Suppose there are two leaders from same political party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your **caste/religion** while the other from a different caste/religion, whom would you be willing to contact first?"

Approaching a leader: Caste

One salient point that may be highlighted here is that the results in this section of the report have clubbed data on the Adivasis and caste communities. This categorisation may appear to be convoluting the boundaries between the caste and Adivasi communities, generally considered to be completely separate categories of identity on the account of castes being segments of the Hindu community, and Adivasi identity being based on ethnicity. Thus, while the term used in Hindi for caste is 'varna', for Adivasis, the term is 'JanaJati.' However, there is scholarly opinion that traditionally castes and some Adivasi communities have been contiguous categories; and gradual alterations in their relationship to land, commercialisation of natural resources, and entry into state-arbitrated market economy have brought about a 'Hinduisation' of Adivasi identities. Scholars also agree to some extent that the caste and tribe identities were reformed and frozen by the British for administrative expediency, which was a commentary in itself on the porous boundaries between tribes and other social formations that coexisted in the Indian society⁴.

Figure 2A.26: Preference on caste of leader to get work done (by State)



A large share of respondents in seven of the 12 states responded that they would approach a leader from their own caste (Figure 2A.26). Support for this view is highest in Mizoram (75 percent) and Nagaland (72 percent) where at least seven out of every 10 respondents prefer a leader from their caste. On the other hand, most respondents in Kerala (74 percent), Punjab (56 percent), Jammu and Kashmir (55 percent), Assam (52 percent) and Uttarakhand (50 percent) do not hold a caste preference for the leader they would approach to get work done. However, the share of respondents who prefer a leader from same caste and those who hold no such preference is less than 10 percentage points in Assam (5 percent), Tamil Nadu (2 percent) and Delhi (1 percent). In contrast, this difference is stark in Kerala, where 54 percent more respondents hold no caste preference, and the north-eastern states of Mizoram and Nagaland, where 52 percent and 45 percent more respondents prefer a leader from the same caste.

Figure 2A.27: Preference on caste of leader to get work done (by Caste and Rural-Urban)



When disaggregated by caste of the respondents interviewed (Figure 2A.27), the preference for leaders from the same caste is more prevalent among Dalits (54 percent) and Adivasis (71 percent). The trend is in the opposite direction among respondents from the Upper Caste and OBC. The preference is striking among Adivasis. While 44 percent more Adivasis prefer an Adivasi leader, the difference among Dalit, upper caste and OBC respondents falls to less than 15 percentage points.

When we explore the preferences among rural and urban members of various castes, we observe a larger share of Dalit and Adivasi respondents from both rural and urban areas prefer a leader from the same caste and a majority of upper caste and OBC respondents do not hold a caste preference (Figure 2A.27). However, a comparison of net preference among rural and urban respondents shows some decline in preference for leaders from the same caste. For instance, 56 percent of rural Dalit respondents prefer a Dalit leader but 48 percent of urban Dalits prefer a Dalit leader — an 8 percent drop. Similarly, the preference for Adivasi leader falls by 6 percentage points among urban Adivasis.

Figure 2A.28: Preference on caste of leader to get work done (by Caste and Economic Class)




We also observe a decline in preference for a leader from the same caste among wealthier respondents, compared to poorer respondents and a corresponding increase in the share of respondents who do not hold a caste preference (Figure 2A.28). Further analysis of the caste of the respondents shows variation in the preferences across economic classes. Upper caste respondents show the largest decline in the preference for an upper caste leader, from 48 percent among the poor to 37 percent among the upper class.

Approaching a leader: Religion

The following figures of religion, and its intersections with the State, rural/urban regions, and economic class, as determining factors for choosing one’s political leader.

Figure 2A.29: Preference on leader to get work done (by State)



Seventy seven percent of respondents in Mizoram prefer to approach a political leader who shares their religious identity, followed by 68 percent in Nagaland, 59 percent in Uttar Pradesh and 56 percent in West Bengal (Figure 2A.29). On the lower end of the spectrum stands Kerala, where only 22 percent respondents reported that they would approach political leaders of their own religious community only. The difference between Kerala, and the next lowest, Punjab, is 19 percentage points; and the total range is 55 percentage points. On the other hand, 21 per cent of respondents in Mizoram feel the religious identity of the leader does not matter.

Figure 2A.30: Preference on leader to get work done (by Caste and Rural-Urban)





Figure 2A.30 further explores the choices of political leaders through an intersection of religion and urban/rural region. Twenty nine percent of Christian respondents in rural areas say that religious identity of a political leader does not matter, while 69 percent of them say they would go to one from their own community. Comparably, 67 percent of Christians in urban regions would approach to political leaders from the same religious background. While 60 percent of the respondents belonging to other religious identities in rural regions say that they would approach political leaders from their own community, only 32 percent of respondents from the same category in urban region would make a similar choice.

Figure 2A.31: Preference on leader to get work done (by Religion and Economic Class)



When looked at through the intersection of religion and economic backgrounds (Figure 2A .31), 40 percent of Hindu upper class respondents prefer a political leader from the same religious community, while for poor Hindus, that number is 51 percent. Again, while 72 percent of poor Christians feel they would prefer someone from the same religious community as a political leader, 68 percent of the poor from this community feel the same way. At the same time, in almost all religious communities, the share of respondents who do not hold any such preference increases with greater wealth. For instance, 54 percent of upper class Hindus and Muslims feel that religion does not matter, compared to 43 percent and 42 percent of the poor Hindus and Muslims respectively.

2.B / Discrimination and Stereotypes

Do religious prejudice and caste discrimination persist behind the veil of Indian secularism and constitutional culture? In this survey, we explore attitudes towards religious and caste communities along four dimensions: work ethic, peacefulness, patriotism and affirmative action. We examine whether the respondents consider certain communities to be worthy of affirmative action based on historical disadvantage or intra-group economic disparity. We also examine the controversial provision of affirmative action to historically dominant caste communities. On topics of diligence and industriousness of communities, peacefulness and patriotism, the responses are constructed along a 10-point scale. For affirmative action, this survey utilises a form of forced choice questions, albeit leaving some space respondents to decline to answer.

We begin this chapter with perceptions about whether various caste groups are hardworking or lazy and then explore the responses for patriotism and peacefulness of religious communities. Finally, we analyse the respondents' perception on affirmative action for Dalits, Adivasis and dominant caste. The responses to these questions are examined through demographic and socio-economic factors such as religion, caste, state and literacy of respondents.

1. Lazy or Hardworking

"Poverty is a matter of lack of opportunity, not a willing choice or fate of the poor."⁵ It is often suggested that Dalits, Adivasis and people from other backward communities are lazy, and do not deserve state support in the form of reservations⁶. This also implies that if these people study and work hard enough, they can automatically lift themselves out of poverty. This perception, when viewed at a national level, ignores the reality that while some of the positive changes brought about by economic growth have provided new opportunities for Dalits to move away from their traditional, non-remunerative occupations⁷, the outcomes for Dalits still remain lower than those for other caste groups⁸.

In this section, we analyse the results for the question (Q22 in our study) for Dalits, Adivasis, OBC and upper caste: "On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at the bottom stands for extremely lazy and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely hardworking, on which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities?"

The respondents were shown a scale from 1 to 10 and asked to select a point on the scale (Figure 2B.1). If the respondent declines to answer, 'No Opinion' was recorded.

Figure 2B.1: 10-point scale used for questions on 'Hardworking or Lazy'



In the results below, if the responses are at 7th point or above on the scale the responses are considered as leaning towards 'hardworking' and if the responses are at 4th point or below they are considered as biased towards 'lazy'. The centre of the scale (5th and 6th points on the scale) indicate an ambiguous attitude that proved difficult to interpret. It may be considered either as no opinion or that a community is neither 'Extremely Hardworking' nor 'Extremely Lazy' but a combination of the two. Additionally, it must be noted that not all states have significant populations of Dalits, Adivasis or upper caste. The question on perception was asked only in the states with a substantial population of the caste groups.


As per the 2011 Census India data, Dalits comprise around 16 percent of India's population⁹ and more than 70 percent live below the poverty line¹⁰, with no access to basic resources. They suffer from among the highest rates of unemployment in the country¹¹.

The overall results show that Dalits are perceived as extremely hardworking by 21 percent of the survey respondents while 4 percent feel that Dalits are extremely lazy (Figure 2B.2). Overall, the trend shows that a majority of respondents (63 percent) perceive Dalits as hardworking, while 20 percent of the respondents view Dalits as lazy.

Similarly, a majority (60 percent) of the respondents perceive Adivasis as hardworking, with 17 percent of the respondents feeling that Adivasis are extremely hardworking. However, with respect to upper caste, 49 percent of the respondents perceived this community to be generally hardworking; 10 percentage points below Dalits and Adivasis. Furthermore, a significantly smaller share of respondents (11 percent) of the respondents perceive the upper caste to be extremely hardworking and 5 percent feel that the upper caste are extremely lazy.

The share of 'No Opinion', although not included in the Figure 2B.2, shows an interesting variation. While less than 20 percent of the respondents declined to express an opinion with respect to Dalits and upper caste, 25 percent of the respondents did not provide a response for perception about Adivasis.

Figure 2B.2: Perceptions about Dalits, Adivasis and Upper Caste as being Lazy or Hardworking



The survey on perception about Dalits was conducted in 10 states: Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Delhi and Uttarakhand.

Overall, while the responses of a large share of respondents across the states tend towards hardworking, the results present interesting variations (Figure 2B.3). While in most of the states less than 20 percent of the responses tend toward perceiving Dalits as lazy, a higher share of respondents in Uttar Pradesh (34 percent), Uttarakhand (29 percent) and Tamil Nadu (20 percent) hold the same view. This trend can also be seen in the share of respondents who perceive Dalits to be 'Extremely Lazy'. 8 percent of respondents in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand and 7 percent in Tamil Nadu perceive Dalits to be extremely lazy, whereas less than 5 percent in other states hold the same opinion. Figure A.3 shows that the share of responses hit a peak at 'Extremely Hardworking' for almost all states except Kerala and West Bengal where the largest share of respondents (23 percent) is at 8th point on the scale, that is, generally hardworking.


Figure 2B.3: Perceptions about Dalits as being Lazy or Hardworking (by State)



An extremely significant result is that of 'No Responses' in various states. In Kerala, 41 percent of survey respondents did not answer this question, followed by 25 percent in Assam and 23 percent in Tamil Nadu. In other states, this number was significantly lower and in the 6 percent to 20 percent range. This result can point to one of two issues: a genuine lack of opinion or a strong sense of social desirability.


Most upper caste, Adivasis and OBCs feel that Dalits are extremely hardworking. While almost 30 percent of Dalits identify themselves as extremely hardworking, this was less than 25 percent among other caste groups (Figure 2B.4). A more positive self-perception of caste and religious communities is a recurring trend in later figures as well.

Figure 2B.4: Perceptions about Dalits as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Caste)



If we view the survey results in terms of literacy levels of the respondents and their views about Dalits, we see a somewhat inverse relation (Figure 2B.5). The overall perception remains that Dalits are generally hardworking, with around 20 percent of respondents, across education levels, stating that Dalits are extremely hardworking. However, closer observation shows a fall in the share of respondents who feel that Dalits are generally hardworking (levels 7 to 10), from 67 percent among non-literates to 56 percent among the college educated. There is a similar rise of 8 percentage points among the share of respondents who feel that Dalits are generally lazy (levels 1 to 4).


Figure 2B.5: Perceptions about Dalits as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Education Level)



Although on average, six in every 10 respondents in the states surveyed (all 12 states in this case) feel that Adivasis are generally hardworking, state-wise disaggregation shows considerable variations (Figure 2B.6). In most states, over half of the respondents show support for the idea that Adivasis are hardworking. However, in Mizoram more than half of the respondents (56 percent) are neutral in their opinion on the hardworking nature of Adivasis while less than 40 percent feel that Adivasis are industrious. For states such as Mizoram, Nagaland and Uttar Pradesh, much of the opinion concentrated around the middle while in other states the opinion concentrates towards the higher end of the scale. Notably, the share of respondents in the lower end of the scale is extremely low and in states like Assam, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and West Bengal, this number is less than 10 percent.


These results must nevertheless be read with a pinch of salt. The share of respondents who declined to give an opinion was a shocking 63 percent in Mizoram and 41 percent in Kerala. In Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Punjab and Tamil Nadu, almost a quarter of the respondents refused to provide any answer. One may question whether such high rates of no responses is a result of low Adivasi population in these states. However, Mizoram and Nagaland, states with large ST populations —94 percent and 86 percent respectively — also register a significantly large number of ‘No Opinion’.

Figure 2B.6: Perceptions about Adivasis as being Lazy or Hardworking (by State)




The general perception among survey respondents belonging to various caste groups is that Adivasis are generally hardworking (Figure 2B.7). Surprisingly, it appears that members of other caste categories hold a slightly better perception about Adivasis than the Adivasis themselves. This is a break from a trend we notice across this chapter, where the largest positive support of a caste or religious community comes from respondents of that community. It is worth noting that in response to this question, about 37 percent of Adivasi respondents chose not to answer; this is almost 20 percentage points higher than other caste communities. It is possible that the large share of 'No Opinion' and of Adivasi population in Mizoram and Nagaland may be driving this number.

Figure 2B.7: Perceptions about Adivasis as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Caste)



The survey results show interesting results when analysed on education levels of the respondents (Figure 2B.8). Respondents who are non-literate have a much better perception of Adivasis as hardworking, with 21 percent of them stating that Adivasis are extremely hardworking. However, at the same time, for respondents with higher education levels, the opinions seem to move largely towards the middle of the scale and minimally towards the lower end of the scale. Education also seems to have some effect on response rate; almost 10 percent fewer college educated respondents declined to answer compared to non-literate respondents.

Figure 2B.8: Perceptions about Adivasis as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Education Level)




This question was asked in 11 states where there are significant upper caste populations. When we disaggregate the survey responses by Indian states, we observe that in seven states (Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Nagaland, Tripura, Delhi and Uttarakhand), the upper caste are generally viewed as being hardworking (Figure 2B.9). This result is particularly pronounced in Kerala, Tripura and Uttarakhand where 60 percent of the respondents hold this view. 23 percent of the respondents interviewed in Uttarakhand perceive upper caste to be extremely hardworking. In general, the share of respondents who feel that upper caste are extremely hardworking is significantly lower than that recorded in other states. In Kerala, once again, we find an extremely large number (41 percent) of 'No Opinion'.

Figure 2B.9: Perceptions about Upper Caste as being Lazy or Hardworking (by State)




Across caste, almost 60 percent of the upper caste respondents perceive themselves to be generally hardworking and 16 percent perceive themselves to be extremely hardworking (Figure 2B.10). The perception of the other caste groups, although generally positive, is not as high. Nearly 8 percent of Dalit respondents and 6 percent of OBC respondents perceive the upper caste as being extremely lazy. More than 25 percent of the respondents of Dalit and OBC community view the upper caste as being generally lazy. While the opinion of the Adivasis seem to concentrate around the middle of the scale, this group also records the largest share of non-response at 25 percent.

Figure 2B.10: Perceptions about Upper Caste as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Caste)



Unlike the trend seen with respect to Adivasis and Dalits, education seems to have a positive correlation with positive perception about upper caste (Figure 2B.11). As the share of 'No Opinion' drops with greater education, the share of respondents who view the upper caste as being hardworking falls too.

Figure 2B.11: Perceptions about upper Caste as being Lazy or Hardworking (by Education Level)



2. Patriotic or Unpatriotic

Religion and faith are central to the lives of people in South Asia. In particular, the politics of the majority and minority religions has played an important role in shaping the ideas of the nation, state and citizenship in this region¹². Religious and social minorities have been subjected to constant majoritarian domination and cultural policing in India¹³.

Gyanendra Pandey notes that “Nations, and nationalisms, are established by defining boundaries”¹⁴ and in many cases involving minority religions, the boundary is faith itself. There is a persistent notion that only “Hindus”, and those communities termed as ‘Hindus’, can be loyal to India and that the affinities of certain other communities lie outside India, therefore making these communities ‘unpatriotic’. Many proponents of this idea, referred to the concept of *punyabhoomi* and *pitrubhoomi* to validate the questioning of patriotism among the minorities. Yet, as some have shown, Indian Muslims continue to pledge their allegiance to the Indian state¹⁵.

The survey asked a question (Q13) on patriotism of various religious communities through a 10-point scale, similar to the one shown in Figure 2B.1: On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely unpatriotic and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely patriotic, on which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities?

Figure 2B.12: 10-point scale used for questions on ‘Patriotic or Unpatriotic’





Figure 2B.13, shows the general trend in perceptions held about Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Sikhs as being patriotic and unpatriotic. While a bulk of the responses with respect to Muslims and Christians seem to centre around the middle of the scale, most of the responses on Hindus and Sikhs concentrate around the higher end of the scale. The results show that around 30 percent of the respondents consider Muslims to be unpatriotic and about 20 percent feel the same about Christians, whereas less than 10 percent hold the same view about Hindus and Sikhs. Despite the bleak numbers and unlike the Hindu nationalistic rhetoric on this subject - which believes that Hinduism is the source of Indian identity and Muslims are the principal adversary¹⁶ - 51 percent of the respondents perceive Christians to be patriotic and 45 percent of the respondents perceive Muslims to be patriotic. Sikhs are also considered to be patriotic with 26 percent of the respondents perceiving this community to be extremely patriotic.

Figure 2B.13: Perception of Religious Communities as Unpatriotic or Patriotic



The trend in responses across the states shows a tendency around the middle of the scale in Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Tripura (Figure 2B.14). While most responses in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand gather towards the lower end of the scale, the opposite is true in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir and Kerala. Over 40 percent of the respondents in Uttarakhand and close to 60 percent in Uttar Pradesh perceive Muslims to be generally unpatriotic. Furthermore, 19 percent of respondents from Uttar Pradesh, 14 percent from Uttarakhand and 12 percent from Tamil Nadu believe that Muslims are extremely unpatriotic. In stark contrast, around 58 percent of the responses in Assam and over 65 percent of the responses in Jammu and Kashmir and Kerala record a positive view of Muslims; over 20 percent perceive Muslims to be extremely patriotic. This result is very interesting, given the press reportage of religious conflict and seeming intolerance between the local Assamese and migrant Bengali Muslim populations particularly in Assam in recent times¹⁷. Still, one must view these results in the light of response rate which shows that half of the respondents in Mizoram and over a third of the respondents in Kerala did not record any opinion.

Figure 2B.14: Perceptions about Muslims as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)



As noted in the case of self-perception of caste groups, religious communities also tend to perceive themselves in a much more positive light than how other communities perceive them (Figure 2B.15). 45 percent of Muslims consider themselves as extremely patriotic and almost 80 percent perceive themselves to be generally patriotic. The other communities, it appear, do not hold the same view; only 17 percent of Sikhs and less than 10 percent of Hindus and Christians hold the view that Muslims are extremely patriotic. Negative perceptions about Muslims are highest among Hindus compared to other communities. Over a third of the Hindu respondents perceive Muslims to be unpatriotic and 12 percent feel Muslims are extremely unpatriotic. Whereas only about 4 percent of Christians and 6 percent of Sikhs hold this view, a proportion similar to Muslims themselves. Most responses among Christians, Sikhs and Other religious communities tend to centre on the middle of the scale. Additionally, Christians also record the highest 'No Opinion' in this analysis.

Figure 2B.15: Perceptions about Muslims as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by Religion)



Greater education does seem to lead to higher response rate and a more negative view of the Muslims. While 49 percent of non-literate respondents feel that Muslims are patriotic (level 7 and above), there is a 6 percent drop with respect to college educated respondents. Nevertheless, the changes seem rather marginal.

In most states surveyed in this project, the perceptions about the Christian community are around the middle of the scale, whereas in states like Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura around 70 percent of the respondents hold a positive view about Christians (Figure 2B.16). As noted in earlier results, Kerala (38 percent) again records the largest share of 'No Opinion', followed by West Bengal (31 percent). In Assam and Tripura more than 20 percent of the responses show that Christians are perceived as extremely patriotic. Except for Uttar Pradesh, less than 30 percent of the respondents in most states perceive Christians as being unpatriotic.

Figure 2B.16: Perceptions about Christians as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)



One remarkable trend is the perception of two minority religious communities about each other. In Figure 2B.15, we had noted that Christians generally hold a neutral perception about Muslims, however in Figure 2B.17, we find that Muslims hold a very positive view about Christians. In fact, Muslims hold a more positive view of Christians than Christians hold of themselves. While 12 percent of Christians feel that Christians are extremely patriotic, 24 percent of Muslim, that is twice that share of Christians, hold the same view. Additionally, a higher share of even Sikh respondents have a positive view of Christians, with 18 percent finding Christians to be extremely patriotic and about 47 percent tending towards this view. Hindus, on the other hand, tend towards the middle of the scale.

Figure 2B.17: Perceptions about Christians as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by Religion)



Literacy does not seem to impact the responses about Christians. Respondents across various levels of education have mostly similar perceptions about Christians, which is that they are patriotic.

The state-wise disaggregation of the perceptions about Hindus shows marginal variations and responses, as noted earlier in this chapter, and is consistently positive across the states (Figure 2B.18). Most states lean towards the higher end of the scale, except for Mizoram and Nagaland where much of the responses concentrate around the middle of the scale. The share of respondents who hold a positive view about Hindus is around 70 percent or more in all states other than the two north-eastern states where the same share is between 50 percent and 60 percent. In Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Tripura and Assam over a third of the respondents view Hindus as extremely patriotic. Mizoram records the highest share of 'No Opinion' at 48 percent followed respondents from Kerala at 37 percent.

Figure 2B.18: Perceptions about Hindus as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)



It is not surprising to find that over a third of Hindus regard themselves as extremely patriotic, but it is also remarkable that a roughly equal share of Muslim respondents (31 percent) also feel the same way about Hindus (Figure 2B.19). While Sikhs also hold a very positive view of Hindus, only Christian respondents have a slightly different perception. Only 8 percent of Christians perceive Hindus as extremely patriotic and most responses among Christians have a tendency towards the middle of the scale; this community also records the highest share of 'no responses' among the religious communities studied. Nevertheless, most respondents across religious communities perceive the majority community to be patriotic.


Figure 2B.19: Perceptions about Hindus as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by Religion)



As noted in earlier sections, education does not seem to have a significant impact on perception. Generally, 75 percent of the respondents across literacy levels view Hindus as being patriotic.


Unlike the other reports in this project series, we analysed the results for Sikhs specifically to the large share of Sikh respondents this time (Figure 2B.20). This question was asked in 9 states which have Sikh residents. Predictably, states with significantly large the Punjabi speaking populations, particularly Punjab, Delhi and Uttarakhand, hold a very positive view about Sikhs. Interestingly, Assam and Uttar Pradesh also hold a similar view of Sikhs. However, the share of respondents who perceive Sikhs to be extremely patriotic is much lower in the states with negligible Sikh population, such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal. In West Bengal particularly, most responses gather around the middle of the scale. These three states also record the largest share of ‘No Opinion’.

Figure 2B.20: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by State)



Over half of the respondents of every religious community hold a positive view of Sikhs (Figure 2B.21). As expected, over a third of the Sikhs view themselves to be extremely patriotic and about 71 percent perceive themselves as highly patriotic. 22 percent of Muslims respondents, 24 percent of respondents belonging to other religious groups and 19 percent of Hindus feel the same way. Less than 20 percent of Hindus and only 13 percent of Christian respondents attribute utmost patriotism to Sikhs.

Figure 2B.21: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Patriotic or Unpatriotic (by Religion)




People’s perception of Sikhs being patriotic or unpatriotic remains vastly similar across education levels of respondents. 28 percent of respondents without a formal education feel the same way about Sikhs as 26 percent of those with a college education or above – that Sikhs are extremely patriotic. Similar views are expressed by 25 percent of respondents with a high school education and 23 percent of those who have only completed primary schooling.

3. Peaceful or Violent

Religion is deeply embedded in Indian society and it plays an important role in shaping the social, cultural and political ideologies about contemporary issues facing the country like politics, terrorism, social norms and development. Indian news media is often rife with controversies emerging from statements about the seemingly violent and anti-national behaviour of certain religious minority communities. To explore the perceptions of people about religious communities further, we asked a question (Q48) dealing with this subject: On a ladder of 10 steps, where the 1st step at the bottom stands for extremely violent and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely peaceful, on which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities?


Respondents were shown a scale from 1 to 10 and asked to select a point on the scale as shown in Figure 2B.22. If the respondent declined to answer the question, ‘No Opinion’ was recorded.

Figure 2B.22: 10-point scale used for questions on ‘Peaceful or Violent’



The results regarding the perception about religious communities as peaceful or violent are shown in Figure 2B.23 and show varying trends. Perceptions about Hindus, Sikhs and Christians largely concentrate around the higher end of the scale whereas perceptions about Muslims are concentrated around the middle of the scale. While 65 percent of the respondents consider Hindus and Sikhs to be generally peaceful (level 7 and above), a similar positive perception is held by only 42 percent of the respondents towards Muslims; a decline of more than 20 percentage points. At the same time while 19 percent of the respondents hold the perceptions that Hindus and Sikhs are extremely peaceful, 13 percent of respondents hold the same view about Muslims and Christians. At the other end of scale, 3 percent of the respondents perceive Hindus, Christians and Sikhs to be extremely violent but the number for Muslims is 5 percentage points higher, at 8 percent. Overall, while less than 20 percent of the respondents feel that Hindus, Christians and Sikhs are generally violent (level 4 or below), the same is not true about the Muslim community which is considered by 31 percent of the respondents are being violent.

Figure 2B.23: Perception about Religious Communities as Peaceful or Violent



In this section, we will analyse the results regarding each of the four religious communities separately across states and religions of the respondents.

In Figure 2B.23, we noted that the overall results show that Muslims are considered in a rather poor light. However, this trend cannot be generalised across the states. Figure 2B.24 shows the spread of perceptions across the states.

The state-wise disaggregation of the results shows multiple trends across states. In Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Mizoram and Nagaland, most of the responses cluster around the middle and towards the lower end of the scale, denoting that most respondents in these states tend to hold a negative view of Muslims. On the other hand, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Tamil Nadu show the opposite trend; most respondents perceive Muslims to be peaceful. In other states, like West Bengal and Tripura we notice spikes at the extremes ends of the scale and right at the middle, but there aren't significantly large numbers of responses in the ranges in between. 42 percent of respondents from Mizoram and 38 percent of the respondents from Kerala refused to provide any response to this question.


Figure 2B.24: Perceptions about Muslims as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)



As noted in earlier figures, respondents tend to perceive their own community in a much more positive light than the other communities. The disaggregation of the results by the religious community of the respondent, seen in Figure 2B.25, shows the same sentiment. 81 percent of Muslim respondents affirm that their community is peaceful and 36 percent feel that they are extremely peaceful. Other communities, except for the Sikh community, do not seem to share this view. Most of the responses among the Sikhs centre around the middle and towards the higher end of the scale, thereby denoting that the Sikh community perceives Muslims as being generally peaceful. On the other hand, the responses among Hindus and Christians cluster around the middle and more towards the lower end of the scale. A higher share of Hindus (11 percent) and Christians (6 percent) perceive Muslims to be extremely violent, compared to 3 percent of Sikhs.

Notably, most of the responses (39 percent) from other religious communities such as Buddhists, Jains and so on, show that they perceive Muslims to be generally peaceful.


Figure 2B.25: Perceptions about Muslims as being Peaceful or Violent (by Religion)



As a variable, literacy does not produce much variation in the results with respect to perceptions about most religious communities. However, when it comes to perceptions about Muslims, we certainly do find some movement in numbers across the literacy levels. Greater education seems to not only reduce the share of 'No Responses' from 22 percent among non-literates to 16 percent among the college educated, it also seems to worsen the perception about Muslims. 16 percent of the non-literate respondents consider Muslims to be extremely peaceful, but this number drops as levels of literacy increase, to 11 percent among college educated. Nearly 50 percent of the responses from the non-literate population tend towards the perception that Muslims are very peaceful. However, this falls almost 10 percent percentage points to 40 percent among those educated up to college or above.


Across the states, Christians are generally perceived as being peaceful (Figure 2B.26). This perception is most prevalent in the responses from Mizoram and Nagaland where 87 percent and 71 percent of the respondents perceive Christians to be largely peaceful. As Christians form a large share of the population of these two states, the overwhelmingly positive sentiment from the two states may be attributed to self-perception. 26 percent of respondents from Mizoram, 19 percent from Tripura, 17 percent from Uttarakhand and 16 percent from Assam consider Christians to be extremely peaceful. The other states particularly Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu share a similar sentiment about Christians where most of the responses tend to cluster around the higher end of the scale.

Figure 2B.26: Perceptions about Christians as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)



As noted in the earlier figure, the perception about Christians among the religious communities is that they are generally peaceful (Figure 2B.27). While 78 percent of the Christians support this view, between 50-60 percent of Hindu, Muslim and Christian respondents support this view and almost 80 percent from other religious communities hold this view. Furthermore, among non-Christian communities, Muslims record the highest share of respondents who state that Christians are extremely peaceful.


Figure 2B.27: Perceptions about Christians as being Peaceful or Violent (by Religion)



When we examine people’s perceptions on how peaceful or violent Christians are based on their literacy levels, we receive responses similar to the views expressed in the earlier sections of this chapter. Christians are believed to be extremely peaceful in nature across the board. Though we do not see any major changes in perception across education levels, the share of respondents who perceive Christians as peaceful (level 7 and above) increases from 54 percent among non-literate respondents to 60 percent among the college educated.

While Figure 2B .21 showed an overwhelming support for peacefulness of Hindus, the state-wise disaggregation shows a slightly different picture (Figure 2B.28). Over 75 percent of the respondents in Delhi, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand consider Hindus to be peaceful (level 7 and above). Furthermore, 44 percent of respondents in Uttarakhand, 31 percent in Tripura and 26 percent in West Bengal believe that Hindus are extremely peaceful. On the other hand, in states such as Nagaland, Mizoram, Jammu and Kashmir and Tamil Nadu, the bulk of the sentiments concentrate around the middle and, to some extent, towers the lower end of the scale. Over 20 percent of the respondents in Jammu and Kashmir and Tamil Nadu and almost 30 percent of the respondents in Mizoram and Nagaland perceive Hindus to be violent. 40 percent of respondents from Kerala and Mizoram did not provide their view on this question.

Figure 2B.28: Perceptions about Hindus as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)



As expected, 75 percent of the Hindus consider themselves to be peaceful and a quarter of Hindus feel that the Hindu community is extremely peaceful (Figure 2B.27). A little less than 60 percent of Muslims and Sikhs also perceive the Hindu community to be peaceful and around 14 percent of respondents from both religious communities feel that Hindus are extremely peaceful. However, the responses from Christian respondents show starkly different opinions. A large share of Christians (37 percent) provide a neutral view of Hindus (level 5 and 6) whereas around 30 percent tend towards the view that Hindus are very violent and 34 percent head towards the opposite view that Hindus are very peaceful. The Christian community also record the highest share of respondents who declined to provide their view.

Figure 2B.29: Perceptions about Hindus as being Peaceful or Violent (by Religion)



Across different levels of literacy, while there isn't a stark change in the responses, there are some interesting marginal differences. The results show a marginally smaller share of college educated respondents (64 percent) who perceive Hindus to be peaceful compared to the non-literate respondents (66 percent).

This question was asked in states with significant Sikh populations such as the northern states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand. (Figure 2B.30) It was also asked in states with smaller Sikhs populations such as the southern and eastern states. While the overall perception about Sikhs is positive and towards the higher end of the scale, we notice certain differences between the states with significant Sikh population and those with a negligible population. In the states with

higher Sikh population, the general trend points to an extremely positive view of the community. While over 65 percent of the respondents in Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi and Uttarakhand held a positive view, almost 80 percent of the respondents in Punjab held a similar perception. In states like Assam, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, where Sikhs account only a fraction of the population, a similarly large share of respondents hold a positive view of the Sikhs, albeit slightly lower than their counterparts from the northern states. Interestingly, West Bengal record the lowest share of respondents who perceive Sikhs to be extremely peaceful and a bulk of the responses concentrate around the middle of the scale. Over 40 percent of survey respondents from Kerala and West Bengal and 31 percent from Tamil Nadu did not express their views on this question.

Figure 2B.30: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Peaceful or Violent (by State)



Across the religious communities, there is generally a positive perception about the Sikh community (Figure 2B.31). Over 60 percent of Hindus, Muslims and Christians perceive Sikhs to be peaceful while over 70 percent of Sikhs hold the same perceptions about themselves. More than a third of the Sikhs consider themselves to be extremely peaceful, though the same perception was held by considerably lower share of respondents from non-Sikh religious communities.

Figure 2B.31: Perceptions about Sikhs as being Peaceful or Violent (by Religion)



Formal education does not seem to have any impact on perception about Sikhs. The percentage of respondents who consider Sikhs to be very peaceful remains consistent across literacy levels.

4. Dalits: Historical Disadvantage or Laziness?

Casteism, as a form of discriminatory social stratification has existed in India for a long time. Post-independence, several affirmative policies like reservations in educational institutions and for employment in the public sector as well as protective legislation like the Scheduled caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 were passed. The social and economic conditions of the Dalits, Adivasis and OBCs continue to be dismal despite decades of such policy actions as they are often subject to forms of discrimination and exclusion from mainstream society. While in the earlier sections we looked at how various caste groups are perceived — as lazy or hardworking— in this section we will delve into the contentious issue of affirmative action for Dalits and Adivasis through questions Q46a and Q46b which asked respondents for their opinion on causes of the poor economic conditions of the marginalised sections of Indian society. Respondents were provided with two options to choose from: first, that the Dalits/ Adivasis were being held back by historic injustices and second that the Dalits/Adivasis are just lazy:


“Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?

Statement 1: Generations of unfair treatment has made it difficult for Dalits/Adivasis to improve their economic conditions

Statement 2: Dalits/Adivasis are not trying harder; if they try hard enough they will be well off.”


The results in Figure 2B.32 show that over 40 percent of the respondents hold the view that Dalits have suffered unfair treatment through the ages and this could be the reason for their poverty. On the other hand, 27 percent of the respondents felt that Dalits weren’t trying hard enough to alleviate poverty. Interestingly, a high proportion of respondents (31 percent) did not express any view.

Figure 2B.32 Cause for poverty among Dalits




In most of the states, the dominant view is that historical injustice has made it difficult for this community to prosper (Figure 2B.33). In other states such as Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, most respondents did not hold any view. In fact, in Mizoram and Tripura over half of the respondents did not provide any opinion on the matter. However, in stark contrast, the dominant opinion in Tamil Nadu is that Dalits are not trying hard enough to improve their life conditions. This opinion finds significant traction in Uttarakhand as well.

Figure 2B.33: Cause for poverty among Dalits (by State)



Most respondents across caste groups agree that the reason for Dalits being poor is external, that is injustice of the ages (Figure 2B.34). Typically, 56 percent of Dalits blamed historical unfairness for their poverty. More than 40 percent of upper Caste, OBC and other respondents agreed with this view. Adivasi respondents however did not follow the dominant view; while more than 50 percent of them did not answer this question, of the remaining, only about 30 percent mentioned historical unfairness as the cause for their poverty.


Figure 2B.34 Cause for poverty among Dalits (by Caste)



5. Adivasi: Historical Disadvantage or Laziness?


In the earlier section, we discussed that the perceptions regarding the cause of poverty among Dalits and most respondents had cited historical injustice as the cause for poverty. As Figure 2B.35 shows, most respondents hold a similar opinion about the Adivasis in India. 40 percent of the respondents feel that generations of unfair treatment has hindered the economic growth of Adivasis.

Figure 2B.35: Cause for poverty among Adivasis




When disaggregated by states, as shown in Figure 2B.36, the results show that most states share the feeling that Adivasis are a historically disadvantaged community and that is the main cause for their poverty. This feeling is particularly strong among people residing in Kerala, West Bengal and Delhi where over half of the respondents have cited this problem. In Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab and Tripura, most respondents declined to provide an answer. However, it is notable that Nagaland, where Scheduled Tribes constitute around 86 percent of the population (according to Census 2011), a third of the respondents feel that Adivasis are not trying hard enough to alleviate themselves from poverty. A striking result from the survey comes from Tamil Nadu where 41 percent support this view. The share of 'no responses' is at the highest among respondents in Mizoram (66 percent) and in Punjab (50 percent).

Figure 2B.36: Cause for poverty among Adivasis (by State)



Members of all caste categories perceive that the historically unfair treatment of Adivasis is holding the community back from improving their economic conditions (Figure 2B.37). Interestingly, almost half (48 percent) of Adivasi respondents declined to answer this question. As noted in the earlier table, a large share of respondents from states (Mizoram and Nagaland) with high Adivasi population had declined to give an opinion.

Figure 2B.37: Cause for poverty among Adivasis (by Caste)



6. Dominant Caste: Privileged All or Privileged Few?

In the recent past, we have increasingly witnessed pushbacks from dominant caste, be it the Patels in Gujarat or the Jats in Haryana and so on, who despite holding strong political and economic clout in their respective states, have demanded affirmative action. It would be natural to presume that rejection of such claims would then be the most commonly held view. Such kind of affirmative action is particularly important today with reservation being announced for the upper caste.

We asked the respondents their view on affirmative action through a forced choice question (Q. 46c):

“Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?”

Statement 1: Over the last 50 years, dominant caste has acquired large political and economic power hence they should not be given any special assistance.

Statement 2: Only few from dominant caste have acquired large political and economic power, while a majority among them are not as privileged. Hence they should be given more privileges in society

Unlike the other survey questions discussed in this chapter, responses for this have been reviewed only from 9 Indian states. In the remaining 3 states surveyed, West Bengal, Uttarakhand and Jammu & Kashmir, no clear dominant caste(s) could be identified.

The results, Figure 2B.38, show that 42 percent of the respondents are in favour of assistance for dominant caste population in that state. While 29 percent of respondents do not support any such action, the remaining 29 percent did not provide their opinion on the issue.


Figure 2B.38: Affirmative action for Dominant Caste



Across the surveyed states, the results in Figure 2B.39 show that most respondents in five states — Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab and Tamil Nadu — support state assistance for the members of the dominant caste. While over half of the respondents in Punjab (60 percent), Mizoram (57 percent) and Nagaland (57 percent) support this view, the support among respondents in Tamil Nadu and Kerala was around 45 percent.


Most respondents in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi show the opposing view — 46 percent and 59 percent respectively — which is that dominant caste do not deserve any special assistance. 47 percent of the respondents in Assam and 62 percent in Tripura did not provide their views on this subject. Of the remaining respondents in both Assam and Tripura, an equal share of respondents support state assistance for dominant caste and disagree that the dominant caste should be given any perks.

Figure 2B.39: Affirmative action for Dominant Caste (by State)



The disaggregation of the results by the caste of the respondents shows fascinating results (Figure 2B.40). While a slightly larger share of upper caste (38 percent) feel that dominant caste should not be given any state assistance, over half of the Adivasi respondents (51 percent) and 42 percent of the OBC respondents support assistance for dominant caste groups. It is fascinating that more than double the share of Adivasis who oppose state assistance for the dominant caste, support positive initiatives by the state for the dominant caste. Interestingly, Dalit respondents are equally divided between those in favour of providing state support and those against. Other caste groups are in favour of assistance to the dominant caste in their state. Overall, the share of 'No Opinion' among the caste groups remains between 27 percent and 33 percent.

Figure 2B.40: Affirmative action for Dominant Caste (by Caste)



2.C / Gender

Gender and sexual orientation hold a strange place in Indian society. There are deeply held beliefs, which are often conservative in nature, regarding the position and power of women and the status of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the society. Yet, much of the discussions on these topics have been through media and, over the last year, at courts. This survey explores the attitudes held towards women in their roles as mothers, daughters, wives and sisters. Is it more important to educate boys? Can women decide whom they want to marry? Should the mother and father have equal child rearing responsibilities? This survey also looks at the attitudes held by society towards its gay and lesbian members.

1. Role of Women

In India, allocation of gender roles within families is rooted in, and shaped by specific social, and historical processes like the practice of sati, or purdah, a long colonial rule. In the post-colonial period women struggled for opportunities in education, equal participation in the workforce, access to public spaces, right to representation, and making choices for themselves. In the decades after independence from colonial rule, women have expressed themselves through the intersections of gender, caste, religion and class, as felt over strong regional and local variations. While there have been struggles to legislate women's rights, the social processes to bring the laws to deliver their objectives in everyday lives of women have been intriguing and complicated. While the primary emphases on women's traditional place as nurturers, carers, as well as embodiment of family's honour and ability to procreate have pushed women towards increased confinement to the private domain, the post-liberalisation era has also opened up important debates about women as being equally relevant in the area of paid work, particularly the service industry. This has created further tensions within the fabric of the family facing wage shrinkages, rising costs, and decreasing state support to supplement these. As Smitha Radhakrishnan points out, the quest is for women to strike a balance between the old and the new roles, or, being "appropriately Indian"¹⁸.


In this study, questions around gender relations have been classified into four main ideas – gender relations at home, agency in decision making processes in marriage and support for equal treatment in work and education (Figure 2C.1). These attitudes were explored through seven statements with responses ranging from of 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree' (See Q65 in the questionnaire).

Figure 2C.1: Statements on Role of Women

Family	<i>A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work. Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing.</i>
Marriage	<i>It is up to women to decide whom to get married to. Women should have the right to decide to get married or not.</i>
Education and Work	<i>Educating boys is more important than educating girls Men should be paid more than women even if it's the same job. Women should have 50% reservations in all jobs.</i>

Overall, 35 percent of respondents covered in the survey said women should prioritise home over work, and 65 percent said women should be equally responsible for child rearing (Figure 2C.2). It may be asked whether equal responsibility for child rearing really means equal distribution of responsibility and decision-making between men and women. On the other hand, 44 per-cent said women have the right to decide whether to marry and 42 per-cent said they have a right to decide who to marry. Here, it must be highlighted that 12 percent of respondents felt that women should not have the ability to decide whom to marry and 11 percent felt women should not have the right to decide whether to marry. The opinion on women’s abilities are therefore quite unevenly split, which creates the space for further questioning as we see in the following sections.

Figure 2C.2: Support for Statements on Role of Women



Family

With respect to gender relations at home, there is a preference for women’s confinement, even seclusion to the domestic sphere in much of India and South Asia¹⁹. When there is economic rationality that drives a woman to work, it is largely to work on the family farm or in a family enterprise. But if this occurs it is both an outcome of the micro-level ideology of gender discrimination within the family but also a result of macro-level inequality in the wage and opportunity structure²⁰. It is also frequently argued that women’s concentration in the domestic sphere leads to their loss of power within the family by reducing their opportunity to earn income that is independent of their husbands or other kin²¹. Childcare has largely been perceived as the woman’s domain. Caregiving across cultures is often the result of social behaviours, organised social networks, acceptable norms of male and female behaviour, and family ideologies. Some empirical investigations of family structure and functioning in modern India have been undertaken in recent years²². However, notions of Indian family practices and division of childcare labour have often been based on anthropological accounts²³ that have largely been

immersed in traditional Indian mythology and cultural symbolism has and have not taken into account the variability that exists in family arrangements and socialisation practices²⁴. Many researchers have found that there has been a shift from traditionally stereotyped roles toward quasi-egalitarian roles among urban, higher-income, better educated dual-earner families²⁵. The argument is that greater opportunities for employment and education challenge patriarchy, and techno-economic changes may have contributed to an improvement (in women's status in India and to possible increases in men's participation in childcare²⁶. Thus, we find we have to keep in mind the heterogeneity and dynamism of gender roles while relating work and care and their linkages as well as their contribution to the status of women in India.

The following figures illustrate the respondents' views across the seven variables, namely, state, gender, economic class, region [rural/urban], and religion and some intersections of these, on women's prioritisation of home over work. "Work" here stands for paid work, mostly in wages, where the "home" would represent unpaid/non-waged work done by women supplementing the wages earned by the family. Some further concerns that this table may raise are, for example: a) what would the opinion about women's home-bound paid work be, considering that this is category is quite common; b) how would women's work in family farm/business, which stands exclusive of household labour, and contributes directly to the family's earnings, be viewed; and c) what would the picture look like across generations, considering that vast shifts for women born in the 1980s to the urban workforce, giving them access to financial independence and decision making, while renegading their older counterparts to traditional roles.

Women Should Prioritise Home Over Work

Figure 2C .3 in this chapter looks at state-wise distribution of the above. The strongest agreement with the proposition that women should prioritise work over home is seen in Mizoram, at 53 percent, with Tamil Nadu lagging behind by as much as 8 percentage points, and Uttar Pradesh following closely at 45 percent. Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab are at 41 percent. It is probably more revealing that there is an evenly sprinkled vote percentage on "somewhat agree", between 19 and 36 percent across the states on this matter. One might imagine that this distribution offsets the figures pertaining to "strongly agree" and may render a shadow weightage to the positive opinion. It is only in Delhi that we see strong disagreement on this question, at 39 percent. However, even this is much lower than the "highly agree"-percentage point of 53 in Mizoram.

Figure 2C.3: Women should prioritise home over work (by State)





Figure 2C.4 provides gender-wise figures on each of the opinion categories. The numbers are very close to each other, and in most cases are equal. For example, 35 percent of men and 35 percent of women respondents strongly feel that women should prioritise home over paid work. However, when strong agreement and moderate agreement are put together, the figures across genders are greater than cumulative figures of strong disagreement and moderate. In other words, 64 percent (that is, 35 percent 'strongly agree' + 29 percent 'somewhat agree') of male respondents are in agreement with the proposition. This figure is more than double of the total of 31 percent (14 percent 'strongly agree' + 17 percent 'somewhat agree') of male respondents who disagree. The trend is similar in female respondents too; overall, more women agree than disagree with the proposition.

Figure 2C.4: Women should prioritise home over work (by Gender)




When we look at the responses to the same question from men across the different states in the survey, Mizoram shows the highest percentage of agreement, followed by Uttar Pradesh at 46 percent, and Tamil Nadu at 45 percent. Delhi registers the highest strong disagreement (37 percent). In Mizoram, only 2 percent men and in Uttar Pradesh, 6 percent men, strongly disagree with this. The responses from Nagaland show a more even distribution of opinion across the scale: 20 percent strongly agree, 30 percent somewhat agree, 30 percent somewhat disagree, and 18 percent strongly disagree.

Interestingly, similar figures are seen across the states for female respondents: 52 percent women in Mizoram strongly agree that women should pay more attention to home, while in Delhi, 41 percent women strongly disagree with the idea. Apart from Delhi, women are more in agreement that home precedes work in all the states.

Figure 2C.5 looks at the distribution along rural and urban locations. As suggested before, here too, the aggregate agreement percentage figure (including strongly and somewhat) is greater than the rest of the opinion categories (including somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, and no opinion) read together. For example, 36 percent of respondents in the rural areas covered in the study strongly agree to women being more relevant at home, and 29 percent of them somewhat agree. The disagreement figures are 14 percent (somewhat) and 15 (strongly). Even when combined with the 'No Opinion' figure of 5 percent, the agreement side is heavier. It is similar for the overall urban trends. More men in rural areas think that a woman's place is at home, than their counterparts in urban areas. However, the percentage point difference between rural men and women in strong agreement is only 1. On the other hand, in urban areas, an equal share of men and women strongly agree, at 31 percent. It is worth noting that the strong agreement figures for urban areas match with agreement of the same category across genders, that is, for urban men as well as urban women. The overall rural figure as well as the gender segregated rural figures are similar to the overall urban figures, with just a 1 percent difference for rural men. The strong disagreement figures for urban men and women match with the overall figures, but are a lot higher than the strong disagreement figures in rural areas overall, and for men and women. The responses for 'somewhat disagree', 'somewhat agree' and 'no opinion' among urban and rural respondents are almost in sync with each other.

Figure 2C.5: Women should prioritise home over work (by Rural-Urban)



Among religious communities that strongly agree that women should prioritise home over paid work, the lowest percentage is for Hindus (31 percent). This is distantly followed by Christians at 38 percent, Muslims at 40, Sikhs at 41, and Other at 42. Notably, another 29 percent of Hindus were in the 'somewhat agree' category and figures for Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and Others are 25 percent, 31 percent, 24 percent, and 33 percent respectively. However, for both Hindus and Sikhs, the figures for 'strongly disagree' are over 20 percent, as opposed to those for Muslims (18), Christians (11), or Other (10), which may suggest that it is more acceptable among Hindu and Sikh communities for their women to participate in paid work outside their homes.

Finally, with respect to economic class, the same pattern follows: the figures for 'strongly agree' across all economic classes, namely, poor, lower class, middle class, and upper class are 34, 35, 36, and 33 percent respectively. The 3 percent difference between the highest (36, for middle class) and the lowest (33, for upper class) may not be related to like education. Workforce participation for women may not completely depend on education, but economic necessities of women themselves or economic condition of a family. Even though the collective rate of participation of women in the workforce has been falling over the last 15 years²⁷, a mid-30 percent rate of strong agreement with the proposition may not mean that women from any of these economic classes are not participating in the workforce. Some of the reasons cited for this are: problems with measurement, women's enrolment in higher education, and increase in family incomes²⁸. The last one seems difficult to understand in the case of the poor, as their income growth has been substantially lower in the last 2 decades (1.9 percent).²⁹ It may also be true that while women from the lower economic class participate in the workforce, they have to carry out additional (and unpaid) housework—which connotes a double burden on these women.


Women and Men should have Equal Responsibility for Child Rearing

The next set of figures examine the proposition: women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing through variables of gender, State, rural and urban regions, religion and economic class. It is interesting to note that the difference here, between the agreement and disagreement percentage figures is much greater, with an overall tendency towards agreeing with the proposition across all the variables. When juxtaposed with the intelligence from the last set of tables, this section raises at least two questions: a) does the idea of equal attention to child rearing by men and women complement the idea of women's need to prioritise home over labour force participation? and b) does the household provide any support to women towards any paid labour that they may be performing, over and after prioritising home over paid work, and making equal contribution to child rearing? One other concern that arises from the figures is the lack of information about who else, besides women take responsibility for child rearing: other female members in the family, or, male parents—in other words, does equal by women imply the other equal portion by men?

Figure 2C .6 looks at the overall survey data for this through the lens of gender. 63 percent of male respondents and 66 percent of female respondents strongly agree that men and women should have equal responsibility for child rearing. The 'somewhat agree' figures for this are much less compared to the 'strongly agree' figures: only 22 percent for males, and 19 percent for female respondents. On the other hand, there is almost no


strong disagreement with the proposition, and the somewhat disagreement figures are only a little over 5 percent across the gender identities.

Figure 2C.6: Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing (by Gender)




When we look at the state-wise distribution of opinion (Figure 2C.7) on sharing of child rearing responsibilities, the highest numbers in the ‘strongly agree’ category are seen in Kerala and Delhi (76 percent in both), followed by Nagaland (72 percent), Jammu and Kashmir (71 percent), and Punjab (70 percent). While Tripura and Uttarakhand reflect more than 65 percent figures, Assam, Mizoram, and Tamil Nadu are above 60 percent, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal are in the 40s.. As in the case of the last table, here too, the percentage of people in each of the States that ‘somewhat agree’ is much lesser than their counterparts who ‘strongly agree’. In States like Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, West Bengal, and Delhi almost none ‘strongly disagree’. Punjab is just above 5 percent, and Uttarakhand, just at 5.

Figure 2C.7: Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing (by State)



When we look at the data of men and women in rural and urban regions, and compared with the overall figures, the responses for 'strongly agree' are all above 60 percent, for 'somewhat agree' between 17 and 22, for 'somewhat disagree' below 10 percent, and even less for 'strongly disagree' (Figure 2C.8)

Figure 2C.8: Women and Men should have equal responsibility for child rearing (by Rural-Urban)



If we look at the data through the lens of economic class, the percentage distributions are tilted towards strongly agreeing and somewhat agreeing more than towards somewhat or strongly disagreeing. The strong agreement figures follow an ascending order from 60 to 69 percent between poor and upper classes respectively. All figures for 'somewhat agree' are around one-third of the figures for 'strongly agree'.

Marriage

The prescriptions and gender roles in family life in India have been largely rooted and shaped by cultural texts like the Hindu Shastras, Ramayana and Mahabharata which have combined with regional, local and religious influences. These have emphasised strict traditional dichotomies of male and female responsibilities: women as nurturers and caregivers in the subservient role of wife and mother, and men as providers and protector of family honour and prestige. These roles temper gender social relationship within the private sphere of marriage and have traditionally limited women's choices and agency in decision-making around the choice to get married, as well as the choice of partner, as these remain strongly influenced by culture, class and caste. This section examines agency in decision-making captured by perceptions around women's role in decision-making around marriage.

Marriages in India have traditionally been a site to cement caste and family ties.

While it has been pointed out that attitudes towards marriage in India are 'markedly conservative'³⁰, there is a shift towards weaker sanctions for inter-caste unions³¹. The two statements discussed in this section are:

"Women should have the right to decide to get married or not"

"It is up to women to decide whom to get married to"


While the above statements could point to a dichotomy between a traditional arranged marriage and a modern love marriage, it could also be read as a rise in a companionate form, 'a bond between two intimate selves'³² within the institution of an arranged marriage. Some evidence suggests that a couple's prospective personal happiness has now become as important in an arranged marriage as it is in love marriage. Several

anthropologists³³ describe this shift in detail, although they may emphasise the opposition between ‘modern’ love and ‘traditional’ arranged marriage. In reality, whether or not parents take part in choosing their children’s partners, we find understandings around marriage steadily transforming into a more companionate form³⁴ that privilege agency and choice over sanction and coercion.

Women should have the right to Decide to get Married or not


The general trend that we see in the data is an overwhelming support for choice in the decision to get married and strong societal sanction that women have the right to choose whether to get married or not (Figure 2C.9).

Figure 2C.9: Women should have the right to decide to get married or not (by Gender)



This trend is supported in the state-wise disaggregation as well, where the idea of choice finds support across the states, especially in Kerala, Nagaland, Mizoram and Tamil Nadu (Figure 2C.10). While above 60 percent of the respondents in most states agreed with the idea of women’s right to choose to be married, the highest proportion of the population who strongly disagreed with this idea were in Punjab (51 percent) and Uttar Pradesh (49 percent).


Figure 2C.10: Women should have the right to decide to get married or not (by State)



Both genders largely support the idea of a women’s right to decide, with the women in UP registering slightly higher support (7 percent) than their male counterparts. Male perception of women’s right to decide on whether to get married is over 50 percent in almost all states except UP (47 percent) and Punjab, where about 50 percent of men agree with this statement. In general, men in Nagaland (90 percent), Mizoram (87 percent) and Tamil Nadu (77 percent) registered the highest support for this idea, while women in Nagaland (90 percent), Mizoram (88 percent) and Kerala (78 percent) displayed the highest amounts of support for this idea.

Rural and urban areas show comparative levels of support for the idea - 70 percent in rural areas and 75 percent in urban areas (Figure 2C.11). When we disaggregate it by gender, we see the group that shows maximum support is urban women (77 percent), followed by urban men (74 percent) and rural women (70 percent). Rural men (68 percent) show slightly less support for this idea, across categories.

Figure 2C.11: Women should have the right to decide to get married or not (by Rural-Urban)




In disaggregating perceptions according to religion, we find highest support for this idea amongst Christians (87 percent), followed by other categories (81 percent). Hindus (96 percent) and Muslims (66 percent) are almost on par, with the least support exhibited by the Sikhs (55 percent) in agreement and 39 percent strongly disagreeing with women’s right to decide to get married.

We find support marginally increasing as we move across classes from the poor to the upper class with 51 percent strongly agreeing with the idea that a woman has the right to decide whether to get married. We see a marginal decline of support for a woman’s right to decide on marriage, as we climb lower down the class structure - upper class (77 percent), middle class (71 percent), lower class (68 percent) and poor (68 percent), pointing to a possible correlation between class and attitudes to marriage.

It is up to Women to Decide whom to get Married to


In highlighting the question on a woman’s right to choose her partner, we find strong support across gender (Figure 2C.12). Women in general show higher support for this idea (71 percent), with men following closely behind (70 percent).

Figure 2C.12: It is up to women to decide whom to get married to (by Gender)




Across states as well, women generally find support for making their own decision on choosing their spouse with the strongest support coming from Mizoram (60 percent), Uttarakhand (53 percent), Nagaland (52 percent), Kerala (51 percent) and Delhi (47 percent) as seen in Figure 2C.13. Punjab was the only outlier with 49 percent disagreeing that this decision is up to the woman. This is across gender with a high percentage of both men (37 percent) and women (40 percent) strongly disagreeing with a woman’s right to choose her spouse.

Figure 2C.13: It is up to women to decide whom to get married to (by State)



Gender perceptions on choice of spouse did not significantly differ across men and women in the other states, with only very marginal differences (Figure 2C.14). Rural and urban areas showed very similar levels of support for the idea, with urban women at 76 percent, and urban men close behind (75 percent). Rural women and rural men were on par (69 percent) in their support of the idea that a woman can choose her spouse.

Figure 2C.14: It is upto women to decide whom to get married to (by Rural-Urban)



In disaggregating this perception according to religion, we see no significant variation across religion with Christians (83 percent) expressing the strongest support for this idea, followed by Other (79 percent), Hindus (70 percent) and then closely by Muslims (67 percent). Sikhs remain the striking outlier where 34 percent strongly disagreeing with the notion, more than any other community, although more than 50 percent of the Sikh community still supported the idea.

Endorsement for this idea steadily increases as we move up class categories with 68 percent of the poor to 77 percent of the urban upper class agreeing that women have the right to choose their spouse.

Education and Work

Perceptions about the value of education have altered dramatically in the last few decades, with sustained administrative attention towards ensuring universal primary education, and campaigns towards fostering more inclusive education for the girl child, like beti bachao beti padhao. Studies like Majumdar³⁵ have found that families from different socio-economic groups all have one thing in common: they place a lot of emphasis on their children's education. Education is widely seen a route to upward mobility³⁶, provided that basic quality is assured³⁷. However, gender plays a crucial difference in determining people's motivation. Economists are of the opinion that parental decisions regarding 'investing' in schooling for girls and boys are determined by perceived differences in 'returns'. Sociologists on the other hand, underline social considerations such as perceptions of gender roles (implicit in gendered division of labour) and preferences for sons (biased intra-household allocation of resources) that have led to educational discrimination against the female child. The perceived difference in benefits for boys and girls, and a combination of economic and sociological factors have led to an undervaluation of female education³⁸. The link between labour markets and education may be a vicious cycle with persistent underinvestment in the education of girls, leading to economic inefficiency. Additionally, labour markets re-enforce discrimination against women, which would be further linked to economic incentives.


While there is a distinct bias against education of girls which is then linked to material benefits and opportunities that a woman can derive from paid labour, there is a surprising amount of support for reservations for women. However, this may very well fall within patriarchal logic as the average women being less educated than the average man may act as proxy for her husband while occupying reserved seats. Some researchers note that women have less of a voice in some political arrangements, in that they don't field as many questions or speak comfortably in public. Others point out that having an elected woman representative ensures an increased voice for women as there is a level of comfort in airing concerns with women present. Women elected as leaders under the reservation policy have also been seen to invest more in public services most closely linked to women's concerns³⁹. Others⁴⁰, also do not find any merit in the tokenism argument, showing that female leaders perform no differently than male leaders. They point out that in the right institutional factors, particularly if women have political experience and live in spaces less dominated by upper castes, they perform no differently than men.

Keeping the above debates in mind, this section will discuss responses on considering girls' education to be a lesser priority than that for boys. The following figures explore the responses through four different variables, namely, gender, State, rural/urban region, and religion. The responses have a pattern across the tables: the percentage figures are heavier towards disagreement with the proposition; there are even percentage distributions between somewhat agree and somewhat disagree slots for some States.

Educating Boys is more Important than Educating Girls

Figure 2C .15 segregates the responses to the idea based on gender identities: male and female. 42 percent of male and 43 percent of female respondents strongly disagree that educating boys is more important than educating girls. 22 percent of both somewhat disagree, while 17 percent and 16 percent of male and female respondents somewhat agree. 13 percent in both categories strongly agree. The notable aspect of the table is the combined figures produced when we add the strongly agree and somewhat agree columns, which are 30 percent and 29 percent for male and female respondents respectively. This in itself is a considerable proportion of people covered under the survey. Also, when considered separately, 42 percent of male respondents and 43 percent of female respondents, who strongly disagree with the idea, are not very ideal figures either.

Figure 2C.15: Educating boys is more important than educating girls (by Gender)



If we look at the state-wise divisions, the percentages of people that strongly agree are quite uneven. As seen below (Figure 2C.16), only 16 percent of respondents in Punjab strongly disagree with the idea, while the figure for the same in Jammu and Kashmir is 64 percent. There are three more states, where over 50 percent of respondents strongly disagree, namely, Mizoram (61 percent), Nagaland (58 percent), and West Bengal (62 percent). Four states exhibit strong disagreement figures between 20 and 30 percent: Tripura (24 percent), Uttar Pradesh (27 percent), Delhi (29 percent), and Kerala (30 percent). In Jammu and Kashmir, there is an additional 13 percent who somewhat disagree, matched by the figure for West Bengal. On the other hand, for Kerala, where 30 percent strongly disagree, there is another 33 percent who somewhat disagree, taking the total disagreement bracket to 63 percent. The figures for each of the slots for Punjab, apart from the 16 percent mentioned above, are similar.

Figure 2C.16: Educating boys is more important than educating girls (by State)





Figure 2C.17 looks at the question by dividing respondents into rural and urban regions. 40 percent of rural and 46 percent of urban respondents strongly disagree, while 22 percent rural and 23 percent urban respondents somewhat disagree. A total of 31 percent rural respondents (13 percent/strongly agree+18 percent/somewhat agree) are in the combined agreement category. The combined agreement figure for urban respondents is 26 percent, showing a difference of 5 percent between the rural and the urban totals.

Figure 2C.17: Educating boys is more important than educating girls (by Rural-Urban)



Across religious communities 52 percent of Sikhs strongly disagree with it, while for all other religions the figures are below 50 percent. The percentage figures for the column representing “Other” religions are all between 20 and 30 percent, where 25 percent strongly agree, 20 percent somewhat agree, 27 percent somewhat disagree and another 22 percent strongly disagree. In contrast, the figures among Hindus are 13 percent for strongly agree, 18 percent for somewhat agree, 23 percent for somewhat disagree, and 40 percent for strongly disagree.

Men Should be Paid More than Women Even if it’s the Same Job

The following three figures again use the variables used in the previous set to illuminate opinion on the proposition that men should be paid more than women even if it’s the same job. An important point to note is that globally, differences between genders in wage rates are common and often stark. This causes difficulties for women’s access to resources despite putting in the same effort (and often more, considering the labour towards unpaid housework), and ability to make decisions as individuals. This causes ripple effects in all aspects of individual as well as lives of the families, like children’s education, women’s ability to claim their rights within family, and their access to property. Figure 2C.18 talks about male and female respondents’ degree of approval on women’s right to equal wage/payment for equal work. 13 percent of men and women strongly agree that men should be paid more than women, and 43 percent men and 44 percent women strongly disagree.

Figure 2C.18: Men should be paid more than women even if it is the same job (by Gender)






Figure 2C .19 explores state-wise disaggregated perceptions and we can see that, there is a 60 percent disagreement with the idea only in Punjab. In the other states, the disagreement percentages are all below 60, and goes down to 26 percent for Tamil Nadu. Additionally, in Tamil Nadu, 28 percent respondents strongly agree that men should be paid more, supported by another 19 percent who somewhat agree. Notably, in Nagaland, only 6 percent strongly agree with and 56 percent strongly disagree. The “somewhat” figures here are 12 and 20 percent respectively for agreement and disagreement. On the other hand, in West Bengal, while the strong agreement figure is only 9 percent, the strong disagreement figure does not carry through the effect: 34 per cent of strong disagreement, a figure that is not remarkable compared to what is seen in other States. The majority, here again, lies in the “somewhat” bracket.

Figure 2C.19: Men should be paid more than women even if it is the same job (by State)



In rural regions, 41 percent respondents strongly disagree with the proposition, while in urban regions, it is 48 per cent (Figure 2C .20). The strong agreement percentage in both regions is 13 percent, while 20 per cent respondents in both somewhat disagree. Overall, the disagreement side is heavier.

Figure 2C.20: Men should be paid more than women even if it is the same job (by Rural-Urban)



With respect to religious communities, the highest percentage in strong disagreement comes from the Sikh community, followed by Muslims at 46 percent, Hindus at 42 percent and Christians at 41 percent. All strong agreement percentages are below 20. However, when the “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree” percentage figures for each of the groups are added, we see a parity among all the religious groups, including the category “Other.”

Women should have 50% Reservations in all Jobs

Women’s reservation for public sector jobs has been a contentious topic. It has been pointed out that reserving 50 percent positions in each job sector would increase chances of participation by women in the paid labour force in India, considering their absence in the past. Some states already have a certain percentage of positions in public sector jobs reserved for women (33 percent in Gujarat, 30 percent in Madhya Pradesh, and 33 percent in Karnataka). Our study, however, extends to all jobs, across public and private sectors. It may be also borne in mind that there is an uneven gender representation in certain kind of jobs, for example, women are considered more suitable in caregiving, nursing and positions involving affective labour. Similarly, in areas associated with the use of physical force, like those involving heavy machinery in mining or manufacturing, men are considered more apt. One contentious area of employment in the public sector in India is the police force, where reservation for women has been recommended to the effect of having at least three women constables at each station and installing women help-desks⁴¹, yet the real figures for women in police force are only a dismal 7.28 percent⁴².

Figure 2C .21 explores the responses to this through the lens of gender. Interestingly, while 38 percent of female respondents strongly agree that asking for 50 percent reservations in all jobs is valid, no more than 30 percent male respondents feel the same. Similarly, while 17 percent male respondents strongly disagree, no more than 12 percent women support this view.

Figure 2C.21: Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs (by Gender)






Figure 2C.22 explores the status of opinions in the different states covered. Nagaland shows the highest percentage that ‘strongly disagree’ (26 percent), while Tripura shows the least. The strongest agreement is in Tamil Nadu, followed by Tripura. But in Tripura, another 26 percent somewhat agree with the idea, which takes the total percentage of agreement to a much higher level than disagreement. On the other hand, for Nagaland, the percentages are equally distributed over the opinion categories.

Figure 2C.22: Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs (by State)



The rural/urban regional distribution is shown in Figure 2C.23. In each, the figures are in descending order from strong agreement to strong disagreement. Also, the category No Opinion here is quite heavy compared to many of the other tables.

Figure 2C.23: Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs (by Rural-Urban)



2. Same-Sex Relationships


Same sex relationships in India have been historically stigmatised or at best tolerated. By the late 20th century, the understanding of homosexuality in the west had moved from “sin, crime and pathology to a normal variant of human sexuality”⁴³. While many allude to the acceptance of different sexual orientations in the culture and heritage of India, prejudice against the gay and lesbian community is widespread in Indian society and further supported by religious and community leaders.

Bearing in mind this prejudice, 2018 may be considered an exceptional year in the history of Supreme Court judgements and the LGBT movements in India. In particular, the judgements on Right to Privacy and Section 377 of the IPC were steps towards affirmation of LGBT rights in India. The question that arises from many recent judgements such as the one on Section 377 and women’s entry to Sabarimala is whether the court is overreaching by stepping up against the existing socio-religious sentiments and morality. This topic has ample legal literature with arguments on both sides. Roscoe Pound, for instance, states that law is “the most highly developed form of social control” and, as an institution, can be used to engineer “socially desirable results”⁴⁴. He further states that law must secure fundamental rights, the absence of which will dissolve society⁴⁵. In continuation to this idea of securing fundamental rights, the role of constitutional courts then is to, as SP Sathe notes, “sustain the constitution’s relevance to changing social, economic, and political scenarios.”⁴⁶ This concept is evident in the text of the 2009 judgement on Section 377 at the Delhi High Court where the Chief Justice A.P Shah alluded to the tenets of inclusiveness, equality and dignity enshrined in the Objectives Resolution of the Constituent Assembly⁴⁷. In the light of the results from this survey project on the acceptance of same-sex couples in the society, it would seem that the higher courts on India act as vanguards of progressive reforms.

In this survey, the attitude towards same-sex relationships was explored through the lens of societal acceptance of same-sex couples, rather support for legal sanctions. The question (Q66 on the questionnaire) was framed as support for a statement with responses from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’ on Likert scale and the results were analysed through gender, religion, state, literacy and media exposure: “Sexual relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?”


In early September 2018, the Supreme Court of India read down Section 377 and thereby, decriminalised homosexuality in India. While the question on acceptance of same-sex relationships was asked in various states in the last two years, this would be the first time the same question would be posed after the apex court judgement. The results indicate a deeply conservative society where one in every two respondents strongly believe that same-sex relationships have no place in society and less than 10 percent accept same-sex couples in society (Figure 2C.24). The share of respondents who either do not hold an opinion or do not wish to state their opinion on acceptance of same-sex couples is remarkably higher as compared to the responses for other attitudes explored in this chapter.

Figure 2C.24: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society



A trend noted in earlier sections of this chapter on perceptions of male and female respondents, can be noticed in the following figures as well. Men and women hold similar views on acceptance of same-sex relationships (Figure 2C.25). Overall, more than a quarter of the male and the female respondents did not express an opinion on the matter. Almost half of all male and female respondents strongly reject the notion of accepting same sex couples and only 20 percent of men and 17 percent of women agree that same-sex couples should be accepted.

Figure 2C.25: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society (by Gender)




Although, more than a quarter of the respondents overall did not express any opinion on the subject, disaggregation of this category across states show remarkable variation (Figure 2C.26). While the share of 'No Opinion' responses is less than 10 percent in Mizoram and Nagaland, the same is over 40 percent among respondents in Assam and West Bengal. Six out of every 10 respondents in West Bengal did not express any opinion on the acceptance of same sex couples. More than 20% of the respondents in Uttarakhand (21 percent), Delhi (22 percent), Jammu and Kashmir (23 percent) and Uttar Pradesh (25 percent), and almost 40 % of the respondents in Tripura (37 percent) and Punjab (39 percent) did not hold any opinion.

Among those respondents who do hold an opinion, a majority strongly reject the acceptance of same-sex couples. Mizoram at 87 percent records the highest share of respondents who strongly reject the statement, followed by Nagaland (63 percent), Jammu and Kashmir (63 percent) and Kerala (58 percent). While the role of literacy in influencing opinions will be explored later in this section, it is noteworthy that Mizoram and Kerala have the highest levels of literacy (over 90 percent) in the country. The greatest support for same-sex couples seems to come from Uttar Pradesh where 36 percent of the respondents agree with the statement. Tamil Nadu (30 percent) and Delhi (30 percent) are the other states with relatively higher acceptance of same-sex relationships.


Considering that over 50 percent of the responses across the states either reject the acceptance of same-sex couples or do not offer any opinion, the reluctance of society in general to even consider, much less begin a conversation on, the acceptance of LGBTQ members evident.

Figure 2C.26: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society (by State)



Urban centres are generally considered more tolerant and accepting of diverse identities compared to rural areas. However, the results show striking similarities in urban and rural responses and in fact, a slightly more conservative urban populace. Figure 2C.27 shows that 19 percent of the respondents in urban and rural areas support the acceptance of same-sex couples. Surprisingly however, 5 percentage points more urban respondents reject same-sex couples than their rural counterparts. When these results are further disaggregated by gender, we notice a similar trend where a larger share of urban men and women strongly disagree with the statement compared to rural men and women.

Figure 2C.27: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society (by Rural-Urban)




The share of respondents who reject same-sex relationships is largest among Christians with over 70 percent of respondents stating this opinion. Among the other religious communities, around 40 percent of Hindus and Sikhs and over 50 percent of Muslims held the same opinion. While the support for same-sex couples was highest among Hindus (22 percent), it falls considerably among Muslims (13 percent) and Christians (13 percent). Furthermore, it is remarkable that at 8 percent, Christians record the lowest share of 'No Opinion' responses whereas this is around 30 percent for Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.

The trend across economic classes is mixed. On one hand, support for acceptance of same sex relationships increases by 10 percentage points — from 13% among the poor to 23% among the middle class and upper-class respondents. On the other, the share of respondents who strongly disagree with accepting same-sex couples in society increases by 6 percentage points from 47 percent among the poor to 53 percent among the upper class. While the results seem ambiguous, a definitive result is the fall in share of 'No Opinion' responses by 18 percentage points between the poor and the upper class. The results suggest that class is not a significant determining factor on social attitudes towards sexual orientation.

When examined, the role of media shows an increase in support for same-sex couples from 10 percent among those respondents with extremely poor exposure to various media to 33 percent among respondents with high media exposure (Figure 2C.28). On the other side of the scale, however, the trend is not as clear. While the proportion of respondents who reject same-sex relationships increases with some amount of media exposure, it but falls by almost 10 percentage points among individuals with high consumption of media. As noted with respect to economic classes, the share of

'No Opinion' response consistently falls with greater media exposure. This supports the commonly held belief that greater representation in media might lead to greater acceptance of the LGBT community in society.

Figure 2C.28: Sexual Relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society (by Media Exposure)



3.

Political Identity

3.A / Freedom of Expression

There is perhaps no better time than now to take a deeper look at the right to freedom of expression (FoE) in India. We are living in times where public opinion regarding what constitutes 'freedom of expression', 'who' is entitled to such freedoms and to 'what extent' are being fiercely debated. The recent arrests of 'urban Naxals', students and civil society activists among others for allegedly 'seditious' and 'anti-national' activities and for posting 'unpatriotic' comments on social media have animated this debate further. While liberals have decried these developments, conservatives have welcomed these moves as the manifestation of a strong government that does not compromise on national security and pride. It is evident that there are multiple ways in which the idea of freedom of expression, and what constitutes "reasonable restrictions" on the freedom to express opinions are being framed. The purpose this chapter is to understand the different ways in which citizens of India perceive or interpret the right to freedom of expression as written in the Constitution of India, rather than assign normative judgements about what is the "authentic" or correct interpretation.

We interrogate freedom of expression through three themes central to India's politics and society: democracy and democratic practice, secularism, and sovereign nationalism. We provide a brief explanation below of how freedom of expression is connected to these three themes. We present our findings by disaggregating public opinion based on a few key parameters such as caste, religion, and tribal identity, level of education, rural-urban and State or regional affiliations.

Using a set of six questions, clustered in three sets of two questions each, we examine the responses across several categories in order to understand factors influencing public opinion on the topic. These questions ask whether people who hold or advocate a certain opinion should be allowed to express their opinion freely in public. These opinions include: (a) a preference for dictatorship over democracy, (b) criticism of elected leaders, (c) ridiculing a religious Religion other than one's own, (d) promoting violence against another Religion, (e) advocating violence against the Indian state, and (f) advocating independence for any part of India. Some of these questions are deliberately provocative in order to understand how people imagine freedom of expression, especially in those circumstances when an opinion pushes the limits to freedom of expression as articulated in the Indian Constitution. Such issues are of significance especially considering the surge in vigilante social enforcement of restrictions on speech and expression through public attacks, either physically or on social media.

The responses to these questions are "fully agree", "somewhat agree", "somewhat disagree", and "fully disagree". The questions we examine are Q21, Q47, Q49, Q53, Q58, and Q64 in the questionnaire (in Appendix). An empirical examination of the survey data suggests the following:

Thematic Variation

Public opinion on freedom of expression varies across the three thematic clusters: democratic practice, secularism, and nationalism. Respondents are generally open, that is, agree to allow free expression of opinion that involves criticism of leaders, but less open to that involving regime and institutional replacement. However, we find that opinion tilts the other way, that is, toward disagreement strongly when it involves the question of secularism (ridiculing or advocating violence against others). Responses to questions on nationalism again produce divergent opinions. While respondents agree with allowing a free expression of demands of independence for any part of India, they disagree when the same opinion involves the use of force against the Indian state. It appears that on some issues such as secularism, public opinion is consistent with the reasonable restriction imposed on freedom of expression, and the need to respect the rights of all religious communities. However, on questions of democratic practice and sovereign nationalism, public opinion seems amenable to a more expansive view of what can be freely expressed by citizens.

Cross-State Variation

While thematic variation noted above is evident across all the States, we also observe a variation in the magnitude of responses across States. Public opinion appears to be very similar for certain States such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and, in some instances, with Uttar Pradesh. Responses in Jammu & Kashmir are similar to those in Delhi on some questions and to those in Tamil Nadu on some other questions. Similarly, opinions on certain questions within States in the north-eastern region reflect broad alignment within the region, and cohere with opinions in States outside the region on some other questions. Surprisingly, the largest proportions of respondents without an opinion are from Assam and West Bengal. The clustering of public opinion across States suggests that regional identities likely play a role in how freedom of expression is viewed across space, a relationship that calls for further empirical scrutiny.

Social Cleavages

Religious identity emerges as a key factor that differentiates public opinion on freedom of expression. Respondents considered a minority (Muslims, Christians, and others) tend to differ systematically from positions adopted by the Hindu majority. While the magnitude of observed differences across communities varies across the substantive dimensions of freedom of expression, that is, whether ridiculing religious practices or promoting violence against the Indian state, these differences persist. caste identity also appears to influence opinion on these questions but selectively; OBCs differ from other caste identities on some dimensions (such as dictatorship over democracy) and cohere with Dalits and Adivasis on others (criticising elected leaders). upper castes adopt more conservative positions on certain dimensions (such as criticising elected leaders) but align with Dalits and Adivasis on others (such as violence against the Indian state).

Education

There is also a systematic difference between non-literates and those respondents with higher levels of education across almost all dimensions of freedom of expression. Non-literate respondents tend to adopt a narrower view of freedom of expression, while views become more expansive as levels of education increase.

Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we examine cross-state variations in responses for each cluster of questions. We then focus on other important social sources of variations such as religious and caste identity as well as location (whether urban or rural) and education levels of the respondents.


Freedom of Expression in Democratic Practice

The Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression that is provided by Article 19 (1) of the Constitution of India, in many ways forms the backbone of several ideals such as democracy, secularism and sovereign nationalism that are considered sacred by the Indian polity. It is intuitively and logically evident that if democracy is a form of government that is based on the consensus of the people, then freedom of speech and expression is vital. One cannot possibly imagine a situation where a democratic form of government is antithetical to this basic freedom. As Justice Bhagwati argued in the *Maneka Gandhi versus the Union Of India* (1978), 'If democracy means government of the people by the people, it is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the democratic process and in order to enable him to intelligently exercise his right of making a choice, free and general discussion of public matters is absolutely essential'. The Indian experience of democracy has shown how mobilisation of hitherto underprivileged groups such as women, Dalits, religious minorities and backward castes at particular points of time deepened and strengthened the foundations of our democracy. None of this would have been possible if the underprivileged did not have the right to resist dominant forces and to freely express their views and opinions in day-to-day politics.

Freedom of expression in democratic practice implies that citizens be allowed to freely articulate views, whether critical or not, of both democratic institutions as well as elected political leaders. Two questions that capture public opinion on freedom of expression in democratic practice are: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote dictatorship over democracy, and (b) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are criticising elected leaders. The first question indicates that an individual should be allowed to freely express a view that advances a set of political institutions that likely curtail a multitude of political and civil rights. Does freedom of expression in democratic practice generate the space for individuals to freely promote a view that ironically calls for limiting or eliminating that very space? This is an important question especially because several political parties in contemporary times reiterate the sacrosanct nature of Indian democracy and hence express deep reservations about opinions that are seen as challenging the sanctity of this institution.


The second question focuses on an opinion involving a relatively more familiar practice among citizens in a democracy, one that allows for individuals to freely criticise elected representatives. While citizen dissatisfaction (or satisfaction) with their elected representatives finds expression during elections, does freedom of expression in democratic practice allow individuals to freely criticise elected leaders regardless of how these leaders are generally perceived?

Figure 3A.1: Dictatorship over Democracy (by State)




We find significant differences in attitudes toward freely expressing a preference for dictatorship over democracy across States (Figure 3A.1). In Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh between 40 to 60 percent of respondents either fully or somewhat agree. This proportion declines to between 30 and 35 percent in Assam, Jammu-Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tripura, Delhi and Uttarakhand. It is also worth noting that Assam and West Bengal exhibit the highest proportions of respondents who do not have an opinion - 42 and 52 percent respectively.

Figure 3A.2: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Religion)




The distribution of responses to this question also varies across religious communities (Figure 3A.2). Muslims are less likely to fully or somewhat agree compared to other religious groups. While approximately 40 percent of Hindu respondents either fully or somewhat agree, only about 32 percent of Muslims do the same. About equal proportions of Christians and Sikhs fully or somewhat agree.

Figure 3A.3: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Caste)




While the difference between Hindu and Muslim respondents is significant, we find that differences across caste groups are negligible (Figure 3A.3). Dalits, Adivasis, and upper castes do not significantly differ from each other, and the difference in proportions of respondents ranges from 1 to 3 percent. However, we find that about 42 percent of OBCs either fully or somewhat agree.

Figure 3A.4: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Education Levels)




We also observe differences across levels of education (Figure 3A.4). While non-literate respondents are less likely to fully or somewhat agree (approximately 32 percent) that individuals should be allowed to express a view that favours dictatorship over democracy, about 41 percent of respondents with higher levels of education do the same.

Figure 3A.5: Dictatorship over Democracy (by Rural-Urban)




We do not, however, find a difference across rural and urban respondents. For instance, approximately 37 percent of rural respondents either fully or somewhat agree while 38 percent of urban respondents adopt a similar position (Figure 3A.5).

Figure 3A.6: Criticising Elected Leaders (by State)




About 50 percent or more of respondents across almost all the States either fully or somewhat agree with the opinion that people should be allowed to freely criticise elected leaders (Figure 3A.6). Jammu-Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu, and Delhi have a larger proportion of such respondents compared to the other States. However, only 44 percent of respondents fully or somewhat agree in Uttar Pradesh. The proportion of respondents who do not have an opinion is highest in Assam and West Bengal - about 37 and 31 percent respectively. Generally, we find that across these States, most respondents support a free expression of views critical of elected leaders.

Figure 3A.7: Criticizing Elected Leaders (by Religion)




We find that, as with the expression of a preference for dictatorship over democracy, religious identity produces differences on how criticism of elected leaders is viewed (Figure 3A.7). Sikhs, Christians, and Muslims are more likely than Hindus to either somewhat or fully agree. About 75 percent of Sikhs, followed by 65 percent of Christians and 64 percent of Muslims hold this view while the comparable value for Hindus is about 60 percent.

Figure 3A.8: Criticising Elected Leaders (by Caste)




We find that about 58 percent of upper Castes are likely to either fully or somewhat agree (Figure 3A.8). There is a 4 to 5 percentage point difference between upper Castes and other caste groups. For instance, between 62 to 63 percent of Dalit, Adivasi, and OBC respondents are likely to either fully or somewhat agree on the view that people should be allowed to criticise elected leaders.

Figure 3A.9: Criticising Elected Leaders (by Education Level)



We find that this opinion is also influenced by levels of education (Figure 3A.9). While 56 percent of non-literates are of the view that people should be allowed to criticise elected leaders, about 65 percent of individuals with a college education hold this position. As levels of education increase, the proportion of respondents agreeing with this view also increases.

Figure 3A.10: Criticising Elected Leaders (by Rural-Urban)



We also find differences across rural and urban respondents (Figure 3A.10). A larger proportion of urban respondents (66 percent) either fully or somewhat agree with the view that people should be allowed to criticise elected leaders compared to rural respondents (about 59 percent).

Freedom of Expression in Secularism


The freedom of speech and expression is also embedded in the notion of secularism. Even as a conceptual idea that may not resonate entirely with the Indian experience, secularism is opposed to the idea of a theocratic state which by itself makes freedom of expression an essential ingredient for its successful practice. The Indian variant of secularism which calls for equal treatment of all religions makes it even more imperative that the freedom of speech and expression be upheld. The Indian Constitution provides for the Right to Freedom of Religion under Articles 25-28 which guarantees all citizens the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, freedom to manage religious affairs, freedom from paying taxes for promotion of any religion and the freedom to attend a religious instruction or religious worship in certain education institutions. Enjoyment of these rights thus entails the provision of free speech and expression.

How does one practice and propagate one's faith without the freedom of expression? Or, how would minority religious groups exercise dissent to any efforts by majoritarian groups at encroaching upon their cultural rights? Or, how would members of any religious Religion resist forced conversions?

We tap into freedom of expression embedded in the idea of secularism using two questions: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they make fun of religious communities other than their own, and (b) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are promoting violence against other communities. Both questions speak to what constitutes freedom of expression in ethnically heterogeneous societies where equal rights for all religions lies at the heart of nation-building.


While freedom of expression is fundamental to secular practice, the relationship between the two is not an easy one. However, the Indian Constitution does not guarantee an unconditional enjoyment of the freedom to express oneself freely. The first Amendment to the Constitution imposes a set of "reasonable restrictions" on the freedom of expression, curtailing public speech against the "interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence". This position is in contrast to Western views (notably the US) on freedom of expression. Does freedom of expression include freely ridiculing persons from other religious communities and their practices, and promoting violence against other communities? More broadly, are these notions of freedom of expression consistent with the practice of secularism in India? While we do not adopt a position on this debate, we examine the factors that appear to drive differences in public opinion on freedom of expression and how it relates to an underlying idea of secularism.

Figure 3A.11: Ridiculing Other Religious Communities (by State)




When it comes to allowing people to freely make fun of religious communities other than one’s own, we find that almost three quarters of respondents in Kerala either fully or somewhat agree (Figure 3A.11). followed by Tamil Nadu where about 47 percent fully or somewhat agree. About 30 and 25 percent of respondents in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand respectively also hold this view. We find that in most other States, the proportion of respondents who either fully or somewhat support this view ranges from about 17 to 21 percent. However, this number falls dramatically in Jammu and Kashmir (10 percent), West Bengal (7 percent) and Delhi (13 percent). We also find that Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal have larger proportions of respondents with no opinion ranging between 23 and 37 percent.

Figure 3A.12: Ridiculing Other Religious Communities (by Religion)




Here again we find that support for allowing people to make fun of other communities draws most support from Hindu and Christian communities while fewer proportions of Muslims and Sikhs support this position (Figure 3A.12). Approximately 27 percent Hindus and 26 percent Christians either fully or somewhat agree that people should be allowed to freely express an opinion that makes fun of other communities. The proportion of Muslim and Sikh respondents who either fully or somewhat agree is about 18 and 19 percent respectively.

Figure 3A.13: Ridiculing other Religious Communities (by Caste)




We do not find differences across upper caste, Dalit and Adivasis supporting this view - approximately 21 percent, but a larger proportion of OBC groups tend to support this position - about 34 percent (Figure 3A.13). This is a relatively large difference and is worth exploring.

Figure 3A.14: Ridiculing Religious Communities (by Education Level)




We find that there are differences among respondents based on levels of education (Figure 3A.14). For instance, about 20 percent of non-literate respondents tend to either fully or somewhat agree that people should be allowed to express an opinion even if it makes fun of other communities. This proportion increases to about 28 percent for respondents who have a college level of education.

Figure 3A.15: Ridiculing Religious Communities (by Rural-Urban)




A larger proportion of rural respondents tend to agree that people should be allowed to express an opinion that makes fun of other communities relative to urban respondents, and the difference is about 5 percentage points (Figure 3A.15).

Figure 3A.16: Promoting Violence against other Communities (by State)




We find that for most States, the proportion of respondents who either fully or somewhat agree that people should be allowed to freely express an opinion that promotes violence against other communities is relatively low (Figure 3A.16). For instance, about 10 percent of respondents in Jammu and Kashmir hold this view. Similarly, in West Bengal and Delhi the proportions are about 14 and 16 percent respectively. Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Uttar Pradesh are States where this proportion increases to 53, 39, and 33 percent respectively. For the remaining States, the proportion of respondents varies between 20 (Tripura) and 26 percent (Uttarakhand). Respondents with no opinions are mostly in Assam and West Bengal at about 31 and 30 percent respectively.

Figure 3A.17: Promoting Violence against other communities (by Religion)




In this section, we observe significant differences across religious identities (Figure 3A.16). Muslims are much less likely to support the view that an individual promoting violence against other communities should be allowed to express that opinion freely. Only about 18 percent of Muslims either fully or somewhat agree. Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs are more likely to agree with this position. Approximately 28 percent of Hindus support this position followed by about 26 percent of Sikh respondents. We find that about 23 percent of Christians support this position.

Figure 3A.18: Promoting Violence against other Communities (by Caste)




Among the different caste groups we find that Dalits and OBCs are more likely to either fully or somewhat agree that people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are promoting violence against other communities (Figure 3A.18). Approximately 28 percent of Dalits and 31 percent of OBCs support this position. About similar proportions of upper Castes and Adivasi respondents (21 and 22 percent respectively) tend to either fully or somewhat agree.

Figure 3A.19: Promoting Violence against other Communities (by Education Level)



We find a difference, about 5 percentage points, across respondents based on levels of education and the expression of ideas that promote violence against other communities (Figure 3A.19). Respondents who identify as non-literate are less likely to either fully or somewhat agree with the position that persons promoting violence against other communities should be allowed to express this view freely, compared to respondents with a college level of education. For instance, while approximately 23 percent of non-literates agree with this view, the proportion increases to about 28 percent among respondents with a college level of education.

Figure 3A.20: Promoting Violence against other Communities (by Rural-Urban)




We also find that rural respondents are more likely to either fully or somewhat agree with the view that persons promoting violence against other communities should be allowed to express this view freely (Figure 3A.20). There is approximately a 4 percentage point difference between rural and urban respondents.

Freedom of Expression in Nationalism


The third theme that freedom of expression locates itself in is sovereign nationalism. Though not clearly articulated in the Indian Constitution, it firmly supports the Indian freedom movement and the politics of post-independence India. Contrary to other kinds of nationalisms that were based on either language or religion, as evident in Europe and certain parts of Asia, the thrust for nationalism in India was based on anti-colonialism. More importantly, given the rich diversity of this country, the leaders of the national movement such as Nehru and Gandhi endorsed a pluralist and civic form of nationalism that transcended caste, class, language, religion or any other form of ascriptive identity. Though in recent times we have witnessed a series of attacks across states by vigilante groups on students, academics, journalists and writers for not complying with accepted norms of 'nationalistic behaviour', one cannot reasonably make the case that nationalism therefore is antithetical to freedom of speech and expression. Those that framed our Constitution would have been appalled to see how a narrow and parochial understanding of nationalism is being used to discipline and punish those who do not subscribe to it. The essence of pluralist nationalism, just like secularism, is the freedom of speech and expression that allows all citizens of the country, not only those belonging to the majority Religion, to voice their dissent. How do people in India however, make sense of opinions that contradict the layman understandings of nationalism and patriotism? Do they feel that freedom of expression should be protected at any cost or do they think that only a particular 'definition' of nationalism should triumph over all other kinds of liberties? Two questions used to identify public opinion on freedom of expression in its relation to sovereign nationalism are: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote the use of violence against the Indian state, (b) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they demand independence for a certain part of India.

Figure 3A.21: Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by State)




We find - similar to our previous observations - that greater proportions of respondents from Tamil Nadu (49 percent), Kerala (36 percent), and Uttar Pradesh (34 percent) either fully or somewhat agree with the view that someone who advocates violence against the Indian state should be allowed to freely express that opinion (Figure 3A.21). Delhi and West Bengal have the lowest proportion of respondents who support this position, about 14 and 16 percent respectively. Other states fall between these two extremes ranging from 20 to 25 percent. However, about 35 percent of respondents from Assam and West Bengal, and 33 percent of respondents from Kerala have no opinion.

Figure 3A.22: Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Religion)




We do not find large differences across respondents with different religious identities. For instance, about 26 percent of Hindu, Muslim, and Christian respondents tend to support this position, while the proportion of Sikh respondents is about 24 percent (Figure 3A.22).

Figure 3A.23: Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Caste)




Responses to whether someone has the right to express an opinion that calls for violence against the Indian state do not show much variation across castes except that 30 percent of OBC respondents who are more likely to fully or somewhat agree (Figure 3A.23). Fewer upper caste, Dalit and Adivasi respondents support this position relative to OBCs. The difference between OBC and other caste respondents is between 6 to 8 percentage points.

Figure 3A.24: Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Education Level)




Here too we find that agreement increases as levels of education increase (Figure 3A.24). A greater proportion of respondents agree that persons advocating violence against the Indian state should be allowed to express these views freely. For instance, while about 24 percent of non-literate respondents either fully or somewhat agree, the proportion of respondents increases to about 27 percent for those with a college level of education. However, we find that almost twice the number of non-literates have no opinion compared to those with a college level of education.

Figure 3A.25: Promoting Violence against the Indian state (by Rural-Urban)




As with the previous responses, rural respondents are more likely to agree compared to urban respondents. In this case we find that there is a 4 percent difference between the two (Figure 3A.25).

Figure 3A.26: Independence for Certain Parts of India (by State)




In most States we find a greater proportion of respondents who agree with allowing people to freely express independence for any part of India than those who disagree with the exception of Delhi and West Bengal (Figure 3A.26). In Tamil Nadu, Nagaland, and Jammu Kashmir, we find that close to 60 percent of respondents either fully or somewhat agree. We also find that this proportion ranges between 40 and 50 percent for several States - Assam, Kerala, Mizoram, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. In West Bengal we find that only 30 percent of respondents agree with this position. As with previous responses, Assam and West Bengal have relatively large proportions of respondents who do not have an opinion. Surprisingly, Kerala has the highest share of respondents who do not have an opinion (41 percent).

Figure 3A.27: Independence for certain parts of India (by Religion)




Similarly, Hindu respondents are less likely to agree with this position (about 41 percent), while Muslim, Christian, and Sikh respondents are more likely to support this view, about 48 percent Muslim respondents, and 52 percent Christian and Sikh respondents (Figure 3A.27).

Figure 3A.28: Independence for certain parts of India (by Caste)




Across caste groups, respondents belonging to the upper caste are least likely to agree, either fully or somewhat, with the view of allowing people to freely express independence for any part of India (Figure 3A.28). Among other caste groups, 43 percent of Dalit respondents, 52 percent of Adivasi respondents, and 46 percent of OBC respondents agree with this view.

Figure 3A.29: Independence for Certain Parts of India (by Education Level)



We also see that across all levels of education the proportion of respondents who agree with allowing people to freely express independence for any part of India is greater than the proportion of respondents who disagree (Figure 3A.29). For instance, among non-literates almost 42 percent of respondents agree. Forty eight percent of college educated respondents agree. However, we also find that the proportion of those who fully agree or somewhat agree is greater than 50 percent across all levels of education.

Figure 3A.30: Independence for Certain Parts of India (by Rural-Urban)



We do not find significant differences across locations. The difference between respondents from rural and urban locations is about 2 percentage points (Figure 3A.30).

Conclusion

While we consider freedom of speech and expression as an a priori condition for the successful practice of democracy, secularism and sovereign nationalism, our findings display a kaleidoscopic view of this constitutional value. There are differences across regions, caste and religious identity on certain dimensions of freedom of expression, but coherence on others. Public opinion ranges from a highly libertarian imagination of the freedom of expression to a view that freedom of expression cannot override certain mainstream understandings of nationalism, secularism and democracy. While what we present here constitutes preliminary examination of patterns, these results open up potential avenues of research on public opinion formation on freedom of expression, both theoretically and empirically.

3.B / The Strange Case of the Indian Nation: Regional and National

The question of 'identity' in India has significantly manoeuvred around national and regional identities. In many ways, this is somewhat unique to Indian society where regional and linguistic identities have played a significant role unlike the west (with some exceptions like Catalonia in Spain or the Irish question in the UK). The diverse regional identities in India have always been more than merely cultural. Post-independence, linguistic identity got a significant traction as a political category with Hindi being instituted as an official language in 1965. After 1969, regional parties increased and formed state governments, further reinforcing regional identities. Even though Nehruvian didactics such as "Unity in Diversity" meant that Nationalism had to take precedence over regionalism, a lot has changed over the years. In a political climate where Bharatiya Janata Party has been able to come to power in most states, and to a great degree, bring a new lease of life to the question of 'Nationalism', this data will only be revealing to what extent this discourse has been successful. It would also tell us what the landscape around regional politics seem to have configured itself in contemporary times. As in last year's report, we continue our interest in the question of identity and are keen on understanding how these identities have shifted or are shifting in the times of majoritarian nationalism. Is this form of majoritarian nationalism displacing regional identity? Or is it attempting to strike some form of harmony with regional identity? This data will be more telling once elections are held in these states.

There are two parts to this chapter: one on self-identification and the second on linguistic preference. We explore whether people identify themselves as either regional or national and whether they have a preference for which language should be used in public. Furthermore, we examine whether those who identify themselves as more regional might also show greater preference for the local language.


1. Identity: Regional or National

In this survey, we explored allegiance to regional or national identity through Q54 in the questionnaire: "When we ask people how they would identify themselves, some say they are only (state identity) and others feel they are only Indian. While some feel they are more (state identity) and less Indian and other feel they are more Indian and less (state identity). How do you identify yourself?"

The respondents were provided six options ranging including 'Don't Know': 'Only (state identity)', 'More (state identity), less Indian', 'More Indian, less (state identity)', 'Only Indian' and 'Both Equally'. In this section, the response categories were further grouped according to regional identity and national identity.


When looked at as a broad category, the numbers reflect almost a clear and equal divide across numbers of respondents who identify themselves as more regional, more national and who feel both equally. To understand these numbers better, we need to take a much closer look.

Figure 3B.1: Regional and National Identity (by State)




The number of respondents who feel a more national than regional identity is significantly higher in states like Delhi, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and, to some extent, West Bengal (Figure 3B.1). Given that they are mostly northern states with Hindi as their primary language, it is only reflective of our reports from previous years. In states like Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, the numbers are heavily skewed towards people expressing their allegiance for their regional identities. It is surprising that most of these states have either experienced civil unrest (such as Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland and Punjab) or have been a part of the Dravidian movement (Tamil Nadu). But that may be a hasty conclusion because many of these states also report a considerably high number of people who believe that they ascribe to both their national and regional identities at the same time. Punjab, Assam, Kerala and Tripura have a significantly high number of respondents claiming they feel close to both their national and regional identities. Tamil Nadu however, despite a higher number of people still expressing their allegiance for their regional identity, also has a high number of respondents (38 per cent) that claim a national identity. A similarly high number of Tamil respondents do not have a problem with people speaking any language other than Tamil. Given the history of the Self Respect movement which at one point found expression in the Anti-Hindi Struggle in the 1960s, these numbers are surprising. What makes it even more surprising, is that no respondent in Tamil Nadu claimed to feel close to her national and regional identities at the same time. Tripura also has a significantly higher number of respondents who identify themselves as more national than regional.

Figure 3B.2: Regional and National Identity (by Rural-Urban)



The numbers do not vary hugely across rural and urban respondents (Figure 3B.2). They follow predictable trends where more rural respondents claim to feel more regional and more urban respondents feel more national, but then the differences are not necessarily huge. Across urban and rural respondents, 30 per cent of respondents said they feel both regional and national at the same time.

Figure 3B.3: 'More Regional' and 'More National' (by State and Rural-Urban)




When rural and urban respondents are split across states, we see that very few states – Jammu and Kashmir, Tripura and West Bengal - show a significant difference in terms of numbers of respondents who feel more regional (Figure 3B.3). In Tripura while 8 per cent of urban respondents felt closer to their regional identity, it rose to 26 per cent for rural respondents. With Jammu and Kashmir, while 81 per cent urban residents feel close to their regional identity, only 64 per cent of the rural residents feel more regional. Jammu and Kashmir is an outlier in this case across the past three reports, because it is the only state to show more urban respondents displaying a higher regional affinity in comparison to their rural counterparts.

On the question of national identities too, a few states reveal a particularly sharp distinction between urban and rural residents - Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and to some extent Uttarakhand. Curiously, in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram and Punjab, more rural people feel more national than urban respondents. It could be because the urban respondents are more aware of the regional and identity discourse. But in none of these cases the difference is particularly high.


A significant chunk of respondents across the states feel close to both their regional and national identities. The two states that have a contrary view are Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh. While the fewer Jammu and Kashmir numbers are not surprising, the low Uttar Pradesh numbers are. For Uttar Pradesh - a Hindi speaking state which has always been dominant in the national politics - it is surprising to see that in people's consciousness, the two identities remain so vastly different. It may be a reflection of the political schisms between national parties like BJP and Congress and regional ones like Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samajwadi Party. In Kerala and Nagaland more rural respondents compared to urban ones claim to feel both regional and national at the same time.

Figure 3B.4: Regional and National Identity (by Religion)



While 43 per cent of Hindus feel that they are more national, there is a significant 29 per cent who also feel close to their regional identity (Figure 3.B.4). Twenty seven per cent of Hindu respondents feel close to both their regional and national identities. With Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, 45 per cent, 52 per cent and 42 per cent of respondents identify themselves as more regional than national. Though 30 per cent of the Muslim respondents claim to feel more national than regional, the same drops to 10 and 18 per cent with Christian and Sikh respondents respectively. But on the other hand, a significant number of minority respondents claimed to feel affinity for both regional and national identities. The numbers stand at 26 per cent for Muslim respondents, 38 per cent for Christian and 40 per cent for Sikh respondents.

Figure 3B.5: 'More Regional' and 'More National' (by State and Religion)




Among the states we see 75 per cent of Hindus from Mizoram and 63 per cent from Tamil Nadu feel closer to their regional identities (Figure 3.B.5). Hindus in most states however show average numbers, that is between 20 to 40 per cent, for the same view. The numbers come down drastically with Delhi and Uttarakhand. Delhi's urban constitution clearly drives this trend. Among Muslims, however, the numbers are again high in Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. As already explained before, this are probably reflective of the political identities of the people belonging to these states. In Uttarakhand and Delhi however, the number of Muslims saying that they feel closer to their regional identity falls sharply to 4 and 8 per cent respectively. Even Nagaland, Assam and West Bengal have Muslim respondents reporting a higher number. More respondents express a closer affinity to their regional identities because of cultural differences that mark these states. But that may not necessarily be a function of their religion. Among Christians, only Tamil Nadu and Mizoram report a high number. No Christian in UP reported that they feel closer to their regional identity. In states like Delhi, West Bengal and Uttarakhand, the numbers go as high as 10, 11 and 14 per cent respectively. Even in Kerala, which has a very strong and prominent Christian population, only 38 per cent of the respondents claim to feel closer to their regional identity

The figures clearly show that respondents across religions from the North Indian, Hindi speaking states, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand identify themselves as more national (Figure 3.B.5). Tamil Nadu, as noted before, is quite a surprise in this regard. Close to 37 per cent Hindus, 53 per cent Muslims and 30 per cent Christians feel that they are more national. This is a high number of Muslims. Is it because they feel safer to

claim their national identity for fear of persecution? Or is it because Islam as a culture allows them to feel this degree of affinity with other Muslims across the country? This is a phenomenon that has been noted in other reports as well. While in states like Kerala, the numbers across religion do not vary much, it varies sharply for Mizoram, Uttarakhand and Tamil Nadu whereby more Muslim respondents feel more national. While Christians across states like Assam, West Bengal, Delhi and Uttarakhand show a relatively higher affinity for their national identity, it drops to 7 per cent for Mizoram and Nagaland.


Across all the states, Punjab, Assam, Kerala and Uttarakhand have very high numbers of people claiming to feel both regional and national. In Assam while 54 per cent Muslims feel this way, the number of Hindus with this view is only 35 per cent. In Punjab, while 53 per cent of Hindus feel this way, with Sikhs and Muslims it is 40 per cent and 49 per cent respectively. The lowest numbers are seen in Nagaland and Uttar Pradesh. While in Nagaland, clearly a higher number of Christian respondents (41 per cent) feel both regional and national, the number for Muslim and Hindu respondents drops down to 17 and 18 per cent respectively. In Uttar Pradesh, the numbers are scant and vary, but hardly significantly across the religious spectrum. While 13 per cent of Hindus identify themselves as both regional and national, the number falls down to 7 per cent among Muslims. It confirms the hunch about the electoral dynamics that this question acquires in Uttar Pradesh. Given that a large section of backward castes, Dalits and Muslims have traditionally voted for SP and BSP, they seem to have associated that with their regional identity. In West Bengal, while 29 per cent of Hindus and 33 per cent of Muslims claim to be more regional than national, this number becomes 40 per cent with Sikhs. And as far as Christians in West Bengal are concerned, the number remains zero, with 89 per cent of them feeling more national.

Figure 3B.6: Regional and National identity (by Education Level)




Education level does not seem to have a major impact on people's responses of regionalism or nationalism (Figure 3.B.6). While 41 per cent of non-literate respondents feel more regional, 33 per cent of college educated respondents say they feel the same. With feelings of nationalism, there is an even slimmer difference across levels of education. While 33 per cent of non-literate respondents say they feel more national, it only goes up marginally to 36 per cent with the college educated respondents. Even the numbers of respondents who feel both equally regional and national barely differ. This is vastly different from what we have seen in our reports where increased levels of education (mostly college level) has clearly marked their preferences .

Figure 3B.7: Regional and National identity (by Media Exposure)



We do not see much difference across levels of media exposure (Figure 3.B.7). The numbers stay within 28 to 40 per cent across the three responses. Among those with no exposure to media, close to 40 per cent of the respondents feel more regional while 30 per cent of them feel national or both equally. For those with low and medium media exposure, 38 per cent and 37 per cent feel more regional. For people with low exposure to media, 35 per cent feel more national. This number is only marginally less for people with medium exposure. Among people with high exposure to media, 38 per cent of the respondents claim to be more national.

Figure 3B.8: 'More Regional' and 'More National' (by State and Media Exposure)



Nagaland shows the biggest swing in terms of media exposure changing people's responses in favour of regionalism (Figure 3.B.8). While 32 per cent of respondents from Nagaland with no exposure to media claimed to feel more regional, it increases to 61 per cent of people with high media exposure saying so. Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Tripura show a bit of a swing. In Tamil Nadu, 78 per cent respondents with little media exposure say they feel more regional and 60 per cent of respondents highly exposed to media feel the same. In West Bengal while 10 per cent people with high exposure to media say that they feel more regional, 30 per cent of people who have no exposure to media say the same. Most states in fact remain within a 10-15 per cent range across the levels of exposure. But in a state like Delhi, the margin falls as low as 3 per cent across the different categories. Delhi's proximity to the central government, being the capital city/state, could be a factor for these results.


Most states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Tripura display a steady increase of feelings of nationalism along the curve of varying levels of exposure to media (Figure 3.B.8). Only in Mizoram do the feelings of nationalism fall, from 45 per cent with low exposure, to 5 per cent with high media exposure. With Uttarakhand, the numbers fall from 52 per cent to 42 per cent. Nagaland too shows a decrease, but only minor. Some states like Assam, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab show a curve that is increasing but then drops again. For example, while 23 per cent of respondents with no media exposure feel more national, it increases to 42 per cent with low exposure to media. But then with moderate exposure to media, the numbers fall to 33 per cent and eventually to 24 per cent for people with a high degree of media exposure. This may be a function of a very unique relationship that Assam has with the centre, especially with respect to the question of illegal immigration. The debate on the National Register of Citizens of India (NRC) and the new citizenship bill seem to have had an impact on how Assamese respondents view their relationship to nationalism.

The north-eastern states collectively show a very curious response to this question. Mizoram shows a steady, directly proportional relationship between levels of exposure to media and the number of respondents saying they feel both regional and national. Nagaland and Tripura show a declining curve, where the numbers increase with higher levels of exposure to media but fall to an extent when it comes to respondents with high exposure to media. In almost all the states, there is very little variation in terms of numbers except in Nagaland and Mizoram which show 26 per cent and 36 per cent difference respectively. Tripura and Assam both show an upswing with increasing levels of media exposure but then eventually fall with high levels of media exposure.

2. Language Preference

India has a history of sub-nationalist and regionalist movements that have drawn on language and associated cultures. Over the years, there have been movements in various states, for instance Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka, which have pushed for primacy for the state language in public spaces. Support for the use of local language over any other language, thus, may be considered an expression of linguistic sub-nationalism. In the earlier section, we looked at how people identify themselves in the context of regional and national, in this section we explore whether people hold a preference in the languages that are used in public spaces. Question 57 in the questionnaire is as follows and the respondents were asked to choose between local language and 'Any Language': "Some people feel it is acceptable to speak in any language in public places while others feel that people should speak only in the local language in public places. What is your opinion on this issue?"


Figure 3B.9: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language in Public Spaces



Over half of the respondents (55 per cent) feel that any language can be used in public spaces whereas 45 per cent of the respondents support the use of the local language (Figure 3.B.9). One might expect that a stronger preference for one's regional identity may drive preference for local or regional language as well. However, as the next figure shows, there is large variation across the states and this does not entirely match entirely with the predominant identity in the state.


While eight of the 12 states show considerable support for the use of any language in public spaces, in five states — Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Assam, Punjab and West Bengal — a majority of the respondents prefers the use of the local language (Figure 3.B.10). Interestingly, of the five states that support the use of local language, only Jammu and Kashmir and Mizoram record a large preference for regional identity, that is, the preference for the local language does not seem to be linked to the preference in identity. In West Bengal, for instance, where close to half of the respondents had identified themselves as 'More National', the preference for local language saw an equally large support (51 per cent). On the other hand, Tamil Nadu, a state with a history of ethno-linguistic movements records strong support for the use of any language in public spaces.

Figure 3B.10: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language in Public Spaces (by State)



The preference for the use of the local language finds lesser support in urban centres, compared to rural areas as seen in (Figure 3.B.11). Nevertheless, a majority of both urban and rural respondents support the use of any language in public spaces. The support for local language among rural respondents seems to match with the results seen earlier (in Figure 3.B.2), where a higher share of rural respondents had identified as 'More regional'.

Figure 3B.11: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language (by Rural-Urban)



However, do urban and rural respondents hold differing attitudes in different states? Is the support for the use of the local language in rural areas consistent across the states? Figure 3.B.12 shows the support for the use of any language among rural and urban respondents in the states. While a larger share of urban respondents in most states do not have a preferred language, five states — Kerala, Nagaland, Tripura and Assam — show striking results. In these states, a greater proportion of rural respondents support the use of any language in public spaces. While the difference in support between urban and rural respondents is just 4 percentage points in Tripura, the same is as high as 20 percentage points in Kerala. This result is extremely interesting as it questions the age-old trope of cosmopolitan urban areas as a melting pot of cultures and language from various regions.

The trend in Delhi must be viewed in a different light because as the National Capital Territory (NCT), it is fundamentally an urban area. According to the 2011 census, 97 per cent of the Delhi population consists of urban dwellers whereas only a small 2.5 per cent is considered rural. However, the support for the use of the local language is extremely low in NCT among both rural and urban respondents..

Figure 3B.12: Preference for Any Language (by State and Rural-Urban)




Figure 3.B.13, shows some clear results and some mixed results when viewed in conjunction with self-identification as regional or national in Figure 3.B.4. There is a clear preference for the use of the local language among Sikhs (59 per cent) and a greater share of Hindus and Christians do not have any preferred language for public spaces. The result for Christian respondents is interesting since over half of the Christian respondents have identified themselves as 'More Regional'. Another fascinating result is with respect to the Muslim community. While half of the Muslims respondents prefer the local language, the other half do not hold any such preference.

Figure 3B.13: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language (by Religion)




Figure 3B.14: Preference for Local Language versus Any Language (by Education Level)





Figure 3B.15: Preference for Any Language (by State and Education Level)



The general trend in literacy, as seen in Figure 3.B.14, shows a monotonic decline in preference for local language and an equal increase in support for the use of any language in public spaces. However, state-wise disaggregation of this result, as seen in Figure 3.B.15, shows a lot of variation across the states. While the support for the use of any language in public spaces increases with education in most states, five states — Assam, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttarakhand - show a different trend. Unlike other states, in Assam, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, greater education seems to lead to a rise in respondents who feel that local language should be used in public spaces. West Bengal and Tripura, on the other hand, pose an entirely different trend in preference. In Tripura, the support for the use of any language in public spaces declines with primary education and matriculation and then increases among the college educated. The trend in West Bengal points toward greater support for the use of any language among those educated to matriculation but shows considerably lower support among all other levels of education.

3.C / Whose Nation Is It Anyway?

Nation is an identity, both political and emotional, and nationalism is an ideology which defines a loyalty or a sense of affection of the citizens towards its nation. The idea of both nation and nationalism has always been discussed and debated in India over the decades, but over the past few years it has been brought centre-stage and widely debated by various political parties, political observers and citizens. People are now divided into two groups— nationalists or anti-nationalists - based on their attitudes and perceptions towards private and public practices.

A closer look at the nature of the nationalism debate reveals issues centred around the idea of 'conservative-nationalism' and closely located to the idea of religious nationalism. The concept of religious nationalism is related to the idea that one religion and its practices are superior to other religions and the polity should be run according to the beliefs and ideology of the majority religion.

In the past three or four years, the country has some violent incidents based on issues such as - a ban on consumption of beef, publicly assaults for not saying '*Bharat Mata ki Jai*' (Hail Mother India), for not standing for the national anthem, and attacks and lynchings in the name of cow protection. This section seeks to see the pattern of people's position on these issues.

We asked a few sets of questions in our survey which revolve around the issue of nationalism. People were asked to give their opinion on whether the government should punish people who don't say *Bharat Mata ki Jai* at public places, consume beef or cow meat, don't stand for the national anthem or engage in religious conversion. The result of the survey directs towards the regional and inter-community variations in people's shared opinion on these issues. For instance, Indian States having a significant population of national religious minorities don't support punishment whereas States in the Hindi heartland overwhelmingly support punishment for the aforesaid positions. To measure these variations, this section tries to present people's opinion on these issues from all sampled States and from different castes and communities.


1. Punish those who do not say "Bharat Mata ki Jai" at Public Functions

One of the issues highlighted and linked with nationalism was chanting '*Bharat Mata ki Jai*' during public gathering and events. Though the chant is closely associated with Indian nationalism and the national movement for independence⁴⁸, it was a form of Hindu nationalism as the geographical boundaries of India were personified as a '*Bharat Mata*' or '*Mother India*', draped in sari, with a crown and holding the Tricolour (National) flag and sometimes with a lion at the back⁴⁹. This visual of the motherland was first represented by Abanindranath Tagore in 1905⁵⁰. The image was a reflection of a Hindu goddess to unite the people of India to fight against the colonisers during the fight for independence.

The personification of the motherland was not a new idea; it was used in European nations as well to strengthen the sense of national unity⁵¹. But it could not work in same way in India as in building European nationalism because the theocratic image of India had divided the society on communal basis instead of uniting her. Some religious communities like the Muslim community, which believe in a monolithic religion, had resisted for the personification of India as '*Bharat Mata*' and the communal divide on this issue still continued. There were several instances where Muslim leaders⁵² and people from Muslim communities resisted chanting '*Bharat Mata ki Jai*' and they received huge criticism and sometimes faced violence for this. Other than Muslim communities, people belonging to other social groups also resist obligatory chanting of *Bharat Mata ki Jai* at public functions. In the lieu of this discussion we tried to capture people's opinion on whether the government should have the right to punish those who do not say *Bharat Mata ki Jai* at public events.


The State-wise analysis on this question indicates that States where religious minorities are actually majorities like Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram and Punjab; or are present in significant proportions like Kerala and West Bengal, are less likely to support the idea of State punishment for those who do not say *Bharat Mata ki Jai* at public functions. Assam perhaps, is the only exception to this pattern. However, even here the proportion of fully disagree was found to be greater than fully agree with the statement. Another State in the north-east region where people who fully disagreed were higher than those who fully agreed was Tripura but difference was not very high. In Jammu and Kashmir (the State with the highest Muslim population), both the regions Jammu and Kashmir hold opposite opinions on this issue. More than four-fifths of Kashmiri people (residents of the Kashmir region) were fully disagreed with the idea of State punishment. On the other hand, people in the Jammu region, mainly dominated by Hindus, hold a more nationalist opinion and behave in the same manner as seen in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. People of these States strongly support the idea of State punishment for not chanting *Bharat Mata ki Jai* at public functions. Two States from North-east India, Nagaland and Mizoram are mainly Christian dominated States (90 percent Christians). A little more than half of the people in Nagaland fully disagree with the statement and only one out of ten fully agree. Like Nagaland, only one in every ten persons in Mizoram and West Bengal fully support punishment for those who do not say *Bharat Mata ki Jai*. However, one-third of the respondents in Mizoram and a little more than two of five respondents in West Bengal did not express their opinion on this question (Figure 3C.1).

Figure 3C.1: Opinion on Punishment to those who do not say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” at Public Functions (by State)



Social cleavages also shape people’s opinion on this issue. Although caste identities are more visible in a society like India, when it comes to religious nationalism, the religious identities overshadow the caste identities of the people. Data clearly indicates that different castes of Hindus - except Tribal communities - are more likely to support punishment for those who do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai. However, among other religious communities such as Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, full disagreement is higher than full agreement for the punishment for those who don’t say Bharat Mata ki Jai. As compared to other religious minorities, Muslims are more likely to fully disagree with the statement (Figure 3C.2).

Figure 3C.2: Opinion on Punishment for those who do not say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” at Public Functions (by Caste/Community)



2. Punish those who do not Stand for the National Anthem at Public Places


The national anthem is a symbol of national unity and integrity. The Fundamental Duties under Article 51A of India Constitution States “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the national Flag and the National Anthem”. A legislation was also passed in 1971 known as ‘The Prevention of Insult to National Honour Act, 1971’. Section 3 of this act specified some protocols for singing the national anthem and stated that “whoever intentionally prevents the singing of the Indian National Anthem or causes disturbances to any assembly engaged in such singing shall be punished with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both”. However, this act does not clearly specify any punishment for not standing during the singing of the National Anthem. However, in 2015 an order related to the National Anthem of India was passed by Ministry of Home Affairs⁵³. According to this order whenever the Anthem is sung or played, the audience shall stand to attention. Here also this order does not specify any punishment.

However, on November 20, 2016, in the Shyam Narayan Chouksey vs. Union of India case the Supreme Court directed that all cinema halls across India must play the National Anthem before every feature film⁵⁴. But, in another hearing on October 23, 2017, the Supreme Court asked the Centre to consider amending the rules for playing the national anthem in movie theatres⁵⁵. And, on January 9, 2018, the Supreme court has disposed the case and changed the previous order and stated that playing of the National Anthem

prior to the screening of feature films in cinema halls is not mandatory, but optional or directory⁵⁶. So as of today, there is no law which States that a person has to stand when the National Anthem is sung or played. In the present study, we seek people's opinion on punishment for those who don't stand for national anthem at public places.


Altogether, 30 percent of the respondents fully agree with the statement that the government should punish those who don't stand for the national anthem at public places and 20 percent fully disagree with the statement. The respondents in the Kashmir region of Jammu and Kashmir strongly rejected the idea of State punishment for those who don't stand for the national anthem. Three fourth of the Kashmiri people fully disagree with this idea. On the other hand, in the Jammu region nearly half of the people supported the idea that the government should punish those who don't stand for the national anthem. Along with the Kashmir region, people from two north-eastern States, Nagaland and Mizoram also reject the idea of State punishment for not standing for the national anthem. Close to one third of the people in Nagaland fully disagree, whereas in Mizoram 18 percent fully disagree or did not express their opinion. The same degree of disagreement was also visible in West Bengal where 18 percent of the people fully disagree and 36 percent did not share their opinion on this statement. States in the Hindi heartland such as Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand took more nationalist positions where close to half of the respondents (except Uttarakhand, with 40 percent) fully agree that the government should punish those not standing for the national anthem. Respondents in the remaining sampled States took middle positions on this question with an inclination towards agreement with the statement (Figure 3C.3).

Figure 3C.3: Opinion on punishment for those who don't stand for national anthem at public places (by State)



An analysis by Caste-community wise also indicates that all castes of Hindu religion - except Hindu Adivasis - agree more than they disagree on the statement that the government should punish those who don't stand when the national anthem is played or sung. The Hindu tribal and Adivasi communities are mainly located in States like Tripura, Assam and West Bengal. So their position on this question is mainly influenced by their geographical and political position. On the other hand, religious identity has a greater impact on their opinion. For instance, people from Muslim communities, followed by Christianity-practicing tribals, fully disagree with the idea of punishment for not standing for the national anthem. Interestingly, Sikh people have a different opinion on this question. Dalit Sikhs were found to be in favour of State punishment for not standing for national anthem whereas a higher number of Sikhs (includes Jat Sikh, Khattris and so on) did not agree with this statement (Figure 3C.4).

Figure 3C.4: Opinion on punishment to those who don't stand for national anthem at public places (by Caste/Community)




3. Punish those who Eat Beef/Cow Meat

In the last two or three years, media reported several incidents where people from minority communities were attacked or lynched by mobs, allegedly for consuming beef or cow meat. There is no uniform law eating beef across Indian States, but various Indian States have different laws regarding cow slaughter and eating cow meat. But in given definition 'beef' is not clearly stated in these State acts. While there is no clear definition of 'beef', most Indian States have laws regarding cow slaughter and beef consumption ranging from a total ban on cow slaughter and cow meat consumption to having some relaxations. But in States like Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, West Bengal, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, Sikkim (a bill was proposed in the assembly in August 2017, but there is no such act implemented till the study was conducted in the State) and Kerala there is no such law. In States like Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Assam, Bihar, Odisha and Tamil Nadu, cow slaughter is allowed after availing a fit-for-slaughter certificate from the recognised State agencies.

In our study we found that in States where cow slaughter is completely banned, they strongly supported the punishment for those who consume beef/cow meat such as Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand. States like Mizoram, Nagaland and Kerala, where there are no such laws, overwhelmingly reject the idea of punishment for those who consume cow meat. Tripura and West Bengal also fall in the category of the States where there is no law on cow slaughter, but in these two States a little more than one in five respondents did not express their opinion on this question. Unlike Mizoram, Nagaland and Kerala, these two States (Tripura and West Bengal) have more Hindu population and therefore, only 39 percent of the respondents in Tripura and 30 percent in West Bengal fully disagree with the statement that people should be punished by the government for eating beef or cow meat.


Jammu and Kashmir has one of the most strict laws on cow slaughter where the slaughter of cow, its progeny and buffalo is punishable. An accused person can be punished by up to 10 years of jail and a fine that is five times the animal's price. However, two regions, Jammu and Kashmir of the State have different perceptions. Jammu region of the State where there is a large Hindu population supports the point that there should be a punishment for those who consume beef or cow meat whereas Kashmir region, with a significant Muslim population, rejects the idea that there should be a punishment for those who eat beef or cow meat. A little more than four out of five respondents in Kashmir fully disagree with the statement that the government should punish those who consume beef or cow meat (Figure 3C.5).

Figure 3C.5: Opinion on punishment to those who eat beef/cow meat (by State)



The discussion above indicates that States have different opinions on the issue of punishment for consuming beef. It is possible that States have perhaps shaped their perception on this issue based on religion. Therefore, to understand how various communities have responded to this issue, a caste-community wise analysis is done. Beef consumption is a part of the food habit for people belonging to Muslim and Christian communities. However, we can notice the intra-religion variations in the opinion. Muslims strongly reject the idea of punishment for beef consumption whereas the Christian community has divided opinion. Adivasi Christians strongly reject the idea of punishment. Close to four-fifths of the respondents from this community fully disagree with State punishment for those who consume beef. Adivasi Christians are mainly located in the north-eastern part of India where beef consumption is part of their food habit and there is no law regarding cow slaughter and beef consumption. On the other hand, half of the other Christians strongly refuted the statement. Different Hindu castes hold different opinions. Hindu Upper Castes and Hindu Dalits were found to be more in favour of punishment for consuming beef. Interestingly Hindu Dalits is also not a homogenous category. Hindu Dalits of Tamil Nadu, Tripura and Assam reject the idea whereas Hindu Dalits of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Delhi overwhelmingly support the idea of punishment for beef consumption. On the other side, Hindu OBC and Hindu Adivasis don't support the States as the other caste of Hindu religion (Figure 3C.6). OBCs from Kerala and Tamil Nadu completely rejected the idea of punishment for beef consumption whereas OBCs from the Hindi heartland support the punishment for beef consumption.

Figure 3C.6: Opinion on punishment to those who eat beef/cow meat (by Caste/Community)




4. Punish those who engage in Religious Conversion

The issue of religious conversion is an oft-debated one in India, and after 2014 it has become the subject of many social and political discussions. In some States these mass conversions occurred to draw attention towards community-based problems. There is no national law to prevent religious conversion and many Hindu organisations have been demanding a strong anti-conversion law. In 1954 a bill called Indian Conversion (Regulation and Registration Bill) was brought into the Parliament but could not be passed due to huge opposition. At present, there are seven Indian States namely, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh which have anti-conversion laws to stop forced and fraud conversion⁵⁷. Out of these seven States, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh are the States where this act is in force.


However, some Hindu organisations like Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) widely criticise religious conversions and have also launched a movement that they call 'Ghar Wapasi' to bring back to the converted people into the Hindu religion⁵⁸. These Hindu organisations are also demanding a strong anti-conversion law in India. Keeping these issues in mind, we asked our respondents their opinion on whether people engaged in religious conversions should be punished by the government. We found that overall, people's opinion on this issue was sharply divided. However, the proportion of those who fully disagree with the statement was higher than those who fully agree. Unlike for other questions, a higher number of respondents (23 percent) did not express their opinion on the issue of religious conversion. Disagreement was higher among Christian dominated States - people in Mizoram (60 percent) and Nagaland (44 percent) fully disagree with the statement that the government should punish those found to be engaged in religious conversions. Rejection was also high among respondents in States like Kerala (37 percent), Tripura (28 percent), Tamil Nadu (27 percent) and Assam (23 percent). On the contrary, support for punishment for religious conversion was found to be greater in States like Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand (Figure 3C.7).

Figure 3C.7 Opinion on Punishment to those who Engaged in Religious Conversions (by State)



When we look at the opinions through a caste-community lens, we find that again, except Hindu Adivasis, all other Hindus supported the idea of punishment for religious conversion. Interestingly, more Sikhs than Hindus are more likely to support punishment for religious conversion. Strong rejection was found among people from Adivasi Christian communities and people from other minority religions (Figure 3C.8).


Figure 3C.8: Opinion on punishment to those who engaged in religious conversion (by Caste/Community)



5. Index of Nationalism


An index of nationalism was constructed using these four questions and based on their opinion, respondents were divided into three groups – 1. opposed to conservative nationalist thoughts, 2. centrist and 3. conservative nationalist thoughts. Those who reject the idea of punishment for the imposition of nationalism were labelled as ‘opposed to conservative nationalist thoughts’ and those who support punishment were labelled as ‘conservative nationalist thoughts’. People having middle responses were put in the category of ‘centrist’. There were a few who did not respond to any of these questions. Overall, two-fifth of the people take a centrist position. One-third were found to be conservative nationalists who believe that people should be punished for not following majoritarian beliefs. Nonetheless, 27 percent of the people were opposed to conservative position and rejected the idea of populist or majoritarian practices. Different States have different positions on the idea of nationalism. States like Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Uttarakhand, and the Jammu region took the stand of conservative nationalists where more than half of the respondents supported the punishment for all four issues. On the contrary, people in the Kashmir region, Nagaland and to some extent Mizoram were found to be opposed to conservative nationalist thoughts. Respondents in Assam, Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal took a centrist stand on the issue of nationalism (Figure 3C.9).

Figure 3C.9: Index of Nationalism (by State)



When we look at the caste/community-wise opinion on nationalism, we found that caste groups such as upper caste Hindu, Hindu OBCs and Hindu Dalits hold conservative nationalist thoughts these issues. On the other hand, Muslims, Christians Adivasis and other religious minorities oppose conservative nationalist thoughts. Hindu Adivasis and other Christian communities took a centrist position (Figure 3C.10).

Figure 3C.10: Index of Nationalism (by Caste/Community)



The location of the respondents also has an impact on their perceived opinions . At first glance, it seems that people living in urban areas would hold less conservative nationalist thoughts. But a further bifurcation of urban areas into towns and metro cities reveals that people living in the metros (Delhi, Chennai and Kolkata in our sample) hold more conservative nationalist thoughts (52 percent) . On the other hand, one third of the respondents in towns and cities oppose conservative nationalist thoughts (Figure 3C.11).

Figure 3C.11: Index of Nationalism (by Rural-Urban)




We also examined whether the level of media exposure has any impact on people’s perception of nationalism. It is an important variable because in the past few years, these issues have been discussed and debated on media. Our data indicates that increased levels of media exposure also increase conservative nationalist thought. People with low media exposure hold a centrist position (Figure 3C.12).

Figure 3C.12: Index of Nationalism (by Media Exposure)



Education levels have no systemic relation but our data indicated that people having a higher education hold extreme opinions. The proportion of people with a centrist view is larger among people with low levels of education (Figure 3C.13).

Figure 3C.13: Index of Nationalism (by Education Level)



Conclusion

To sum up, our findings are that people's position on issues related to nationalism is clearly associated with their geographical and social position and linked with their caste and religious identity. States located in the Hindi heartland and with a higher proportion of Hindu population hold conservative nationalist thoughts whereas States located at border areas like Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura either oppose conservative nationalist thoughts or take centrist positions. Along with geographical position, caste and religion of the respondents also shapes their perception towards nationalism. Religious minorities such as Christians and Muslims oppose conservative nationalist thoughts whereas Hindus (except Adivasis) take conservative positions.

3.D / Populism

Has India turned populist? Personality-based politics and majoritarian nationalism have always been a part of the fabric of India's democracy, but the recent success of populists around the world and in the 2014 elections in India, compels scholars to sharpen our understanding of these themes, and of populism, in India. We need to understand the nature, spread and depth of populism in India better, as that has implications on democratic disenchantment, a possible consequence of politics between elections.

Much of the literature on populism in India is focused on understanding populism through electoral mobilisation, political discourse and governance, but such a focus helps us to grapple with only the supply side. The demand side of looking at the scale and depth of populist attitudes in India can help us explain how ideas at the individual level can generate mass outcomes⁵⁹.

We adopt a conservative understanding of populism in this survey as there is scholarly consensus on these fundamental parameters to define populism. We understand populism to comprise of three attributes - popular sovereignty, the existence of a Manichean ethic and an aversion to public institutions.

First, the defining feature of populism is the existence of a perceptible divide between the 'people' and the 'other'. Populists typically believe that there is a community of people whose interests are not being served by some constructed 'other' – both categories being fluidly defined but nevertheless existent. Our attempt through the survey was to understand who these 'people' are and who the 'other' is. The question we had asked was: "In your opinion, who is blocking progress of people like you?" (Q8). The identified groups include: (a) Elites/Influential people, (b) Minorities, (c) Migrants/ Outsiders, (d) Lower castes, and (e) Upper castes. Response categories are "yes" or "no".

Second, populist scholars agree that the division between the people and the 'others' is necessarily a moral one wherein the people are considered virtuous and the other is considered self-serving at best or corrupt at worst. By extension then, the relationship between them acquires a Manichean character whereby their relationship is antagonistic and not pluralist in nature and the will of the 'people' (or popular sovereignty) is pitted against the 'other'. Our attempt through the survey was to understand whether respondents understand political contestations as essentially antagonistic or accommodative by nature. The question we had asked for this attribute is as follows: "Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most." (Q26)

Statement 1: Politics is ultimately a battle between good and bad.

Statement 2: Politics is ultimately a compromise between good and bad.

Response categories include: "Agree with Statement 1" or "Agree with Statement 2."

And third, by implication, such people in an antagonistic relationship with the other, are averse to existing public institutions because they feel that the latter have been captured by the other, and therefore necessitates re-envisioning such institutions to live up to their original promise. It must be said here that in India, election is one such 'institution' that escapes this aversion and indeed is seen as a pathway to better governance. The question that captures this attribute is as follows: "Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most." (Q 52)

Statement 1: Elected leaders should be able to override the courts to serve the people better.

Statement 2: Courts should be able to limit elected leaders to protect the people better.

Response categories include: "Agree with Statement 1" or "Agree with Statement 2."


We provide a summary of results from questions pertaining to each of these attributes. We also provide a summary of results from respondents who intersect with any two or all three of these attributes. We hope to understand what motivates the spread and depth of populist sentiments among respondents by exploring their individual attributes in terms of background characteristics. The last section provides some concluding remarks.

Populism and its three attributes.

I. Who are the People Against?

The first question related to populism was to ascertain if there is widespread disenchantment with a particular group. That a little more than 48 percent of all respondents reflected an anti-elite attitude, which was also more than twice that of any other cleavage (minorities, migrants, upper and lower castes), clearly shows that the primary motivation behind populist attitudes is against elites more than traditional cleavages that typically influence politics in India. It is also the case that this attitude is concentrated in a few states like Kashmir, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi (Figure 3D.1). On the other hand, Kerala stands out as a state that reflects a non-populist attitude, though it has the largest number of respondents who had 'no opinion' on the question.

Figure 3D.1: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by State)




Further, the survey results do point to some underlying factors that influence respondents with a populist attitude. Interestingly, age, caste and religion seem to matter more than gender and location (urban/rural), while education and class have a moderate influence. We present the results on age, religion, caste and education and exclude the other factors considering their limited influence on the anti-elite perception.

Figure 3D.2: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Age)




Figure 3D.2 reveals two patterns. First, older respondents seem to be less certain about their opinions. Second, an anti-elite sentiment seems to decrease quite substantially as the age of the respondents seem to increase. While it would not be possible to argue what the results would be if the respondents grow older or how they felt when they were younger, one can clearly say that the younger population today is relatively more anti-elitist than the elder population, and that the latter is less certain as to where they stand on the 'elite versus the people' divide.

Figure 3D.3: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Religion)




With the exception of Christians, almost all other non-Hindu religions seem to hold an anti-elite attitude particularly Sikhs, other religions, and Muslims (Figure 3D.3). While the antagonism is most stark amongst the Sikhs, Christians seem to be equally divided on this question. However, Hindu's being the largest religious group, the analysis warrants that we examine if there are further divisions within the Hindus.

Figure 3D.4: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Caste)



Dalits and other castes within the Hindu population seem to have a higher proportion of respondents who share an anti-elitist attitude more than the other caste groups (Figure 3D.4). Interestingly, the Adivasi caste group seems to be as divided as the Christians on this question. In sum, one could speculate that the lower castes and Dalits may be reflecting a sentiment against upper and OBC caste groups even though the latter groups are divided on this question.

Figure 3D.5: Anti-Elite Sentiment (by Education Level)




The education table reflects two interesting patterns – an upward linear line among those who believe that elites are not blocking their progress, and a U-shaped curved line among those who believe that they are indeed blocking their progress (Figure 3D.5). Education seems to play a role among those who feel that elites are not blocking their progress, as college educated respondents seem to feel less strongly anti-elite compared to the non-literates. Simultaneously however, among those who feel that elites are blocking their progress, both the non-literates and the college educated hold relatively strong anti-elite views.

II. Is Politics a Battle or Compromise between Good and Evil?

While 48 percent believe that elites are blocking their progress on the one hand, 47 percent believe that politics is ultimately a compromise between starkly divergent views on politics on the other. Put another way, while an anti-elite based antagonism is widespread, it is heartening to note that almost an equally substantial number believe that compromises more than ‘battles’ lies at the core of political contestations. That being said, 29 percent believe that it is a battle, and therefore this result requires further analysis.


Our results show, predictably, that those belonging to urban areas and the upper class seem to endorse the idea of politics being a compromise. Interestingly however, Christians, other religious groups and Adivasi groups seem to share a similar view of politics as well. However, state, age, and education seem to show distinctions in terms of populist attitudes. Finally, gender does not seem to make a difference as the division is almost uniform across the categories. Hence, we present the results related to state, age, and education below.

Figure 3D.6: Battle or Compromise (by State)




An antagonistic relationship between political contestants seems to be a feeling concentrated in fewer states compared to an anti-elite attitude, as seen above (Figure 3D.6). Respondents in Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh seem to have a stronger populist perception relative to other states, but respondents in Punjab seem to distinguish between anti-elite perceptions and the nature of political contestants. Interestingly, Kerala seems to share this idea of antagonistic political contestants, whereas Nagaland is exactly on the opposite end. Even more interesting, respondents in Delhi seem to overwhelmingly think that politics is a compromise and not a battle between good and bad.

Figure 3D. 7: Battle or Compromise (by Age Group)



Interestingly, while the idea of an antagonistic relationship is equally shared across all age groups, younger people seem to be more persuaded by the idea of a compromise between good and bad political contestants. However, the latter pattern needs to be understood carefully as around 56 percent of those who agree that it is a compromise have not revealed their age (Figure 3D.7).

Figure 3D. 8: Battle or Compromise (by Education Level)




On education, those who hold a high school or college level education seem to have an opinion on this question relative to those who have lower levels of education – only 17 percent in the former two groups do not have an opinion on this question (Figure 3D.8). Although education matters in the forming of an opinion, these opinions also diverge as 32 percent of the respondents who have studied up to middle school seem to believe that politics is a battle. Put another way, education seems to help form opinions but not necessarily in the direction that politics is a compromise between good and bad.

III. Can Elected Leaders Override Courts on Behalf of the People?


The third question related to populist attitudes is whether respondents believe that elected leaders should be able to override courts, reflecting an attitude that popular sovereignty can undermine public institutions because they may feel that such sacrosanct institutions are in fact not representative of popular interests. Predictably, respondents that are upper class and those that are in urban locations believe that courts are sacrosanct. Interestingly divergent results are revealed when one considers states, age and education. Gender, caste and religion (excepting Sikhs) do not seem to show divergent patterns with the larger majority for courts and a significant minority for elected leaders. On this question then, we present results related to state, age and education.

Figure 3D. 9: Elected Leaders can Override Courts (by State)




Clearly, the eastern states of West Bengal, Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura do not feel that elected leaders can override courts (Figure 3D.9). At the other end, Punjab, Tamil Nadu followed by Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and Kashmir have more than a quarter of the respondents who think that elected leaders can override courts. Delhi is an interesting case in that most people feel that courts should be able to limit elected leaders as against the opposite perception.

Figure 3D. 10: Elected Leaders can Override Courts (by Age Group)



While one should note that around 54 percent of respondents who believe that courts should limit elected leaders have not mentioned their age, it is interesting that the older respondents don't seem to have an opinion on this question (Figure 3D.10). Seen another way, a substantial number of young respondents believe in the courts, and around one fifth of respondents across all age groups affirm the contrary. There are larger numbers of older groups who do not share an opinion and so remain non-committal about the relationship between the courts and the elected leaders.

Figure 3D. 11: Elected Leaders can Override Courts (by Education Level)




Education clearly shows that educated people have formed opinions on this question with the majority affirming that courts should be able to limit elected leaders (Figure 3D.11). However, one cannot ignore that the percentage of people who believe that elected leaders can override courts is also higher among college educated respondents.

Strong and Moderate Populism

Finally, to understand the prevalence of a populist attitude better, we present results below of respondents who affirm all three 'populist' statements – that elites are blocking their progress, politics is a battle between good and bad, and that elected leaders should be able to override courts. We characterise those respondents – who affirm all three statements – as strong populists. Those respondents who affirm any two of the three statements are considered moderate populists.


Out of the total number of 24197 respondents, only 1326 answered the question. Among those that answered the question, around 10 percent affirmed all three statements, while almost 29 percent affirmed any two of the statements. For the purpose of the report, we will only present the results of the strong populists and only in the cases where the percentages were equal or more than 12 percent. In this case, class, location and age do not seem to matter in that percentages were close to 10 percent, but clear patterns can be seen in the case of state, education, gender, religion and caste.

Figure 3D. 12: Populism (by State)




Strong populists were concentrated in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kashmir (Figure 3D.12). In all the other states, strong populists were less than 10 percent with Kerala, Nagaland and Delhi below 5 percent. Further, more than 50 percent of the respondents were either strong or moderate populists in Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh.

Figure 3D. 13: Populism (by Education Level)




In the case of education, the non-literate respondents seem to have a higher share of strong populists relative to other groups with different levels of education (Figure 3D.13). But it is also the case, that the levels of education and the degree of populist attitudes seem to share similar results across the groups.

Figure 3D. 14: Populism (by Religion)



In the case of religion, clearly the Sikhs and the Muslims hold stronger populist views relative to other religious groups with the Christians and other religious groups being least persuaded by populist statements (Figure 3D.14).

Figure 3D. 15: Populism (by Caste)



In terms of caste, Dalits and other caste groups have relatively higher respondents who have strong populist leanings relative to other groups. Interestingly, Upper Castes, OBC and Adivasi seem to share similar distributions (Figure 3D.15).

Conclusion

Based on the results from the above questions, we can claim that India is not overwhelmingly populist because almost two-thirds of the population seem to affirm the opposite on most of the questions. On the contrary, we cannot say that India is pluralist, but it is essentially non-populist. However, it is disconcerting that around 20 – 30 percent on an average seem to affirm questions that can be construed as highly strong assertions of populism.

It is also important to note that the spread and depth of populist sentiment clearly indicates that there is much research to be done in this area. It is clear that state-level characteristics do seem to matter as much as individual characteristics especially age, education, religion and caste. Interestingly, rural urban locations, gender and class do not seem as significant as originally presumed.

4.

Political

Institutions

4.A / Ascertaining Citizen Preferences

1. Most Important Issue

This chapter attempts to understand people's perceptions in 12 states about important issues and also whether these issues shape their view on what the government's responsibilities or priorities should be. In order to understand what the important issues are for the voters, a question on issues was operationalised into the survey questionnaire (Q4) as an open-ended question (post coded later into crisper categories for the purpose of better analysis): In your opinion, what is the most important issue facing India today? 19 per cent of the respondents state unemployment to be the single biggest problem in the country today. Development, Growth and Poverty is at 15 per cent, of which poverty alone is stated by 11 per cent of the respondents. Physical infrastructure and law, governance and corruption are at 13 per cent each and price rise was affirmed by 11 per cent. These make up the top five issues for the people of 12 states (Figure 4A.1). One in every five respondents did not offer any response on this question.


Figure 4A.1: Unemployment is the primary issue concerning the people



There is a fair degree of variation on significant issues across the states. Unemployment does not emerge as the most important issues for all the states. Figure 4A.2, represents a heatmap of issues across states in which the darker shades represent a larger share of respondents who cite the issue. Of the 12 states where the study was conducted, only six stated it as the most important issue. These states were Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Tripura, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. Amongst these six states, the issue is the most predominant for Uttarakhand where the figure was 17 percentage points higher than the average. Though the biggest issue for Jammu and Kashmir is unemployment and development, growth and poverty, but when we segregate the data for the Jammu and Kashmir regions, we see clear variation on what is considered the predominant issue. While unemployment is the biggest issue in Jammu region, in Kashmir, however, it is the Kashmir problem; two in every five respondents in valley state this to be the most important issue. For Kerala the top two issues are development' growth and poverty and law, governance and corruption. Physical infrastructure, which includes the issue of drinking water, electricity, housing, roads, cleanliness and other basic amenities, is the biggest issue for the people in the states of Assam, Mizoram, and West Bengal. Two in every five respondent of Assam state physical infrastructure as the most important issue. In Tamil Nadu the top issues are physical infrastructure and law, governance and corruption. Law, governance and corruption is also the biggest issue in Kerala and Nagaland.


When we look at the issue of farmers and agriculture one notes a clear disappointment regarding farmers issues in Tamil Nadu and 4 per cent of the farmers report this to be the issue of significance. In March 2017⁶⁰ and November 2018⁶¹, farmers from the state protested in Delhi with a series of demands to alleviate the farmer's plight and government apathy towards their cause⁶². They carried the skulls of other farmers who had committed suicide and demanded removal of all farmer loans, profitable price for their agricultural products and a ₹5,000 pension for farmers per month.

Figure 4A.2: State- wise breakup of the concerned issues.




On segregating important issues by education of the respondents, Figure 4A.3, we observe that education makes a significant difference on only two issues: unemployment and law governance and corruption. Unemployment as an issue find more support when one moves from non-literate voters to highly educated voters. For the college educated respondents, unemployment is an issue for 26 per cent of the respondents. The corresponding figures for the matriculate, the primary educated and the non-literate were 19, 13 and 12 per cent respectively. The biggest issue clearly differs across education. Among the non-literates, the predominant issue was of growth and development (18 per cent), for primary educated respondents, it was physical infrastructure (19 per cent) and for the matriculate and college educated voters it was unemployment (19 and 26 per cent respectively).

Figure 4A.3: Education makes significant difference only on two Issues



Unemployment is also the prime concern for young Indians as can be seen in Figure 4A.4. Undoubtedly as one moves from young voters to comparatively older voters, one notices a decline in unemployment as the important issue. Unemployment is the biggest issue for those belonging to the age group of 18- 35 years and this issue takes a back seat for those respondents above the age of 36 years. The only significant difference with regard to gender on the most important issue facing India is in the case of unemployment where more men state it as an issue than women. This difference remains even when we analyse at college educated men and women. We do not observe much difference on issues across locality, except for the two topics of law governance and corruption and physical infrastructure. Where on one hand physical infrastructure, is an important issue for those residing in rural areas (15 vis-à-vis 10 per cent), law, governance and corruption is a predominant concern for those in urban localities (17 vis-à-vis 11 per cent). All other issues were more or less of equal concern to both rural and urban residents.


Figure 4A.4: Unemployment a bigger issue for the young



Different Issues During and Between the Time of Elections

A similar question was asked in the post poll survey conducted by Lokniti-CSDS in 2014 where the voters were asked identify the issue of utmost significance when deciding their vote-choice. We find that people prioritize different issues during the time of elections compared to periods between elections (Figure 4A.5). Where on one hand, the top two dominant issues for the 12 states in 2014 were price rise (20 per cent) followed by law, governance & corruption (18 per cent), the voters of the same states identify different issues in 2018. From 20 per cent in 2014 to 11 per cent in 2018, the issue of price rise has seen a steep decline. Law, governance and corruption is another topic which has seen a similar decline from 18 to 13 per cent. On the other hand the issue of unemployment has seen a massive increase in support from 2014 to 2018. In 2014, only 6 per cent of the voters stated this to be an important issue for them while voting, while in 2018, the figure increased three fold to 19 per cent. The other issues which are given comparatively lesser importance during elections but are more important during the inter-election period are development, growth and poverty, physical infrastructure, social issues and social infrastructure. The only states which reported the same issue both during election and between elections are Tamil Nadu and Tripura. In Tamil Nadu the issue is physical infrastructure and in Tripura it is unemployment. All other states reported different issues during elections and after.

Figure 4A.5: Citizens prioritize different issues during the time of elections



2. Citizen Defined Government Priorities

The earlier section highlighted the issues that were important to citizens and how these issues differed across states and at the time of elections. This section will focus on whether the citizens identify the same topics as the most pressing issues and as government's priority. In order to gauge this, an open-ended question (Q45) with post-coded categories was asked on what the most important responsibility of a government is towards its citizens: "What is the most important responsibility of a government towards its citizens?"

Figure 4A.6 shows the spread of responses. The citizens prioritize unemployment and development, growth and poverty as the primary responsibilities of the government (15 per cent each). It was closely followed by physical infrastructure (14 per cent) and law, governance and corruption (13 per cent). While 19 per cent of the respondents find unemployment to be the most important issue facing the country, a slightly lower 15 per cent identify the same as government responsibility; it does not retain the same prominence as a government responsibility. For all other topics roughly the same proportion of respondents identify them as important issues and also as important governmental responsibilities.

The inter-state variation in Figure 4A.7 show interesting results. Figure 4A.7, like Figure 4A.2, is a heatmap. The darker parts of the graph show greater support for an issue to be considered as government priority. While the most pressing issue is also identified the government priority in all states, there is much variation in the extent to which the predominant issues find support as important government responsibilities. The states can be classified into three groups based on support for topics as important issues and important government responsibilities. In most states, a smaller share of respondents identify topics as government responsibilities compared to the share of respondents who consider these topics to be predominant issues. In Mizoram and Punjab, unlike other states, a higher proportion of respondents support certain topics as government priorities compared to the share who consider these topics to be pressing issues. This begs the question, why it that some issues are find more support as important issues but do not retain the same importance when it comes to government's responsibilities? Do citizens doubt government ability to deliver in the areas they consider important or so they feel that the government is responsible for some issues and not for others?

Figure 4A.6: Citizen defined government priorities in aggregate terms.




Figure 4A.7: State-wise government priorities of citizens



Government's Priority across Various Socio-Economic Groupings

There is no significant difference across different economic classes on government responsibilities barring unemployment and law, governance and corruption which a greater proportion of upper class citizens want the government to prioritize. 19 per cent of the respondents belonging to the upper class report unemployment to be the most important responsibility of the government, however the figure drops by 9 percentage points among the poor (10 per cent). The topic of development, growth and poverty is the biggest priority at 16 per cent among the poor respondents. Of the 16 per cent, poverty alone was mentioned by 8 per cent of the respondents. For those belonging to the upper class, the top government priority is unemployment followed by law, governance and corruption. Unemployment is the biggest priority for the younger respondents (18 – 36 years), but for the older respondents (36 years and above) the biggest priority shift to development, growth and poverty. Among the educated respondents too, unemployment is the biggest government priority (20 per cent). Among respondents of all other categories, the same figure was below 15 per cent.

On disaggregating the responses by caste, we find that across caste groups, unemployment is the biggest government priority with the exception of Adivasis and Muslims. Where on one hand Adivasis state physical infrastructure as the biggest government responsibility (24 per cent), Muslims consider development, growth and poverty (18 per cent) and followed by unemployment (17 per cent). In Punjab, price rise is considered government priority by almost twice the average figure (14 per cent and opposed to average of 6 per cent). This state also has the highest proportion of respondents who feel that unemployment as the biggest issue facing India (25 per cent). While unemployment, price rise and law, governance and corruption are considered as government responsibility in the urban parts of the states, physical infrastructure, social infrastructure and development, growth and poverty find more support in rural areas. On all the other issues, there is no significant difference.

To sum up, this chapter tried to delve into what people identify as important issues and whether these issues also shape their view on what the utmost responsibility of the government should be. The finding of this section reveals some interesting trends. Firstly, unemployment, followed by development, growth and poverty, are the most important issues facing India according to the respondents. However, the salience of these issues differ across states. Secondly, people report different issues at the time of elections and periods between elections. The findings of this section reveals that price rise and law, governance and corruption were the most important issues during national elections of 2014, however the voters identify vastly different issues in 2018. Thirdly, though there is similarity in the topics that are considered as the most important issue and those identified as biggest government responsibilities, the support for certain topics as pressing issues do not find similar support as government responsibilities. Finally, in most states the topics identified as the most important issues rank lower as government priorities, barring the states of Mizoram and Punjab.

4.B / The State-Citizen Interface

One of the most important channels of interaction between the state and its citizens is through schemes and public services provided by governments. The state and citizens also interact through various political and social institutions which safeguard the interest of citizens and resolve issues or challenges faced by them. People approach such institutions for dispute resolution, get services, and to get their work done. However, are citizens aware of opportunities provided by Central and State governments? Do they have access to schemes that have the potential improve livelihoods? And what are kinds of challenges they face while accessing public services? And what sorts of institutions do citizens approach for dispute resolution and to access services?

We explore these questions in the following sections through multiple lenses: across States, across caste and religious identities, levels of education, and class. The first section examines the awareness of citizens with regard to both Central and State level schemes. These schemes cover four broad areas: agriculture, housing, employment, and health care. We find that awareness of both Central and State schemes is influenced by the social position of the respondent. In the second section, we focus on the beneficiaries of these schemes. Do targeted groups benefit from these schemes? Section three considers the experiences of citizens in availing public services such as education, health services, sanitation, water and electricity. The final section reports on the kinds of institutions citizens approach for dispute resolution and get important work done.

The questions asked in the survey that identify this information are as follows: (a) "Now I am going to name a few schemes (PM Fasal Bima Yojana, PM Jan Avas Yojana, PM Jan Aushadi Yojana, and MGNREGA) that the Central Government has initiated for the benefit of people. Have you or your family availed any benefit from these schemes?" The responses are "Benefitted", "Not benefitted" and "Not Heard." (Q5); and (b) "Now I am going to name a few schemes (agriculture schemes, medical/health schemes, employment schemes, education schemes) which have been launched by the (State) government for the benefit of the people. Have you or anyone in your family benefitted from these schemes." The responses are "Benefitted", "Not benefitted" and "Not Heard." (Q19).

1. Awareness of Central and State Welfare Schemes

For availing the benefits of the schemes, awareness about them is very important. Therefore, to understand the level of awareness about the schemes launched by the both Centre and state governments, respondents were asked various questions regarding various welfare schemes – agriculture, housing, employment and health related schemes.

Figure 4B.1: Awareness of Central and State schemes (by State)




We find that, with the exception of employment schemes, respondents are marginally more aware about state schemes compared to central schemes (Figure 4B.1). Awareness of Central agriculture schemes is high in Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Tripura, Punjab and Kerala. With the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, Tripura, and West Bengal, the level of awareness about State agriculture schemes among farmers across the States is also high. There are a few States where awareness about the central agricultural scheme is higher than state schemes such as Tripura, West Bengal, Uttarakhand, Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir. In Assam, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand approximately nine in ten respondents are aware of a Central housing scheme, Pradhan Mantri Jan Avas Yojna. In Punjab, West Bengal and Delhi the level of awareness about Central and State housing schemes is about the same. And in Kerala, Mizoram and Tamil Nadu, we find more

respondents aware of State housing schemes compared to Central housing schemes. Greater than 80 percent of respondents are aware of Central employment schemes. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme is widely recognized relative to State employment schemes across most States. In Tamil Nadu and Delhi, however, more respondents are aware of State employment schemes. In Kerala and Mizoram awareness for both schemes are somewhat same.

When it comes to the health scheme, the awareness about state health schemes is much higher than the central health scheme, Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojna. Overall, 85 percent of the respondents are aware of state health schemes, whereas 73 percent are aware of central health scheme. In Mizoram, Punjab, West Bengal, Delhi and Uttarakhand there is a greater awareness of State health schemes relative to Central health schemes. In Assam, however, the Central health scheme is recognized more than state health scheme. In the other States, awareness about the both central and state health schemes are somewhat equal.


Figure 4B.2: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes (by States)



We create a summative index of awareness that ranges from low awareness to high awareness. for both Central and State schemes. In Assam, Tripura, Delhi and Uttarakhand respondents reveal a high level of awareness across Central schemes compared to State schemes (Figure 4B.2). In Kerala, Mizoram, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, there is a high level of awareness regarding State schemes. In Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir, more respondents indicate a low level of awareness when it comes to Central schemes (note that except agricultural schemes in Jammu and Kashmir, respondents were not asked about State schemes in these two States). For instance, approximately 42 percent of respondents in Nagaland have low levels of awareness regarding Central schemes and


a third of respondents in Jammu and Kashmir indicate a low level of awareness). In Uttar Pradesh, level of awareness about the state and central scheme is about the same. Eighty one percent of respondents in Tripura are highly aware of Central schemes. In Assam and Kerala, respondents are also highly aware of Central schemes. In Kerala, Mizoram, and Tamil Nadu, respondents indicate a high level of awareness of State schemes.

Figure 4B.3: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes (by Caste/Communities)



When we examine levels of awareness across caste and religion, we find that Christian Adivasi respondents have the lowest awareness of schemes introduced by the Centre. Approximately 35 percent of Christian Adivasi respondents have a low level of awareness of Central schemes. Respondents with 35 percent of people who were less aware about the central schemes. On the other hand, 13 percent of Hindu Adivasis exhibit a low awareness of Central schemes, while 66 percent indicate high awareness. Among State schemes Christian Adivasis reflect the lowest proportions of low awareness, and 84 percent indicate a high awareness. (Figure 4B.3).

Figure 4B.4: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes (by Education Levels)



Could differences in education be a possible reason for the degree of awareness (Figure 4B.4). As levels of education increase we find that the proportion of respondents who have a low level of awareness of either Central or State schemes decreases. Similarly, the proportion of respondents who exhibit high awareness about Central and State schemes increases. Twenty five percent of non-literates have a low level of awareness while 17 percent of respondents with a college education have low awareness. While 50 percent of non-literate have a high level of awareness, the proportion increases to 66 percent.

Figure 4B.5: Index of Awareness about the Central and state schemes (by Economic Class)




We find that economic class of an individual is correlated to awareness as well (Figure 4B.5). Respondents classified as poor have lower levels of awareness compared to those considered wealthier. For instance, about 20 percent of respondents among the poor have a low level of awareness of Central schemes. This proportion drops to about 19

percent among the upper classes. While 56 percent of poor have a high awareness, the proportion increases to 63 percent for the upper class. Awareness of State schemes follows similar lines. Sixteen percent of poor respondents reflect a low awareness of Central schemes and 57 percent show a high level of awareness. The proportions for those classified as upper class, the proportions are 9 and 67 percent. Awareness of both Central and State schemes across class and education exhibit similar patterns.

2. Beneficiaries of the Central and State Welfare Schemes

Who benefits from Central and State schemes? We organize the different Central and State schemes into the following categories - agriculture, employment, housing and health.

Figure 4B.6: Beneficiaries of Schemes (by States)



We find that the beneficiaries of State agricultural schemes (14 percent) are higher than Central agricultural scheme (7 percent). The largest proportion of beneficiaries of Central agriculture schemes are farmers in Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh with 16 and 15 percent respectively. The counterparts for State agricultural schemes are in Mizoram and Tamil Nadu. Close to half of the farmers in Mizoram and 21 percent of people in Tamil Nadu report benefits of state agricultural schemes.

We find that Central housing schemes has a greater proportion of beneficiaries (10 percent) relative to State housing schemes (8 percent). The largest proportions of beneficiaries of Central housing schemes are in Assam and Uttarakhand (Figure 4B.6). In rest of the states, we do not observe much difference in the proportions of the beneficiaries of Central and State housing schemes. The greater difference in beneficiaries was observed in employment schemes. Overall, only 7 percent of the respondents say they got benefits of state employment scheme, but 32 percent say they have availed the central employment scheme, NREGA. In Mizoram and Tripura, close to two-third of the respondents indicate benefits of NREGA, and the proportions for Nagaland and West Bengal are about 45 and 43 percent respectively.


Unlike employment scheme, more respondents indicate benefits from from State health schemes as compared to Central health scheme. Data indicate that only eight percent of the respondents report benefits from a Central health schemes whereas when it comes to the state health schemes, every one out of five respondents availed the benefits of health schemes launched by their respective state governments. Larger proportions of beneficiaries are in Tripura and Kerala, about 17 percent and 13 percent respectively. Mizoram and Delhi are found to be performing well in delivering state health schemes. Forty-five percent in Mizoram and 39 percent of respondents in Delhi claim benefits of the state health schemes. Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand and West Bengal also report close to twenty five percent respondents as benefiting from State health schemes.

Figure 4B.7: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Agricultural Schemes (by Type of Farmer)




We find smaller proportions of farmers have availed the benefits from the central agriculture scheme , Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (PMFBY), introduced by the central government in 2016 to ensure crop insurance for farmers in India (Figure 4B.7). However, big and small farmers have benefitted from State agricultural schemes with 24 and 22 percent respectively. benefitted from the state agriculture scheme as compared to tenant cultivator and agricultural laborers .

Figure 4B.8: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Agricultural Schemes (by Caste/Communities)




When viewed through caste we notice that Hindu Dalits (12 percent) report the highest percentage of beneficiaries of housing schemes at the central level followed by Hindu Adivasi and Hindu upper castes with 11 percent each (Figure 4B.8). Christian Adivasis and Dalit Sikhs have the lowest percent of respondents who benefit at the central level with only five percent each. At State level, Hindu Adivasi have highest percentage of people who benefitted from housing schemes at 11 percent. Hindu OBC, Hindu Dalit and OBC Muslims are not far behind with nine percent each. Here as well Dalit Sikhs have the lowest percentage of people, who benefitted from the housing schemes at the state level, with only three percent.

Figure 4B.9: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Housing Schemes (by Economic Class)




Economic class of the respondents does not have much impact in availing benefits of housing schemes (Figure 4B.9). Eleven percent of the poor benefit from the housing scheme introduced by the Centre. Smaller proportions across class groups benefit from state housing schemes.

Figure 4B.10: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Housing Schemes (by Rural-Urban)




Rural areas seem to have benefited more than the urban areas at the central and the state level, but difference is not much (Figure 4B.10).

Figure 4B.11: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Employment Schemes (by Caste/Communities)




We find that across caste and religious groups, Christian Adivasis appear to have benefitted the most (72 percent) from the Central employment scheme, NREGA (Figure 4B.11). Hindu Adivasis and Dalits are also beneficiaries with 53 and 42 percent respectively. Other Sikhs and other Christians are the castes that benefitted the least with 11 and 13 percent. The state employment schemes have relatively have low percentages of beneficiaries across all castes and religions, with only 3 percent of Muslims reporting benefits.

Figure 4B.12: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Health Schemes (by Rural-Urban)




There isn't much variation when we look at Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojna a health scheme offered by the Centre with 8 percent of rural and 7 percent urban respondents reporting benefits (Figure 4B.12). State health schemes have comparatively more beneficiaries than the Central schemes. Urban areas have higher percentage of beneficiaries with 25 percent and rural with 18 percent.

Figure 4B.13: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Health Schemes (by Economic Class)



The beneficiaries of Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojana are same across all classes - 8 percent of people across all classes are the beneficiaries of the scheme (Figure 4B.13). When we look at state health scheme middle classes have the highest percentage of beneficiaries with 22 percent of people who benefitted from the health scheme introduced by the state.

Figure 4B.14: Beneficiaries of Central and States' Health Schemes (by Caste/Communities)




Across caste and religious groups, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojana does not appear to have found purchase (Figure 4B.14). We see that State health schemes are much more beneficial - 43 percent of Christians Adivasis say that they have benefited from the schemes.

3. Citizens' Experience in Availing Public Services

In availing public services like education, healthcare, electricity, water and sanitation, citizen experiences vary – some find it easy while others experience difficulty. Respondents were asked to share their experience of how easy or difficult it was for them to avail public services like education, healthcare, electricity, water and garbage collection.

Figure 4B.15: Experience in availing public services



Overall, access to education system is reported as the easiest, as eight out of ten reported that getting admission for their child in government school was easy – if we combine the categories of very easy and somewhat easy. In contrast, getting a water connection is not as easy; more than one third of the respondents availing water connection find it to be very difficult (Figure 4B.15).

Figure 4B.16: Experience in availing public services (by States)





Figure 4B.16 represent a heat map of ease of availing various services across 12 states. In this heat map, the darker parts represent a higher share of respondents who find it easy to avail a particular service in a state. Access to the government education services is the easiest in Uttarakhand compared to other states as 92 percent of the respondents in Uttarakhand say it is easy for them to avail the education services, followed by Kerala, Assam and Tamil Nadu. On the contrary, access to the education services is not as easy in Delhi. Access to healthcare services at a government medical hospital was reported as easiest by the people of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, while less than 50 percent of respondents in Delhi and West Bengal find it easy. Electricity and water connections are reported as easiest by respondents in Kerala and Mizoram, though in West Bengal the proportions drop to 38 and 21 percent for these services.

Figure 4B.17: Experience in availing public services (by Rural-Urban)



Availing education services is easier in rural areas compared to urban locations (Figure 4B.17). However, all other services are easier to obtain in urban localities compared to rural areas. Data also indicates that factors such as level of education, economic class and caste and religious identity of the respondents have an impact on their experience in availing public services. Generally, respondents from higher economic classes, and those with higher levels of education find it easier to avail public services compared to respondents from lower economic classes, and those less educated.

Figure 4B.18: Experience in availing public services (by Caste/Communities)






Figure 4B.18 represent a heat map of ease of availing various services across caste communities. In this heat map, the darker parts represent a higher share of respondents who find it easy to avail a particular service. Caste and religious identity of respondents also shapes the experience in availing the public services, and it is general notion that a person placed high on social hierarchy can easily avail the services. Sikhs as a community and Hindu OBCs find it easy to to avail education services. Christians (both Adivasi and others) report education as the easiest followed by electricity. Hindu OBC groups also follow a similar pattern. Christian Adivasis and Hindu OBC report sanitation as the easiest service. Christians and Hindu upper castes find it easy to avail electricity services.

Figure 4B.19: Experience in availing public services (by Economic Class)



Education services is easy for middle and lower class groups compared to upper class respondents (Figure 4B.19). The possible reason for this is likely that wealthier citizens are not likely to avail government school education for their children, and have difficulty in getting admission to private schools. With the exception of education services, wealthier classes find it easier to access medical, sanitation, electricity and water connection services compared to poorer respondents.

Figure 4B.20: Experience in availing public services (by Education Levels)




Similarly, respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to report ease in accessing services such as electricity, water, and medical services (Figure 4B.20).

4. Preference for Institutions Citizen Approach

There are several political, non-political, formal and non-formal institutions or individuals whom citizens directly or indirectly approach to get the services or to get their important work done. Figure 4B.21 shows the people and institutions that citizens of different states approach to get important work done. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person.

In Punjab, a little less than eight of ten respondents, and Assam, about one in two respondents, report they will approach councillor to get important work done. In Tripura respondents report approaching local political leaders to get their important work done. In Nagaland preference to approach elder outside family is higher. In Tripura one of three respondents are likely to approach local political leaders to get their work done. In Mizoram 13 percent of respondents say that they will approach religious leaders.

Figure 4B.21: Institutions to approach to get an important work done (by States)



In rural areas more number of respondents (32%) report they will approach the *sarpanch* or councillor followed by local political leaders (15 %) to get their work done (Figure 4B.22). In the urban localities a little less than one of five respondents say they will approach councillor to get their work done. In urban areas, 14 percent of respondents approach an MLA and government officials to get their work done. Compared to rural areas (10%) a marginally higher proportion of respondents in urban areas (11%) report they would approach elder outside family.

Figure 4B.22: Institutions to approach to get an important work done (by Rural-Urban)






Figure 4B.23 show the people that citizens of different caste communities approach to get important work done. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. Caste and community data indicates that a large proportion of respondents approach a councillor. Hindu Adivasis also indicate approaching local political leader to get an important work done. Muslims as a community preferred to approach MLA. Hindu upper caste say they would approach government officials while Christians are more likely to approach religious leaders and elders outside their family to get their work done.

Figure 4B.23: Institutions to approach to get an important work done (by Caste/Communities)



Across levels of education, we find that most of the respondents like to approach councillor or sarpanch followed by local political leaders to get important work done. Figure 4B.24 show the people that citizens at different levels of education approach to get important work done. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. A large proportion of non-educated respondents (39%) said they would approach sarpanch or councillors to get their work done and this proportion is higher as compared to those respondents who were college and above educated (23%) said they will approach councillor or sarpanch.

Figure 4B.24: Institutions to approach to get an important work done (by Education Level)



College educated respondents also report that they approach government officials. Local political leaders also play an important role among those with lower levels of education.

Figure 4B.25: Different forums to resolve various disputes



There are multiple institutions, state as well as non-state, that citizens approach to resolve disputes. Figure 4B.25 show the persons and institutions that citizens approach to resolve various disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. Most respondents find family members as most reliable forum to resolve property disputes, marital disputes and those

related to domestic violence). A village elder is found to be an important forum to resolve neighbourhood disputes. Around one of five respondents say they would approach police to resolve domestic violence. In case of property disputes, 16 percent of respondents also said they will approach a court as forum to resolve property disputes.

Figure 4B.26: Preferred forums to resolve property disputes (by States)




Figure 4B.26 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach to resolve property disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. In Punjab, 60 percent of respondents prefer family members as the forum to resolve property disputes. In Kerala, 50 percent of respondents prefer to resolve property disputes through family. In Mizoram (47%) respondents prefer to approach court to resolve their property related disputes while in Assam, (36 percent) and in West Bengal (30 percent) respondents prefer neighbourhood or village elder. Caste and community organisations are found to be an important forum in Nagaland (16%) and Jammu and Kashmir (14%) to resolve property disputes, and 15 percent in Tamil Nadu prefer the police.

Figure 4B.27: Preferred forums to resolve marital disputes (by States)



Figure 4B.27 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach to resolve marital disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. In most States, a large proportion of citizens prefer family members to resolve marital disputes. In Nagaland (67%), Punjab (65%) and in J&K (61%) respondents said that they would prefer to resolve marital disputes through family members. One third of respondents in Assam prefer to resolve marital disputes through neighbourhood and village elders. In Uttar Pradesh, Tripura, West Bengal, Uttarakhand and Delhi after family members, respondents prefer neighbourhood or village elder to resolve marital disputes. In Mizoram after family members, respondents prefer to resolve marital disputes through courts. In Kerala (21%) of respondents prefer Police to resolve their marital disputes. Beside this one of ten respondents in Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir prefer caste and community organisation to resolve marital disputes.

Figure 4B.28: Preferred forums to resolve neighbourhood dispute (by States)




Figure 4B.28 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach to resolve neighbourhood disputes. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. Most respondents in the states prefer to resolve neighbourhood disputes through village elders and the proportion is higher in north-eastern states like Assam (65%) and Nagaland (56%). In Punjab, one third of respondents prefer to resolve neighbourhood disputes by family members. One of five respondents in Nagaland also prefers to resolve neighbourhood disputes by caste community organisations. In Delhi and Kerala, a little more than one fourth of respondents say they would approach the police to resolve neighbourhood disputes. One sixth of respondents in Mizoram prefer to resolve neighbourhood disputes through courts.

Figure 4B.29: Preferred forums to resolve dispute related to domestic violence (by States)




Figure 4B.29 show the institutions and persons that citizens across states approach to resolve domestic violence. In this heat map, the darker parts of the graph represent a greater share of citizens who approach a particular institution or person. A large proportion of people in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir approach family members to resolve disputes related to domestic violence. In Kerala (44%) and Mizoram (49%) respondents said they would like to approach Police to resolve disputes related to domestic violence. In Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal people prefer to approach neighbourhood or village elder to resolve disputes of domestic violence. In Nagaland and Tripura, preferences for caste or community organization to resolve domestic violence disputes is high as compare to other state. In Mizoram (14%) people prefer to approach court to resolve disputes related to domestic violence.

4.C / Governance

Governance has been a catchphrase and extremely popular in the discourse of post-liberalisation India. Corruption, public service delivery, institutional efficiency are but some of the concepts that have found resonance in the discourses on governance. In this section, we explore two other aspects of governance: economic governance, and education. The first part of this section pertains to eminent domain and the contentious issue of land acquisition in India. The second part relates to the preference for public and private schools, and the rationale for such choices.

1. Economic Governance

How people perceive modes of land acquisition by state? How do people perceive their ability to respond to land acquisition by state? And how do people perceive the dispute resolution mechanism over land acquisition disputes? These are some of the questions that this section will look into.

As per the February 2015 data from the Ministry of Finance, in response to the RTI query filed by RTI activist Mr. Venkatesh Nayak, about 8 per cent of the 804 projects were stalled due to land acquisition issues⁶³. As per the information provided by Minister of State for road transport and highways in December 2018 in the lower house of the parliament⁶⁴, land acquisition was one of the reasons why 435 infrastructure and highway projects were hindered. It is clear that land acquisition is a contentious issue when it comes to the state policies for development, infrastructure and transport projects. According to the 2011 census, about 24 per cent of the population is dependent on agriculture. Land thus holds a much importance in the livelihood of at least one fourth of the Indian population. Besides this, about ten per cent of the population work as agricultural labourers. The varied impact that land acquisition issues have on the lives of the people dependent on agriculture can be seen in the land holding pattern. The agricultural census of 2010-11 shows that—while an average marginal farmer holds 0.39 hectare, an average large farmer holds about 17.38 hectares. Further, 5 per cent of the farmers (medium and large) account for about 32 per cent of the cultivated land, while about 95 per cent of the farmers (marginal, small, and semi-medium) hold the rest of it.

Land is a difficult subject to legislate on in India. While land falls under state list, various aspects of land acquisitions fall under the concurrent list. Thus, both centre and state have power to create and amend laws related to land acquisition. Land acquisition has often emerged as a political issue with different political parties and social movements organized around this issue. States have often taken remarkably distinct trajectories on the issues of land acquisition and land reforms. Land acquisition has different nuances attached to it, from moral dilemmas to economic issues of compensation and rehabilitation, from coercion by state in lives of the people to the issue of agricultural and rural distress. Almost every aspect of this issue requires a careful scrutiny on its own. While the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (LARR) in 2013 provided a framework for land acquisition for all states in India (except Jammu and Kashmir), various states like Telangana, Haryana, Tripura, Chhattisgarh have continued to add their own twists to it. A study by Centre for Policy Research⁶⁵ suggests that between 1992 and 2016, there were about 102 laws that were legislated on with regard to land acquisition; 87 out these were legislated by state assemblies. Apart from highlighting different state

trajectories, this study also shed light on the centrality of the judiciary in the disputes over land acquisition.

In this chapter, we look at the responses of the people on three issues: a) whether the use of force by state is preferable or should the landowners voluntarily give up the land, b) whether the landowners should be allowed to resist the government in peaceful manner or by violent methods, and c) whether the court has any role in settling the disputes over land acquisition. We asked the respondents to choose between two contrasting statements on each of these three issues.

A. Modes of land acquisition:

On the issues of mode of land acquisition, we asked the respondents to choose one statement amongst two following statements:

Statement 1: Landowners should give up their land in the larger interest of development

Statement 2: The government should be allowed to use force to displace local villagers/ landowners.

On an average, about 60 per cent of the respondents agree with the first statement, while about 13 per cent agree with the second statement. As Figure 4C.1 shows, more than one-fifth of the respondents in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh support the use of force by state to displace landowners. On the other hand, North-Eastern states (Assam, Tripura, Nagaland, and Mizoram) seem to be particularly less inclined, compared to the other states, to agree with the use of force by the government to displace local villagers and landowners. A reason for this could be a closer experience with Armed Force Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which might have highlighted the negative side of the excesses of state. Kerala, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir are also significant in their extremely low preference for the use of force by state for land acquisition. While both Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir have had a history of military and police operations, Kerala remains an aberration. Nagaland and Uttarakhand are two states that stand out in their relatively higher preference for voluntarily giving up the land in interest of development.

Figure 4C.1: Modes of Land Acquisition (by State)






Figure 4C.2: Modes of Land Acquisition (by Farmer-Non-Farmer)




There is no major difference between the broader categories of farmers and non-farmers on the mode of land acquisition, Figure 4C.2.

Figure 4C.3: Modes of Land Acquisition (by Type of Farmer)



As the land holdings decrease, Figure 4C.3, we see that the tendency to give up the land voluntarily for development projects increases. This is counter-intuitive if we assume that small farmers or tenant cultivators are at a greater risk of marginalization due to land acquisition. One of the possible interpretations of this puzzle could be that small farmers are more likely to engage with the state as they might see greater incentive in the compensation and rehabilitation. On the other hand, the other possible interpretation could be that big farmers are better equipped to negotiate with the state and hence less likely to give up the land, even when threatened by the use of force by state.

Figure 4C.4: Modes of Land Acquisition (by Rural-Urban)



Since rural economy is comparatively more shaped by agrarian economy, it would be intuitive to expect a greater resistance to give up the land voluntarily. This expectation is borne out as we see that rural respondents are less likely to give up their land for development projects as compared to urban counterparts, Figure 4C.4.

B. Response to land acquisition

In the face of land acquisition, what options do the citizens have to respond to such a situation? We asked the respondents to choose between two statements:

“Statement 1: Villagers/Landowners should be allowed to continue their protest in a peaceful manner.

Statement 2: Villagers/Landowners should be allowed to resist the government by violent methods.”

Out of the surveyed states, Figure 4C.5, every second respondent was more likely to espouse resistance by violent means than peaceful protests. Nagaland, Kerala, and Mizoram stand out in their support for resisting by violent means as opposed to only protesting by peaceful means. The militarisation of North-Eastern states (as well as Jammu and Kashmir) could be a reason for the preference for violent dissent over peaceful protests. However, within the North-Eastern states, the inclination towards violent means in Assam and Tripura is significantly less. Perhaps the influence of communist parties might be a factor for higher tendency for violent response in West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura. Only Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Delhi show greater support for peaceful protests over violent methods. Tamil Nadu is more in tune with the average figures. One possible explanation could be that the State has penetrated enough in the daily lives that the people have escaped the language of violent means. The other interpretation could be that in the central parts of India, as you move closer to the capital region, one is more likely to be politically mobilised in organising protests or showing dissent.

Figure 4C.5: Response to Land Acquisition (by State)





Figure 4C.6: Response to Land Acquisition (by Farmer-Non-Farmer)



There is no major difference between the broader categories of farmers and non-farmers on the responses to land acquisitions either, as show in Figure 4C.6. While amongst farmers, there is not much variation in the response to the use of violent means, Figure 4C.7, we also observe that agricultural labourers are comparatively less likely to see the merit in resisting the government by peaceful means. This is in line with the assumption that agricultural labourers are more likely to face the precarious situation arising out of ill-designed land acquisition policies.

Figure 4C.7: Response to Land Acquisition (by Type of Farmer)





Figure 4C.8: Response to Land Acquisition (by Rural-Urban)



Similarly, in Figure 4C.8, if we assume that people staying in rural locations have lesser avenues to register their dissent as compared to their urban counterparts, they are less likely to believe in the merit of only peaceful protests. We see a significant drop in the proportion of the people in rural regions who believe that they should resist the government by peaceful means as against violent means.

C. Dispute resolution over land acquisition


With respect to dispute resolution in land acquisition problems, we asked the respondents to choose one statement amongst the following two statements:

Statement 1: Dispute over land between the government and local villagers/land owners should be settled by the court.

Statement 2: The courts have no role to play in these disputes over land between the government and the local villagers/land owners.


As Figure 4C.9 shows, about three fifths of the respondents agree that the courts should settle the disputes between the government and the landowners and villagers. This highlights the central role that the judiciary plays in the imagination of the Indian population. Tamil Nadu and West Bengal show the least amount of faith in the role of the courts. On the other hand, Delhi, Kerala, Punjab and Uttarakhand show much higher degree of faith in the role of courts than the average respondent of the surveyed states. Perhaps the performance of district courts and high courts in these states needs to be reviewed in this light.

Figure 4C.9: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by State)




In continuation to the earlier theme, as Figure 4C.10 shows, we find no major difference between the broader categories of farmers and non-farmers on the role of the courts in dispute settlement over land acquisition issues.

Figure 4C.10: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by Farmer-Non-Farmer)




As the proportion of land holding decreases, we can see a corresponding fall in the role that courts occupy for dispute resolution between the government and land owners/villagers, see Figure 4C.11. The big farmers are more likely to have enough resources and knowledge to deal with the legal system than agricultural labourers.

Figure 4C.11: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by Type of Farmer)



As Figure 4C.12 shows, the urban respondents are more likely to espouse dispute resolution by courts as compared to the rural counter parts. This again could be an indicator of a stronger State presence (in general) in the urban areas.

Figure 4C.12: Modes of Dispute Resolution (by Rural-Urban)




To sum up, we do not find any major difference of opinion among farming and non-farming communities on aspects of modes, responses and dispute resolution over land acquisition issues. However, the differences creep in, when we factor variations on account of state, location, and land-holding patterns. While some states prefer a more peaceful and voluntary manner of handling land acquisition, in many other states the respondents prefer to resist through force. This may be due to the history of leftist movements, land reform legislations and militarization in the area. While farmers with large land holdings are less likely to give up land voluntarily and more likely to approach courts to settle the land dispute, farmers with smaller holdings and agricultural labourers are less likely to support dispute resolution through courts and more likely to support the use of violence against the state. The affluence of big farmers is visible in the choice of approaching courts and the rejection of voluntarily giving up the land. Finally, the urban and rural differences has been as expected with more rural residents, who are more likely to be dependent on land for agricultural purposes, to refuse voluntary giving up of land, likely to resort to violent means to protect their land and to avoid the legal system for resolution.

2. School Choice

Family decisions related to a child’s schooling, especially the choice between public and private schooling, are complex, and many factors influence this choice. In developing societies, socio-economic factors are shown to be key drivers behind decisions regarding the type of school a child attends⁶⁶.


In this survey, we find that about 71 per cent of respondents report having children of school going age (below 18 years). The remaining respondents do not report children of school going age as part of a family unit. Of the respondents that have children of school going age, 58 per cent report that their children attend government school and about 42 per cent attend a private school. These numbers are consistent with the national averages from other sources. For instance District Information System for Education (DISE) data shows about 60 per cent students across the country receive their education from a government school⁶⁷.

Figure 4C.13: School Enrolment (by State)




In the twelve states surveyed, in shown in Figure 4C.13, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura have the highest enrolment in government schools, with 89 per cent, 83 per cent and 81 per cent respectively. Kerala and Tamil Nadu follow with more than 60 per cent children enrolled in government schools. Jammu and Kashmir (52 per cent), Delhi (50 per cent) and Punjab (47 per cent) have almost equal enrolment in government and private schools. Mizoram and Nagaland indicate higher private school enrolment relative to public school – about 65 and 70 per cent respectively. These proportions are also consistent with other state-level data related to schooling. Overall, 75 per cent of all elementary schools are run by the state or the union government. Data for 2016-17 reported by DISE shows that there is some variation in this number across states. For example close to 90 per cent of schools in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura are managed by the government. Kerala is the only state where only 29 per cent of schools are managed by the government. Mizoram and Nagaland have 25 per cent privately managed schools. Yet, these schools account for about 65 per cent of total school enrolment in each of the states.

Figure 4C.14: School Enrolment (by Parental Education Level)




Extant research suggests that a parent's level of education plays a significant role in whether they choose public or private schools for their children's' education⁶⁸. Consistent with these findings, our data indicates, Figure 4C.14, that as parental level of education increases the likelihood that the child attends a government school decrease. About 75 per cent of non-literate parents have their child enrolled in a government school. Approximately 70 per cent of parents who have some school education report children enrolled in government schools, with the number dropping to 39 per cent when parents have a college education.

Figure 4C.15: School Enrolment (by Rural-Urban)




We also find significant urban rural differences in school choice in Figure 4C.15. In rural areas 68 per cent respondents said that they send their child to a government school. Whereas 39 per cent urban respondents had children enrolled in a government school.

Figure 4C.16: School Enrolment (by Rural-Urban and Parental Education Level)




When we further disaggregate school choice by location and parents' education, Figure 4C.16, we find that while 78 per cent of rural non-literate respondents have a child in a government school this proportion drops by about 16 percentage points for the urban counterparts. Similarly, we observe a 23 percentage point increase in private school choice among respondents with a college degree (or above) as we move from rural to urban locations. Among non-literate respondents, the proportion reporting private school choice is 38 per cent and 22 per cent for urban and rural locations respectively. More broadly, respondents reporting higher levels of education tend to choose private schools over public schools regardless of whether they are located in urban or rural areas. Have government schools in India become the last option for families with higher levels of education and wealth? Are children from relatively poor, marginalised, and minority communities notably Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims, and Christians left behind by private education sector?

Figure 4C.17: School Enrolment (by Caste)



Research suggests that minority communities are moving to public education⁴⁹. In Figure 4C.17, we find that Dalit and OBC respondents report higher levels of enrolment in government schools with 73 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. Upper caste respondents also indicate high enrolment in private schools – about 49 per cent. Interestingly, Adivasis are the only social category that report higher private school enrolment with 52 per cent versus 49 per cent in government schools.

Figure 4C.18: School Enrolment (by Religion)




In Figure 4C.18, Muslim respondents also had high enrolments in government schools with 66 per cent. However, we find that about 63 per cent of Christian respondents indicate private school enrolment. It is likely that Christian enrolment in private schools are being driven by Nagaland and Mizoram as a result of the large number of Christian respondents from these two States (as noted earlier in Table).

In addition to level of parental education and location (whether rural or urban), what other factors determine a preference for private or public education? We find that respondents with children enrolled in a government school said that affordability of the school was the most important factor, followed by proximity to the school and the provision of a mid-day meal. We find these reasons are common for both rural and urban respondents, in Figure 4C.19. For instance, approximately 85 per cent respondents in rural areas and 86 per cent respondents in urban areas cite affordability as the primary reason for choosing a government school over a private school. Similarly, 85 per cent of rural respondents and 82 per cent of urban respondents choose a government school over a private school due to proximity of the school, and about 75 per cent rural respondents and 72 per cent urban respondents indicate the provision of mid-day meals as a reason for their choice.

In Figure 4C.19, among respondents with children enrolled in government schools, school facilities, teacher quality, and discipline play a secondary role. Once again, these preferences are similar across rural and urban respondents. For instance, 62 per cent of rural respondents and 65 per cent of urban respondents note that school facilities are an important factor in school choice. Similarly, 66 per cent of rural respondents and 73 per cent of urban respondents choose a government school over a private school due to teacher quality, and about 62 per cent rural respondents and 72 per cent urban respondents indicate discipline as a reason for their choice.


Figure 4C.19: Reasons for School Choice (by Rural-Urban)



In stark contrast, respondents who had children enrolled in private schools say that school facilities, teacher quality and student discipline in school are the most important reasons for school choice. As with government school choice, we find reasons for choosing a private school are similar across both rural and urban locations. For instance, 82 per cent of rural respondents and 89 per cent of urban respondents cite school facilities as an important reason; 86 per cent of rural respondents and 93 per cent of urban respondents note teacher quality, and 86 per cent of rural respondents and 91 per cent of urban respondents point to student discipline as important reasons for choosing a private school over a government school.

We find that only about half the respondents, 50 per cent of rural respondents and 54 per cent urban respondents say school proximity plays a role in school choice. The cost of schooling isn't an important factor when parents choose private schools: only about 42 per cent in rural areas and about 40 per cent in urban areas note affordability as a reason. Similarly, the availability of a mid-day meal at school does not appear to be important for either rural or urban respondents with only 17 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. Finally, just about more than half, about 52 per cent, of rural respondents say their child is enrolled in a government school as it is the only available school, while this number drops to 28 per cent in urban areas, suggesting that rural respondents are faced with a limited choice of schools compared to urban respondents.

Figure 4C.20: Government School or Private School? (by Current School Choice)



Given current school choice, would respondents prefer to send their children to a private school or a public school? We find that, in Figure 4C.20, about 50 per cent of respondents who send their children to a public school prefer to continue with private school. However, only 20 per cent of respondents who send their children to a private school would choose to send their child to a public school. It appears that respondents hold a preference for a private education over a public one.

We generally find that both parental education as well as location, whether urban or rural, influences whether a child attends a private or public school. We also find that the reasons why parents send their children to a public or private school differs.

4.D / Institutional Trust

Trust is the underpinning of all human contact and institutional interaction⁷⁰. This section evaluates political trust by which we mean the “judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny”⁷¹ which is “... a central indicator of public’s underlying feeling about its polity”⁷². Political trust serves as a conceptual device that serves as a “middle-range indicator of support between the specific political actors in charge of every institution and the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a given polity”⁷³.

This chapter discusses trust in both macro-level institutions, as well as trust in public offices and actors at the micro or individual level. The confidence people place on their governments come with the payment of taxes, acceptance of legislative and judicial decisions, compliance with social service programmes, and support of military objectives among others, all factors that reaffirm public faith in the state⁷⁴. Trust has been studied in different forms, both at the aggregate⁷⁵ and individual levels⁷⁶. While some studies have focused on falling levels of trust in developed countries⁷⁷, few⁷⁸ focus on South Asia. This report aggregates understandings around trust in political institutions and actors in India.

1. Trust in Institutions

In this section, we explore public trust in various elected and non-elected political institutions (Q14, Q15, Q16, Q17, Q24, Q31 and Q37). The respondents were asked: “How much trust do you have in the following institutions?”

The responses were constructed along a four-point Likert Scale, ranging from ‘No trust at all’ to ‘Great deal of trust’. In the rest of this section, we use the measure of ‘effective trust’, calculated by subtracting the share of respondents who claimed to have either ‘No trust at all’ or ‘Not a lot of trust’ from those who claimed to have either ‘Great deal of trust’ or ‘Quite a lot of trust’. This measure seeks to understand a ‘net’ level of trust that these political institutions enjoy.

Figure 4D .2 shows that the military seems to enjoy the highest levels of trust (80 percent), followed by the Supreme Court (69 percent) which is consistent with the findings of the last two reports. While political parties continue to have the lowest levels of public trust, the Prime Minister enjoys more net trust at 42 percent, than Chief Ministers, government officials and the police. However, he has lost ground compared to the other states surveyed in the last reports which were 62 percent (in Politics and Society between Elections 2018) and 68 percent (in Politics and Society between Elections 2017).

The District Collector continues to experience high levels of trust, faring better than the Tehsildar and President. The Election Commission receives higher net trust (42 percent) than the Gram Sabha (29 percent) which has seen a marked erosion of trust since the first report (52 percent) and the second (56 percent). While the variation between the Election Commission and Gram Sabha might be explained by the fact that elected institutions do not necessarily enjoy high levels of trust, the marked decline of trust in the Gram Sabha, compared to other institutions, is something to be noted.

Overall trust levels show an interesting trend, regarding the Panchayat and its comparison to the Parliament and the Vidhan Sabha, clustered together as elected institutions rather than offices. Our Politics and Society between Elections 2017 data showed the Panchayat enjoyed higher trust than both the parliament and the Vidhan Sabha. Politics and Society between Elections 2018 saw more equal levels of trust between the three institutions. However, this situation shows a complete reversal in the states surveyed in the current report with the Gram Panchayat showing the lowest effective trust between the three.

Figure 4D.1: Trust in Institutions





Figure 4D.2: Effective Trust in Institutions



We analyse the variations in effective trust across elected and non-elected institutions and offices. According to Fritz Scharpf⁷⁹, citizens evaluate political institutions and actors based on two different sets of performance criteria: those related to “input” or procedural performance and those related to “output” or policy performance. The former would include institutions and actors in executive functions like the Prime Minister, bureaucracy and policy and the latter would include the legislative institutions like the Vidhan Sabha, Parliament and Panchayats.


Figure 4D.3 shows effective trust in institutions across states; the darker parts of the heat map represent a higher share of effective trust in a particular institution. In comparing effective trust across states, we find the Prime Minister enjoys high levels of trust in Mizoram (88 percent), Tripura (84 percent) and Assam (82 percent), with the highest distrust in Punjab (-29 percent), followed by Jammu and Kashmir (-20 percent) and Tamil Nadu (-15 percent). Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Delhi and Uttarakhand show higher effective trust in the Army, and Supreme Court, over all other institutions. In general, these states tend to favour institutions that are further from everyday interaction. In all states, political parties registered the lowest effective trust. This is especially the case in the north-eastern border states. In contrast, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, while showing high levels of trust in the army also consider the District Collector, who has less institutional distance, to be credible. A striking outlier is Jammu and Kashmir which shows an overall low level of trust, across institutions but high levels of trust in the District Collector, Tehsildar and District Court as compared to the other institutions we surveyed. This points to an inversion of our understanding that institutional distance affects trust, in the sense that more distance inspires greater trust.

Figure 4D.3: Effective Trust in Institutions (by State)



Figure 4D.4 shows effective trust in institutions across levels of education. In comparing trust across levels of literacy, we find that the non-literate respondents have lowest levels of trust across all institutions except political parties, who record the lowest trust among the college educated and above. Effective trust is highest among those who have completed primary school for all institutions. Thus, we find that effective trust increases substantially with primary education and then plateaus with higher education.

Figure 4D.4: Effective Trust in Institutions (by Education Level)




In Figure 4D.5, a heat map which shows effective trust in institutions among religious communities, we find that the army enjoys comparatively high effective trust among all communities except the Muslims and Christians who trust the Supreme Court more than the army. If we rank the institutional effective trust according to community, we find that the Prime Minister is ranked higher among Hindus (11th) than Christians (12th), however Christians (58 percent) show higher absolute effective trust than Hindus (52 percent). The Prime Minister is among the least trusted elected office among the Sikhs (-19 percent) and Muslims (5 percent), ranking 15th and 14th respectively, among the 16 institutions. The overall ranking of effective trust places the Prime Minister ahead of the Chief Minister, however, when disaggregated by religion, this trend holds true only among the Hindus and Christians.

Figure 4D.5: Effective Trust in Institutions (by Religion)



Figure 4D.6 shows effective trust in institutions among caste groups; in the heat map, the darker parts represent a higher effective trust. As Figure 4D.6 shows, the army is the most trusted institution among the upper caste, Dalit and OBC categories while the Adivasis trust the army but second to the Supreme Court. The top three institutions that enjoy high effective trust are Army, Supreme Court and High Court, across caste. The District Collector is trusted more than the Chief Minister and Prime Minister in all caste categories. Interestingly, the Parliament also enjoys high levels of trust among Adivasis.

Figure 4D.6: Effective Trust in Institutions (by Caste)



2. Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness

Effective trust encompasses two main aspects: gaining immediate and long-term compliance with decisions made by legal authorities like the courts and police, for specific interactions between public and the state apparatus and secondly, encouraging general cooperation and compliance. Psychological research on procedural justice⁸⁰ and courts and police⁸¹ finds that the public's behaviour with relation to the apparatus of law (police and courts) are powerfully influenced by subjective perceptions of fairness in the process of exercising authority by these institutions.

Procedural fairness consists of the quality of decision-making and the quality of treatment. Both these aspects are ultimately rooted in a feeling of legitimacy, that is, people believe that police and judges are entitled to be obeyed and that their actions are legitimate in particular contexts. Legitimacy is encouraged by the perception of fairness, both towards communities, as well as in individual interactions and encounters⁸².

This survey explores the concept of trust in the light of aspects such as effectiveness and procedural fairness which have been posited to contribute to perceptions of trust. The respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed on a battery of four statements pertaining to three institutions: Police (Q34), Government Officials (Q32)

and Courts (Q39). The statements consist of positive and negative assertions that point to effectiveness in action and fairness in procedure. As noted in Figure 4D .7 below, for Police and Government Officials, the statements consist of two positive assertions on respectful interaction and quick action, and two negative assertions on bribery and political influence. For courts, four negative assertions on effectiveness were measured by respondents' opinion on whether individuals would be wrongly convicted or acquitted. Procedural fairness was interrogated through perceived corruption of the courts by money and political influence.

Figure 4D.7: Statements on Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness

Police	Government Officials	Courts
<i>a. If a citizen were to report a crime to the police, quick action would be taken.</i>	<i>a. If a citizen approached with a problem, quick action would be taken.</i>	<i>a. It is highly likely that an innocent person will be convicted.</i>
<i>b. The police in the (State) generally take bribes.</i>	<i>b. The government officials in (State) generally take bribes.</i>	<i>g. It is highly likely that a guilty person will be acquitted.</i>
<i>c. The decisions made by the police are unduly influenced by political parties/ politicians.</i>	<i>e. The decisions taken by the government officials are unduly influenced by political parties/politicians.</i>	<i>h. The decisions made by the court are unduly influenced by political parties/ politicians.</i>
<i>d. Police generally treats people with respect.</i>	<i>f. Government officials generally treats people with respect.</i>	<i>i. Court officials in (State) generally take bribe.</i>

Based on responses, ranging from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree', for positive and negative assertions, three indices of effectiveness and procedural fairness for Police, Government Officials and Courts were created. The index consists of three levels 'Largely Positive', 'Largely negative' and 'Neutral'. This section explores the results of the indices for the three institutions.

Figure 4D .8 shows that while less than 20 percent of the respondents held a positive view of the Police and Government Officials, a larger share of respondents (24 percentage points higher) felt negatively about the police and 18 percentage points more for government officials. Interestingly, more than half of the respondents held a negative perception about effective and procedural fairness of the courts, compared to only 21 percent who held a positive view. 42 percent and 45 percent of the respondents held a neutral view of both police and government officials respectively, but not the courts. We will analyse these numbers, according to their respective intuitions, in the upcoming sections.

Figure 4D.8: Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, and Courts




Figure 4D.9 shows that a significant share of respondents in eight of the 12 states hold a neutral view of the police. Similarly, for government officials, a large proportion of respondents in seven of the states surveyed hold neutral perceptions on effective and procedural fairness. However, this contrasts with the perceptions on courts, where over 40 percent in each of the 12 states - with the highest in Tamil Nadu (78 percent) and Tripura (68 percent) - hold a negative perception regarding procedural fairness of the courts. Nine out of 12 states hold negative perceptions of the police. However, Mizoram (19 percent), Uttarakhand (8 percent) and Kerala (5 percent) hold a more positive perception of the same institution. The perceptions fairness of the police was recorded at its lowest in Punjab (63 percent), Delhi (65 percent), West Bengal (65 percent) and Jammu and Kashmir (54 percent).

For government officials, nine out of the 12 states hold a more negative view, with Delhi (64 percent), West Bengal (59 percent) and Punjab (57 percent) recording the highest negative perception. Kerala is twenty percentage points higher than Uttarakhand (eleven percentage points) and Mizoram (four percentage points) who all generally hold a more positive perception.

Courts in general are perceived as having the least effective and procedural fairness. Within this generally poor opinion, Uttarakhand holds the highest positive perception with 36 percent.

Figure 4D.9: Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, and Courts (by State)






Figure 4D.9 (Continued) : Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, and Courts (by State)



Our research shows that most respondents, across religions, hold either a neutral or negative perception of the police and government officials (Figure 4D.10). Most Sikhs (58 percent) and Muslims (47 percent) hold a negative perception of the police, while a larger share of Christians (46 percent) and Hindus (42 percent) hold a neutral opinion. A larger share of Christians (47 percent), Muslims (46 percent) and Hindus (45 percent) have a neutral opinion of government officials, whereas more than half (53 percent) of the Sikh community holds a negative opinion.

As seen in previous figures, a significant proportion of respondents hold a negative perception about the effective and procedural fairness of courts. When disaggregated across religion communities, we find that a significantly larger proportion of Hindus, compared to other communities have a negative perception of the courts - five percentage points more than Muslims and Christians and twelve percentage points more than Sikhs.


Figure 4D.10: Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, and Courts (by Religion)



Caste differences with respect to perceptions of police, Figure 4D.11, show that most respondents hold either a neutral or negative perception of the police. A larger proportion of upper caste (43 percent) and Dalits (49 percent) hold a largely negative perception, whereas, a large proportion of Adivasis (44 percent) and OBCs (45 percent) hold a neutral opinion. A larger share of OBCs (50 percent), Adivasis (43 percent) and upper caste (42 percent) have a neutral opinion of government officials, whereas over 40 percent of Dalits hold a negative opinion.

As seen in Figure 4D.11, over 50 percent across all categories, hold a negative perception about the effectiveness and procedural fairness of courts. Within this general trend, OBCs, at 61 percent, have the highest share of respondents with a negative perception of the courts.

Figure 4D.11: Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness of Police, Government Officials, and Courts (by Caste)



3. Distributive Fairness

Distributive or outcome fairness refers to the way people respond to the fairness of the outcomes they receive. This concept relates to perceptions of “violations in principles of fairness in the allocation of outcomes”⁸³ and is conceived as an expression of what people think is just. Three different principles underpin the notion of distributive justice: equity, equality and meeting the basic needs of everybody⁸⁴. While all three are legitimate and complementary criteria, societies as well as individuals of different socio-economic backgrounds may vary according to the importance they assign to these three principles⁸⁵. This lends itself to a psychological model that contends that values held by individuals influence how they cognitively perceive the world⁸⁶. This also relates to the cognitive frame of ‘perceived legitimacy’ of various institutions. The perception of equal treatment among communities is often considered as either a cause or consequence of institutional trust. In this study, perception of distributive fairness of the institutions is captured using questions on preferential or equal treatment by the Police, the Courts and the Government Officials, also mapped according to socio-economic backgrounds and their ideas on fairness of outcomes. The respondents were asked in Q28, Q34 and Q40:

Which group do you think the police will treat better?

- a. A Rich person or a Poor person?
- b. An Upper caste or a Dalit?
- c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu?
- d. A Man and a Woman?

A. Rich versus Poor

In evaluating distributional justice overall, Figure 4D.12, we find that almost 70 percent of the respondents feel that the rich will be favoured by the police and government officials and over 50 percent hold the same view for courts. While the courts in the previous section on effective and procedural fairness, fared very poorly, we find more support for the perception for the distributive fairness of the courts. 46 percent of the respondents feel that both rich and poor will be treated fairly by the courts, which is twenty percentage points more than for government officials and the police.

Figure 4D.12: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Police/Government Officials/Courts favour?



In comparing distributional justice across states, Figure 4D .13-15, 10 out of the 12 states feel that the rich will be treated comparatively better than the poor. Uttarakhand (55 percent) and Kerala (54 percent) stand out as states where a larger proportion of the respondents feel that both will be treated equally. The results are similar for government officials across states, with Kerala (52 percent) and Uttarakhand (55 percent) both perceiving equal treatment. The trend remains consistent for these two states with respect to the court as well.

Figure 4D.13: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Police favour? (by State)




Figure 4D.14: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Government Officials favour? (by State)




Figure 4D.15: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)





Figure 4D.16: Rich versus Poor - Who will the Police/Government Officials/Courts favour? (by Education Level)




In comparing perception of distributional justice across literacy for the police, Figure 4D.16, we find that the percentage of people who believe that the rich will be treated better decreases with college education. It falls 11 percentage points as we move across the category from non-literate to college educated. Similarly, it decreases by nine percentage points for government officials and 16 percentage points for courts. The trend we find, therefore, is that the perception of distributional justice increases with education.

B. Upper Caste versus Dalits

Evaluating distributional justice through the lens of caste, Figure 4D .17, we find that a larger share of respondents overall perceives that both upper castes and Dalits will be treated equally by the courts and government officials. An equal share of respondents (47 percent) perceive that the police will treat the upper castes better and in proportion to that, an equal number (47 percent) believe that both groups will be treated equally.

Figure 4D.17: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ Courts favour?



As Figure 4D .18-20 shows, a significant proportion of respondents (over 50 percent) in eight states out of 12 believe that the upper castes will be treated better by the police. However, Kerala (73 percent), Uttarakhand (69 percent), Tripura (57 percent) and Assam (55 percent) hold differing views, believing that both will be treated equally. For government officials too, the same set of states hold the view that upper castes will be treated better, a view opposed to the majority view. Interestingly in Nagaland an equal share of respondents hold opposing views, in that, 48 percent of the respondents feel that both upper castes and Dalits will be treated equally and the other 48 percent feel upper castes will be treated better. For courts, a majority of respondents across states believe that both will be treated equally. While the average number of respondents who feel that Dalits will be treated better by the different institutions remain low, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh are outliers in that a significant proportion of respondents feel that Dalits will be treated better. Around the question of distributional justice, we find that there is maximum consensus around courts, across states.

Figure 4D.18: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Police favour? (by State)




Figure 4D.19: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Government Officials favour? (by State)






Figure 4D.20: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)



In Figure 4D.21, the share of respondents that says upper castes will be treated better decreases with greater literacy, with a greater share of non-literate respondents perceiving institutions to be unfair. A majority of college educated respondents perceive that the police, courts and government officials treat upper castes and Dalits equally.


Figure 4D.21: Upper Caste versus Dalit - Who will the Police/Government Officials/Courts favour? (by Education Level)



C. Hindu versus Non-Hindu

In analysing distributive trust according to religion, Figure 4D .22, we find that there is a greater proportion of respondents (70 percent) who consider that police, courts and government officials are fair. This is in direct contradiction to their negative perception on procedural fairness, and a variation from the trends noticed in wealth and caste, in that they believe that all institutions do not discriminate based on religion.

Figure 4D.22: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ Courts favour?



Across states, Figure 4D .23-25, we find that a majority of respondents feel that Hindus and Non-Hindus will be treated equally, for all three institutions. The sentiment is highest in Kerala (over 90 percent) and Tripura (over 85 percent). The outliers in this regard are Uttar Pradesh (13 percent) and Tamil Nadu (11 percent) with a higher share of respondents who feel that Non-Hindus will be treated better than Hindus.

In disaggregating Jammu and Kashmir as separate regions, we find that Jammu has a higher share of respondents who feel that both communities are treated equally, as compared to Kashmir, where a significant proportion of respondents (five times higher than Jammu) believe that Hindus will be treated better. For instance, 5 percent of Hindus from Jammu feel that courts would favour Hindus, whereas 30 percent of Hindus in Kashmir believe that Hindus would be treated better by the courts. Interestingly, Christians in Kashmir, in relatively high numbers (13 percent on average), feel that Non-Hindus would be favoured by all three institutions. There is also a relatively high number of Sikhs in Jammu, as compared to other Non-Hindu minorities, who believe that Hindus would be favoured by all three institutions, with a majority (57 percent) believing that government officials show a marked preference for Hindus.

Figure 4D.23: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Police favour? (by State)




Figure 4D.24: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Government Officials favour? (by State)






Figure 4D.25: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)



The perception on distributive fairness across institutions according to levels of education, in Figure 4D .26, shows a consistency of perception around both Hindus and Non-Hindus being treated equally. We find only a marginal increase (2 percent increase) in the belief that both communities are treated equally, with a corresponding increase in education levels.

Figure 4D.26: Hindu versus Non-Hindu - Who will the Courts favour? (by Education Level)



D. Men versus Women

As Figure 4D .27 shows, in analysing distributive fairness across gender, we find that most respondents feel that both men and women are treated equally across institutions, but a significant proportion also feel that women are treated better.

In disaggregating the results of the survey by state, Figure 4D .28-30, we find that a significant share of the respondents in 10 states believe that the police treats both men and women equally. Interestingly, Delhi (51 percent) and Uttar Pradesh (43 percent) are the only states where a majority of the respondents perceive that the police treat women better than the men. With respect to the courts and government officials, most respondents across all states feel that both are treated equally. across In 10 states out of 12 respondents who believe that courts and government officials favour women form the second largest category of responses. Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi have the highest number of respondents who believe that women are treated better, compared to all the other states.

Figure 4D.27: Men versus Women - Who will the Police/Government Officials/ Courts favour?




Figure 4D.28: Men versus Women - Who will the Police favour? (by State)




Figure 4D.29: Men versus Women - Who will the Government Officials favour? (by State)






Figure 4D.30: Men versus Women - Who will the Courts favour? (by State)




As Figure 4D.31 shows, literacy doesn't seem to show any significant or clear variation in the perceptions of the respondents. While there is some marginal changes across the levels of literacy, the numbers seem to remain consistent.

Figure 4D.31: Men versus Women - Who will the Police/Government Officials/Courts favour? (by Education Level)



In comparing perceptions of distributive justice with respect to gender, we notice a very marginal increase with a corresponding increase in education, in the share of respondents who believe that both are treated equally. While most men and women feel that all three institutions do not discriminate on the basis of gender, we find that both men and women believe that the opposite sex is treated better by all three institutions.

Figure 4D.32: Men versus Women - Who will the Police/Government Officials/Courts favour? (by Gender)



5.

Conclusion

How do interactions between the state and the citizen unfold in periods between elections? What characterizes interactions between citizens across class, caste and community? And what sorts of perceptions, attitudes, and opinions do everyday forms of governance engender within society? These questions are of importance in a democracy undergoing significant economic and social transformation. Governments consolidate their political mandate, outline new directions in policy, mould institutions, and routinize governance in periods between elections. New ideas emerge or older ideologies resurface in public discourse. Spaces for engagement between state and citizens either expand or contract, and extant forms of vertical and horizontal citizenship strengthen or fray in times between elections. And equally important are the perceptions, attitudes, and opinions citizens hold about others across caste, community and geography, as well as those relating to their relationship with state institutions and officials that both shape and in turn are shaped by politics and society between elections.

This report examines perceptions, public opinion, and political subjectivities of citizens in twelve States, focusing specifically on social identity, political identity, political institutions and governance. The chapter on social identity explores how inter-caste and inter-community networks shape perceptions of social and political relations: the nature of friendships, the overlap between social and political networks, and gender equality.

The chapter on political identity broadly focuses on stereotypes, the regional-national dichotomy in political expression, as well as the libertarian and majoritarian impulses that characterize the debates on freedom of expression and nationalism respectively. The chapter on political institutions explores citizens' perceptions of their performance in public service delivery, their role in economic governance, and the degree of trust they inspire among citizens cutting across social categories.

The results for Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West Bengal, and Delhi, the twelve States covered in this study, suggest that public opinion and social attitudes exhibit remarkable variation across space, community. For instance, preferences for a conservative form of nationalism cohere around specific religious or caste identities rather than being defined by class or levels of education. Social ties, on the other hand, are produced not just by ascriptive identities but through education as well. Social identities appear to strengthen intra-group ties and opinions tend to reflect these bonds. On questions such as the most important issue facing India today there is greater unanimity across space and other socio-economic categories. In addition, issues identified as important between elections (unemployment) is markedly different from those considered important during elections (inflation). While across States there is a high awareness of State schemes, and to an extent, Central schemes, the distribution of benefits is varied. For instance, big farmers are clear beneficiaries of schemes aimed at crop insurance, while Adivasis and Dalits appear to be benefitting from housing and employment schemes. In the States covered, the 'national' and 'regional' appear equally as identities, and a significant number of respondents support the use of any language, not just the local language, in public places.

These results also indicate the growing importance of local governments in India given that a large number of respondents repose faith in the district collector, and a significant number approach municipal corporator or sarpanchin order to get important work done. Institutions enjoy varying levels of trust. Courts enjoy high levels of trust and are associated with distributive fairness, yet seen as procedurally unfair. Police appears as

among the least trusted institution, and score on both procedural as well as distributive fairness. Interpreting results proves to be trickier in the case of gender related attitudes. A majority indicate that women should prioritize home over outside work, but at the same time call for greater reservation in all jobs for women and subscribe to equal responsibility in child rearing. Contrary to the commonly held view that the medium of instruction is the driver for school choice, there appear differences among rural and urban respondents in their reasons for choice. Rural respondents are concerned with proximity and affordability of schools, while teachers and discipline emerge as primary concerns for urban residents.

Normative interpretations of the results are likely to view some - such as high levels of trust in national institutions - as contributing to improved democratic deepening and governance and others - such as weak cross-caste and cross-community personal friendships, prejudicial notions about other castes or communities, and low support for liberal attitudes - as markers of a dilution in the quality of democracy.

Two aspects of the analysis must be stressed here. First, the results are primarily descriptive and seek to identify broad patterns across key social groups. While inferential analysis requires controls and robustness checks, the initial results presented here open possibilities for empirically testing theoretically driven hypotheses relating to the horizontal and vertical relationships in society and politics between elections. Second, the results are a comparative analysis of twelve States and cannot be generalized to a national public opinion. They can however be considered a barometer of public opinion within a State as the data allows for an analysis of political and social preferences and opinions within a single State across relevant groups. However, inter-State comparisons become increasingly meaningful as more States are compared, and results will approximate a national picture.

Nevertheless, the findings from the twelve States help us hypothesize about the broader patterns that obtain. As has been already noted in the previous studies (such as the two rounds of South Asia study), trust in institutions can at best be described as mixed and at a middling level only. Similarly, delivery of public goods leaves a lot to be desired and yet unlike what the critics of India's public delivery system would like to believe, people are not very strongly disappointed with the system. The broader patterns of political culture however throw up more complex patterns that may require further investigation both in the States studied here and through an expansion of this study in other States. Just as the findings about institutions and delivery mechanisms have implications for the governance regime in India, the findings about citizen attitudes and values hold important lessons for contemporary India's political culture that provides the basis for the way democracy functions and what it means for citizens.

These political cultural patterns may be summarized as follow: (a) the caste-community driven social universe and the somewhat broad-based political universe constitute the context in which citizens relate to each other; (b) More importantly, caste-community based identities are not only inward looking images of the self, they also impose deep burdens on certain communities. (c) Third, the study hints at the need to more carefully redefine the meanings and significance of ideas of freedom of expression and revisit liberal fundamentals in an Indian context (d) Fourth, several large States under study indicate strong public support for emerging majoritarian nationalism as well as a tendency toward populism which must be taken very seriously as it is likely to dominate both public discourse and our collective lives in the near future.

Annexure

Method Note

Lokniti – Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), in collaboration with Azim Premji University (APU) conducted a round of surveys in Assam, Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and West Bengal between September and October 2018. These twelve states were selected because they provided the proximity to study politics between elections closely and accurately. The study was conducted between election and aims to capture public opinion and perception on the interaction between the state and citizens. It covers various aspects related to delivery of public services, law and order, identities, discrimination and violence, economic processes and governance. The study was an attempt to know whether various social groups get access to better public services such as water, sanitation, roads, electricity among others, which groups do the police protect. whether the rate of discrimination towards marginal groups has reduced over a period of time and which states do a better job in providing public services. The survey provides a broad perspective on everyday governance and development in India.

The survey was conducted among 24,092 respondents in 22 assembly constituencies each across 12 states. The assembly constituencies where the survey was conducted were randomly selected using the probability proportionate to size method (See Table A.1). Thereafter four polling stations within each of the sampled constituencies were selected using the systematic random sampling method. Finally, 30 respondents were also randomly selected using the same method from the latest electoral rolls of the sampled polling stations. This procedure ensures that the selected sample is fully representative of the cross-section of voters in the country. Specially trained field investigators asked the respondents, in a face-to-face interview a detailed set of questions which could take up to 20-25 minutes. They were instructed to interview only those whose names were given to them. At some locations the non-availability of sampled respondents or difficulty in finding households necessitated replacements or substitutions.

Table A.1: Distribution of the achieved sample

	Sampled assembly constituencies	Sampled polling station	Sampled respondents	Achieved sample
Assam	22	88	2640	2095
Jammu and Kashmir	22	88	2640	2011
Kerala	22	88	2640	1943
Mizoram	22	88	2640	2199
Nagaland	22	88	2640	1886
Punjab	22	88	2640	2041
Tamil Nadu	22	88	2640	2028
Tripura	22	88	2640	1717
Uttar Pradesh	22	88	2640	2151
West Bengal	22	88	2640	1860
Delhi	22	88	2640	2098
Uttarakhand	22	88	2640	2063
All	264	1056	31680	24092

To make the sample more representative and for the cross-community analysis, a booster was conducted in each state. The booster was conducted to perform cross-sectional analysis to ensure equal representation of targeted communities in each state. The rationale behind conducting the interviews of selected communities in the booster was to include the perspective of the dominant communities as well as to include the perception of the communities that are not adequately represented in the respective states. For the representativeness of the sample see Table A.2.

Table A.2: Representativeness of sample

	Women		Urban		Dalit		Adivasi		Muslim	
	Census 2011	Survey								
Assam	48.9	46.0	14	7.0	7.15	11.3	12.45	17.1	34.22	29.8
Jammu and Kashmir	47.0	43.5	27	23.5	7.38	6.0	11.91	8.6	68.31	71.4
Kerala	52.0	53.1	48	22.4	9.1	11.8	1.45	1.3	26.56	22.7
Mizoram	49.4	51.1	52	52.9	0.11	0.1	94.43	99.6	1.35	0.2
Nagaland	48.2	47.1	29	34.0	0	2.6	86.48	91.3	2.47	1.0
Punjab	47.2	44.5	37	30.4	31.94	31.0	0	0.3	1.93	7.2
Tamil Nadu	49.9	49.4	48	49.5	20.01	17.1	1.1	1.4	5.86	2.8
Tripura	49.0	47.9	26	25.0	17.83	19.7	31.76	35.4	8.6	8.2
Uttar Pradesh	47.7	42.0	22	14.4	20.7	22.2	0.57	0.5	19.26	17.1
West Bengal	48.7	51.2	32	12.9	23.51	23.2	5.8	11.5	27.01	25.8
Delhi	46.5	38.5	98	99.6	16.75	19.4	0	8	12.86	12.7
Uttarakhand	49.1	40.6	30	29.0	18.76	14.2	2.89	1.7	13.95	8.4

Research Instruments

Questionnaire: The questionnaire was carefully designed and was in the language mainly spoken in the respondents' state. The translation process was carefully monitored, so that a question in one state did not have a different meaning in another. Most questions were well structured, with a few exceptions of open-ended questions. The questionnaire was based on six broad themes: citizen perception and state institutions, delivery of public services, economic policy and governance, identity, corruption, and consciousness.

Fieldwork manual: A fieldwork manual has been specially designed for field investigators with general instructions in how to conduct standard interviews. It also contains question specific instructions explaining skip patterns in questions and probing levels for the right responses. The manual also has numerical codes for background variables like education, occupation, caste and so on, with pre-codes for some open-ended questions.

Training

Training workshop: A day long training workshop is organised before the survey fieldwork starts at various places in the state to train the field investigators (FIs) and supervisors who carry out the fieldwork operations. State coordinators conduct an intensive and interactive workshop for training field investigators on conducting face-to-face interviews based on the questionnaire. The investigators undergo an orientation programme and train rigorously about interviewing techniques and communications with the respondents. A comprehensive and detailed interviewing guide, based on the questionnaire and survey methodology, is designed for the interviewers.

Field Work

Procedures: The interviews of the selected respondents are conducted at their residence or place of work. Field investigators meet the respondents and explain the purpose of the interview, establish their identity and inform them about the expected research output of the study. The field investigators conduct the interview of the selected respondent in face-to-face interactions using the questionnaires designed for this purpose. The investigators follow the standard and accepted practices of fieldwork and all information collected is kept strictly confidential.

Data Processing

Data coding and cleaning: All questionnaires were manually screened for consistency and quality checks. The questionnaire had codes (of pre-coded questions) that were used for data punching. A team constituted for data checking checked the code and made corrections if there was any mistake made by investigators while filling the code.

Data entry and analysis: Codes on the questionnaire are punched into an electronic database. Punched data was then edited through a specially written edit programme, which checks for eligibility criteria, range and logic errors.

The fieldwork of the study was coordinated by Dr. Dhurba Pratim Sharma in Assam, Dr. Biswajeet Mohanty in Delhi, Dr. Aijaz Ashraf Wani and Dr. Ellora Puri in Jammu and Kashmir, Dr. Sajad Ibrahim in Kerala, Dr. Lallian Chunga in Mizoram, Dr. Amongla N. Jamir in Nagaland, Dr. Jagroop Kaur in Punjab, Dr. P. Ramajayam in Tamil Nadu, Anindya Sarkar in Tripura, Dr. Shashi Kant Pandey and Dr. Sudhir Khare in Uttar Pradesh, Rakesh Negi in Uttarakhand and Dr. Suprio Basu and Jyotiprasad Chatterjee in West Bengal.

Dominant Castes in different states

States	Dominant Castes/Communities	
Assam	Ahom	Kalita
Delhi	Jat	Gujjar
Jammu and Kashmir	--	
Kerala	Nair	Ezhavas
Mizoram	Mizo	Pawi
Nagaland	Aos	Angamis
Punjab	Jat	Khatri
Tamil Nadu	Vanniyar	Gounder
Tripura	Debnath	Debbarma
Uttar Pradesh	Yadav	Thakur
Uttarakhand	---	
West Bengal	---	

Questionnaire

State Code	A.C. Code	PS. Code	Respondent S.No.
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

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- F1. State Name: _____
- F2. A.C. Name: _____
- F3. P.S. Name: _____
- F4. Name of the Respondent: _____
- F5. Address of the respondent (*Give landmark*): _____
- F6. Date of interview (*dd/mm/yyyy*): _____
- F7. Name of the Investigator (*Code Roll No.*): _____

INVESTIGATOR'S INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT

My name is _____ and I have come from Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (also give your University's reference), a social science research organization in Delhi. The study aims to capture public opinion between elections. It covers various aspects related to delivery of public services, law and order, identities, discrimination and violence, economic processes and the perception of on the state at various levels the citizens interact with.

Every person over the age of 18 has an equal chance of being included in this study. You have been selected by chance. There is no risk and also no benefit in participating in this survey. But if you answer our questions, you will help us in understanding how the public feels about issues facing the country today.

This survey is an independent study and is not linked to any political party or government agency. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. The findings of this survey will be used for research work.

Participation in this survey is voluntary and it is entirely up to you to answer or not answer any question that I ask. We hope that you will take part in this survey since your participation is important. It usually takes 40 to 45 minutes to complete this interview. Please spare some time for the interview and help me in successfully completing the survey.

- F8. May I begin the interview now? 1. Respondent agrees to be interviewed
2. Respondent does not agree to be interviewed

Q1. What is your age? (*in completed years*) _____ 98. No Response (*Code 95 for 95 yrs & above*)

Q2. Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other

Q3. Up to what level have you studied? (*Record exactly and consult code book*)

9. No response

Q3a. Up to what level have your father and mother studied? (*Record exactly and consult code book*)

Father: _____ Mother: _____ 9. No response

Q4. In your opinion, what is the most important issue facing India today? (*Record the answer & consult the codebook for coding*) _____ 98. Don't Know

Page: 1

		Q5.	Now I am going to name a few Central Government schemes and programmes which Central government has initiated for the benefit of the people. Have you or your family ever availed any benefit of Central government schemes?	Benefitted	Not benefitted	Not heard	No response		
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a.	Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana	1	2	3	8		
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b.	Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana	1	2	3	8		
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c.	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)	1	2	3	8		
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d.	Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojana	1	2	3	8		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q6.	If you ever have difficulty in getting an important work done, whom will you first think of approach -ing for help? (Do NOT read answer categories)						
			01.MP	02.MLA	03. Councillor/sarpanch	04. Government official			
			05. Local political leader	06. Caste leader	07. Religious leader	08. Elder outside your family			
			09. Dalals/Touts	10.NGOs	11. Any other_____	98.DK			
		Q7.	Based on your experience, how easy or difficult was it to obtain the following services - was it very easy, easy, difficult or very difficult?	Very easy	Easy	Difficult	Very difficult	Never tried	No response
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a.	Admission in a Govt. school for a child.	1	2	3	4	5	8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b.	Medical treatment at a nearby government Hospital.	1	2	3	4	5	8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c.	Garbage collection.	1	2	3	4	5	8
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d.	Electricity connection.	1	2	3	4	5	8
e	<input type="checkbox"/>	e.	Water connection.	1	2	3	4	5	8
		Q8.	In your opinion, who is blocking progress of people like you?	Yes	No	DK			
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a.	Elites/Influential people		2	1	8		
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b.	Minorities		2	1	8		
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c.	Migrants/Outsiders		2	1	8		
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d.	Lower castes		2	1	8		
e	<input type="checkbox"/>	e.	Upper castes		2	1	8		
		Q9.	Total No. of family members living in the household:						
	<input type="checkbox"/>		Above 18 years: _____		Below 18 years : _____ <i>(If more than 9, Code 9)</i>				
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q10.	<i>(If below 18 years)</i> Do your children go to government school or private school?						
			1. Government School	2. Private school					
			3. Some schooling from government schools and some from private schools						
			4. Few children go to government schools and few go to private school						
			5. Does not go to school any more	6. No children of school going age	9.NA				
		Q10a.	<i>(If respondent answers with 1, 2, 3 or 4)</i> What are the reasons for current choice of school for your child? (Check all applicable)	Yes	No	DK	NA		
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a.	It is closer than other schools	2	1	8	9		
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b.	It is more affordable than other schools	2	1	8	9		
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c.	It has better facilities compared to other schools	2	1	8	9		
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d.	It has better teachers compared to other schools	2	1	8	9		
e	<input type="checkbox"/>	e.	It has better discipline compared to other schools	2	1	8	9		
f	<input type="checkbox"/>	f.	It has mid-day meal scheme	2	1	8	9		
g	<input type="checkbox"/>	g.	It is the only school here	2	1	8	9		

Q10b. (If child does not go to school any more) Grade/class completed before discontinuance/dropping out?
 _____ 99. NA

Q11. If you had a choice, would you send your child to a private school or a government school?
 1. Private School 2. Government School 8. Don't Know/Can't Say

Q12. I will read out a few statements that people often make about getting work done in government offices. Please tell me which statement you agree with the most? (If no answer then code 8)
 1. Proper documents and information are not enough, proper connections/networks are important to get work done in a government office/department.
 2. Proper documents and information are not enough, bribes are important to get work done in a government office/department
 3. It is possible to get work done in a government office, if one has all documents and information, without paying bribe or having connection/network

Q13. On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely unpatriotic and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely patriotic, On which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? **SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)**

		Extremely unpatriotic										Extremely patriotic									
		01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. Muslims																			
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. Christians																			
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. Hindus																			
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. Sikhs																			

Q14. How much trust do you have in the following institutions – a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not a lot of trust, no trust at all?

		A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8

Q15. How much trust do you have in the following institutions?

		A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8

Q16. I will now name a few government officials. Please tell me how much trust do you have in them: a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not a lot of trust, no trust at all?

		A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8

Q17. How much trust do you have in the following institutions?

		A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	8

Q18. The government should punish those who do not say "Bharat Mata ki Jai" at public functions. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*)
 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree
 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know

Q19. Now I am going to name a few schemes and programmes which have been launched by Andhra Pradesh government for the benefit of the people. Have you or your family ever availed any benefit of these schemes?

	Benefitted	Not benefitted	Not heard	No response
a. Agriculture scheme	1	2	3	8
b. Housing Scheme	1	2	3	8
c. Medical/Health scheme	1	2	3	8
d. Employment scheme	1	2	3	8
e. Education scheme	1	2	3	8

Q20. Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?
Statement 1: People, not governments, should punish those who commit rape.
Statement 2: Governments, not people, should punish those who commit rape.

1. Agree with Statement 1 2. Agree with Statement 2 8. DK

Q21. People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote dictatorship over democracy in India. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*)
 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree
 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know

Q22. On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely lazy and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely hardworking, On which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? **SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)**

	Extremely									
	Lazy									Extremely hardworking
a. Dalits/SCs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
b. Adivasis/STs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
c. Upper Caste	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
d. Dominant caste 1	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
e. Dominant caste 2	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10

Q23. How worried do you feel about the way things are going in the country these days - very worried, somewhat worried, or not at all worried?
 1. Very worried 2. Somewhat worried
 3. Not worried 8. DK

Q24. How much trust do you have in police - a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not a lot of trust, no trust at all?
 1. A great deal of trust 2. Quite a lot of trust 3. Not a lot of trust
 4. No trust at all 8. Don't know

Q25. In the last 2-3 years have you or your family ever been in a situation where you needed to contact the police, or the police contacted you?
 2. Yes 1. No 8. DK

Q25a. (*If yes*) Did they come to your home/workplace or did you go to them?
 1. I went to the police station 2. Police came to my home/workplace
 3. They called me 8. DK 9. Not Applicable/NA

Q26. Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?
Statement 1: Politics is ultimately a battle between good and bad.
Statement 2: Politics is ultimately a compromise between good and bad.
 1. Agree with Statement 1 2. Agree with Statement 2 8. DK

Q27. I am now going to read out some statements about the police and the nature of the decisions made by them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. *(Probe further whether 'strongly' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree).*

		Agree		Disagree		DK
		Strongly	Somewhat	Somewhat	Strongly	
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. If a citizen were to report a crime to the police, quick action would be taken.	1	2	3	4 8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. The police in the name of State generally take bribes.	1	2	3	4 8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. The decisions made by the police are unduly influenced by political parties/ politicians.	1	2	3	4 8
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. Police generally treats people with respect.	1	2	3	4 8

Q28. Now I will read out a few situations of people from different social backgrounds going to the police. Which group do you think the police will treat better? *(Ask questions one by one)*

a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. A Rich person or a Poor person?	1. Rich	2. Poor	3. Both treated same	8. DK
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. An Upper caste or a Dalit?	1. Upper caste	2. Dalit	3. Both treated same	8. DK
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu?	1. Hindu	2. Non-Hindu	3. Both treated same	8. DK
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. A Man and a Woman?	1. Man	2. Woman	3. Both treated same	8. DK

Q29. The government should punish those who eat beef/cow meat. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? *(Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)*

<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Fully Agree	2. Somewhat Agree	3. Somewhat Disagree	4. Fully Disagree	8. DK
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Q30. How safe is to live in this city/town/village – very safe, safe or unsafe.

<input type="checkbox"/>	1. Very safe	2. Safe	3. Unsafe	8. DK
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Q31. How much trust do you have in the different level of judiciary - a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not a lot of trust, no trust at all?

		A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. Supreme Court	1	2	3	4 8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. High Court	1	2	3	4 8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. District Court	1	2	3	4 8

Q32. I am now going to read out some statements about the courts and the nature of the decisions made by them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. *(Probe further whether strongly or somewhat agree or disagree).*

		Agree		Disagree		DK
		Strongly	Somewhat	Somewhat	Strongly	
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. It is highly likely that an innocent person will be convicted.	1	2	3	4 8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. It is highly likely that a guilty person will be acquitted.	1	2	3	4 8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. The decisions made by the court are unduly influenced by political parties/politicians.	1	2	3	4 8
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. Court officials in name of State generally take bribe.	1	2	3	4 8

Q33. In the past five years have you or your family been in any situation that could have involved the court system or where you could have gone to the court to resolve matter/ dispute?

<input type="checkbox"/>	2. Yes	1. No	8. DK
--------------------------	--------	-------	-------

Q33a. *(If yes)* Did they contact you or did you go to the court?

<input type="checkbox"/>	1. I went to the court	2. The court summoned me	8. DK	9. NA
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- Q34. Now I will read out a few situations of people from different social backgrounds going to the court. Which group do you think the court will treat better? (*Ask questions one by one*)
- | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------------|-------|
| a | <input type="checkbox"/> | a. A Rich person or a Poor person? | 1. Rich | 2. Poor | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| b | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. An Upper caste or a Dalit? | 1. Upper caste | 2. Dalit | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| c | <input type="checkbox"/> | c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu? | 1. Hindu | 2. Non-Hindu | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| d | <input type="checkbox"/> | d. A Man and a Woman? | 1. Man | 2. Woman | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
- Q35. The government should punish those who don't stand for national anthem at public places. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'some what' agree or disagree*)
- | | | | | |
|--|--|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| | | 1. Fully Agree | 2. Somewhat Agree | 3. Somewhat Disagree |
| | | 4. Fully Disagree | 8. Don't know | |
- Q36. Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?
Statement 1: People, not governments, should punish those who kill cows.
Statement 2: Governments, not people, should punish those who kill cows.
- | | | | | |
|--|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|
| | | 1. Agree with Statement 1 | 2. Agree with Statement 2 | 8. DK |
|--|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|
- Q37. How much trust do you have in government officials - a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not a lot of trust or no trust at all?
- | | | | | |
|--|--|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | 1. A great deal of trust | 2. Quite a lot of trust | 3. Not a lot of trust |
| | | 4. No trust at all | 8. Don't know | |
- Q38. In the past two years have you or your family contacted a government officials to resolve matter/ dispute?
- | | | | | |
|--|--|--------|-------|-------|
| | | 2. Yes | 1. No | 8. DK |
|--|--|--------|-------|-------|
- Q39. I am now going to read out some statements about the government officials and the nature of the decisions taken by them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (*Probe further whether 'strongly' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*).
- | | | Agree | | Disagree | | DK | |
|---|--------------------------|--|----------|----------|----------|----|---|
| | | Strongly | Somewhat | Somewhat | Strongly | | |
| a | <input type="checkbox"/> | a. If a citizen approached with a problem, quick action would be taken. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| b | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. The government officials in the name of State generally take bribes. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| c | <input type="checkbox"/> | c. The decisions taken by the government officials are unduly influenced by political parties/politicians. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| d | <input type="checkbox"/> | d. Government officials generally treats people with respect. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
- Q40. Now I will read out a few situations of people from different social backgrounds going to the government officials. Which group do you think the government officials will treat better? (*Ask questions one by one*)
- | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------------|-------|
| a | <input type="checkbox"/> | a. A Rich person or a Poor person? | 1. Rich | 2. Poor | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| b | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. An Upper caste or a Dalit? | 1. Upper caste | 2. Dalit | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| c | <input type="checkbox"/> | c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu? | 1. Hindu | 2. Non-Hindu | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| d | <input type="checkbox"/> | d. A Man and a Woman? | 1. Man | 2. Woman | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
- Q41. Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?
Statement 1: It is more important for a politician to have a clean image than to deliver public services.
Statement 2: It is more important for a politician to deliver public services than to have a clean image.
- | | | | | |
|--|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|
| | | 1. Agree with Statement 1 | 2. Agree with Statement 2 | 8. DK |
|--|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|

	Q42.	I will name a few methods through which it is possible to resolve a dispute between you and another party. Could you please tell me which one of these methods you are most likely to go to resolve the following disputes?	Family member	Neighbourhood/ village elder	Caste/Community organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. Property dispute	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. Marriage dispute	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. Neighbourhood dispute	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. Domestic violence	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q43.	The government should punish those who engage in religious conversions. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (<i>Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree</i>)						
			1. Fully Agree		2. Somewhat Agree		3. Somewhat Disagree		
			4. Fully Disagree		8. Don't know				
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q44.	Is any of your close friends a?			Yes	No	DK	
a	<input type="checkbox"/>		a. Dalit			2	1	8	
b	<input type="checkbox"/>		b. Adivasi			2	1	8	
c	<input type="checkbox"/>		c. OBC			2	1	8	
d	<input type="checkbox"/>		d. Upper caste			2	1	8	
e	<input type="checkbox"/>		e. Muslim			2	1	8	
f	<input type="checkbox"/>		f. Christian			2	1	8	
g	<input type="checkbox"/>		g. Hindu			2	1	8	
h	<input type="checkbox"/>		h. From opposite gender			2	1	8	
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q45.	What is the most important responsibility of a government towards its citizens? (<i>Record exact answer options</i>) _____ 98. Don't Know						
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q46a.	Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most ? Statement 1: Generations of unfair treatment has made it difficult for Dalits to improve their economic conditions Statement 2: Dalits are not trying harder; if they try hard enough they will be well off. 1. Agree with Statement 1 2. Agree with Statement 2 8. DK						
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q46b.	Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most ? Statement 1: Generations of unfair treatment have made it difficult for Adivasis to work their way out of the lower class. Statement 2: Adivasi are not trying harder; if they try hard enough they will be well off. 1. Agree with Statement 1 2. Agree with Statement 2 8. DK						
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q46c.	Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most ? Statement 1: Over the last 50 years, dominant caste has acquired large political and economic power hence they should not be given any special assistance. Statement 2: Only few from dominant castes have acquired large political and economic power, while a majority among them are not as privileged. Hence they should be given more privileges in society. 1. Agree with Statement 1 2. Agree with Statement 2 8. DK						
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Q47.	People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are making fun of religious communities other than their own. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (<i>Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree</i>) 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know						

		Q48. On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely violent and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely peaceful, on which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? <i>SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)</i>									
		Extremely violent					Extremely peaceful				
		01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
a											
b	a. Dalits/SCs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
c	b. Adivasis/STs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
d	c. Upper Caste	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
e	d. Dominant caste 1	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
f	e. Dominant caste 2	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
g	f. Muslims	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
h	g. Christians	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
i	h. Hindus	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
	i. Sikhs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
	Q49. People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are criticizing elected leaders. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? <i>(Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)</i> 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know										
a	Q50. How regularly do you do the following for News – daily, sometimes, rarely or never?										
		Daily	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	DK					
b	a. Watch Doordarshan	1	2	3	4	8					
c	b. Watch Private News Channels	1	2	3	4	8					
d	c. Watch Local language television channel	1	2	3	4	8					
e	d. Read Hindi Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8					
f	e. Read English Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8					
g	f. Read Local language newspaper	1	2	3	4	8					
h	g. Facebook	1	2	3	4	8					
i	h. Whatsapp	1	2	3	4	8					
	i. Twitter	1	2	3	4	8					
a	Q51. How much trust do you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not a lot of trust or no trust at all?										
		Great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK					
b	a. Doordarshan	1	2	3	4	8					
c	b. Private News Channels	1	2	3	4	8					
d	c. Local language television channel	1	2	3	4	8					
e	d. Hindi Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8					
f	e. English Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8					
g	f. Local language newspaper	1	2	3	4	8					
h	g. Facebook	1	2	3	4	8					
i	h. Whatsapp	1	2	3	4	8					
	i. Twitter	1	2	3	4	8					

- Q52. Now I am going to read out two statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?
Statement 1: Elected leaders should be able to override the Courts to serve the people better.
Statement 2: Courts should be able to limit elected leaders to protect the people better.
1. Agree with Statement 1 2. Agree with Statement 2 8. DK
- Q53. People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are promoting violence against people from other communities. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*) 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree
4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know
- Q54. When we ask people how they would identify themselves, some say they are only **state identity** and others feel they are only Indian. While some feel they are more **state identity** and less Indian and other feel they are more Indian and less Telugu. How do you identify yourself?
1. Only **state identity** 2. Only Indian 3. More **state identity** less Indian
4. More Indian less state identity 5. Both equally 8. DK
- Q55. Suppose there are two leaders from same political party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your **caste** while the other from a different caste. Whom would you be willing to contact first?
1. Leader from same caste 2. Leader from different caste
3. Will not make any difference 8. DK
- Q56. Suppose there are two leaders from same political party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your **religion** while the other from a different religion. Whom would you be willing to contact first?
1. Leader from same religion 2. Leader from different religion
3. Will not make any difference 8. DK
- Q57. Some people feel it is acceptable to speak in any language in public places while others feel that people should speak only in the local language in public places. What is your opinion on this issue?
1. Speak any language 2. Speak local language 8. Can't say
- Q58. People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote the use of violence against the Indian state. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*) 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree
4. Fully Disagree 8. DK
- Q59. In many parts of India, large parts of agricultural and forest land are acquired to build a factory, a road, railway lines, bus stand, airport, pipelines, dams. Often local villagers protest against these acquisitions: Now, I am going to read out pairs of statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with the most.
- | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|---|--|
| a | <input type="checkbox"/> | a. (1) Local villagers/landowners should give up their land in the larger interest of development. | (2) The government should be allowed to use force to displace local villagers/landowners. |
| | | 1. Agree with one (1) 2. Agree with two (2) 8. No Opinion | |
| b | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. (1) Local villagers/landowners should be allowed to resist the government by violent methods. | (2) Local villagers/landowners should be allowed to continue their protest in a peaceful manner. |
| | | 1. Agree with one (1) 2. Agree with two (2) 8. No Opinion | |
| c | <input type="checkbox"/> | c. (1) Disputes over land between the government and local villagers/landowners should be settled by the court. | (2) The courts have no role to play in these disputes over land between the government and the local villagers/landowners. |
| | | 1. Agree with one (1) 2. Agree with two (2) 8. No Opinion | |
- Q60. The government should punish individuals or groups that use violence or violent means against others in the name of cow protection. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*) 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree
4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know

- Q61. How would you describe your social class? Are you in the **lower class**, the **working class**, the **middle class**, or the **upper class**?
 1. Lower class 2. Working class
 3. Middle class 4. Upper class 8. DK
- Q62. Now I am going to read out a few statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?
Statement 1: Elected leaders should be able to override the bureaucrats to serve the people better.
Statement 2: Bureaucrats should be able to limit elected leaders to protect the people better.
 1. Agree with Statement 1 2. Agree with Statement 2 8. DK
- Q63. Compared to your parents, do you think it is easy or hard for you to move up the income ladder?
(Probe whether a great deal easier, moderately easier or a great deal harder or moderately harder)
 1. A great deal easier 2. Moderately easier 3. A great deal harder
 4. Moderately harder 5. Neither easier nor harder 8. DK
- Q64. People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they demand independence for a certain part of India. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? *(Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)*
 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree
 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know
- Q65. I am now going to read out some statements about men and women and their place in the family. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. *(Probe further whether 'strongly' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)*
- | | | Agree | Disagree | DK | | |
|---|--|----------|----------|----------|---|---|
| | | Strongly | Somewhat | Somewhat | | |
| | | Strongly | Somewhat | Strongly | | |
| a | a. A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| b | b. It is up to women to decide whom to get married to. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| c | c. Educating boys is more important than educating girls. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| d | d. Men should be paid more than women even if it's the same job. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| e | e. Women should have 50% reservations in all jobs. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| f | f. Women should have the right to decide to get married or not. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| g | g. Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
- Q66. Sexual relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? *(Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)*
 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree
 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know

BACKGROUND DATA

Personal Information

<input type="checkbox"/>		Z1.	Now let us talk about this village/ town you live in. How long have you lived here? <i>(If not all life, probe for number of years lived here)</i>	1. Less than 5 years	2. 5 to 10 years	
				3. More than 10 years	4. Entire life	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Z1a.	<i>(If Not all life)</i> Where did you come from? Name of State: _____ 99. Not answer			
		Z2.	Occupation? <i>(Record exactly and consult codebook & if retired, try to ascertain his/her previous occupation. If student or housewife, then note down that as well)</i>			
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a.	What is your Occupation? _____	98. No response		
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b.	What is your mother's occupation? _____	98. No response		
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c.	What is your father's occupation? _____	98. No response		
<input type="checkbox"/>		Z3.	How is payment for your work calculated? Do you have an hourly wage, a daily wage, fixed weekly salary, or a fixed monthly salary or is it calculated some other way? 1. Hourly wage 2. Fixed daily wage 3. Fixed weekly salary 4. Fixed monthly monthly 5. In an other way 6. I am not working 8. Don't know			
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Z4. What is your Caste/Jati-biradari/Tribe name? <i>(Consult code book for code)</i> _____			
<input type="checkbox"/>		Z4a.	And what is your caste group? <i>(Double check and consult code book)</i> 1. Scheduled Caste (SC) 2. Scheduled Tribe (ST) 3. Other Backward Classes (OBC) 4. Other			
<input type="checkbox"/>		Z5.	What is your religion? 1. Hindu 2. Muslim 3. Christian 4. Sikh 5. Buddhist/Neo Buddhist 6. Jain 7. No religion 9. Others <i>(Specify)</i> _____			
<input type="checkbox"/>		Z5a.	<i>(If Hindu)</i> To which sect do you belong Shaiva or Vaishnava? 1. Shaiva 2. Vaishnava 8. Can't say 9. NA			
<input type="checkbox"/>		Z5b.	<i>(If Muslim)</i> To which sect do you belong Shia or Sunni? 1. Shia 2. Sunni 8. Can't say 9. NA			
<input type="checkbox"/>		Z6.	Which ration card do you have? 1. Above Poverty Line 2. Below Poverty Line 3. Antyodaya 4. Annapurna 5. Do not have 6. Had, but lost it 7. Any other (Specify) _____			
<input type="checkbox"/>		Z7.	Do you have an Aadhar card? 2. Yes 1. No 8. NR			
		Z8.	Which language do you use the most for the following? <i>(Record answer and consult language codes from codebook for coding)</i>			
a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a.	For conversing at home/speaking with family members _____	98. No response		
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b.	For watching TV news _____	98. No response	99. Do not watch TV/News	
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c.	For reading the newspaper _____	98. No response	99. Do not read Newspaper	

Household Information

Z9. Area/Locality: 1. Village 2. Town 3. City 4. Metropolitan City

Z9a. (If Town/City/Metropolitan) Type of house where Respondent lives
 1. House/Flat/Bungalow 2. House/Flat with 5 or more rooms
 3. House/Flat with 4 rooms 4. Houses/Flat with 3 rooms 5. Houses/Flat with 2 rooms
 6. House with 1 room 7. Mainly Kutch house 8. Slum/Jhuggi Jhopri 9. NA

Z9b. (If village) Type of house where Respondent lives
 1. Pucca (both wall and roof made of pucca material)
 2. Pucca-Kutch (Either wall or roof is made of pucca material and other of kutch material)
 3. Kutch/Mud houses (both wall and roof are made of kutch material)
 4. Hut (both wall and roof made of grass, leaves, un-burnt brick or bamboo) 9. NA.

Z10. Total agricultural land including orchard and plantation owned by your household (as on date of survey):
 _____ (Ask in local units, but record in standard acres. If more than 99, Code 99)

Z11. Do you or members of your household have the following: Yes No

a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. Car/Jeep/Van	1	2
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped	1	2
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. Airconditioner	1	2
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. Computer/laptop	1	2
e	<input type="checkbox"/>	e. Washing machine/Microwave/Fridge	1	2
f	<input type="checkbox"/>	f. Fan/Cooler	1	2
g	<input type="checkbox"/>	g. TV	1	2
h	<input type="checkbox"/>	h. Mobile phone	1	2
i	<input type="checkbox"/>	i. LPG gas	1	2
j	<input type="checkbox"/>	j. Motorised pumping set for irrigation	1	2
k	<input type="checkbox"/>	k. Tractor	1	2
l	<input type="checkbox"/>	l. Handpump inside the house	1	2
m	<input type="checkbox"/>	m. Power back up (Inverter/Generator, etc.)	1	2

Z12. Livestock **Total Number**

a	<input type="checkbox"/>	a. Goat/sheep:	_____
b	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. Pig:	_____
c	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. Cow/Oxen	_____
d	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. buffalo/Camel:	_____

Z13. Total monthly household income - putting together the income of all members of the household?

 (Record exact amount in Rupees. If respondent does not give any amount then record 000000)
 Mobile/Telephone number of the respondent _____

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