



# POLITICS AND SOCIETY BETWEEN ELECTIONS 2018

Azim Premji University and CSDS-Lokniti



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Photo from Lokniti-CSDS Survey fieldwork

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States Surveyed





## 1. Introduction

The problems of India's development and governance are routinely linked to the logic of India's electoral democracy. As a result, a great deal is known about elections, but paradoxically our knowledge of politics and society between elections is relatively underdeveloped. As much as anything else, development and governance outcomes are shaped by how the government functions between elections; including how it relates to citizens on a regular basis, how it provides routine public services to them, and how public order is maintained. Further, governance process are nested in the social and political relationships between citizens inter se and with government functionaries.

Since the mid-1990s, the National Election Studies have systematically researched electoral behaviour in India, covering the 1996, 1998, 2004, 2009 and 2014 parliamentary elections (see, for instance, Asian Survey (volume 52, issue 2, 2012), and special issues of Economic and Political Weekly 2004 (51), 2009(39) and 2014 (39)). In addition, numerous State Assembly election studies have also been conducted. These and other studies show that even marginal citizens of India are wooed at the time of elections (Banerjee, 2014; Ahuja and Chhibber, 2012). But, what happens to state-citizen interaction once elections are over?

The normal assumption is that a great deal of distance marks state-citizen interaction between elections. What is the nature of this

distance? In what way do political actors engage or disengage with citizens? In what ways does the bureaucracy step into this void? What explains the distance between political actors and citizens in everyday governance? Is the state closer to its citizens in some parts of India, but not in others? Which classes and groups are served better? Furthermore, how do different groups of citizen view the state and do such perceptions differ in different parts of the country? Our current insights into these questions are based on studies in specific parts of India and in particular fields of citizen-state interaction (Gupta, 2012). There is an urgent need to go broader and study nationwide governance patterns across a whole range of issues.

No systematic nationwide studies have been undertaken about politics and society between elections. We still do not know enough about which social groups (castes, tribes, religious communities, classes, gender) get better public services (water, sanitation, roads, electricity, irrigation, education, medical care); which groups do the police protect and which ones it does not in times of need; in which States, marginal groups face less discrimination from government agencies and fellow citizens, compared to the other States; which States do a better job of providing public services? These questions are at the heart of a fuller understanding of the problems of everyday governance and development in India. To generate such knowledge we need a data gathering effort that allows a nationwide understanding of everyday development and governance.

## The Key Issues

Substantively, the following sorts of issues, directly addressing governance, development and public policy, are of great relevance here. An illustrative list of enquiries is set out below:

**(a) Delivery of public services and public order:** What communities receive what sorts of public services (for example, education, health and sanitation, power, transport, irrigation)? What are the mechanisms that promote or hinder service delivery? In what ways are services unevenly distributed across space? What roles do political agents and/or community engagement play in service delivery? What strategies do citizens deploy to engage with the state? What are the state-level and urban-rural variations?

**(b) Identity and consciousness:** What are the primary identities – national, sub-national, religious, caste, urban-rural – in different parts of the country? Are urban identities different from rural identities? Is the South different from the North in the way caste and religious identities are experienced and expressed? How do religious, caste and linguistic identities interact? Which one becomes dominant in which part of the country and how?

**(c) Discrimination and violence:** Which communities face discrimination from the State and/or fellow citizens? Which ones face violence from the State and/or fellow citizens? Is there a State-level difference? Is there an urban-rural difference? For instance, Ambedkar had famously argued that the village is a cesspool for Dalits in particular (and, arguably, for lower castes in general) and the city would offer them a better life. Is that true? Which States provide evidence for Ambedkar's claim, and which ones do not? Similarly, in which States do minorities face acute deprivation? Is there a relationship between discrimination by state authorities and discrimination by fellow citizens?

**(d) Citizen perception of state Institutions:** How do citizens perceive state institutions and their capacity to govern? Does this vary by social category? To what extent do citizens trust the (a) legislature (b) executive (c) judiciary (d) bureaucracy and (e) police (f) army? Do citizens relate to parts of the state machinery – different departments and across hierarchies – differently? Is there a State level or urban-rural variation in perceptions? These questions are centrally related to the legitimacy of the state and the citizens' sense of belonging.

**(e) Economic process and governance:** How is economic regulation by the state experienced by citizens? Do traders, hawkers, and street vendors face harassment, by whom and of what kind? How do citizens secure building and business approvals from the state? What are citizen attitudes toward taxation? Are there varying levels of corruption in government-business and farmer-government interface in different States? Which States are better and how? How do citizens relate to global economic networks? How do they understand the impact of global forces on their lives? Does this vary from State to State and city to city? What are the emerging forms of governance as previously

agricultural labour shifts to industry? In what ways do economic communities engage with the state?


This report, the second in the collaboration between Azim Premji University and Lokniti (CSDS) conducted in 2018 covers 8 States: Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. In the Chapters below we report a summary of our findings.

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## 2. Social Identity

### 2. A. Ties that bind:

#### I. Friendship networks: Caste

We live in times that are strange. On one hand, the liberalised economy understands openness as its maxim, on the other, our social lives remain equally homogeneous and exclusive as before if not more. Cities which were to provide the death knell to casteism and other social divisions, seems to be only reinforcing these identities through modern ghettos.<sup>1</sup> Technology and social media too, especially in the times of majoritarian politics, have in the last couple of years spawned an entire industry of fake news, rumours against minority communities.<sup>2</sup> This section, rather than ‘real numbers’ is more about our attitudes, our perceptions that tell us substantially about the cleavages that exist on social lines. Perceptions have a crucial story to tell with respect to our lived social universes. Perceptions in many ways becomes the function of social distances between these universes in any case. Given that identity is theoretically not seen as a stable category, but something that is always framed in response to socio-economic contexts, post 1990s India has witnessed a much

1 Azim Premji University-Lokniti Report on ‘Politics and Society between Elections 2017’ clearly shows that urban respondents do not show any greater social interaction amongst different castes and community.

2 Muzaffarnagar riots in 2013 which took the lives of 62 people and left 50,000 homeless was entirely stoked through a fake video that went viral through social media platforms like Facebook and Whatsapp.

**Table 2.A.1: Friend from various caste groups by State**

Have a close friend who is:	Dalit	Adivasi	OBC	Upper Caste
Andhra Pradesh	79	51	81	65
Bihar	58	12	75	71
Madhya Pradesh	71	54	80	73
Maharashtra	73	57	78	71
Rajasthan	58	41	76	75
Jharkhand	75	73	76	59
Chhattisgarh	67	78	86	64
Telangana	83	68	89	80
<b>Overall</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>70</b>

**Note: All figures are in percentages.**

stronger consolidation of caste and religious identities for both progressive and conservative politics.<sup>3</sup> Of course, these cleavages are products of modernity and have been in place since precolonial times and has only exacerbated since then.<sup>4</sup> Electoral politics in India which feeds off social cleavages too has a mutually constitutive relationship with social identities. While it can be in the form of progressive Dalit politics, it also exists in the regressive and dangerous right wing politics which stokes majoritarian sentiments in order to consolidate Hindu Upper Caste votes. The heightened anxiety over ‘love jihad’ and the frequent resurfacing of cases of caste violence only allude to this. The relationship between caste and religion and electoral politics therefore an intrinsic one. For these 8 states, we look at the data on what we are calling ‘social universe’. Using a sample of data cutting across caste and religion, we try to understand what the social life of these communities look like on an everyday basis. Using ‘close friendship’ as a marker, we attempt to see how people respond to having close friends from across caste, class and gender which gives us a sense of how these communities coexist. Though the literature on new social movements and right wing politics post 1990s there is a consensus amongst social scientists that we have progressively moved to much stronger social cleavages, we rarely have

a sense of the extent of this polarisation. Which states look more polarised than others? What is the possible caste and religion dynamics in a particular state? Does it vary between rural and urban areas? Or with literacy? Apart from giving us a sense of understanding these societies better, it is indicative of how electoral politics gets shaped in each state. We use data collected for Q41, Q52 and Q53 in the questionnaire to infer the following patterns.

The overall data collected across eight states show that there is a significant interaction among castes (Hindus), as seen in Table 2.A.1. For both Dalits and Upper Castes, seventy per cent of respondents said that they had a close friends from both the categories. For OBCs, it was as high as eighty per cent. The lowest, quite predictably is the data for the Adivasis, which stands at fifty-five per cent.

Andhra Pradesh shows interesting numbers in this regard. While 79 per cent and 81 per cent of the respondents say they have a close Dalit friend and OBC friend respectively, only 65 per cent of respondents mention having a close Upper Caste friend. 51 per cent of respondents said they had a close Adivasi friend. We find it difficult to judge if this is simply a function of caste composition of Andhra Pradesh as the last census data we have

3 Thomas Blom Hansen, *Wages of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay*, University of Princeton Press, 2001; *The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India*, Princeton University Press, 1999.

4 Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*, Oxford, 1990.


dates back to 2011, when Andhra Pradesh existed as unified Andhra Pradesh which included Telangana. Telangana data on the other hand reveals that there seems to be a healthy and almost comparable intermixing with Dalits, OBCs and Upper castes with the data ranging between 80 to 90 per cent. In comparison to Andhra Pradesh, a significantly higher number of respondents said that they have a close Adivasi friend. Quite predictably, Bihar has the lowest number of respondents acknowledging they have an Adivasi friend. According to a newspaper story written in 2009 which discusses the state’s gross institutional neglect towards its Adivasi population.<sup>5</sup> Since mobility is directly linked with social and economic wellbeing, the abysmal data in this regard is only reflective of the widespread neglect and segregation that the Adivasis in Bihar are subjected to. Roughly constituting 1 per cent of its total population, Adivasi communities seem to be placed quite low in the state’s list of priorities to the extent that it does not have an SC/ST commission. Chhattisgarh on the other hand, with around 22 per cent Adivasi population, has 78 per cent of respondents saying they had a close Adivasi friend. Similarly Jharkhand too reports a significantly high number. Overall, unless stated otherwise, most respondents across states acknowledged having a close friend from the

OBC Category followed by Upper Caste and then Dalits and lastly the Adivasis.

Interestingly, the data shows little variation when seen through the lens of urban and rural divisions (see Figure 2.A.1a&b). The number of respondents across the states saying they have close friends from Dalit, Adivasi and OBC community remains eerily almost the same. It is only the data for respondents saying they have a close Upper Caste friend fall by eight percentage points in the case of rural locations.

When the data is further zoomed in on, to understand the data according to the caste of the respondents, it throws up some interesting tendencies. The data on intra-caste friendships are of course high. Though across castes, and rural and urban locations, a significantly high number of respondents claimed that they had a Dalit friend, the number of Upper Caste claiming they have a Dalit friend is visibly lower. Here too, the numbers do not vary significantly across rural and urban numbers apart from the data on friendships between Upper Castes and Dalits. The number of Dalit respondents saying they have an Upper Caste close friends jumps up by a marked 20 percentage points from 56 per cent to 76 per cent as we move from rural to urban. On the obverse, the number of


Figure 2.A.1a: Friend from various caste groups by Location and Caste



Note: All figures are in percentages.

5 Shoumojit Banerjee, “Does Bihar know how many tribals live in the State?” The Hindu, 16th August 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/Does-Bihar-know-how-many-tribals-live-in-the-State/article16875233.ece>

Figure 2.A.1b: Friend from various caste groups by Location and Caste



Note: All figures are in percentages.

Upper Caste respondents saying they have a close Dalit friends remains close to static between 63 per cent to 66 per cent. This may be indicative of the power dynamics that exist within society which indicates the extent to which Upper Castes have percolated economic, social and spheres which makes it inevitable for almost all castes especially in urban areas (apart from Adivasis). Similarly, the OBC community too shows a great degree of penetration into the social, economic and political field. This corresponds to the last year's report too which shows similar levels of penetration.

Again, quite confirming the data from previous year, the Adivasis seem to be the most insular group, with really high intra-caste friendships and relatively lower inter-caste friendships. This may be due to the fact that little mobility exists among the Adivasis and even in the case of migration to cities, marginalisation ensures that they remain socially insular. OBCs in this regard seem to be the community with significantly high number of close friendships with all other categories. The Upper Caste community in comparison seem to be more insular with the numbers progressively falling across OBCs, Dalits and the Adivasis. If understood as an indicator of a broader social phenomenon, it may make for an important qualitative study to understand the changing social dynamics of OBCs as a social category. 71 per cent of the Dalits said they have a close OBC friend and Adivasi friend

respectively which quite predictably drops to 64 per cent when it comes to their response regarding Upper Castes.

A state wise segregated data shows us greater nuances in this regard. Both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana show a much higher interaction with Dalits across other castes with 82 per cent of Upper Castes in Andhra Pradesh and 72 per cent of Upper Castes in Telangana saying they have a close Dalit friend. It significantly drops in other states with only 46 per cent of Upper Caste of Upper Castes saying they have a Dalit friend. The number of OBCs also saying they have a close Dalit friend too fluctuates significantly across states. While 88 per cent of the OBCs in Telangana acknowledged having a Dalit friend, the numbers drops to 55 per cent in a state like Rajasthan. The social distance between Upper Caste and OBCs with respect to Dalits seem to be the direst in states like Bihar and Rajasthan. This seems corroborated in the high number of caste atrocity in both these states. This is not to say that caste violence does not exist in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, the form of it would be greatly different. Intra-caste friendships across castes and states are always consistently high for obvious reasons. But rather strangely, both Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh and to some extent Bihar report a much lower intra-Dalit friendships. Its puzzling to see that only 60 something per cent of Dalit respondents say that they have Dalit friends in these states.

As has already been pointed out, the state wise data on Adivasis quite clearly point out to a much more insular social worlds that they inhabit across states which show a very high intra-community friendships. Conversely states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan and to some extent Andhra Pradesh show low levels of interaction with Adivasis. While with Bihar, as already pointed out previously, the reason could be double edged. As their numbers are low, they rarely become the target of state development projects and have seen little upward mobility. In Madhya Pradesh however, the Adivasi population is by no means small, but the Adivasi population is limited to specific districts like Jhabua which makes them insular. However, lack of development of Adivasi populations across these states remains a significant issue.

With regard to OBCs, both Chhattisgarh and Telangana show significantly high numbers of Upper caste and Dalit respondents saying they have close friends from OBC communities. Jharkhand and Rajasthan and Bihar show results within the 70-79 per cent spectrum across castes, with an

exception in Bihar with only 69 per cent of Upper Caste respondents say they have an OBC friend. The number of Dalit respondents saying they have a close OBC friend across states again remains between 74 to 77 per cent apart from Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Telangana where it is higher. Though this relationship is important to look at given the exacerbated nature of caste violence whereby the OBC category has appeared to be the perpetrator of caste violence, these figures do not throw up anything significant perspective with regard to the nature of caste

The data on Upper Castes also confirms the long standing perceptions of inter-caste relationships. The Upper Caste with all their social mobility and access to institutional access seem to be significantly inward looking in terms of its intra-caste networks. Quite predictably, across states, the numbers drop progressively with OBCs, Dalit and Adivasis. In most states the number of Dalit respondents saying that they have an Upper Caste friend is significantly higher than their Adivasi counterparts. However, In Andhra Pradesh, the number of Adivasi respondents saying they have an

**Table 2.A.2: Friend from various caste groups by Literacy and Caste**

Have a close friend who is:		Dalit	Adivasi	OBC	Upper Caste
Non literate	Upper Caste	58	42	79	77
	OBC	71	49	84	65
	Dalit	78	50	79	51
	Adivasi	78	85	74	52
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>61</b>
School Educated	Upper Caste	60	41	79	81
	OBC	69	50	85	69
	Dalit	76	56	79	64
	Adivasi	74	87	76	53
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>68</b>
College Educated	Upper Caste	70	48	83	89
	OBC	76	59	88	82
	Dalit	86	62	84	74
	Adivasi	75	85	76	55
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>80</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 2.A.3: Friend from various religions by State**

Have a close friend who is:	Muslims	Christians	Hindu
Andhra Pradesh	63	65	93
Bihar	31	10	90
Madhya Pradesh	38	13	93
Maharashtra	63	36	94
Rajasthan	39	8	91
Jharkhand	48	55	87
Chhattisgarh	25	25	92
Telangana	74	71	94
<b>Overall</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>92</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

Upper Caste close friend is higher than the number of Adivasi respondents saying so by 10 per cent. In Bihar, this difference jumps to 22 per cent.


Table 2.A.2 shows that there seems to be little impact of education in terms of people’s social spheres. Most numbers remain stable across caste across education levels. The only instance where one can see a significant jump is in the case of Upper Caste figures. While 61 per cent of non-literate respondents said that they have Upper Caste friends, the numbers rise significantly with college education. This, to reiterate the arguments made before is probably the function of the elite-

Upper Caste capture of higher education across the country.

## II. Friendship network: Religion

Like caste, religion too is a significantly important social cleavage that exists in our society. As Table 2.A.3 shows, it appears that while 92 per cent of respondents had Hindu friends, only 48 per cent of respondents had Muslim friends and 36 per cent of them had Christian friends. Though this data is inadequate to make any suggestion, the tables to follow would give a better sense of the social universe of the people inhabit these eight states.

**Figure 2.A.2: Friend from various religions by Location and Religion**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

63 per cent respondents from both Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra said they have close Muslim friends. Around 65 per cent of respondents from Andhra Pradesh also acknowledged having a close Christian friend. Given a strong history of proselytization amongst the Dalits in Andhra Pradesh, the Dalit Christian population in Andhra Pradesh is a substantial one. The surprise actually comes from Maharashtra where a 36 per cent of respondents say that they have a Christian friend but has only 1 per cent of Christian population. In Rajasthan, while 39 per cent of respondents said that they have a close friend from the Muslim community, 8 per cent of the respondents said they have a close Christian friend. Hindus, being the majority and dominant religious group, fare very high in this regard. Around 31 per cent of respondents from Bihar say that they have a close friend from the Muslim community but only 10 per cent from the Christian community. Possibly, the higher concentration of Muslims in several districts of Bihar increases this percentage well above their population ratio which is only at 19 per cent.

Location of the respondents divided across rural and urban gives us considerably different figures (Figure 2.A.2). While only 41 per cent of rural respondents said they have a Muslim friend, it rises to 65 per cent in urban areas. For the Christians

it rises from 31 per cent to 48 per cent from rural to urban. For Hindus, the data barely changes across rural to urban. It again may be important to understand what these figures mean in the light of growing communalism and religious extremism in the country.

When the data is further disaggregated in terms of the religion of respondents, it shows some clearer indications. In terms of Hindu-Muslim friendships, the numbers are quite telling. While only 36 per cent of Hindu respondents in rural areas said they have a Muslim friend, almost 81 per cent of Muslim respondents say they have a close Hindu friend. In the case of urban areas, while 58 per cent of Hindu respondents say that they have a close Muslim friend, it rises to 88 per cent when Muslim respondents are asked if they have a Hindu friend. Very high numbers of intra-religious friendships are obviously reported across all eight states and urban and rural boundaries. While 29 per cent Hindu respondents in rural areas acknowledged to having Christian friends in rural areas, it increases to 44 per cent in urban areas. Among the minority religions, the Muslim-Christian friendships also do not point to any significantly concrete direction in terms of their numbers which could indicate some form of solidarity towards each other.

**Table 2.A.4: Friend from various religions by Literacy and Religion**

Have a close friend who is:		Dalit	Adivasi	OBC
Non literate	Hindu	35	29	91
	Muslim	93	32	78
	Christian	65	77	95
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>90</b>
School Educated	Hindu	38	29	93
	Muslim	90	38	85
	Christian	52	96	97
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>92</b>
College Educated	Hindu	54	44	95
	Muslim	90	48	88
	Christian	56	94	96
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>94</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 2.A.5: Friend from opposite gender by State and Gender**

	Male respondents who have Female close friend	Female respondents who have Male close friend
Andhra Pradesh	27	22
Bihar	31	30
Madhya Pradesh	22	15
Maharashtra	46	41
Rajasthan	13	14
Jharkhand	25	23
Chhattisgarh	15	9
Telangana	42	31
<b>Overall</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>23</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

This state wise disaggregated data is able to throw light on the status of social universe in different states. With respect to Hindu Muslim friendships, Bihar and Chhattisgarh fare the worst with only 19 per cent and 22 per cent of Hindu respondents respectively saying that they have a Muslim friend. On the obverse, 71 per cent of Telangana's Hindu respondents say that they have a close Muslim friend. Could this be a result of the fact that Hyderabad, which was culturally and socially dominated by Muslims, has now become a part of Telangana? Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra seem to be doing relatively better on these lines with significantly higher number of Hindus saying the same. Telangana, also reports an exceptionally high number of Christians with close Muslim friends. In Andhra Pradesh, the same numbers drop down to 65 per cent and in Madhya Pradesh to 50 per cent.


Again in terms of having Christian friends, in consonance with previous tables, we see Andhra Pradesh and Telangana hit very high numbers across religions. In fact, strangely, intra-Christian friendship numbers are considerably lower than other states. Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan report very few numbers because of low population. In fact for a state with only 0.29 per cent Christians, 13 per cent of Hindus and 12 per cent of Muslims reporting they have a close friendship with one or more Christians is revealing. It may be the case that Christians in Madhya Pradesh are upwardly

mobile and do not face the kind of exclusion that Christians face in some other states. In Jharkhand and Maharashtra around 49 per cent and 34 per cent of Hindu respondents have a Christian friend. Muslim respondents mostly report almost the same numbers as Hindu respondents in this regard. The numbers only hugely vary when looking at Chhattisgarh data when it jumps to 57 per cent for Muslim respondents as opposed to only 22 per cent when it comes to Hindu respondents.

When it comes to having Hindu friends, the numbers across the states are quite high. The numbers dip to some extent when we look at Muslim respondents where the numbers seem to be between 70 per cent to roughly 80 per cent. It only goes up in states like Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Telangana. However, when looked at in comparison to the number of Hindus saying that they have a close Muslim friend, these numbers are significantly higher.

With education, the numbers across states are not necessarily revealing (Table 2.A.4). Respondents saying they have a Muslim friend amongst the college educated goes up to 58 per cent from 42 per cent amongst the non-literate. The numbers do not necessarily vary too dramatically between the non-literate and school educated. The numbers for Hindu friends remains very high across educational status.

Figure 2.A.3: Friend from opposite gender by Location and Gender



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**III. Friendship networks: Gender**

In the previous sections, we analysed friendship networks along caste and religious lines. This section looks at the friendship between members of opposite gender i.e. men and women. While the survey had interviewed members of the transgender community, we will analyse the results only for male and female respondents. Compared to the earlier sections, a significantly lower share of respondents state that they have friends from the opposite gender. Largely, five percentage points more men report having a female friends than the vice versa.

Overall, at low-forties Maharashtra has the largest share of respondents with friends from the opposite gender. Table 2.A.5 shows that a

higher share of male respondents across all states have a female friend, except for Rajasthan where a slightly higher number of female respondents register having a male friend. The difference is most pronounced with respect to Telangana (11 percentage points) and Madhya Pradesh (7 percentage points). In Maharashtra and Telangana, despite the considerably higher share of friends from opposite gender among men and women as compared to other states, still note a 5 and 9 percentage point difference between male and female respondents.

Furthermore, we notice urban-rural differences in gender-based friendship. While three in every ten urban respondents register having a friend from opposite gender, closer to two out of every ten rural

respondents register the same. When the urban-rural responses are further disaggregated by gender of the respondent, as shown in Figure 2.A.3, we find that over 30 per cent of male, urban respondents report having a female friend, followed by female-urban respondents, male-rural respondents and, finally female-urban respondents with the smallest share of respondents with male friends.


Similarly, there seems to be considerable effect of literacy on opposite gender friends as shown in Figure 2.A.4. The share of respondents who register having a close friend from opposite gender rises from 22 per cent among non-literate respondents to 31 per cent — a 9 percentage point increase. A similar disaggregation with literacy and gender shows that, as noticed with respect to location and gender, male-literate respondents record the highest and female-non-literate respondents record the lowest proportion of respondents with a friend from opposite gender.

#### IV. Which politician would you choose: Caste

Caste has been in the eye of the storm of Indian politics since the mid-1970s. Some of the issues that have been raised are comparative resource

allocations, entitlements to seats in state institutions and decision making bodies, vote bank politics, access to education, health, and livelihood, as well as equitable opportunities in the domain of social relations—all of which are decisive factors when it comes to choosing one’s own political leader. Despite wide-spread awareness programmes, the indignation of the Upper Castes towards the positive discriminations made available at formal institutional levels by the Indian Constitution to alleviate the problematic conditions of lower castes, and addressing problems faced by them has been stunning. Instead of making the gaps smaller, processes like the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report in 1992 aggravated the animosities between caste communities, raising the debate whether reservations should be made available on the basis caste/tribe identities of individuals or their socio-economic conditions. There have been discussions, following Andre Beteille’s pointing out that one significant fall-out of reservations has been the increase in difference of socio-economic conditions between individuals belonging to the same caste/tribe community, as opposed to between them and the mainstream.<sup>6</sup>

**Figure 2.A.4: Friend from opposite gender by Literacy and Gender**



**Note: All figures are in percentages.**

<sup>6</sup> Beteille invites us to “view with caution a policy .... which sets out to decrease the inequalities between castes and communities but ends up by increasing the inequalities between individual members of each caste and community” (Beteille, A. (1983) *The backward classes and the new social order*. In: *The idea of natural inequality and other essays*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 78-121.:100). The Mandal Commission too recommended that candidates from the “creamy layer” should be excluded from the benefits, and the delicate task of defining this layer was devolved on the states [Parry, J. (1999) *Two cheers for reservation: the*

Middle and Upper castes' questioning of reservation found a fresh lease of life with the rise of of right wing political environment in India since the middle of this decade. Several attacks in the last four years on the marginal communities, including the Dalits and Muslims, has compounded their vulnerabilities in the face of direct actions taken against them with the patronage of organized right-of-centre political forces that have infringed upon freedom of discursive engagements in universities, and local recreational collectives including clubs and libraries.

One salient point that may be highlighted here, is: Tables in this section of the report have clubbed data on the Adivasis and caste communities. On the one hand this categorization may appear to be convoluting the boundaries between the caste and Adivasi communities—generally considered to be completely separate categories of identity on the account of castes being segments of the Hindu community, and Adivasi identity being based on ethnicity. Thus, while the term used in Hindi for caste is 'varna', for Adivasis, the term is 'JanaJati.' On the other hand, however, there is scholarly opinion that traditionally castes and some Adivasi communities have been contiguous categories; and gradual alterations in their relationship to land, commercialization of natural resources, and entry into state-arbitrated market economy bringing about Hinduization of Adivasi identities. Scholars also agree to some extent that the caste and tribe identities were reformed and frozen by the British for colonial administrative expediency, which was a commentary in itself on the porous boundaries between tribes and other social formations that coexisted in the Indian society.<sup>7</sup>

The tables below depict the opinion of people from the 8 responding States in different aspects that arise out of the overlap between caste identities and politics, like choice of politicians by caste, respondents' economic class and its co-occurrence with caste-identity of politician etc. An extremely striking feature that appears from the numbers is the distaste for political leaders from outside one's

own caste/tribe community, and it remains the same notwithstanding the intersectionalities of caste/tribe, economic class, urban/rural location, States, as well as literacy. The polarization is also stronger than that seen in the case of preferences on the basis of religious identity, as will be revealed in the next bunch of tables.

Table 2.A.6 shows that over half of the respondents [55 per cent], would choose a political leader only from their own castes. Only 10 per cent said they may relent to one from a different caste as well, while 35 per cent said that they would not count caste as a determining factor at all in this matter.

When the data is further disaggregated by State, the possibility of respondents choosing a leader from a different caste still fares low; Chhattisgarh depicts an abysmal figure at only 3 per cent, while Rajasthan and Jharkhand, where the highest number of people are comfortable with the same stand at still low figures of 15 and 19 per cent respectively (Table 2.A.6). It is interesting to note the figures from Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, both of which show almost equal percentage points for leaders from the same caste as well as not minding caste backgrounds of leaders at all. This suggests some obvious homogeneity between these two contiguous States, only reinforced by the information that they constituted a single territorial entity till mid-2014. More disparate figures are seen in Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh, where there is a mean difference of 30 percentage points between the preference for leaders of the same castes and that of no preferences

When respondents' own caste backgrounds are included, the figures tread the same pattern i.e. all sections—the Upper Castes, OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis—prefer leaders from their own communities. The disagreement with leaders of a different caste/tribe background is somewhat strong, with Upper Castes and Dalits registering the highest dissent. The opinions across the States that record that caste/tribe identities would not matter range mostly in the mid-30s.

*satnamis and the steel plant*. In: *Institutions and Inequalities: Essays in Honour of André Béteille*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 128-169].

7 Baviskar, A (2012) *In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts over Development in the Narmada Valley*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. pp 49-104; Shah, A. (2010) *In the Shadows of the State Indigenous Politics, Environmentalism, and Insurgency in Jharkhand*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

**Table 2.A.6: Caste Preference for Politician by State**

	Leader from same caste	Leader from different caste	Will not make any difference
Andhra Pradesh	43	10	47
Bihar	57	12	31
Madhya Pradesh	65	9	26
Maharashtra	54	5	41
Rajasthan	62	15	22
Jharkhand	52	19	29
Chhattisgarh	61	3	36
Telangana	48	6	46
<b>Overall</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>35</b>

**Note: All figures are in percentages.**

We see staggeringly high preference for leaders being from the same community among Adivasis in Bihar (95 per cent) and Jharkhand (72 per cent). Furthermore, only 5 per cent of the Adivasis in Bihar feel that caste will not make a difference. Dalits and Upper Castes in Madhya Pradesh are groups of respondents where over 70 per cent prefer same-community leaders. In all the rest of the combinations of States and communities, between 15 and 53 per cent of respondents prefer leader of same caste group.

There is a distrust of leaders from outside the community across all classes, and all caste-class intersections. The Upper Castes in general express the lowest trust in leaders from outside their own. When the upper class data is disaggregated it produces further confirmation that across all castes/tribes, the upper echelons feel comfortable only with leaders from their own caste/tribe segment, and are averse to any from outside. The highest percentage of people that say that caste/tribe identity would not matter is at 45, and come from the Upper-Upper castes and Upper-OBCs.

By location, 58 per cent of rural respondents say they would prefer their political leaders from their own caste/tribe background, while 32 per cent of rural respondents, the same does not matter. This is a striking feature, as only 10 per cent among them say they would be comfortable with someone from outside their community represent them at a political stage.

When the data is further disaggregated by State, the possibility of respondents choosing a leader from a different caste still fares low; Chhattisgarh depicts an abysmal figure at only 3 per cent, while Rajasthan and Jharkhand, where the highest number of people are comfortable with the same stand at still low figures of 15 and 19 per cent respectively (Table 2.A.6). It is interesting to note the figures from Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, both of which show almost equal percentage points for leaders from the same caste as well as not minding caste backgrounds of leaders at all. This suggests some obvious homogeneity between these two contiguous States, only reinforced by the information that they constituted a single territorial entity till mid-2014. More disparate figures are seen in Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh, where there is a mean difference of 30 percentage points between the preference for leaders of the same castes and that of no preferences.

Table 2.A.7 look at the intersections of literacy and caste/tribe preferences. Overall, only 9 per cent of college educated individuals would approach a leader from a different caste/tribe, and 10 per cent of the non-literate feel the same. However, we notice a jump of 15 to 20 percentage points between non-literate respondents and college educated respondent of every caste group, except Adivasis, where the respondents feel that the caste of the leader will not make any difference. Preference for

**Table 2.A.7: Caste Preference for Politician by Literacy and Caste categories**

		Leader from same caste	Leader from different caste	Will not make any difference
Non Literate	Upper Caste	68	11	21
	OBC	63	9	28
	Dalit	59	11	30
	Adivasi	66	7	27
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>27</b>
School Educated	Upper Caste	56	10	34
	OBC	57	10	33
	Dalit	54	11	34
	Adivasi	64	7	29
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>34</b>
College Educated	Upper Caste	46	9	45
	OBC	48	8	44
	Dalit	46	9	45
	Adivasi	60	7	33
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>44</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

same-community leaders remains strong among Adivasis of all education levels.

#### V. Which politician would you choose: Religion

The vitriolic nature of religious violence in India in the last 20 years, and its renewal in the wake of the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] to the seat of power emanated from a coupling of religion and politics embodied in the Hindutva ideology. It has been instrumental in attempts to raise the claim of India being a place for Hindus, pushing not only the religious minority communities to the wall, but also delegitimizing the claims of other minorities towards being treated with dignity and equality. As a result, the image of a Hindu adult male of working age has been churned out the figure of an ideal citizen of India, and all other communities' relevance and claim to the nation being compromised to that effect. The entanglement between religion and politics also has shaped peoples' claims to the public places, with minority communities being ghettoized, and targeted for the basic minimum practices of their

everyday-lives, like food habits, social gatherings, presence in medium of transport and social media, participation in educational institutions, cultural spaces, employment, as well as, being part of electoral processes.

Generally, over half of the respondents (55 per cent) prefer political leaders from the same religion, while only 9 per cent would prefer approaching one from other religions, as shown in The vitriolic nature of religious violence in India in the last 20 years, and its renewal in the wake of the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] to the seat of power emanated from a coupling of religion and politics embodied in the Hindutva ideology. It has been instrumental in attempts to raise the claim of India being a place for Hindus, pushing not only the religious minority communities to the wall, but also delegitimizing the claims of other minorities towards being treated with dignity and equality. As a result, the image of a Hindu adult male of working age has been churned out the figure of an ideal citizen of India, and all other communities' relevance and claim to the nation being compromised to that effect. The

**Table 2.A.8: Religion Preference for Politician by States**

	Leader from same religion	Leader from different religion	Will not make any difference
Andhra Pradesh	38	9	53
Bihar	61	10	28
Madhya Pradesh	64	9	27
Maharashtra	54	4	42
Rajasthan	62	15	23
Jharkhand	54	13	33
Chhattisgarh	62	3	35
Telangana	46	5	49
<b>Overall</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>37</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

entanglement between religion and politics also has shaped peoples' claims to the public places, with minority communities being ghettoized, and targeted for the basic minimum practices of their everyday-lives, like food habits, social gatherings, presence in medium of transport and social media, participation in educational institutions, cultural spaces, employment, as well as, being part of electoral processes.

Table 2.A.8. show that 37 per cent say that they would really not make a difference between politicians on the basis of religion. In Andhra Pradesh, the lowest share of respondents have expressed preference for leaders from same religion, Telangana follows this trend closely. In the rest of the States, over half of the respondents show same-religion bias. The highest faith in leaders of the same religion have been expressed, at percentage figures past 60, by respondents from Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh. In Andhra Pradesh the preference stands at 38 per cent, and in Telangana at 46 per cent. Respondents from both Maharashtra and Jharkhand have 54 per cent preference for politicians from their own religion. The low figures pertaining to faith on leaders from other religions are stark among all States, with Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Telangana not even making it to double digit, with Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra below 5. The highest faith, among all the States have been recorded in Rajasthan, Jharkhand, and Bihar, where Bihar merely touches 10 per cent.

Over half of the respondents from each religious communities i.e. Hindus, Muslims and Christians, say that they would like their political leaders to come from their own religion. Only 8 per cent of the Hindus have responded that they would be prefer approaching leaders from other religions, and are matched up by Christians by the figure. For Muslims and Others, the level of preference in leaders from other religions is 11 per cent and 7 per cent respectively.

When disaggregated by rural and urban locations, the following are the responses: 58 per cent of rural respondents say they prefer leaders from same religion, while only 9 per cent would a leader of a different religion. In the urban regions too, only 7 per cent of respondents would be comfortable with leaders from other religions. One in every three rural interviewees say that religion would not be a discriminatory ground for them while choosing their leaders. The figure for the same category in urban zones is 45 per cent. Preference for leaders from different religion fare abysmally low both in rural and urban areas. All communities in rural region have expressed indifference to religion at levels below 40 per cent. To over half of the urban Christians, religious affiliation of the leader would make no difference.

Across all levels of literacy, viz., non-literate, school educated, and college educated, all communities report that they would not prefer leaders from other religions (Table 2.A.9). Among the non-

**Table 2.A.9: Religion Preference for Politician by Literacy and Religion**

		Leader from same religion	Leader from different religion	Will not make any difference
Non Literate	Hindu	62	8	30
	Muslim	57	12	31
	Christian	56	8	37
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>30</b>
School Educated	Hindu	57	9	34
	Muslim	51	10	39
	Christian	47	11	42
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>35</b>
College Educated	Hindu	48	7	45
	Muslim	42	9	49
	Christian	56	3	40
	<b>Overall</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>46</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

literate respondents, 62 per cent say that they would prefer leaders from their own community while 56 per cent of school educated respondents and 47 per cent of college educated chose leaders of the same religion. There is a parity between those who prefer leaders of same religion, and those who feel that it will not make any difference among college educated individuals—both figures are between 45 to 50 percentages. Only 35 per cent of school educated individuals say that religious affiliation of the political leaders would not make any difference to them.

The next table on relation between literacy and political choice based on religion is a little more complex with the levels of literacy distributed along religious ascriptions of the respondents. Here too, a similarity with Table 48 is seen on the distrust of leaders from a different religion recorded across members of all religious backgrounds. It is intriguing that the levels of trust irrespective of religion are higher among non-literate members of all communities compared to school and college educated ones.

Very small percentages of people from all economic classes—poor, lower, middle, and upper—show trust in political leaders from different religion. All

the figures are at or below 10. Every community said, they are more comfortable with leaders from their own community. While preferences for leaders from the same religion ranges between 47 per cent and 62 per cent across the economic classes, all classes have recorded a contingency on religious basis below 50 for choosing political leaders.


Among Muslims of poor and lower classes, the level of trust in leaders from different religions is from 3 to just above 10 per cent. Among Hindus, the same category ranges between 7 and 10 percentage points. The figures for poor, lower, middle and upper classes across all religious backgrounds depict an even distribution of figures between a fairly large range of 30 and 51 towards not differentiating between leaders based on the latter's religious identities. Similarly, the figures for preferring leaders from same religion across classes are high, with a more or less wide range between 62 and 46.

## 2.B. Gender

### I. Role of women

The role of women in society in a multilingual and multicultural society like India reflect aspects

Figure 2.B.1: Role of women



Note: All figures are in percentages.

of the older, centuries' long struggle over the politics of gender in India. The prescriptions and gender roles in family life in India has been largely rooted and shaped by cultural texts like the Hindu Shastras, Ramayana and Mahabharata which have combined with regional, local and religious particularities. These have largely emphasized strictly traditional dichotomies of male and female responsibilities: women as nurturers and caregivers in the subservient role of wife and mother and men as providers and protector of family honour and prestige. These persistent ideas on the specific roles and structures of gender relations is often theorised under the overarching concept of patriarchy.<sup>8</sup> Patriarchy is a society ordered by the norms of female subordination and is interwoven with the hierarchical social structures of caste, ethnicity and religion. This then tempers every gender social relationship from marriage, to women's labour and participation. For the purposes of this study, questions around gender relations have been classified into four main ideas – Gender relations at home, Agency in decision making captured by preferences in marriage, education and representation.

Decisions on marriage, managing a home and importance of education and work were explored

through seven statements; the respondents were provided with a scalar range of 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree' (See Q61 in the questionnaire). Figure 2.B.1 shows that a majority of respondents replied in affirmative to most of the statements – some of which are in contradiction to each other. For instance, while 76 per cent of the respondents agree that women should prioritise home over work, a surprising 84 per cent believe that women and men have equal child rearing responsibilities. Similarly, over half of the respondents feel that educating boys is more important than educating girls and that men should be paid more, yet 71 per cent of the respondents agree that fifty per cent of all jobs must be reserved for women. The respondents were asked two statements with regard to women's right to decide when they want to get married and to whom. The complimentary nature of the statements seem to lead to similar responses. 64 per cent of the respondents feel that it's a women's choice to decide to get married and 68 per cent of the respondents agree that it's the women's prerogative to decide whom she wants to get married to. The statements have been categorised according to the sphere of life it is related to and the puzzles posed by the results will be analysed in the upcoming sections; we

8 Beechey, V. 1979. "On Patriarchy." *Feminist Review* 3.66-82

Delphy, C. 1977. *The Main Enemy*. London: Women's Research and Resource Centre

Eisenstein, Z. 1978. "Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism." Pp. 5-40 in *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, edited by Z. Eisenstein. New York: Monthly Review Press

will focus only on 'Strongly Agree' and 'Strongly Disagree' responses.

#### A. *Managing home*

With respect to gender relations at home, there is a preference for women's confinement, even seclusion to the domestic sphere exists in much of India and South Asia (Sharma 1990<sup>9</sup>). When there is economic rationality that drives a woman to work, it is largely to work on the family farm or in a family enterprise. But this specialization in the domestic sphere is both an outcome of the micro level ideology of gender discrimination within the family but also a result of macro level inequality in the wage and opportunity structure (Desai and Jain 1994<sup>10</sup>). It is also frequently argued that women's concentration in the private sphere leads to their loss of power within the family by reducing their opportunity to earn income that is independent of their husbands or other kin (Acharya and Bennett, 1983; Omvedt, 1980<sup>11</sup>).

With regard to childcare, it has largely been perceived as the woman's domain. Care giving across cultures is often the result of social behaviours, organized social networks, acceptable norms of male and female behaviour, and family

ideologies (Super and Harkness 1997). While some empirical investigations of family structure and functioning in modern India have been undertaken in recent years (e.g., Ramu 1987<sup>12</sup>; Roopnarine, Talukder, Jain, Joshi, & Srivastav 1992<sup>13</sup>), notions of Indian family practices and division of childcare labour have often been based on anthropological accounts (e.g., Kurtz 1992<sup>14</sup>; Freed & Freed, 1980<sup>15</sup>) that have largely been immersed in traditional Indian mythology and cultural symbolism that has not taken into account the variability that exists in family arrangements and socialization practices (Roopnarine & Suppal 1998<sup>16</sup>). Many researchers have found that there has been a shift from traditionally stereotyped roles toward quasi-egalitarian roles among urban, higher-income, better educated dual-earner families (Rajagopalan 1989<sup>17</sup>; Shukla 1987<sup>18</sup>; Verma 1995<sup>19</sup>). The argument is that greater opportunities for employment and education, challenges to patriarchy, and technoeconomic changes may have contributed to an improvement (in women's status in India and to possible increases in men's participation in childcare (Suppal and Roopnarine 1999<sup>20</sup>). Thus we find we have to keep in mind the heterogeneity and dynamism of gender roles while relating work and care and their linkages to both each other and

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- 9 Sharma, U. 1990. "Public employment and private relations: Women and work in India," in Sharon Stichter and Jane Parpart (eds.), *Women, Employment and the Family in the International Division of Labour*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 229-246.
  - 10 Desai, S., & Jain, D. (1994). Maternal Employment and Changes in Family Dynamics: The Social Context of Women's Work in Rural South India. *Population and Development Review*, 20(1), 115-136.
  - 11 Acharya, M and L Bennet (1983). Women and the Subsistence Sector: Economic Participation and Household Decision making in Nepal. World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 526. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
  - Omvedt, G. 1980. *We Will Smash This Prison: Indian Women in Struggle*. London: Zed Press
  - 12 Ramu, G. (1987). Indian husbands: Their role perceptions and performance in single and dual-earner families. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 49, 903-915.
  - 13 Roopnarine, J. L., Talukder, E., Jain, D., Joshi, P., & Srivastav, P. (1992). Personal wellbeing, kinship tie, and mother-infant and father-infant interactions in single-wage and dual-wage families in New Delhi, India. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 54, 293-301.
  - 14 Kurtz, S. (1992). *All the mothers are one: Hindu India and the cultural reshaping of psychoanalysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
  - 15 Freed, R. S., & Freed, A. S. (1980). *Rites of passage in Shantinagar*. Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. 56, Pt. 3. New York: American Museum of Natural History.
  - 16 Roopnarine, J. L., & Suppal, P. (1998). *Kakar's psychoanalytic interpretation of Indian childhood: A - agrant disregard for the father and non-traditional multiple caregiving in a changing India*. Manuscript submitted for publication.
  - 17 Rajagopalan, J. (1989). *Current trends in infant care: An Indian experience*. Unpublished master's thesis, Lady Irwin College, University of Delhi.
  - 18 Shukla, A. (1987). Decision making in single- and dual-career families in India. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 49, 621-629.
  - 19 Verma, J. (1995). Transformation of women's social roles in India. In J. Valsinner (Ed.), *Comparative-cultural and constructivist perspectives*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
  - 20 Suppal, P., & Roopnarine, J. L. (1999). Paternal involvement in child care as a function of maternal employment in nuclear and extended families in India. *Sex Roles*, 40, 731-744.

more generally to their contribution to the status of women in India.

The two statements relating to the sphere of home and family were:

*“A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work”*

*“Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing”*

We noted earlier that a majority of the respondents agree that women should prioritise home and that both women and men have equal child rearing duties. While this trend holds consistent across the states, there are some interesting variations (See Table 2.B.1 and Table 2.B.2). For instance,

close to half of the respondents of Rajasthan and Bihar feel that home must be prioritised by women, this number falls to mid-twenties in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Whereas a low 3 per cent of the respondents in Bihar disagree with this proposition, a significantly higher share of respondents in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra do not feel that women should prioritise managing home over work. Similarly, with regard to equal responsibilities, despite the overall support for this proposition, there is a stark variation; 30 percentage points more respondents in Chhattisgarh support equal responsibility compared to Bihar. Surprisingly, 6 out of every 10 respondents in Rajasthan strongly support the idea of equal responsibility in child rearing, yet every

**Table 2.B.1: “A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work” by States**

	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Andhra Pradesh	25	21
Bihar	47	3
Madhya Pradesh	34	10
Maharashtra	36	23
Rajasthan	49	9
Jharkhand	36	6
Chhattisgarh	39	11
Telangana	25	12


Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 2.B.2: “Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing” by State**

	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Andhra Pradesh	49	6
Bihar	43	5
Madhya Pradesh	46	5
Maharashtra	65	7
Rajasthan	60	2
Jharkhand	47	8
Chhattisgarh	73	2
Telangana	58	2


Note: All figures are in percentages.

Figure 2.B.2: “A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work” by Literacy



Note: All figures are in percentages.

Figure 2.B.3: “Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing” by Literacy



Note: All figures are in percentages.

other respondents of the same state believes that women must prioritise home.

Although a larger proportion of respondents feel women should prioritise home over work, the share of respondents who support this falls across the economic class – from the poor to the

upper class. Conversely, in a case of congruence of attitudes, over 55 per cent of the poor respondents and the upper class respondents agree that both parents must take equal responsibilities. With regard to the location of the respondent, 8 percentage point more rural respondents feel that women should prioritise home and 7 percentage

points more urban respondents disagree with this statement. Over half of both rural and urban respondents support equal responsibilities in child rearing but, strikingly, 2 percentage point more rural respondents supported this proposition than urban respondents.

Gender does not seem to play a part in perception towards women giving greater importance to managing home i.e. almost equal share of men and women believe that women should prioritise work. However, gender seems to play a large role in child rearing responsibility since a larger proportion of women — 4 percentage points higher — agree than child rearing is a matter of equal responsibilities. We notice that, intuitively, the agreement to the proposition that women must prioritise home over work falls and the disagreement rises substantially with higher educational attainment as we see in Figure 2.B.2 and Figure 2.B.3. Still, there isn't any significant variation with respect to child rearing.

#### B. Marriage

Marriage as a key institution for the production and reproduction of gender hierarchies. Marriages

in India have traditionally been a site to cement caste and family ties. Some scholars (Beteille (1991:15,17<sup>21</sup>) have pointed out that while attitudes towards marriage are 'markedly conservative', there is a shift towards where sanctions inter-caste unions have weakened (1996:162-6<sup>22</sup>). There has also been a shift in the way marriage is conceived. While the two statements set out below could point to a dichotomy between a traditional arranged marriage and a modern love marriage, it could also be read as a rise in a companionate form, 'a bond between two intimate selves' (Parry 2001: 816<sup>23</sup>) within the institution of an arranged marriage.

Some evidence suggests that a couple's prospective personal happiness has now become as important in arranged marriage as it is in love marriage. Several anthropologists (Donner 2002<sup>24</sup>; Mody 2002<sup>25</sup>; Seymour 1999<sup>26</sup>; Uberoi 2006<sup>27</sup>) describe this shift in detail, although they may emphasize the opposition between 'modern' love and 'traditional' arranged marriage. In reality, though, whether or not parents take part in choosing their children's partners, middle-class marriage has progressively developed in recent years into a

**Table 2.B.3: "Women should have the right to decide to get married or not" by States**

	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Andhra Pradesh	26	12
Bihar	29	15
Madhya Pradesh	23	18
Maharashtra	32	28
Rajasthan	38	13
Jharkhand	29	7
Chhattisgarh	37	6
Telangana	35	8

**Note: All figures are in percentages.**

21 Beteille, A. (1991). The reproduction of inequality: occupation, caste and family. *Contributions to Indian Sociology* (N.S.) 25,3-28

22 Beteille, A (1996) Caste in contemporary India. In *Caste today* (ed.) C.J.Fuller,150-79. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

23 Parry, J.P. 2001. Ankalu's errant wife: sex, marriage and industry in contemporary Chhattisgarh. *Modern Asian Studies* 35, 783-820.

24 Donner, H. 2002. 'One's own marriage': love marriages in a Calcutta neighbourhood. *South Asia Research* 22, 79-94

25 Mody, P. 2002. Love and the law: love-marriage in Delhi. *Modern Asian Studies* 36, 223-56

26 Seymour, S.C. 1999. *Women, family, and child care in India: a world in transition*. Cambridge: University Press

27 Uberoi, P. 2006. *Freedom and destiny: gender, family, and popular culture in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press

**Table 2.B.4: “It is up to women to decide whom to get married to” by States**

	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Andhra Pradesh	24	12
Bihar	24	26
Madhya Pradesh	23	29
Maharashtra	39	23
Rajasthan	35	19
Jharkhand	31	18
Chhattisgarh	43	7
Telangana	38	7

Note: All figures are in percentages.

more companionate form (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008<sup>28</sup>) which is reflected in the statements below.


In this section, we look at two statements on women’s choices with respect to marriage:

*“Women should have the right to decide to get married or not”*

*“It is up to women to decide whom to married to”*

Although in aggregate a higher proportion of respondents supported a woman’s right to decide whether to get married, the state-wise disaggregation shows a different picture, see Table 2.B.3 Including Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Telangana, which recorded the largest share of respondents supporting a woman’s choice to get married, a greater share of respondents in six out of eight states agreed to this proposition. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh were outliers to the larger trend, with over a quarter of the respondents


**Figure 2.B.4: “Women should have the right to decide to get married or not” by Literacy**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

28 Fuller, Chris J., Narasimhan, HariPriya. 2008. “Companionate Marriage in India: The Changing Marriage System in a Middle-Class Brahman Subcaste.” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 14:736–54.

Figure 2.B.5: “It is up to women to decide whom to get married to” by Literacy



Note: All figures are in percentages.

in both states registering strong disagreement. As Table 2.B.4 shows, across the states, a greater proportion of respondents supported a woman’s right to choose her spouse. The disagreement to this proposition was largely similar across the states with exception to Maharashtra where over a quarter of the respondents felt that it’s not up to women to decide whom to get married to.

The perceptions of the economic classes towards both statements seem to move in, largely, the same direction. Whereas around 30 per cent of the respondents of the poor, the lower class and the middle class categories, closer to 40 per cent of the upper class respondents agree with both statements. Generally, a similar share of urban and rural respondents agree with both proposition on women’s choice with respect to marriage, but we find that a somewhat higher percentage of rural respondents disagree with both statements compared to their urban counterparts. Male and female respondents register similar perceptions towards women’s choice, even so a marginally higher share of women agree with both statements.

Furthermore, there seems to be a significant and positive correlation between literacy of the respondent and their support for the any woman’s right to decide when to marry and whom to marry – larger share of respondents with more educational attainment supports both statements, as seen in Figure 2.B.4 and Figure 2.B.5.

### C. Education and Work

Perceptions of the value of education have altered dramatically in the last few decades. Studies like Majumdar<sup>29</sup> (1996, 22) have found that families from different socio-economic groups all have one thing in common, that is they place a real emphasis on their children’s education. Education is widely seen a route to upward mobility<sup>30</sup>, provided that basic quality is assured<sup>31</sup>. However, a crucial difference in determining motivation is played by gender. Economists are of the opinion that differential market returns to educational investment in girls and boys are important determinants of parental decisions regarding schooling. Sociologists on the other hand, underline social considerations such as

29 Majumdar, M (1996): ‘Kanyakumari: The Leading Edge of Education in Tamil Nadu’, Madras Institute of Development Studies for UNDP-GOI research programme on human development

30 Dreze. Jean and Amartya Sen (1995): India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

31 ILO (1994): Action for the Elimination of Child Labour: Overview of the Problem and Response, International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), ILO Office; Geneva

Sinha, Shanta (1995): ‘Education and the Role of ‘NG’s’, paper presented at the workshop on abolition of child labour, National Institute of Rural Development (NIRD), Hyderabad.

perceptions of gender roles (implicit in gendered division of labour) and son preference (biased intra-household' allocation of resources) that have led to educational discrimination against the female child. The perceived difference in benefits for boys and girls, a combination of economic and sociological factors have led to an undervaluation of female education (Bhatty 1998<sup>32</sup>). The link between labour markets and education may be a vicious cycle with persistent underinvestment in the education of girls leading to economic inefficiency, with labour markets re-enforcing discrimination against women which would be directly linked to economic incentives.

While there is a distinct bias against the education for women which is then linked to the material benefits and opportunities that a woman can accrue from paid labour. There is surprising amount of support for reservations for women. However this may very well fall within the patriarchal logic as the average women being less educated than the average man may act as proxy for her husband while occupying reserved seats. Some researchers note that women have less voice in some political arrangements, in that they don't field as many questions or speak publicly as comfortably.

However others point out that having an elected woman representative ensures increased voice as there is a level of comfort in airing concerns with women present. Women elected as leaders under the reservation policy have also been seen to invest more in public goods most closely linked to women's concerns (Chattopadhyay and Dufflo 2001<sup>33</sup>) Others (Ban and Rao 2008<sup>34</sup>), also do not find any merit in the tokenism argument, showing that female leaders perform no differently than male leaders. They point out that in the right institutional factors, particularly if women have political experience and live in spaces less dominated by upper castes, they perform no differently than men.

The statements considered in this section relate to the educating girls, equal pay for equal work and reservation at work for women:

*“Educating boys is more important than educating girls”*

*“Men should be paid more than women even if it's the same job”*

*“Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs”*

**Table 2.B.5: “Educating boys is more important than educating girls” by State**

	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Andhra Pradesh	16	28
Bihar	22	17
Madhya Pradesh	17	23
Maharashtra	13	46
Rajasthan	25	16
Jharkhand	23	20
Chhattisgarh	23	25
Telangana	13	32

Note: All figures are in percentages.

32 Kiran Bhatty. (1998). Educational Deprivation in India: A Survey of Field Investigations. Economic and Political Weekly, 33(28), 1858-1869.

33 Chattopadhyay, R. and Dufflo E. (2001) “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from an India-Wide Randomized Policy Experiment.” Typescript, MIT

34 Ban R. and Rao V (2008), “Tokenism or Agency? The Impact of Women's Reservations on Village Democracies in South India,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 56, no. 3: 501-530.

**Table 2.B.6: “Men should be paid more than women even if it’s the same job” by States**

	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Andhra Pradesh	13	33
Bihar	23	19
Madhya Pradesh	18	20
Maharashtra	26	36
Rajasthan	22	24
Jharkhand	26	33
Chhattisgarh	24	27
Telangana	18	35

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 2.B.7: “Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs” by States**

	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Andhra Pradesh	29	10
Bihar	31	12
Madhya Pradesh	34	11
Maharashtra	58	9
Rajasthan	38	12
Jharkhand	31	25
Chhattisgarh	45	9
Telangana	34	9

Note: All figures are in percentages.


While two of the above statements are more patriarchal in nature, the third statements supports the empowerment of women through job reservation. We noted in the earlier tables that although half of the respondents believe that educating male children is more important and, a little less than 50 per cent of the respondents feel that men should be paid more than women, there is strong support for reservation of jobs for women with over 70 per cent of the respondents replying in affirmative to this statement. However, there is considerable variation in responses for these statements across the states as we see in Table 2.B.5-7.

A higher proportion of respondents in Rajasthan, Jharkhand and Bihar believe that educating boys is

more important; the percentage point difference between those who strongly agree and strongly disagree with this statement is particularly significant with respect to Rajasthan (10 percentage points). On the other hand, Maharashtra tops the list, followed by Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, with 46 per cent of the respondents stating that they strongly disagree with discriminatory treatment of children. Maharashtra is closely followed by Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.


Bihar is the only state where a larger share of respondents support higher pay for men, compared to the other seven states where a significantly greater proportion of respondents disagree with the proposition. In continuance with the perceptions towards educating girls, Maharashtra records the

Figure 2.B.6: “Educating boys is more important than educating girls” by Literacy



Note: All figures are in percentages.

Figure 2.B.7: “Men should be paid more than women even if it’s the same job” by Literacy



Note: All figures are in percentages.


highest proportion of respondents who disagree with unfair pay practices, followed by Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand.

Maharashtra again records the highest share of respondents, close to 60 per cent, who support the reservation in jobs for women, followed by Chhattisgarh. Surprisingly, Rajasthan, despite a significantly large share of respondents registering their support for educating boys over girls, has the

third highest share of respondents, close to 40 per cent, stating that they support the reservation of jobs for women.

When disaggregated by economic class of the respondents, we notice that there is no significant difference in perceptions of the respondents. The larger trends noted earlier in this sections – higher support for reservation, equal pay and educating girls – is consistent, albeit with minimal variation.

**Figure 2.B.8: “Women should have 50% reservation in all jobs” by Literacy**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

While there is a general feeling of disagreement with discriminatory behaviour towards educating male and female children, a larger share of urban respondents strongly disagree with statement than rural respondents (8 percentage points higher). The same holds true for equal pay proposition, with 7 percentage points more urban respondents supporting it. With respect to reservation in jobs, there are no significant differences in support between rural and urban respondents, but we notice that a slightly larger share of urban respondents do not support reservation in jobs. While a virtually identical share of male and female respondents register support for educating girls and equal pay, we notice significant difference with respect to reservation in jobs. There is a clear gender-based perception with regard to job reservation since a third of all male respondents strongly support reserving 50 per cent of all jobs for women and 10 percentage point more women (44 per cent) support the same proposition.

Literacy, see Figure 2.B.6-8, unlike gender, seems to lead to greater variation apropos educating girls and equal pay. Whereas the share of respondents, who feel that educating boys is more important and that men should be paid higher, remains steady across the educational levels, those holding the contrary opinion rises from low twenties among non-literate respondents to around 33 to 34 per cent among the college educated. There is no


discernible difference in support for reservation in jobs with higher educational attainment of respondents, nevertheless there is a noticeable rise towards strong disagreement for reservation.

## II. How safe are women

The perceptions regarding the status of women’s safety in India have been strongly influenced by a series of incidents of gender violence in the last decade. The 2012 Nirbhaya case has raised questions on whether women feel safe enough in the public domain. This is notwithstanding the fact that there is a significant share of women who face violence every day at home. Moreover, most safety perception indexes do not include all strata of society to give a comparative insight.


To understand the perceptions on safety of women, questions were asked with respect to the time of the day, and places of being (See Q63 in the questionnaire). Figure 2.B.9-11 show that while 75 per cent of the respondents felt women were safe after sunset, only 25 per cent of the respondents felt that women were unsafe after that. Regarding the places of being, there was an equal distribution of figures on perception of women’s safety between place of work and home: 78 per cent of the respondents felt women were safe at work place as well as home, while 22 per cent felt they would be unsafe at both.

Figure 2.B.9: Safety of women at sunset




Note: All figures are in percentages.

Figure 2.B.10: Safety of women at Place of Work




Note: All figures are in percentages.

Figure 2.B.11: Safety of women of at Home



Note: All figures are in percentages.



Note: All figures are in percentages.

In the state-wise distributions of positive safety-perceptions after sunset, see Table 2.B.8, respondents from Maharashtra and Telangana reflect the highest figures at 85 and 84 per cent respectively. Andhra Pradesh [75 per cent], Bihar [75 per cent], Madhya Pradesh [77 per cent], and Chhattisgarh [75 per cent] stand at the medium levels in terms of the perception figures, while 65 per cent and 61 per cent of the respondents from Rajasthan and Jharkhand respectively feel women would be unsafe after sunset.

The perceptions of women’s safety at work places are quite evenly distributed at the higher end at 82 per cent in Andhra Pradesh, 80 per cent in Bihar, 81 per cent in Madhya Pradesh, 82 per cent in Maharashtra, 82 per cent in Chhattisgarh, and 83 per cent in Telangana. Responses from Jharkhand stood at the lowest end of the distribution, where 62 per cent felt women would be safe at place of

work, and a little higher percentage of people [74] said work places were safe for women to be in, after sunset.


The overall caste-wise percentage distributions of feeling women are safe range between the high seventies to low seventies, which reflects a generally stable and even position in terms of women’s safety. Among respondents from the Upper Castes, 72 per cent felt women were safe after sunset, 78 per cent felt women were safe at work places, and 79 per cent felt they were safe at home. Among respondents belonging to the Other Backward Castes [OBC] 76 per cent, 79 per cent, and 79 per cent felt women would be safe at sunset, at work place, and at home respectively. 73 per cent, 77 per cent, and 78 per cent of Dalits respondents perceive that women are safe after sunset, at place of work, and at home respectively.

Table 2.B.8: Safety of women by States

	At Sunset	At Place of Work	At Home
Andhra Pradesh	75	82	76
Bihar	75	80	81
Madhya Pradesh	77	81	84
Maharashtra	85	82	83
Rajasthan	65	74	80
Jharkhand	61	62	59
Chhattisgarh	75	82	83
Telangana	84	83	78

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 2.B.12: Acceptance of same-sex relationship**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 2.B.9: Acceptance of same-sex relationship by States**

Sexual relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know
Andhra Pradesh	12	42	46
Bihar	39	55	6
Madhya Pradesh	31	45	24
Maharashtra	29	38	33
Rajasthan	37	36	27
Jharkhand	28	64	8
Chhattisgarh	28	39	33
Telangana	19	47	33

Note: All figures are in percentages.

In a similar manner, there is an equitable distribution of perceptions of women’s safety after sunset between the poor, the lower, the middle, and the upper classes. The levels of perceptions of safety reflected among the different classes on women being safe at workplaces and at home are also staggeringly even, within which the poor have responded with the highest of 80 each. The lower, and the middle differ negligibly [at 79 each and 77 each respectively], while the upper castes stand at the mid-seventies for both places [75 and 76 respectively].

It is interesting to note that there is an almost equal distribution in terms of the percentage of people that feel women are safe in rural and urban areas after sunset, at their place of work, as well as at home. There is a similar distribution under the heads of time and place between male and female respondents. 75 per cent and 74 per cent of rural and urban respondents respectively feel women are safe outside after sunset, 79 per cent and 76 per cent of them feel women are safe at their workplaces, and 80 and 74 per cent of rural and urban respondents feel women are safe at home. A reconsideration of the figures suggests that the percentage of people

that feel the lack of safety is quite high too, and particular attention if drawn by the feeling of lack of safety of women at home in the urban sector, which is equal in value to that on the safety after sunset. Could it be because the increasing number or reports like the Arushi Talwar murder case, and the Nirbhaya case—instances where young women were sexually tortured and killed by unknown people at home and at public place respectively?

75 per cent of male respondents feel that women are safe outside after sunset, and the figure is matched up by the percentage of women that feel the same. An almost equal percentage of male and female respondents feel that women are safe at their workplaces. About safety at home, the figures are similar at very high 70s. The workplace as a shared premise between men and women is a ponderable category, and with the flexibilization of production structures since 1990s, there have been high stakes placed on bringing women to the workforce, as their labour is considerably cheap and as they are docile workers compared to men. The feminization of the workforce ensuing out of this has also populated the production floors in certain industries exclusively with women. Once segregated, the perceptions of safety at workplace may only correspond to a pool where men are largely absent. Again, the same feeling may be reinforced among men when they think about the safety of women in such place, and in places where both men and women are present, the feeling may stem from a relative trust in their own selves as agents of women's safety.

What is more eye-catching in the table below, is that almost equal percentages of male and female respondents in all the States feel women are unsafe at home; and its variation from the percentages that feel women are unsafe after sunset are only in the range of 3-4.

### III. Acceptance of same-sex relationship (SG)

Same sex relationships in India have been historically stigmatized or at best tolerated in India. Indian culture has been considered generally repressive of individual sexual expression and particularly women's sexuality (Kartrak, 1992; Uberoi, 1996; Vanita 2002a). Same sex relationships,

in this climate, further disrupt conservative family values. These relationships have often been studied through historiography (Srivastava, 2004) or understood to be mediated through colonialism ((Sinha, 1997; Vanita and Kidwai, 2000) or present imperialism (Khanna 2005). While people in same sex relationship constitute a minority, they are politically vocal in local and national activism (Vanita, 2002a). This may account for a growing awareness of rights based politics around same sex relationships, as well as a slow shift in attitude and awareness among the general populace.

We asked whether "sexual relationships between two men or two women should be accepted in a society" (see Q62 in the questionnaire). The societal acceptance of same-sex relationships remain low among the eight states interviewed. While 28 per cent of the respondents feel that same-sex relationships should be accepted by the society, almost 20 percentage points more respondents feel that same-sex couples should not be accepted by society. Unlike the other questions asked in this survey, we notice that 26 per cent of the respondents replied 'Don't Know' (See Figure 2.B.12). We will analyse this statement further through state-wise disaggregation (Table 2.B.9).

Surprisingly, Bihar and Rajasthan register the largest share of respondents who support the acceptance of same-sex relationships; Bihar is also among the states with the largest shares of disagreement to the proposition. The southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana register the lowest levels of support, with less than 20 per cent of the respondents supporting acceptance of same-sex relationships. Interestingly, Bihar and Jharkhand which register the highest levels of disagreement also has the lowest levels of no response.

The effect of literacy on acceptance of same-sex relationships is ambiguous. While there is a fall in the share of respondents with no response, there is a simultaneous rise in the share of respondents who both agree that same-sex relationships should be accepted by society and those who disagree with the proposition. We notice a similar trend with respect to exposure to media.



## 3. Political Identity

### 3.A. Freedom of Expression

In this section, we examine public opinion on freedom of expression that thread through three themes central to India's politics and society: democracy and democratic practice, secularism, and sovereign nationalism. Using a set of six questions, clustered in three sets of two questions, we examine each across several categories in order to understand factors that are associated with public opinion on freedom of expression. These questions ask whether people who hold or advocate a certain opinion should be allowed to express their opinion freely in public. These opinions include: (a) a preference for dictatorship over democracy, (b) criticism of elected leaders, (c) ridiculing a religious community other than one's own, (d) promoting violence against another community, (e) advocating violence against the Indian state, and (f) advocating independence for any part of India. Broadly, these questions focus on whether people should be allowed to express certain opinions freely even when that opinion encounters and in some instances, pushes beyond, the limits to freedom of expression articulated in the Indian Constitution. Such issues are of significance

especially in light of recent events in which a number of writers, artists, journalists, activists, students and academics have been charged with sedition, and given a surge in vigilante social enforcement of restrictions on speech and expression through public attacks, either physically or on social media. The responses to these questions are “fully agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, and “fully disagree”. The questions we examine are Q20, Q44, Q46, Q50, Q55, and Q60 in the questionnaire (in Appendix). While what we present here constitutes preliminary examination of patterns, these results open up potential avenues of research on public opinion formation on freedom of expression, theoretically and empirically.

An empirical examination of the survey data suggests the following:

**Thematic Variation:** Public opinion on freedom of expression varies across the three thematic clusters: democratic practice, secularism, and nationalism. Respondents are generally open i.e. agree to allow free expression of opinion that involves criticism of leaders, but less open to that involving regime and institutional replacement. However, we find that opinion tilts the other way i.e. toward disagreement strongly when it involves the question of secularism (i.e. ridiculing or advocating violence against others). Responses to questions on nationalism again produces divergent opinions. While respondents agree with allowing a free expression of demands of independence for any part of India, they disagree when the same opinion involves the use of force against the Indian state. It appears that on some issues (i.e. secularism) public opinion is consistent with the reasonable restriction imposed on freedom of expression, and the need to respect the rights of all religious communities while on questions of democratic practice and sovereign nationalism, public opinion seems amenable to a more expansive view of what can be freely expressed by citizens.

**Cross-State Variation:** While thematic variation noted above is evident across all the States, also observable is variation in the magnitude of responses across subnational units. Fewer respondents in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana adopt extreme positions (i.e. fully agree or fully disagree) while comparatively larger proportions are found in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. The pattern is not entirely clear for Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, that is, for some

questions responses mirror patterns observed in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan while for others there is greater similarity with Andhra Pradesh or Telangana. The latter two States also have the highest proportion of responses who do not have an opinion. The clustering of public opinion across States suggests that regional identities likely play a role in how freedom of expression is viewed across space, a relationship that calls for further empirical scrutiny.

**Social Cleavages:** Religious identity emerges as a key factor that differentiates public opinion on freedom of expression. Respondents with religious identity considered minority (Muslims, Christians, and others) tend to differ systematically from positions adopted by the Hindu majority. While the magnitude of observed differences across communities vary across the substantive dimensions of freedom of expression i.e. whether ridiculing religious practices or promoting violence against the Indian state, these differences persist. Caste identity appears to influence opinion on these questions but selectively – only Adivasis differ from other caste identities and the questions relating to nationalism seem to resonate with them more so than other issues.

**Rural-urban Differences:** Rural respondents tend to adopt more expansive views of freedom of expression across all the questions. Urban residents on the other hand indicate a narrower view of freedom of expression.

Our analysis proceeds as follows. First we examine cross-state variation in responses to these questions for each cluster of questions. We then focus on other important social sources of variation such as religious and caste identity as well as location (whether urban or rural) and levels of respondent education.

### **Freedom of Expression in Democratic Practice**

The Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression that is provided by Article 19 (1) of the Constitution of India, in many ways forms the backbone of several ideals such as democracy, secularism and sovereign nationalism that are considered sacred by the Indian polity. It is intuitively and logically evident that if democracy is a form of government that is based on the consensus of the people, then freedom of speech and expression is absolutely vital for the former’s functioning. One cannot possibly imagine a situation whereby a

democratic form of government is antithetical to this basic freedom. As Justice Bhagwati argued in the *Maneka Gandhi Vs the Union Of India* (1978), 'If democracy means government of the people by the people, it is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the democratic process and in order to enable him to intelligently exercise his right of making a choice, free and general discussion of public matters is absolutely essential'. The Indian experience of democracy has shown how mobilisation of hitherto underprivileged groups such as women, Dalits, religious minorities and backward castes at a particular point of time deepened and strengthened the foundations of our democracy. None of this would have been possible if the underprivileged did not have the right to freely express their views and opinions in day to day politics and resist dominant forces.

Freedom of expression in democratic practice implies that citizens be allowed to freely articulate views critical of both democratic institutions as well as elected political leaders. Two questions that capture public opinion on freedom of expression in democratic practice are: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote dictatorship over democracy, and (b) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are criticizing elected leaders. The first question taps into an opinion that allows an individual to freely express a view that advances a set of political institutions that likely curtail a multitude of political and civil rights. Does freedom of expression in democratic practice generate the

space for individuals to freely promote a view that ironically calls for limiting or eliminating that very space? The second question focuses on an opinion involving a relatively more familiar practice among citizens in a democracy, one that allows for individuals to freely criticize elected representatives. While citizen dissatisfaction (or satisfaction) with their elected representatives finds expression during elections, does freedom of expression in democratic practice allow individuals to freely criticize elected leaders regardless of how these leaders are generally perceived?

We find significant differences in attitudes toward freely expressing a preference for dictatorship over democracy across States (see Table 3.A.1). In Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan more than half the respondents either fully or somewhat agree. This proportion declines to about 46 percent in Jharkhand and 42 percent in Chhattisgarh, and further drops to 37 percent in Telangana, and is lowest for Andhra Pradesh at 25 percent. Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh also show the highest proportion of respondents who either fully or somewhat disagree - 45 and 34 percent respectively. It is also worth noting that the two southern States also exhibit the highest proportions of respondents who do not have an opinion - 47 percent in Andhra Pradesh and 39 percent in Telangana.


The distribution of responses to this question also varies across religious communities. Muslims are less likely to fully or somewhat agree compared to other religious groups. While approximately 60 percent of Hindu respondents either fully or

**Table 3.A.1: State-wise attitudes toward dictatorship over democracy**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	10	17	15	12	47
Bihar	24	36	11	20	9
Madhya Pradesh	14	37	8	24	17
Maharashtra	22	26	8	16	28
Rajasthan	20	31	11	21	17
Jharkhand	14	32	13	32	10
Chhattisgarh	18	24	8	26	25
Telangana	11	24	15	12	39

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 3.A.1: Attitudes towards dictatorship over democracy by Caste and Community**




Note: All figures are in percentages.

somewhat agree, only about 52 percent of Muslims do the same. We do not find significant differences between Hindus and other religious groups. While the difference between Hindu and Muslim is significant we find that differences across caste groups are negligible. Dalits, Adivasis, and OBCs do not significantly differ from each other (or from upper caste groups), and the difference in proportions of respondents ranges from 1 to 3 percent (see Figure 3.A.1).

We also observe differences across rural and urban respondents, as shown in Figure 3.A.2. About 60 percent of rural respondents either fully or somewhat agree that individuals should be allowed to express a view that favours dictatorship over democracy. However, only 55 percent of urban respondents adopt a similar position.

We do not find large differences across levels of education either. While non literate respondents are more likely to fully or somewhat agree

**Figure 3.A.2: Attitudes towards dictatorship over democracy by Location**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.A.2: State-wise attitudes toward criticizing elected leaders**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	27	28	16	4	26
Bihar	31	39	9	12	9
Madhya Pradesh	33	34	7	11	15
Maharashtra	32	31	11	14	12
Rajasthan	39	35	5	9	12
Jharkhand	26	35	11	20	8
Chhattisgarh	34	21	5	12	28
Telangana	25	24	16	6	29

Note: All figures are in percentages.

(approximately 60 percent), about 57 percent of respondents with higher levels of education do the same. The four percentage point difference between the two is not strong or significant.

We find that about 50 percent or more of respondents across all the States either fully or somewhat agree with the opinion that people should be allowed to freely criticize elected leaders (see Table 3.A.2). We find, as with the previous question, that Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan have a larger proportion of such respondents compared to the other States. Sixty percent or more respondents fully or somewhat agree in the former, including Jharkhand, while among the latter, between 49 to 55 percent of respondents do the same. The proportion of respondents who do not have an opinion ranges from about 26 percent in Andhra Pradesh to 29 percent in Telangana while not insignificant are smaller compared to the previous question. Generally, we find that across these States, a majority of respondents support a free expression of views critical of elected leaders.

We find that, as with the expression of a preference for dictatorship over democracy, religious identity produces differences on how criticism of elected leaders is viewed (see Figure 3.A.3). Muslims are more likely to either somewhat or fully disagree. About 32 percent of Muslims hold this view while the comparable value for Hindus is about 26 percent. We do not find differences across caste groups. Dalits and OBC respondents do not differ significantly from upper caste groups on this issue. Adivasis are more likely to disagree compared to

other groups, but the difference is about 4 points or less.


In Figure 3.A.4, we observe a 4 percentage point difference across rural and urban respondents. Here we find a larger proportion of respondents fully or somewhat agree compared to the previous question. A little more than three quarters of rural respondents fully or somewhat agree reflecting the majority view this opinion commands across space.

We do not find significant differences across levels of education. Similar proportions, approximately three in four, of non-literate respondents and those with a college degree (or above) either fully or somewhat agree that individuals should be allowed to criticize leaders.

### Freedom of Expression in Secularism

The freedom of speech and expression is also embedded in the notion of secularism. Even as a conceptual idea that may not resonate entirely with the Indian experience, secularism is opposed to the idea of a theocratic state which by itself makes freedom of expression an essential ingredient for its successful practice. The Indian variant of secularism which calls for equal treatment of all religions makes it even more imperative that the freedom of speech and expression be upheld. The Indian Constitution provides for the Right to Freedom of Religion under Articles 25-28 which ensure to all citizens the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, freedom to manage religious affairs, freedom from

**Figure 3.A.3: Attitudes towards criticizing elected leaders by Caste and Community**




Note: All figures are in percentages.

paying taxes for promotion of any religion and the freedom to attend a religious instruction or religious worship in certain education institutions. Enjoyment of these rights thus entail the provision of free speech and expression. How does one practice and propagate one’s faith without the freedom of expression? Or, how would minority religious groups exercise dissent to any efforts by majoritarian groups at encroaching upon their cultural rights? Or, how would members of any

religious community resist forced conversions for instance?

We tap into freedom of expression embedded in the idea of secularism using two questions: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they making fun of religious communities other than their own, and (b) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are promoting violence against other communities. Both questions speak to what constitutes freedom

**Figure 3.A.4: Attitudes towards criticizing elected leaders by Location**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

of expression in ethnically heterogeneous societies where equal rights for all religions lies at the heart nation-building.

While freedom of expression is fundamental to secular practice, the relationship between the two is at times fraught. However, the Indian Constitution does not guarantee an unconditional enjoyment of the freedom to express oneself freely. The first Amendment to the Constitution imposes a set of “reasonable restrictions” on the freedom of expression curtailing public speech against the “interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence,” that stand in contrast to Western views (notably US) on freedom of expression. Does freedom of expression include freely ridiculing persons from other religious communities and their practices, and promote violence against other communities? More broadly, are these notions of freedom of expression consistent with the practice of secularism in India? While we do not adopt a position on this debate we examine the factors that appear to drive differences in public opinion on freedom of expression and how it relates to an underlying idea of secularism.

When it comes to allowing people to freely make fun of religious communities other than one’s own, we find that excepting Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, more than a third of respondents fully disagree across the States (see Table 3.A.3). In Andhra Pradesh 29 percent fully disagree while 23 percent

do so in Bihar. However, while only 6 percent fully agree in the former, about 29 percent do so in the latter. In other States, 20 percent or less fully agree. We also find that Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Chhattisgarh have larger proportions of respondents with no opinion ranging between 25 and 35 percent.

Here again, in Figure 3.A.5, we find that minority religious groups disagree, either fully or somewhat, that individuals should be allowed to make fun of religious communities other than their own as compared to Hindus. We find that the difference between Hindu and respondents who belong to other religious is approximately 7 percentage points. However the differences between religious communities drops to about 3 percent when we consider only those respondents who fully disagree. We find that Adivasis are also less likely to fully disagree relative to other caste groups though the difference is only 2 percent. We do not find significant differences across other caste identities notably Dalits and OBCs.

As shown in Figure 3.A.6, larger proportions of both rural and urban respondents tend to fully disagree - about 37 percent rural and 41 percent urban. Rural respondents are more likely to agree compared to urban respondents.


We find that there are no significant differences across respondents across levels of education. Close to about 40 percent of respondents across all levels of education tend to fully disagree.

**Table 3.A.3: State-wise attitudes toward making fun of other religious communities**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	6	15	18	26	35
Bihar	29	33	10	23	6
Madhya Pradesh	15	26	8	34	17
Maharashtra	17	22	12	33	17
Rajasthan	20	23	12	33	13
Jharkhand	14	29	18	34	5
Chhattisgarh	17	14	8	37	24
Telangana	8	15	17	30	29

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 3.A.5: Attitudes toward making fun of other religious communities by Caste and Community**




Note: All figures are in percentages.

With the exception of Bihar most respondents fully disagree that people should be allowed to freely promote violence against other communities (see Table 3.A.4). While 24 percent of respondents fully disagree in Bihar, the proportion increases to between 31 percent (Rajasthan) and 40 percent (Jharkhand). The other States fall within this range. Respondents with no opinions are mostly in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana at about 35 and 34 percent respectively.

In Figure 3.A.7, we do not observe significant differences across religious identities. Muslims and respondents from other minority religions do not hold different views than Hindus. About 44 percent of Muslims fully disagree while about 42 percent of Hindus do the same. And so do 43 percent of respondents from other religions. Adivasis, however, are less likely to fully agree as compared to other castes. For instance, while one is four Adivasis are likely to fully agree only one in

**Figure 3.A.6: Attitudes toward making fun of other religious communities by Location**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.A.4: State-wise attitudes toward promoting violence against other communities**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	9	13	7	37	35
Bihar	28	33	7	24	8
Madhya Pradesh	14	30	6	34	16
Maharashtra	17	20	12q	`a	15
Rajasthan	21	24	11	31	14
Jharkhand	13	27	12	40	7
Chhattisgarh	18	18	7	35	23
Telangana	8	16	9	33	34

Note: All figures are in percentages.

five Dalits or OBCs are likely to agree. The figure is not different for upper castes either.

We also find that rural respondents are more likely to either fully or somewhat agree with the view that persons promoting violence against other communities should be allowed to express this view freely (see Figure 3.A.8). There is approximately an 8 percentage point difference between rural and urban respondents.


We find a difference, about 4 percentage points, across respondent levels of education and the expression of ideas that promote violence against

other communities. While 40 percent of non-literate respondents fully disagree, the same proportion for urban respondents is 44 percent.

**Freedom of Expression in Nationalism**


The third theme that freedom of expression locates itself in is sovereign nationalism. Though not clearly articulated in the Indian Constitution, it firmly undergirds the Indian freedom movement and the politics of post-independence India. Contrary to other kinds of nationalisms that were based on either language or religion, as evident in Europe and certain parts of Asia, the thrust for

**Figure 3.A.7: Attitudes towards promoting violence against other communities by Caste and Community**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 3.A.8: Attitudes towards promoting violence against other communities by Location**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

nationalism in India was based on anti-colonialism. More importantly, given the rich diversity of this country, the leaders of the national movement such as Nehru and Gandhi endorsed a pluralist and civic form of nationalism that transcended caste, class, language, religion or any other form of ascriptive identity. Though in recent times we have witnessed a series of attacks by state authorities and vigilante groups on students, academics, journalists and writers for not complying with accepted norms of 'nationalistic behaviour', one cannot reasonably make the case that nationalism therefore is antithetical to freedom of speech and expression. The framers of our Constitution would have been appalled to see how a narrow and parochial understanding of nationalism is being used to discipline and punish those who did not subscribe to it. The essence of pluralist nationalism, just like secularism is the freedom of speech and expression that allows all citizens of the country, not only those belonging to the majority community, to voice their dissent.

Two questions used to identify public opinion on freedom of expression in its relation to sovereign nationalism are: (a) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote the use of violence against the Indian state, (b) people should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they demand independence for a certain part of India.

In Table 3.A.5, we find that greater proportions of respondents fully or somewhat disagree with the

view that someone who advocates violence against the Indian state should be allowed to freely express that view in most States. These proportions range from a low of 42 percent (Madhya Pradesh) to a high of 49 percent (Jharkhand) with other States clustered within. Bihar stands out, in that only 34 percent of respondents fully or somewhat disagree. A quarter of respondents in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana fully or somewhat agree, while the same proportion increases to about 40 percent in Rajasthan, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh suggesting that public opinion is somewhat divided in some if not all States.

Responses to whether someone has the right to express an opinion that calls for violence against the Indian state do not show much variation across caste and community groups except for Adivasis who are more likely to agree with this position (see Figure 3.A.9). For instance, only 43 percent Dalit and 47 percent OBC respondents either fully or somewhat agree with this statement. In contrast, about 58 percent Adivasis are in full or somewhat agreement. However we do not observe significant differences across religious communities. While approximately 46 percent Hindus support this position, the proportions for Muslims and respondents from other religions are similar.

As with the previous responses, rural respondents are more likely to agree compared to urban respondents (see Figure 3.A.10). In this case we find that there is a 9 percentage point difference between the two. While one in two rural respondents either

**Table 3.A.5: State-wise attitudes toward promoting violence against the Indian state**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	9	13	7	37	35
Bihar	28	33	7	24	8
Madhya Pradesh	14	30	6	34	16
Maharashtra	17	20	12q	`a	15
Rajasthan	21	24	11	31	14
Jharkhand	13	27	12	40	7
Chhattisgarh	18	18	7	35	23
Telangana	8	16	9	33	34


Note: All figures are in percentages.

fully or somewhat agree, only 40 percent of urban respondents do so.

Forty percent or more respondents across all levels of education fully disagree with the view that persons advocating violence against the Indian state should be allowed to express these views freely. Conversely, 20 percent or less respondents fully agree with this view. While more respondents fully disagree we do not see significant differences across levels of education. More than half the respondents either somewhat or fully disagree suggesting majority support.


In all States, shown in Table 3.A.6, we find a greater proportion of respondents who fully disagree with allowing people to freely express independence for any part of India than those who fully agree. In Bihar these are about equal, a quarter of respondents either fully agree or fully disagree. In Andhra Pradesh and Telangana the difference is about 5 percentage points in favour of fully disagree, and 7 points in Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan. This difference increases to about 15 points Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra and is about 25 points in Jharkhand. Across States,

**Figure 3.A.9: Attitudes towards promoting violence against the Indian state by Caste and Community**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 3.A.10: Attitudes towards promoting violence against the Indian state by Rural/Urban**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

we find that Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have the lowest proportions of those who fully disagree, about 19 percent. In all other States, more than quarter of respondents fully disagree on allowing one to freely advocate independence for any part of India. Once again, we find that Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Chhattisgarh have a sizeable proportion of respondents who do not have an opinion.

Across caste identities, shown in Figure 3.A.11, we find that proportions of respondents who fully or somewhat agree are similar. While upper castes and OBCs are less likely to do so relative to Dalits and Adivasis, the difference is small. We do not find differences across Hindu, Muslim and respondents identifying with religions either. While a third of respondents fully disagree we find that close to 50 percent of respondents tend to either fully or somewhat agree.

We do not find significant differences across location, as can be seen in Figure 3.A.12. The difference between respondents from rural and urban locations is about 2 percentage points.

We also see that across all levels of education the proportion of respondents who fully disagree with allowing people to freely express independence for any part of India is greater than the proportion of respondents who fully agree. For instance, among non-literates almost a third of respondents

fully disagree while about 23 percent fully agree. Similarly, while 37 percent of college educated respondents fully disagree, only about 20 percent fully agree. However, we also find that the proportion of those who fully agree or somewhat agree is greater than 50 percent across all levels of education.

In conclusion, freedom of speech and expression is an a priori condition for the successful practice of democracy, secularism and sovereign nationalism. Rights ensuring free speech and expressions not only have institutional consequences impinging on democratic deepening, but enhance human capacities as well – an outcome intrinsic to human development. The importance accorded to this right by the framers of the Indian Constitution becomes evident from the following excerpt of the Preamble ‘...to secure to all its citizens...LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship’. Thus liberty is considered not only an important means for ensuring democracy or secularism, but is considered important and worthy and an end in itself. No progressive society can do without guaranteeing liberty to its citizens.

### 3.B. Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: Strange case of the Indian Nation

The question of identity in India has significantly manoeuvred around national and regional identities. In many ways, this is somewhat unique

**Table 3.A.6: State-wise attitudes toward independence for certain part of India**


	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	14	21	6	19	40
Bihar	25	37	4	25	9
Madhya Pradesh	14	33	6	32	15
Maharashtra	14	28	10	31	16
Rajasthan	19	31	8	26	16
Jharkhand	14	28	8	40	11
Chhattisgarh	21	21	5	28	25
Telangana	14	24	6	19	37

Note: All figures are in percentages.

to Indian politics where regional and linguistic identities have played a significant role unlike the west (with some exceptions like Catalonia in Spain or the Irish question for UK). The diverse regional identities in India have always been more than merely cultural identity. Post-independence, linguistic identity got a significant traction as a political category with Hindi being instituted as the official language in 1965<sup>35</sup>. With congress system beginning to decline since 1969, and regional parties coming up to form state governments,

regional identities were further reinforced in opposition to national identity. Nehruvian didactics around “Unity in Diversity” however continued on the lines of Nationalism which had to take precedence over regionalism. In continuation with our interest in this question as expressed in last year’s report, we are keen on understanding how these identities have shifted or are shifting in the times of majoritarian nationalism. Is this form of majoritarian nationalism displacing regional identity? Or is it attempting to strike some form of


**Figure 3.A.11: Attitudes towards independence for certain part of India by Caste and Community**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

35 The first agitation though was led by Periyar as early as 1939. For a richer discussion see Sumathi Ramaswamy, *Passions of the Tongue: Language Devotion in Tamil India 1891-1970*.

**Figure 3.A.12: Attitudes towards independence for certain part of India by Location**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

harmony with regional identity? This data will be more telling once elections are held in these states. In a political climate where Bharatiya Janata Party has been able to come to power in most states, this data will only be revealing if states with strong regional identity voted differently or not. In this section we will look at the results from Q51 and Q54 in the questionnaire.

### I. Self-identification: National or Regional


The overall data across eight states (Figure 3.B.1) suggests that 46 per cent respondents categorically mention that they identify more with the national identity as opposed to only 24 per cent of respondents saying that they feel closer to their regional identity. Almost 30 per cent of respondents also said that they feel equally national and regional and that they barely see a contradiction between the two identities. Unlike last year, where apart from Haryana, all other states, namely Odisha, Gujarat and Karnataka, most number of respondents had mentioned their regional identity as being more important to them than their national identity, this time, the trend is just the opposite. The fact that most states under study this time are Hindi Heartland states, the results vary clearly in favour of national identity. At the same time, the numbers are not skyrocketing

despite being so. A closer look at individual states would be revealing in this regard.

State wise data reveals that in states (Table 3.B.1) like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Jharkhand a relatively high number of respondents reply in favour of national identity. Like already mentioned, given these states also constitute the Hindi heartland belt, this is not surprising. Maharashtra results are surprising on this account. Not only is Maharashtra not a Hindi speaking northern state, it has also seen a considerable political mobilisation around the Shiv Sena Marathi Manos identity.<sup>36</sup> The high numbers associating themselves with the national identity is therefore surprising. Is it the case that the Shiv Sena/ Maharashtra Navnirman Sena phenomenon is largely limited to Mumbai and is not reflective of all of Maharashtra? Shiv Sena has been in power only between 1995 and 1999, but as a political and cultural force they have been significant. 38 per cent of respondents in Andhra Pradesh and 26 per cent of respondents in Telangana saying they feel more regional than national is somewhat curious. Not only have these states had a strong regional and linguistic identity, they both have had a strong regionally driven political culture too. More so Telangana, which after decades of demanding

36 Suhas Palshikar, "In the Midst of Sub-democratic Politics", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2010 and Sudha Gogate, *The Emergence of Regionalism in Mumbai: History of Shiv Sena*, Popular Prakashan, 2014

**Figure 3.B.1: Self-identification as national or regional**



**Note:** All figures are in percentages.

separate statehood accompanied by very strong activism managed to get it only in 2014. Bihar and Rajasthan, and to some extent even Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, record relatively higher numbers of respondents saying that they are closer to their regional identity than expected in this regard despite being largely Hindi speaking states (when seen in comparison with Maharashtra). Could this be a cultural response to underdevelopment that these states have experienced over decades?

When seen through the lens of religion (Figure 3.B.2), Christians with 27 per cent of their respondents, say that they are closer to their regional identity, unlike last year where most Christians seemed more comfortable with their national identity. In the case of Muslims however, almost 55 per cent of their respondents feel closer to their national identity. These results though surprising in some way, given their degree of marginalisation seem to replicate last year's trend. This needs to be unpacked a little more. While one reason could be that in a strongly polarised environment, where Muslims are constantly questioned as anti-national, it is only obvious why a marginalised community would assert its national affinities more. The other reason could also be that regional politics across states has rarely spoken to Muslim concerns and they feel politically and culturally closer to forces in other regions which articulate their concerns better. Quite like the four states last year, these states too have roughly one third of the respondents saying they feel equally national and regional. This

data needs to be followed up more closely next year to be able to say anything conclusively. With states like West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala being up for survey, which have had a very strong regionally driven politics, it will need to be seen if such high numbers of respondents end up saying they are comfortable with both their regional and national identity. Only then we may be able to with some certainty argue if at all the political schism between regional and national identity which drove Indian politics is getting blurred or not.

Across states significantly high number of Muslim respondents express their proximity to their national identity or like in the case of Andhra Pradesh (41 per cent) say that they value both their regional and national identities. Apart from Chhattisgarh, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, very high number of Hindu respondents in other states said they feel more national than regional. When it comes to Christian respondents, the numbers swing quite a great deal. Among those who feel more national, it fluctuates between 17 per cent and 84 per cent and among those who feel more regional it varies from 0 to 40 per cent. For both Andhra and Telangana, it is only the Hindu respondents who interestingly throw up no clear cut trend in this regard. Quite contrary to popular conception, not only do they do not seem very enamoured by their national identity, they also dither from identifying with their regional identities despite a history of strong regional politics.

**Table 3.B.1: Self-identification by States**

How would you identify yourself:	More Regional	More National	Equally National and Regional
Andhra Pradesh	38	27	35
Bihar	24	51	25
Madhya Pradesh	18	65	17
Maharashtra	18	62	21
Rajasthan	26	48	26
Jharkhand	21	47	32
Chhattisgarh	22	25	53
Telangana	26	39	35

Note: All figures are in percentages.

Across the rural urban divide (Figure 3.B.3), the numbers clearly seem to be weighing in in the favour of national identity. While 52 per cent of urban respondents say that they feel more national than regional, 42 per cent of rural respondents also says the same. Given the penetration of national media in rural India, the ideological gap in this regard seems to have been bridged.

Apart from Andhra Pradesh where 43 per cent of rural respondents identified with regional identity, no other state has over 30 per cent of its rural respondents saying the same. In Telangana, the number for rural respondents is not so conclusive unlike other states. While 29 per cent of rural respondents from Telangana say that they are more regional, only 31 per cent say that they feel more national. 40 per cent of their rural population on the other hand say that they feel equally regional as they feel national. The Chhattisgarh rural population data throws up a similar trend. When it comes to urban respondents, only Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Telangana show close numbers between both the data with the difference becoming as low as 2 per cent in the case of Telangana. While these were the outliers, the rest of the numbers fit in with the dominant trend that we noted in the previous table.


When education is looked at as a criteria (Figure 3.B.4), it throws up predictable results in many ways. There is a clear directly proportionate relationship with education levels and association with national identity. The relationship is exactly inverse in the case of regional identity. As education levels go up, their association with

regional identity also goes down. The number of respondents who feel equally national and regional is the same across education levels.

The state wise data only confirms the broader data in almost all the states. The difference is however in the numbers. In a state like Chhattisgarh, though more college educated respondents say that they feel more national than regional, the numbers are no way significantly divergent from those who are school educated. In the case of Jharkhand, Telangana and Rajasthan this difference increases quite sharply. In Chhattisgarh however, very high number of respondents across education levels say that they feel equally national and regional. And interestingly this number falls with education levels, i.e., more non literate respondents say that they feel equally regional and national than college educated ones. In other states too, the number of respondents saying they feel equally national and regional does not vary too much according to education levels. However, what it may mean for larger politics needs to be analysed in greater detail.

When we look at levels of media exposure (Table 3.B.2), trend remains that across exposure levels, the highest number of respondents in each category say that they feel more national than regional. The interesting bit however is that with increasing exposure, the difference only keeps getting starker. While in the case of respondents with no exposure to media, around 33 per cent of them say that they feel more regional and 39 per cent feel they are more national; with high exposure, around 16 per cent of

**Figure 3.B.2: Self-identification by Religion**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

respondents say that they are more regional and 57 per cent say they are more national. Here too, quite like the data on literacy levels, the number of respondents saying they feel equally national and regional remains roughly the same across varying degrees of media exposure among respondents.


## II. Language to be spoken in public place

The respondents were asked which language is acceptable to be spoken in in public places: the local language or any language. This survey did not specify any official state languages in order to incorporate into the responses the local affinity to regional dialects. As shown in Figure 3.B.5, we

find that an almost equal share of respondents feel that either local language can be spoken in (45 per cent) or the any language can be used (43 per cent); albeit local language enjoys 2 percentage points higher support. This alludes to the support for linguistic identity and points out the pressure faced by migrants to adapt and learn the local language and culture.


With respect to the States (Table 3.B.3), Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, parts of the erstwhile state of Andhra Pradesh, surprisingly show the highest levels of support for speaking in any language in public places. The low support for the

**Figure 3.B.3: Self-identification by Location**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 3.B.4: Self-identification by Literacy**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

use of local language in public places (43 per cent in Andhra Pradesh and 32 per cent in Telangana) is surprising since erstwhile Andhra Pradesh was the first state to be drawn along linguistic lines in 1953. In Maharashtra, a state with a history of pro-Marathi movements, only a little over half of the respondents supported the use of local language in public places. Rajasthan, remarkably, also registers one of the highest levels of support for speaking any language in public place. Interestingly, the largest share of respondents supporting the use of local language in public places come from Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. This is particularly notable since all three states are part of the Hindi-speaking belt of northern India but the local residents speak a multitude of Hindi dialects.

There is considerable difference in opinion across the religious communities. While a larger share of Hindu and Christian respondents support the use of local languages in public places, the reverse is true with respect to Muslims. Although the difference in those supporting local language and those supporting any language is almost insignificant among Hindus, the difference is significantly large, 16 per cent among Muslims and 20 per cent among

Christians. As expected, we find that a majority of urban respondents find it acceptable to use any language in public place, while a similarly large majority of rural respondents prefer local languages in public places.

We find that the economic class and literacy show a similar trend in numbers. With an increase in wealth and education, the support for the use of local language falls significantly. Whereas 57 per cent of the poor respondents feel that local language must be used in public places, 40 per cent of the upper class respondents conveyed the same opinion. In a similar vein (Figure 3.B.6), a little more than half of the non-literate respondents supported the use of local language but closer to 60 per cent of the college educated respondents feel that any language can be spoken in in public places.

### 3.C. Whose Nation is it anyway?


In the recent past there have been several egregious instances of public lynching and other forms of violence that can be described as majoritarian cultural nationalism. Not far behind are also certain controversial Dalit decisions that seem to

**Table 3.B.2: Self-identification by Media Exposure**

How would you identify yourself:	More Regional	More National	Equally National and Regional
No Exposure	33	39	29
Low Exposure	31	38	31
Medium Exposure	20	48	32
High Exposure	16	57	28

Note: All figures are in percentages.

Figure 3.B.5: Language preference



Note: All figures are in percentages.

reinforce majoritarian nationalism. Such repeated instances shape political discourse as they can bolster majoritarian sentiment, and stoke and polarize public opinion that tear at the social fabric of Indian nationalism.

In a predominantly Hindu population, there is no gainsaying that majoritarianism will share an affinity with nationalism. Therefore, it is to be expected perhaps that such nationalism will acquire a cultural-religious complexion. What is however not expected is when majoritarianism becomes dangerously illiberal in that it almost disabuses from public memory nationalism's syncretic form upon which the nation state was built. Such illiberal populism is not just exceptional to India, but symptomatic of many democracies around the world today.

Our aim is to understand how pervasive is public opinion that is supportive (not) of such instances and what are its correlates in terms of subnational regimes, social cleavages and in rural and urban areas? How polarized is the public on matters of cultural nationalism? How closely intersected are adherents of Hindu culture with loyalists of majoritarian nationalism?

We ask four questions to ascertain the strength of support for state censure as sanctions against what could be construed as anti-national actions. We suggest that respondents that harbour majoritarian opinions would expect the state to

protect the sanctity of such homogenous notions, while pluralists would instead find alternate ways to accommodate political diversity. The four questions are meant to infer how people think about majoritarianism in both the public and private domains. In the public domain we ask questions related to the standard protocol associated with the national anthem. Further, we are curious to know if inflecting this standard national icon with a cultural flavour influences public opinion in a manner that reinforces majoritarian perspectives on nationalism. In the private domain we ask two questions that are central to a person's identity – matters of faith and dietary preferences. We asked whether the state should punish those who eat beef or cow meat and we asked whether those who engage in religious conversion should be punished. These are Q18, Q28, Q34, and Q40 in the questionnaire (in Appendix).

A broad assessment of the patterns that emerge from our analysis of the four questions related to the national anthem, Bharat Mata Ki Jai, beef consumption, and religious conversion suggests the following important sources of variation in public opinion:

**Subnational variations:** Three patterns seem to emerge. First, Bihar, Maharashtra and Rajasthan have larger majoritarian majorities relative to other states. Bihar is clearly the frontrunner among the majoritarian states. Second, Bihar

**Table 3.B.3: Language preference by States**

Language to be spoken in public places	Speak in any language	Speak local language
Andhra Pradesh	57	43
Bihar	37	63
Madhya Pradesh	40	60
Maharashtra	46	54
Rajasthan	60	40
Jharkhand	50	50
Chhattisgarh	39	61
Telangana	68	32

Note: All figures are in percentages.

and Jharkhand, though were earlier a single state, have actually very divergent patterns with respect to the issue of majoritarianism. Jharkhand has typically adopted a more centrist position on all the questions in this section. Third, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have been outliers on all the four questions, with substantive numbers simply opting out of answering questions.


**Social Cleavages:** Expectedly, upper caste Hindus tend to be supportive of majoritarian perspectives. Intermediate castes tend to be less supportive but follow the overall patterns set by the upper castes. Muslims and sometimes other religious groups tend to have contrasting opinions quite expectedly again. However, their resistance to

majoritarianism is not as deeply polarized as one may have expected but are nonetheless divided. What is equally interesting is that the Adivasis tend to think along Hindu majoritarian lines and might not be willing to voice alternate opinions.

**Rural and Urban Perspectives:** Urban respondents seem to be more aligned with majoritarian perspectives when compared to rural respondents. Further, rural respondents seem to be more polarized than urban respondents with slightly larger proportions fully disagreeing at times.

In the following sections we present the distribution of responses to the four questions identified above

**Figure 3.B.6: Language preference by Literacy**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

primarily in the form of cross-tabulations across States, caste and religious identity, and location (i.e. rural-urban). We also examine other factors such as respondent class status and levels of education, and due the high correlation between these two variables, that requires further examination, we do not present these results here, but are available upon request.

### I. “Punish those who do not stand for national anthem”

Nationally, around 68 percent of the respondents either fully agree or somewhat agree with the statement and interestingly 38 percent either somewhat agree/disagree with the statement, thereby quite starkly reflecting that respondents from these states are not only polarized but also share a stronger majoritarian sentiment. For instance, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bihar have more than 75 percent believing that the government should punish those who do not stand for the national anthem, with more than 50 percent of the total respondents being polarized in Maharashtra and Rajasthan as they strongly agree with the statement. While more than the national average of respondents in Jharkhand affirm the statement, a little more than one fifth disagree, and so can be described as the relatively less polarized state. Indeed, almost 43 percent of the respondents in Jharkhand somewhat agree with the statement, and 52 percent either somewhat agree or disagree with the statement. Clearly, Jharkhand has a strong centrist position relative to other states. Of

particular concern is that more than a quarter of the respondents in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have chosen to not voice their opinion (or have shared an inconclusive opinion), and interestingly an equal number seem to disagree with the statement, thereby not toeing the nationalist line relative to the other states. There is, of course, no state that has a substantial proportion of respondents that fully disagree with the statement.

Almost every four out of five Hindus affirm that the state should punish those who don’t stand up for the national anthem. Particularly interesting in this context, is that the Adivasis tend to share the same perspective as the Upper Caste Hindus. Both Sikhs and Muslims seem to be divided on the issue with a little more than 40 percent from both groups disagreeing with the statement, with a little less than a third from both groups disagreeing with the statement. Christians seem to hold the most moderate views relative to other groups with almost 50 percent either somewhat agreeing or disagreeing with the statement. Dalits, Upper and Lower backward castes mirror the views of the Hindu dominant castes in the states under consideration.

In terms of a rural urban distinction, clearly a majority of more than 70 percent agree with the statement. Urban respondents seem to have a slightly higher proportion at around 82 percent.

**Table 3.C.1: State wise attitude towards punishing those who do not stand for national anthem**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	18	21	18	11	32
Bihar	42	37	4	13	4
Madhya Pradesh	39	35	6	9	11
Maharashtra	59	20	5	10	6
Rajasthan	51	29	4	8	8
Jharkhand	30	43	9	12	6
Chhattisgarh	43	25	7	7	18
Telangana	28	21	12	12	27

Note: All figures are in percentages.

## II. “Punish those who do not say ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’”

When people are asked to respond to a nationalist symbol with an added cultural inflexion (Bharat Mata ki Jai), expectedly, patterns similar to those reflected with the national pattern emerge: Bihar, Maharashtra and Rajasthan have more than three fourths of the respondents affirming the statement, Jharkhand remaining the least polarized, and the Telugu speaking states seemingly relatively more disengaged or disaffected than other states. However, the inflexion seems to resonate the most with Bihar with a 5 percent increase in among respondents who fully agree with the statement. Jharkhand responds in the opposite direction, with more than double the respondents (18.73) disagreeing with the statement. Hence, when the nationalist symbol is shifted towards the cultural right and citizens are asked whether states should censure any form of its violation, respondents in Bihar tend to become more strident (more protective?) while Jharkhand’s respondents are less aggressive.

Despite an added cultural inflexion, all caste and religious groups, interestingly, have responded in exactly the same fashion as they did with the national anthem question. That is, the cultural

inflexion unexpectedly, had little effect upon the social groups – most Hindu groups tended to agree with the statement; Muslims tended to be divided with at least a quarter fully disagreeing with the statement. Interestingly, Sikhs tend to moderate their position, adopting a more centrist position, compared to their position vis a vis the national anthem, with 71.41 percent either somewhat agreeing or disagreeing with state punishment for those who don’t respect Bharat Mata ki Jai. The shares of respondents that took extreme views (fully agree/fully disagree) were halved and seemed to have taken a more moderate position amongst the Sikhs, and was the largest social group with such a position in this table.

Rural urban distinctions mirror those found amongst respondents views on the national anthem as well, with most respondents agreeing with the statement and the urban citizen agreeing slightly more strongly than the rural citizen. There is almost no difference between rural and urban citizens in terms of how they view state censure against those who don’t follow the mores associated with the national anthem or ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’.

**Table: Attitude towards punishing those who do not stand for national anthem by Caste and Community**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Upper Castes	47	37	7	9
Peasant Proprietor	53	27	11	9
Upper OBC	45	36	8	11
Lower OBC	47	32	9	12
Dalit	44	34	11	11
Adivasi	53	31	7	9
Muslim	31	29	15	25
Christian	37	34	16	13
Sikh	29	29	14	28
Other	47	40	5	9
<b>Overall</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.C.3: Attitude towards punishing those who do not stand for national anthem by Location**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Rural	43	29	11	17
Urban	47	35	8	10

Note: All figures are in percentages.

### III. “Punish those who eat beef/cow meat”

Again, Bihar, Maharashtra and Rajasthan seem to have a large majority of respondents who believe that beef/cow meat eating should be punished by the State. Rajasthan is overwhelmingly affirmative with almost 90 percent of the respondents agreeing with the statement. Maharashtra is clearly divided in that around 16 percent fully disagree with the statement, and so almost three fourths of the respondents have extreme views. Yet again, both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are outliers relative to other states, with opinions similarly apportioned across the scale. And yet again, Bihar and Jharkhand seem to hold quite distinct positions despite being neighbouring states, unlike Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh where the distributions are quite similar.

In terms of cleavages, expectedly, Muslims are the only group that are clearly against the ban and in fact seem quite strongly opposed to it with around 45 percent fully disagreeing with the statement. And expectedly again, upper castes are those diametrically opposed to the Muslim point

of view with the largest majority supportive of such a ban. Dalits and other intermediate castes are also supportive of the ban with more than half their numbers fully agreeing with the statement. Adivasis though, intriguingly, are as supportive of the ban as the upper castes. What is obvious is the clear Hindu majoritarian point of view, with a little more than three fourths of the Hindus across the states being either fully or somewhat in agreement with the idea that the state should punish those who eat beef or cow meat.

Again, 80 percent of the urban population is in agreement with the idea of state prohibition against beef or cow meat while a significantly lower number is supportive of such a ban in the rural areas. Urban populations in agreement with the statement together constitute around 80 percent of the total respondents while rural populations in agreement constitute only 69 percent; a clear ten percent difference between the two groups. What is interesting to note here is also that around one fifth of the respondents from the rural areas are clearly against the statement. Hence it seem that

**Table 3.C.4: State wise attitude towards punishing those who do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	15	19	15	13	38
Bihar	47	33	8	10	2
Madhya Pradesh	39	33	5	8	15
Maharashtra	55	22	3	10	10
Rajasthan	54	27	3	8	8
Jharkhand	28	37	19	8	8
Chhattisgarh	43	19	7	10	21
Telangana	27	21	11	14	27
<b>Overall</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.C.5: Attitude towards punishing those who do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai by Caste and Community**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Upper Castes	46	36	9	9
Peasant Proprietor	52	25	11	12
Upper OBC	48	32	11	9
Lower OBC	47	32	11	10
Dalit	47	32	9	12
Adivasi	54	30	7	9
Muslim	28	28	16	28
Christian	44	26	8	22
Sikh	14	43	29	14
Other	46	36	10	8
<b>Overall</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

the rural populations are relatively more polarized on the issue compared to urban populations.

#### IV. “Punish those who engage in religious conversion.”

Among the questions asked within this section, clearly this particular question has had the most interesting results, with opinions less polarized and more moderate in support of Hindu majoritarianism. What is striking first is that most states have at least a third of their respondents either not in agreement or being ambivalent (“don’t know”) with some states like Andhra and Telangana having more than 60 percent belonging to these categories, and other states in the forties. The only exception to this trend is Bihar, with not just 41 percent fully supportive of such punishment

but 74.18 percent in agreement with such a measure. Clearly Bihar’s respondents are supportive of religious conversation; this is in contrast to their majoritarian views with regard to national public symbols, and so one has to be careful in how we interpret this result. Another pattern is the almost divergent and centrist position by respondents from Jharkhand. While 67 percent of respondents from Jharkhand are supportive of such a measure, 53 percent of respondents somewhat disagree/agree with the statement. Overall though, what is clear is that opinion across the states are more divided on this issue than they are on other issues of a majoritarian nature.

In terms of cleavages, all groups seem uniformly supportive of state punishment against religious conversion, with a combined national average of

**Table 3.C.6: Attitude towards punishing those who do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai by Location**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Rural	40	30	13	17
Urban	48	32	9	11
<b>Overall</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.C.7: State wise attitude towards punishing those eat beef or cow meat**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	Don't Know
Andhra Pradesh	22	18	18	21	21
Bihar	51	28	7	11	3
Madhya Pradesh	49	28	4	7	12
Maharashtra	55	19	5	16	5
Rajasthan	76	14	1	5	4
Jharkhand	38	28	17	8	9
Chhattisgarh	59	16	3	5	17
Telangana	30	18	13	23	16
<b>Overall</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.C.8: Attitude towards punishing those eat beef or cow meat by Caste and Community**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Upper Castes	63	24	7	6
Peasant Proprietor	58	20	12	10
Upper OBC	56	26	9	9
Lower OBC	59	23	9	9
Dalit	52	25	10	13
Adivasi	61	24	6	9
Muslim	19	21	14	46
Christian	56	12	7	25
Sikh	50	17	17	16
Other	43	36	11	10
<b>Overall</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>14</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.C.9: Attitude towards punishing those eat beef or cow meat by Location**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Rural	47	22	12	19
Urban	56	24	8	12
<b>Overall</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.C.10: State wise attitude towards punishing those who engage in religious conversion**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	15	18	17	20	30
Bihar	42	32	4	15	7
Madhya Pradesh	29	30	6	17	18
Maharashtra	36	24	9	14	17
Rajasthan	36	28	5	15	16
Jharkhand	30	38	16	8	8
Chhattisgarh	36	21	4	13	25
Telangana	20	19	13	20	28
<b>Overall</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 3.C.11: Attitude towards punishing those who engage in religious conversion by Caste and Community**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Upper Castes	40	36	9	15
Peasant Proprietor	39	29	13	19
Upper OBC	38	33	11	18
Lower OBC	38	33	9	20
Dalit	35	34	12	19
Adivasi	43	31	8	18
Muslim	32	26	16	26
Christian	33	27	13	27
Sikh	29	43	14	14
Other	40	36	13	11
<b>Overall</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>19</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

around 69 percent of those respondents who fully or somewhat agree with the statement. Muslims and Christians, predictably, have not only the lower share of respondents that are supportive (58 percent and 60 percent respectively) but also have the relatively higher share of respondents that fully disagree with the statement (26 percent

and 27 percent respectively). In sum, though, it is clear that there are no starkly surprising trends. Intriguingly, the population that is usually subject to conversion, the Adivasis, tend to share perspectives that are not different from the upper caste Hindus, whereas one would have expected a more polarized response.

**Table 3.C.12: Attitude towards punishing those who engage in religious conversion by Location**

	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree
Upper Castes	40	36	9	15
Peasant Proprietor	39	29	13	19
Upper OBC	38	33	11	18
Lower OBC	38	33	9	20
Dalit	35	34	12	19
Adivasi	43	31	8	18
Muslim	32	26	16	26
Christian	33	27	13	27
Sikh	29	43	14	14
Other	40	36	13	11
<b>Overall</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>19</b>

**Note: All figures are in percentages.**

Both rural and urban populations do not seem divergent and instead seem supportive of state punishment. What is interesting though is that in both populations, the number of respondents that fully disagree with the statement is nearly twice that of those who somewhat disagree. One could infer, perhaps that there is a group of respondents who have quite strong statements against the statement.

In conclusion, one can quite clearly infer that many respondents tend to support state punishments that contravene majoritarian interests. Cultural inflexions do not make much of a difference to the overall patterns and seem to reflect in similar fashion across both public and private domains. These results also serve as preliminary evidence for a broader set of claims on majoritarian nationalism that we believe can be made. These however require further systematic empirical scrutiny.




## 4. Political Institutions

### 4.A. Citizen Perceptions

#### I. Ascertaining Citizen Preferences

In this chapter, we seek to understand people's perceptions about important issues and whether these issues shape their view on what the government's responsibilities/priorities should be. In order to understand what the important issues are for the voters of 8 states where the study was conducted, a question on issues was operationalized into the survey questionnaire. Which issues are at the forefront of voters' mind and whether these issues are similar across the eight states? When asked in an open-ended question (*post coded later into crisper categories for the purpose of better analysis*) what they thought is the most important issue facing India, a plurality (23 %) stated unemployment to be the single biggest problem in the country today. Poverty at 11 percent, physical infrastructure at 10 percent, price rise at 9 percent and social infrastructure at 5 percent make up the top five issues (*Figure 4.A.1*).

**Figure 4.A.1: Unemployment is the primary issue concerning the people**



Note: Physical infrastructure includes categories of water facilities, electricity, housing, roads, public transport and sanitation. Social infrastructure includes food, health, educational and other basic amenities.

The responses also show a fair degree of variation across the eight states. Unemployment emerges as the most important issue for all states but the issue appears to be the most important for Bihar at 33 percent and this is 10 percentage points higher than the average (Table 4.A.1). Additionally, the issue of price rise is also a big concern for the state and 20 percent of the voters stated this as an issue. The issue of poverty and physical infrastructure appear to be the key concerning issue of people

in Chhattisgarh. What is surprising is that a large proportion of people in Andhra Pradesh (43 %) followed by Telangana (31%) chose not to respond to the question.

In the area of physical infrastructure, it seems that the government of Rajasthan has somewhat ignored the issue as 18 percent of the people in the state reported this to be the biggest issue after unemployment. Moving on to the issue of farmers

**Table 4.A.1: State- wise breakup of the concerned issues**

	Unemployment	Poverty	Physical infrastructure	Price Rise	Social infrastructure	Farmer/ Agricultural Issue	DK/NR
Andhra Pradesh	14	12	7	1	3	6	43
Bihar	33	11	8	20	7	2	2
Madhya Pradesh	25	8	8	10	4	6	13
Maharashtra	26	6	5	11	5	9	17
Rajasthan	26	11	18	6	5	3	7
Jharkhand	20	12	9	16	6	2	3
Chhattisgarh	24	17	15	9	2	2	21
Telangana	17	9	9	1	6	6	31

Note: All figures are in percent. Rest of the respondents stated other issues

**Table 4.A.2: Farmers opinion on the biggest issue of the country**

	Unemployment	Poverty	Physical infrastructure	Price Rise	Social infrastructure	Farmer/ Agricultural Issue	No Opinion
Andhra Pradesh	15	12	7	1	3	6	42
Bihar	36	11	8	20	8	2	2
Madhya Pradesh	26	9	7	10	4	8	14
Maharashtra	24	7	6	8	4	15	16
Rajasthan	26	13	22	6	4	4	7
Jharkhand	21	16	11	18	7	2	3
Chhattisgarh	27	19	17	9	2	3	16
Telangana	16	7	12	0	6	7	35
<b>Overall (Farmers)</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17</b>

Note: All figures are in percent and for only farmers. Rest of the respondents stated other issues

and agriculture, there is a clear disappointment in Maharashtra and 9 percent of the people reported this to be the issue of significance. The survey also found plurality of farmers from Maharashtra reporting farmers/ agricultural issue as the biggest issue for them (Table 4.A.2). Recently (March 2018) farmers in the state staged a massive rally in Mumbai where protesting farmers from across the state protested against the government's apathy towards the farmers of the country<sup>37</sup>.

On segregating important issues by locality, ones observe not much differences on most issues. But where on one hand, Physical infrastructure,

Poverty, farmer's issues were issues for those residing in rural parts, corruption, law and order and demonetization were a bigger concern for those in urban localities. Education too clearly makes a difference as far as issues are concerned. Undoubtedly as one moves from non-literates voters to highly educated voters, one notices a rise in unemployment as an issue as well. For the college and above educated voters, unemployment was the biggest concern (32%) which is also much above the average (23%). In fact, all the other issues stated by them were in a single digit as compared to unemployment (Table 4.A.3). The corresponding figures for the non-literates, up to primary educated


**Table 4.A.3: Unemployment is a major concern for the educated**

	Unemployment	Poverty	Physical infrastructure	Social infrastructure	Price Rise	Other issues
Non Literate	15	14	13	4	7	18
Upto Primary	21	13	10	4	10	23
Upto Matric	24	10	10	6	11	27
College and above	32	7	6	6	8	34

Note: All figures are in percent. Rest stated other issues or did not respond.

37 *Hindustan Times*. (2018, March 12). Why Maharashtra's farmers are protesting and why Mumbaiers are supporting them: 10 points. Retrieved from <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-maharashtras-farmer-are-protesting-and-why-mumbaiers-are-supporting-them-10-points/articleshow/63263394.cms>. Accessed on 15 March, 2018.

**Figure 4.A.2: Age makes significant difference only on the issue of unemployment**



Note: All figures are in percent


and matric are 15, 21 and 24 percent respectively. The younger ones and men are more likely to report unemployment as an issue as compared to the older ones and women. Also the only significant difference one notes with regards to age is on the issue of unemployment where the younger ones are more likely to state unemployment as an issue (Figure 4.A.2). This trend is common to all the states.

**A) Different Issues During and Between the Time of Elections**

In the Lokniti- CSDS post poll survey conducted in 2014, voters were asked to report issues which were of utmost significance when deciding their vote-choice. With respect to this, several interesting

findings were observed. People prioritized different concerns/issues during the time of elections compared to periods between elections (Figure 4.A.3). The most pressing issue for these states in 2014 was price rise (19 %) followed closely by lack of development (13%). So where in 2014 National elections, price rise, development and corruption were the most important issues while voting, the voters of these states identifies different issues in 2017. The issues of unemployment and poverty have seen a massive increase from 2014 on the other hand price rise, corruption and lack of development have seen a steep decline. From 13 percent in 2014 to a drop of 2 percent in 2017 on the issue of lack of development is astounding.

**Figure 4.A.3: Citizens prioritize different issues during the time of elections**



Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not respond to the question. Question asked in 2014: -What was the single most important issue for you while voting in this election?

On comparing the responses across states, we find that price rise emerged as the most important issue while voting in 2014 Lok Sabha elections and the only states which reported a different issue was Andhra Pradesh (27 %) and Telangana (19%) where the voters reported lack of development as an issue. In this survey, the number decreased to one percent in Andhra and 2 percent for Telangana. For all the states, unemployment and poverty has seen an increase from 2014 and price rise and corruption has seen a decline barring the states of Andhra and Telangana where corruption as an issue has increased (Table 4.A.4).

## II. Citizens-defined Government Priorities

In the earlier section on issues, preferences of citizens were underlined and there is no doubt that the problem area has been highlighted but do citizens identify the same issues as government's priority? This study attempts to gauge this perception of citizens as far government's responsibility is concerned by drawing out responses to a question on what the most important responsibility of a government is towards its citizens. Figure 4.A.4 exemplifies the spread of responses.

Interestingly three in every 10 respondents chose not to respond to the question. This number was more than the 'No response' answer received in the question related to issue preference. Among the remaining 75 percent who responded to the

question, unemployment is prioritized as the primary responsibility followed by physical and social infrastructure. While unemployment is as high as 23 percent on the issue scale, it does not retain the same prominence as a government responsibility (15 %). Similar is the case with the issue of price rise and poverty but with much lesser difference in stating an issue and wanting the government to prioritize it. Social infrastructure on the other hand was prioritized as a government's responsibility by almost double the proportion of those who stated it as an issue. For all other issues roughly the same proportion of respondents identified them as important issues and also regarded them as important governmental responsibilities. Why it that some issues are high up on the issue scale but do not retain the same importance when it comes to government's responsibility. Do citizens doubt government ability to deliver in the areas they consider important or they feel that the government is responsible for some issues and not for others?


Andhra Pradesh has the highest proportion of no response followed by Telangana on this question as well. On the other hand, Bihar has the least number of no responses. Table 4.A.5 shows the interstate variation in government priorities cited by citizens. Across all states people prioritized unemployment as the most important governmental responsibility with the exceptions

**Table 4.A.4: Change in issues from 2014**

	Un employment	Poverty	Physical infra-structure	Social infra-structure	Price Rise	farmer/ Agri issue	Lack of development	Corruption
Andhra Pradesh	8	9	1	-13	-2	3	-26	3
Bihar	19	8	-3	0	-6	2	-14	-2
Madhya Pradesh	15	6	-2	4	-21	2	-6	-16
Maharashtra	22	5	-1	2	-7	7	-9	-12
Rajasthan	9	10	4	3	-20	1	-3	-7
Jharkhand	8	11	-2	2	-13	1	-6	-11
Chhattisgarh	10	16	-1	-3	-11	2	-4	-4
Telangana	12	7	-1	-13	-1	3	-17	5

**Note:** All figures are in percent. Change in each issue has been calculated by subtracting the figure for a particular issue in 2017 by what the number was for the same issue in 2014.

Figure 4.A.4: Citizen defined government priorities in aggregate terms



Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not respond to the question. Question asked in 2014: -What was the single most important issue for you while voting in this election?

of Telangana where social infrastructure was prioritized and Chhattisgarh where physical infrastructure was prioritized. Surprisingly only 6 percent of the people in Telangana had reported social infrastructure to be the most important issue. Though people did prioritize government responsibility according to the top issue they had specified but it was not on the same scale. The only state that was close was Andhra Pradesh. For e.g. across all states the issue of unemployment was the biggest issue but this was the only state which was the closest to identifying this issue as an important responsibility of the government in the more or less same proportion. Here 14 percent of the citizens had reported unemployment as the biggest issue and 11 percent considered it as a government's utmost responsibility.

#### A) Government's Priority across Various Socio Economic Groupings

On disaggregating the responses relating to government's priorities by caste, one notes that across caste groups, maximum priority is given to government responsibility in the area of unemployment. Also where on one hand social infrastructure and price rise as government responsibility was higher than what they rated the same on the issue scale. On the other, issue of unemployment and poverty was lower. Though Peasant proprietors' stated employment followed by farmer's issues as the biggest issue but when it came to government's responsibilities, the

percentage of those who stated social infrastructure was equal to those who stated unemployment. Farmers issue is stated as the third priority. One also notes no variance across Dalits and Adivasis on most issues except on the issue of employment where Dalits tend to prioritize unemployment as government responsibility (gap of 5 percent). Compared to all other groups, Christians strongly feel that poverty is the second main issue that the government should address. The figure for them was much above the average (13 to 7 percent). One notices no significant difference across different economic classes on issues of social infrastructure, price rise, farmer's issues but on the issue of unemployment greater proportion of upper class citizens want government to prioritize the issue of unemployment. As one will expect poverty was rated as a responsibility by more people from poorer economic class and least by upper class. But again among the poorer class, 13 percent stated it to be an issue but only 8 percent fixed it as a government responsibility.

Where unemployment and law and order are labelled as government responsibility in the urban parts of the states, physical infrastructure and poverty are more pronounced in rural ones. On all the other issues, one notes no significant difference. Yet again, one notes a similar trend as was for the question on issues where the educated and the younger ones are more likely to state unemployment as the government's responsibility.

**Table 4.A.5: State- wise government priorities of citizens**

	Un employment	Physical infrastructure	Social infrastructure	Price Rise	Poverty	Farmer/ Issues related to agriculture	No Opinion
Andhra P.	11	4	8	1	4	2	59
Bihar	19	14	11	18	8	2	4
Madhya P.	17	7	7	7	5	7	19
Maharashtra	14	9	13	7	3	8	24
Rajasthan	21	15	8	8	10	2	13
Jharkhand	13	11	9	10	11	2	8
Chhattisgarh	12	13	6	4	11	3	33
Telangana	11	9	14	0	3	4	39

Note: All figures are in percent.

To sum up, this chapter tried to delve into what people perceive as important issues and whether these issues also shape their view on what the utmost responsibility of the government should be. The findings of the chapter reveal few interesting trends. Firstly, one finds that unemployment followed by poverty, physical infrastructure and price rise are the four key issues for the people of the 8 states. The top most issue of unemployment emerged as the most important issue for all the states. Secondly, one notes that people report different issues at the time of elections compared to periods between elections. Where in 2014 National elections, price rise, development and corruption were the most important issues while voting, the voters of these states identifies different issues in 2017. Thirdly, some issues are high up on the issue scale but do not retain the same importance when it comes to government's responsibility. On the other hand, other issues are low on the issue scale and high on government's responsibility scale. While unemployment is as high as 23 percent on the issue scale, it does not retain the same prominence as a government responsibility and only 15 percent reported it to be the government's priority. On the other hand, social infrastructure was prioritized as a government's responsibility by almost double the proportion of those who sated it as an issue. Fourthly, a huge proportion of respondents in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana choose not to respond to both the issue and government's responsibility question where all the other 6 states had a comparatively lower no response rate.

#### 4.B. State-Citizen Interfaces

This chapter focuses on state-citizen interface. There are various platforms or forums through which state and citizen can interact and this ongoing interaction between state and society is an imperative for democratic government. The state formulates the policies for the citizen and implements those policies. On the other hand, citizen avail the benefit of those policies. Citizens also approach the public institutions to get their work done or settle any dispute if needed. Therefore, it becomes important to understand whether the policies introduced by the governments are accessible to the citizens; whether citizens are aware about the schemes or policies drafted by their governments and could avail the benefits of those schemes. What are the citizens' experiences in obtaining services provided by the governments? Which institutions or forums citizens approach to get their work done? This section broadly focuses on these questions in detail in three sections. First section tries to see whether people are aware about the various schemes launched by the Centre as well as their state governments; and can avail the benefits of those schemes. The second section accounts citizens' experiences in receiving public services. Third section talks about citizens' preferences for approaching institutions or individuals for getting any important work done or for settling any dispute.

## I. Awareness about the Schemes

For availing the benefits of the government schemes, the awareness or information about the existing schemes is important. The study indicates that awareness about all central and state government schemes is low in Andhra Pradesh and higher in Rajasthan except a few schemes. Interesting trend which emerges from the study is that in Jharkhand people are more aware about the central government schemes as compared to schemes launched by state government. On the contrary, in Telangana people are more informed about the state government schemes as compared to central government's schemes (Table 4.B.1).

To understand the nuances of regional variance across the level of awareness about the schemes launched by the government, two indices of awareness were created for both central and state schemes using summing scores. The scores were divided into three categories ranging from low awareness to high awareness (for more details about the indices see Note1). Figure 4.B.1 shows that the awareness about central schemes is low in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana; whereas highest level of awareness about central government's schemes was observed in Chhattisgarh, followed by Bihar. People of Bihar were also found to be more aware about state government's schemes. Nonetheless, amongst all the states, highest level

of awareness about state government schemes was found in Telangana. Factors such as level of educational attainment, locality and level of media exposure were positively associated with the high awareness.

## II. Access to the schemes

Both the central and state governments have introduced several welfare schemes for the benefits of the farmers, students, poor and unemployed. We have observed in the section above that people are aware about these schemes. But when it comes to avail the benefits of these schemes, it varies across the states. In some states, self-reported beneficiaries of these welfare schemes are higher in numbers compare to other states. In subsequent sub-sections, a discussion about few central and state government schemes such as agricultural, housing, employment and health is brought out.

### A) Agriculture Scheme


The Central Government has launched an agricultural scheme, Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojna (PMFBY), for the farmers to insure their crops. Overall, 20 percent of the farmers across eight surveyed states had reported that they had availed the benefits of the crop insurance scheme, but self-reported beneficiaries of this scheme were found to be less in Andhra Pradesh followed by Telangana.

**Table 4.B.1: Awareness about the scheme**

	Agriculture Scheme		Housing Scheme		Employment Scheme		Health Scheme	
	Central	State	Central	State	Central	State	Central	State
Andhra Pradesh	69	72	71	75	85	*	63	59
Bihar	90	80	94	94	90	81	80	84
Madhya Pradesh	90	81	91	74	83	76	63	85
Maharashtra	87	81	86	81	86	86	76	76
Rajasthan	95	89	95	94	97	71	78	94
Jharkhand	91	55	95	89	93	64	69	88
Chhattisgarh	97	86	98	83	91	86	89	73
Telangana	74	90	79	96	91	92	65	98
<b>Overall</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>82</b>

Note: All figures are in percent. \* Employment scheme was not asked in Andhra Pradesh.

**Figure 4.B.1: Index of awareness about the schemes by states**



**Note: All figures are in percent.**

Only 9 percent of the farmers in Andhra Pradesh and 11 percent in Telangana got the benefits of the crop insurance scheme; on the contrary, one of the three farmers (32%) in Rajasthan claimed to avail the benefits of the agriculture scheme launched by the central government, followed by Madhya Pradesh with 28 percent. Not only had the central agricultural scheme, the farmers of Rajasthan claimed that they had availed the benefits of the state agricultural scheme ‘Agriculture Produce Deposit Loan Scheme’ launched by Rajasthan government for short-term credit loan for the farmers in higher proportion as compared to other states.

Interestingly, in Telangana, where farmers have not much benefitted from PMFBY, have reported to be benefitted from the state agriculture scheme ‘crop investment subsidy scheme’ which provide Rs. 4000 per acre to buy fertilizers. A quarter of the farmers in Telangana claimed to avail the benefit of this scheme. In Jharkhand farmers are getting more benefits of the PMFBY as compared to state agriculture scheme which tried to attract and retain youth in agriculture (ARYA) by providing them proper training to make them self-dependence in agriculture. However, from the study it reflects that farmers of Maharashtra were found to be less benefitted from both central as well as Maharashtra government’s agricultural schemes (Table 4.B.2).

Data also suggest that self-reported beneficiaries of the crop insurance scheme launched by the central government were mainly big or small farmers, not many tenant cultivators and agricultural labourers reported that they had availed the benefit of the crop insurance scheme. However, proportionally higher numbers of tenant cultivators were found to be benefitted from the state agriculture schemes (Figure 4.B.2).

### B) Housing Schemes

With the aim ‘housing for all’, a nationwide housing scheme ‘Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna (PMAY)’ was introduced by the central government. Following the central government’s line, the state governments have also announced the housing schemes in much localized and specific in nature. For instance, states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan are promoting central housing scheme in localized form. Andhra Pradesh has merged the central scheme with the state scheme and named it ‘Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna – NTR Nagar Scheme’ for providing houses to urban poor, at the same time Bihar has carried the central schemes PMAY in rural area. Rajasthan government has introduced ‘Mukhyamantri Jan Awas Yojna’. However, Maharashtra and Jharkhand have housing schemes for specific caste groups like for Dalits and Neo-Buddhists in Maharashtra and for primitive tribes in Jharkhand. Though many

people were aware about the housing scheme, yet not many had availed the benefits of the housing schemes launched by the governments. Overall, 18 percent of the respondents asserted that they had availed the benefit. PMAY was found to be well reached in Jharkhand, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and to some extent in Bihar as self-reported beneficiaries of this scheme were proportionally higher in these states. In same set of states except Madhya Pradesh, self-reported beneficiaries of

state housing schemes were more. In states such as Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Telangana not many have reported to avail the benefits of the central as well as of the state housing schemes (Table 4.B.2).


When we look at the socio-economic profile of the self-reported beneficiaries of the housing schemes (both Central as well as state housing schemes), they mostly belong to Adivasis or Dalit communities.

**Table 4.B.2: Self-reported Beneficiaries of the schemes across states**

	Agriculture Scheme (All farmers)		Housing Scheme		Employment Scheme		Health Scheme	
	Central	State	Central (All)	State	Central (Rural)	State (All)	Central (All)	State (All)
Andhra Pradesh	9	9	7	5 (Urban)	38	*	4	5
Bihar	16	10	21	18 (Rural)	12	5	3	9
Madhya Pradesh	28	17	24	8 (All)	32	11	11	37
Maharashtra	14	5	7	9 (Dalits)	7	5	2	2
Rajasthan	32	26	24	22 (All)	47	9	13	36
Jharkhand	24	6	36	35 (STs)	48	13	13	26
Chhattisgarh	22	10	20	1 (Urban)	49	14	23	8
Telangana	11	24	4	2 (All)	55	25	5	40
<b>Overall</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>

Note: All figures are in percent. \* Employment scheme was not asked in Andhra Pradesh.

**Figure 4.B.2: Self-reported beneficiaries of Agriculture schemes by type of farmers**



Note: All figures are in percent.

**Table 4.B.3: Self-reported beneficiaries of the central and state housing schemes by caste – communities and Locality**

	Housing Scheme	
	Central Scheme (All)	State Scheme
Upper caste	18	11
Peasant proprietors	10	7
Upper OBC	17	9
Lower OBC	18	12
Dalit	20	13
Adivasi	26	18
Muslims	15	9
Rural	20	13
Urban	12	8

**Note: All figures are in percent.**

Twenty six percent and 18 percent of the Adivasis said that they have benefited from Central and state housing schemes respectively. The beneficiaries of housing schemes are more in rural areas as compare to urban areas (Table 4.B.3).

All the housing schemes either targets lower or middle income groups. The benefits of the housing schemes can be availed in a form of low interest rates on home loans and it is mainly the middle income groups who have reported more that they had availed the benefits of housing schemes.

#### *C) Employment Scheme*

As discussed in previous chapter, unemployment was reported as the biggest problem of India by the respondents. The central government had introduced the National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme to provide work in rural India. The scheme was originally launched in 2005 and had provided employment to many people living in rural India. Close to two of five rural respondents asserted that they had availed the benefit of MGNREGA. However, self-reported beneficiaries of this scheme were more in Telangana as 55 percent of the rural people in Telangana claimed that they had benefitted from the MGNREGA. On the other hand, only 7 percent of the rural respondents of


Maharashtra reported that they had benefitted from the MGNREGA.

Along with Telangana, in states like Rajasthan, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh self-reported beneficiaries of the central employment scheme were proportionally higher in number compared to other states. On the other hand, the employment schemes launched by state governments were not reached to the targeted population as not many had availed the benefits of the state employment schemes. Almost all the state employment schemes provide loan at the lowest interest rate to start up small business ventures. However, in Telangana a quarter of the respondents asserted that they had availed the benefits of employment scheme launched by Telangana government which provides a subsidy for setting up small businesses. Data also indicate that the self-reported beneficiaries of the employment scheme MGNREGA are mainly from the marginal communities such as Dalits and Adivasis (Figure 4.B.3).

#### *D) Health Schemes*

Providing accessible and affordable health services to the citizens is one of the most important responsibilities of the government. Focusing on the agenda the central government has launched

**Figure 4.B.3: Self-reported beneficiaries of employment schemes by caste – communities and Locality**



Note: All figures are in percent.

a scheme called ‘Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojna (PMJAY)’ which targets to provide generic medicine to the citizen at affordable cost. To give access to all, the government has targeted to open ‘Jan Aushadhi Kendra’ at local level so that citizen can avail the benefit of the scheme. However, only one out of ten have reported to avail the benefit of Jan Aushadhi scheme. However, the self-reported beneficiaries of this scheme were found more in Chhattisgarh as close to quarter of the respondents asserted that they have availed the benefit of the schemes

On the other hand, the self-reported beneficiaries of the health schemes launched by the state government were found to be more in numbers as altogether, 21 percent of the respondents reported that they have availed the benefits of the health scheme launched by their state governments. Most of the beneficiaries of the state health schemes were more in the states like Telangana (40%) followed by Madhya Pradesh (37%) and Rajasthan (36%). In Telangana, the government has launched a scheme ‘Aarogyasri’ which is a community health insurance scheme which provides financial protection to BPL families and other employees. In Madhya Pradesh, state government has launched ‘Deen Dayal Antyoday Upchar Yojana’ which provides free healthcare to poor families and scheme is doing well. Similarly the Rajasthan government has launched ‘Bhamashan Swasthya Bima Yojna’ and many people in Rajasthan had asserted that they have availed the benefits of this scheme in Rajasthan. In Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Bihar, state health schemes had not much impact as not many had claimed to avail the benefits of the schemes.


Almost, all the scheme either provide free health care services to the poor or lower income groups or give health insurance to these families. Data suggest it is mainly the lower or middle income groups which are availing the benefits of the health schemes. Self-reported beneficiaries of these schemes were found more in rural area. When we look at the caste communities of the self-reported beneficiaries of these schemes, they were either from tribal communities or from other backward castes (Figure 4.B.4).

### III. Experience in availing public services

In availing public services such healthcare, electricity water and sanitation, people encounter with different experiences. Some services are easily available to some citizens whereas for others it is quite difficult. So, this section tries to bring out the people’s experience in availing public services. People were asked to share their experience how easy or difficult was for them to avail public service like healthcare, electricity water and sanitation. Overall, access to health services was the easiest as seven out of ten reported that getting medical treatment at government hospital was easy if we club the categories of very easy and somewhat easy. On the contrast, getting a water connection was not as easy; as for more than half of the respondents availing water connection was not an easy experience (Figure 4.B.5).

Access to the healthcare services was the easiest in Madhya Pradesh as compared to other states as 85 percent of the respondents said that it was easy for them to avail the healthcare services in their state, followed by Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. On the other hand, access to the healthcare services

**Figure 4.B.4: Self-reported beneficiaries of health schemes by caste communities**




Note: All figures are in percent.

was not as easy in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Access to sanitation was also easy for people living in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh and comparatively was not easy for Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand.

Unlike services such as access to healthcare and sanitation, getting electricity connection was reported as the easiest service by the people of Andhra Pradesh, though Chhattisgarh again shared

a positive experience in availing the electricity connection, followed by Bihar. For Rajasthan and Jharkhand access to the basic services like electricity and water connection was not easy. When we look at the overall score for the access to these services altogether, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh shared a positive experience whereas for Jharkhand and Rajasthan access to all these services were not that easy (Figure 4.B.5).

**Figure 4.B.5: Access to services by States**



Note: All figures are in percent.

**Table 4.B.4: Access to services by socio-economic status**

	Medical treatment at a nearby government Hospital	Garbage collection	Electricity connection	Water connection
Rural	71	49	56	46
Urban	66	60	60	52
Non Literate	65	46	54	43
Upto Primary	73	52	57	48
Upto Matric	72	54	57	48
College and above	71	57	61	53

Note: All figures are in percent.

Availing these services was easier in urban localities as compare to rural area expect availing health services which was reported to be easy in rural areas. Other factors, such as level of education, economic class and caste-community of the respondents, also have an impact on their experience in availing public services (Table 4.B.4). It was observed that availing public services like sanitation, electricity and water connection were easier for people belonging to upper class and those who were highly educated. However, there is not much class difference when it comes to avail the healthcare services.

The caste or community, a person belongs to, also shapes ones experience in availing the public services and it is believed that a person placed high on social hierarchy can easily avail the services; whereas for a person who belongs to a marginal

section of the society, availing these services is not easy. However, the data suggests a different story. Data indicate that availing these services reported to be easy by the people belonging to the tribal communities (STs), followed by lower OBCs. Nonetheless, availing services like electricity and water connection was not as easy as other services for STs (Table 4.B.5).


This is important to mention here that the STs are politically important categories in a few surveyed states like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh due to their large share in state population. Therefore, it becomes important to see state wise experience shared by STs in availing these services. Data suggest that the STs in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are more likely to report that they had positive experience in availing these services whereas for STs in Rajasthan and Jharkhand

**Table 4.B.5: Access to services by caste communities**

	Medical treatment at a nearby government Hospital	Garbage collection	Electricity connection	Water connection	Average
Upper caste	71	52	54	46	56
Peasant Proprietors	66	47	60	55	57
Upper OBC	67	50	58	48	56
Lower OBC	69	54	61	49	58
Dalit	69	51	56	48	56
Adivasi	79	61	54	42	59
Muslims	69	43	54	45	53

Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 4.B.6: State-wise access to services by STs



Note: All figures are in percent.

the experience in availing these services was not that easy (Figure 4.B.6).

#### IV. Institutions to approach to get work done and for settling a dispute


There are several political and non-political institutions or individuals with whom citizens directly or indirectly interact to get the services or to get their important work done. The study indicates that people were more likely to approach political institutions if they want to get their work done than social networks. However, one can find from the data that people are more likely to approach their *sarpanch* or councilor than their MLAs or MPs, almost half of the respondents said that they would like to approach their elected local representatives like *sarpanchs* or councilors. Only six percent said that they will approach their MLAs if they face any difficulty to get their work done. Only one percent of the respondents were willing to approach their MP (Figure 4.B.7).

There are state-level variations on these responses. For instance, in Chhattisgarh four out of five

respondents said that they would approach their *sarpanchs* or councilors; whereas preference for approaching a MLA is greater in Jharkhand. In Bihar preference for approaching government official is higher, 23 percent of the respondents from Bihar said that they will approach government officials to get their work done if needed. When it comes to the non-political institution or social networks, it is mainly the elders outside the families or the leader of caste and communities whom people preferred to approach to get their work done. In Maharashtra, Bihar and Jharkhand people preferred to go to elders outside the family.

In rural society, people prefer to approach *sarpanch*. Economic class of the respondents also has an impact on their preferences. Poor people preferred to approach *sarpanch* or councilor; on the other hand, upper classes try to approach government officials. As compared to the poor, upper class respondents prefer to approach MLA. Level of educational attainment also influences ones choice for preferring an institution to approach to get an important work done. More educated prefer

Figure 4.B.7: Preference to approach to get important work done by states



Note: All figures are in percent.

government officials; whereas non-literates prefer local elected representatives (Table 4.B.6).

Social group a person belong to also have an impact on preference for opting an institution. For instance, upper caste respondents preferred to approach MLAs and government officials whereas STs preferred to approach *sarpanchs* or councilors. When we look at the religious communities of the respondents, more Muslim respondents compared to other communities approach community leaders to get work done (Table 4.B.7).

Though people preferred political institutions for getting their work done if needed, but when it comes to settle down a dispute related to property, marriage or neighbourhood, people preferred to approach the non-political institutions or their social networks. Data suggest that for settling property and domestic violence dispute people preferred to approach their family members; whereas for disputes related to neighbourhood, people preferred to approach neighbourhood or village elders. However, a common trend which emerges is that for almost all the disputes, people

either preferred family members or other social networks like neighbourhood/village elders and caste community leaders. Nonetheless, police was also preferred by few respondents to settle the neighbourhood disputes or disputes related to domestic violence and court was mainly preferred to seek to resolve property disputes (Figure 4.B.8).

A state- level trend is also observed in approaching institutions for settling disputes. For instance, people from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra preferred to approach family members; whereas Rajasthan preferred to approach neighbourhood or village elders for each dispute. In Telangana respondents preferred to approach caste/ community organizations for settling their disputes; on the other hand, in its neighbouring state, Andhra Pradesh, people were more likely to prefer police to settle their disputes as compared to other states (Tables 4B.8a to 4B.8e).

Finding suggests that upper economic class, highly educated and urban prefer family members or institutions like police and court. On the contrary, poor, non-literate and rural

**Table 4.B.6: Preference to approach to get important work done by socio-economic status**

	MP	MLA	Councilor / Sarpanch	Government Official	Local Political Leader	Caste / Religious Leader	Elder Outside Family
Non Literate	1	3	56	5	5	10	8
Upto Primary	1	5	53	6	6	8	11
Upto Matric	1	7	48	9	6	8	11
College and above	2	8	41	12	7	8	10
Rural	1	5	54	8	5	8	10
Urban	1	7	38	9	8	9	10
Poor	1	4	57	6	4	8	10
Lower	1	6	47	9	7	8	11
Middle	1	7	47	8	7	9	9
Upper	1	9	38	13	6	8	10

Note: All figures are in percent.

people prefer approaching village elder or caste community leaders for settling their disputes. There is not much gender difference was observed when it comes to prefer institution for settling disputes, however comparatively women are more likely to approach their families whereas the men prefer other social network or police to settle the disputes.

## 4.C. Governance

### I. Education


One of the more contested debates in the discourse on education is the one between private and public education. There are many facets to this debate – what is the role of the state in the provision of education services; the quality of teachers in both public and private schools; differences

**Table 4.B.7: Preference to approach to get important work done by caste communities**

	MP	MLA	Councilor / Sarpanch	Government Official	Local Political Leader	Caste / Religious Leader	Elder Outside Family
Upper caste	2	8	40	14	8	8	10
Peasant Proprietors	1	6	45	8	7	5	11
Upper OBC	1	5	52	8	6	7	11
Lower OBC	1	6	52	8	6	6	9
Dalit	1	5	51	7	5	7	12
Adivasi	0	5	60	4	5	11	6
Muslims	1	6	37	9	5	16	10

Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 4.B.8: Preference for institution for settling disputes



Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not respond.

Table 4.B.8a: Preference for approaching family members for settling disputes by states

	Property Dispute	Marriage Dispute	Neighbourhood Dispute	Domestic Violence
Andhra Pradesh	48	36	13	30
Bihar	33	29	23	54
Madhya Pradesh	55	51	20	68
Maharashtra	47	56	25	43
Rajasthan	37	29	18	57
Jharkhand	32	26	18	35
Chhattisgarh	39	39	20	44
Telangana	34	35	13	22
<b>Overall</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>44</b>

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 4.B.8b: Preference for approaching neighbourhood for settling disputes by states

	Property Dispute	Marriage Dispute	Neighbourhood Dispute	Domestic Violence
Andhra Pradesh	24	33	44	22
Bihar	29	27	49	24
Madhya Pradesh	25	29	55	15

	Property Dispute	Marriage Dispute	Neighbourhood Dispute	Domestic Violence
Maharashtra	22	22	44	21
Rajasthan	34	36	53	20
Jharkhand	33	42	44	28
Chhattisgarh	34	31	43	25
Telangana	26	26	44	16
<b>Overall</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>21</b>

Note: All figures are in percent.

**Table 4.B.8c: Preference for approaching caste community leaders for settling disputes by states**

	Property Dispute	Marriage Dispute	Neighbourhood Dispute	Domestic Violence
Andhra Pradesh	11	16	13	11
Bihar	12	18	10	9
Madhya Pradesh	4	12	6	3
Maharashtra	2	6	5	6
Rajasthan	11	22	9	5
Jharkhand	5	15	11	8
Chhattisgarh	2	11	6	3
Telangana	20	20	17	15
<b>Overall</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>

Note: All figures are in percent.

**Table 4.B.8d: Preference for approaching Police for settling disputes by states**

	Property Dispute	Marriage Dispute	Neighbourhood Dispute	Domestic Violence
Andhra Pradesh	9	11	26	25
Bihar	6	12	11	7
Madhya Pradesh	8	3	13	7
Maharashtra	9	8	14	14
Rajasthan	7	4	13	9
Jharkhand	7	6	11	10
Chhattisgarh	8	7	20	19
Telangana	7	7	16	30
<b>Overall</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>

Note: All figures are in percent.

**Table 4.B.8e: Preference for approaching court for settling disputes by states**

	Property Dispute	Marriage Dispute	Neighbourhood Dispute	Domestic Violence
Andhra Pradesh	6	1	0	3
Bihar	18	12	3	2
Madhya Pradesh	5	2	2	2
Maharashtra	13	4	7	9
Rajasthan	7	5	3	3
Jharkhand	21	9	7	10
Chhattisgarh	10	7	2	1
Telangana	5	2	1	4
<b>Overall</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>

Note: All figures are in percent.

in infrastructure and facilities; access and affordability.

In this section, we focus on school choice and examine the distribution of respondents with children in public and private schools as well as reasons for these choices across States, caste and religious identity, parental schooling, and urban-rural divisions. We use the following questions: Do parents with higher levels of education prefer private over public education for their children? Are historically disadvantaged social communities and ethnic identities likely to exhibit preferences different from the more privileged? Are there significant urban-rural differences in school choice? What are some reasons that ultimately result in school choice? These are significant questions in developing democracies that generally have large populations that either tend to be rural and poor. We use the following questions from the questionnaire to shed light on these questions.

#### A) School Choice

Any decision within a family related to schooling, especially the choice between public and private schooling, is a complex one and many factors likely influence this choice. In developing societies,

socio-economic factors are shown to be key drivers behind decisions regarding the type of school a child attends.<sup>38</sup>

In this survey, as shown in Table 4.C.1, we find that about 67 percent of respondents report having children of school-going age (below 18 years). The remaining respondents do not report children of school-going age as part of a family unit. Of this set of respondents, about 63 percent report children attending government or public school and about 31 percent attending a private school. About 6 percent of respondents indicate a mix of public and private school, i.e. at least one child in a public school and one in a private school or children having spent a period of time in both. These numbers are consistent with the national averages from other sources. For instance, District Information System for Education (DISE) data says 65 percent of students across the country receive their education from a government school.

In the eight states surveyed, Chhattisgarh and Bihar had the highest enrolment in government schools, with 77 per cent and 76 per cent enrolment respectively. Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh follow with more than 65 per

38 E. Carvalho Filho, *Household Income as a Determinant of Child Labor and School Enrollment in Brazil: Evidence from a Social Security Reform*, 8–241 (International Monetary Fund, 2008); Alain Mingat, 'Social Disparities in Education in Sub-Saharan African Countries', in *International Studies in Educational Inequality, Theory and Policy* (Springer, Dordrecht, 2007), 223–55, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5916-2\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5916-2_10). A. H. M. Huisman and JPJM Smits, 'Keeping Children in School: Household and District-Level Determinants of School Dropout in 363 Districts of 30 Developing Countries', 2009; Kumar Rana et al., 'Public-Private Interface in Primary Education: A Case Study in West Bengal', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2005, 1550–1555.

**Table 4.C.1: State wise School Choice**

	Public	Private
Andhra Pradesh	65	35
Bihar	76	24
Madhya Pradesh	58	42
Maharashtra	65	35
Rajasthan	69	31
Jharkhand	70	30
Chhattisgarh	77	23
Telangana	48	52


Note: All figures are in percentages.

cent enrolment in government schools. Telangana notable is the only state with higher private school enrolment, with 52 per cent enrolled in private schools versus 48 per cent enrolled in government schools. These proportions are also consistent with other state-level data related to schooling. Overall, 75 per cent of all elementary schools are run by the state or the union government. Data for 2015-16 reported by DISE shows that there is some variation in this number across states. For example close to 90 percent of schools in Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are managed

by the government whereas in Telangana only 70 per cent of all schools are managed by the government. In Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh almost two out of every three schools is a government managed school.<sup>39</sup>

Extant research suggests that a parent’s level of education plays a significant role in where they choose to send their child to school.<sup>40</sup> Consistent with these findings, we find that as a parent’s level of education increases the likelihood that the child attends a government school decreases. About 82 per cent of non-literate parents have

**Figure 4.C.1: School Choice by Education (Parent)**




Note: All figures are in percentages.

39 ‘Trends Elementary Education’, accessed 26 March 2018, <http://udise.in/TrendsElementaryEducation.htm?ay=2015-16#>.

40 ed., *Reaching the Marginalized*, Education for All. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2010 (Paris : Oxford: UNESCO; Oxford University Press, 2010); Richard Breen and John H. Goldthorpe, ‘Explaining Educational Differentials: Towards A Formal Rational Action Theory’, *Rationality and Society* 9, no. 3 (1 August 1997): 275–305, <https://doi.org/10.1177/104346397009003002>.

**Figure 4.C.2: Urban Rural**




Note: All figures are in percentages.

their child enrolled in a government school. An average of about 70 per cent of parents who have some school education had children enrolled in government schools, with the numbers dropping to 41 per cent when parents have a college education. This proportion declines to about 33 per cent when we consider those parents who have a professional degree.

We also find significant urban rural differences in school choice. In rural areas three out of every four (75 per cent) respondents said that they send their child to a government school. Whereas three out of every seven (44 per cent) urban respondents had children enrolled in a government school.


When we further disaggregate school choice by location and parents' education, we find that while 86 per cent of rural non-literate respondents have a child in a government school this proportion drops by about 23 percentage points for the urban counterparts. Similarly, we observe a 30 percentage point increase in private school choice among respondents with a college degree (or above) as we move from rural to urban locations. Among non-literate respondents, the proportion reporting private school choice is 37 per cent and 13 per cent for urban and rural locations respectively. More broadly, respondents reporting higher levels of education tend to choose private schools over

**Figure 4.C.3a: School Choice by Rural and Level of Education**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 4.C.3b: School Choice by Urban and Level of Education**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

public schools regardless of whether they are located in urban or rural areas.

Government schools in India have become the last option for families with higher levels of education and wealth. Children from relatively poor, marginalized, and minority communities notably Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims, and Christians are left behind by the private education sector

and therefore seem to move to public education.<sup>41</sup> We find that Dalit and Adivasi respondents report higher levels of enrolment in government schools with 83 per cent and 78 per cent respectively. Muslim and Christian respondents also had high enrolments in government schools with 65 per cent and 73 per cent respectively. Upper caste respondents were the only category that had higher enrolments in private schools than


**Table 4.C.2: School Choice by Caste Community**

	Public	Private
Upper Castes	47	53
Peasant Proprietor	60	40
Upper OBC	66	34
Lower OBC	66	34
Dalit	78	22
Adivasi	83	17
Muslim	65	35
Christian	73	27
Sikh	50	50
Other	72	28

Note: All figures are in percentages.

41 Härmä, 'Low Cost Private Schooling in India: Is It pro Poor and Equitable?', International Journal of Educational Development 31, no. 4 (May 2011): 350–56, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2011.01.003>.

**Figure 4.C.4: Reasons for (Current) School Choice**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

government school, with 47 per cent enrolled in government schools versus 53 per cent in private schools. Similarly, we also find income difference. We find that 83% of respondents classified as poor had children enrolled in government schools while 62 per cent of upper class respondents had children enrolled in private schools.

#### B) Reasons for School Choice

In rural areas three out of every four (75 per cent) respondents said that they send their child to a government school. Whereas three out of every seven (44 per cent) urban respondents had children enrolled in a government school.

Interestingly, we find that urban and rural respondents appear to have different reasons when it comes to school choice. For rural respondents proximity of the school is most important reason with 84 per cent respondents saying the school their child attends is the closest school to them. A slight majority of them, about 54 per cent say it is the only school near them. The affordability of schools is another important factor when it comes to school choice for rural respondents with nearly four out of five (81per cent) respondents saying that the cost of the school is what determines where they send their child to school. Facilities, better teachers, discipline in the school and provision of a midday meal played an almost

equal role in determining school choice in rural areas, with 78 per cent, 79 per cent, 76 per cent and 72 per cent respectively.

In contrast respondents from urban areas report that the quality of teachers (83 percent), facilities (81 percent), and discipline (81) are three important reasons for school choice. Proximity and affordability follow with 74 per cent and 69 per cent. The availability of a hot meal in school isn't as important for urban respondents as it is for rural respondents. While 45 percent of respondents in urban areas indicate mid-day meal as a reason, nearly three quarters of rural respondents suggest the same.

#### 4.D. Institutional Trust

Citizen trust in public institutions has always been an indicator of citizen satisfaction with democratic institutions. Trust is the underpinning of all human contact and institutional interaction (Tonkiss, Passe, Fenton and Hems 2000<sup>42</sup>, Misztal 1996<sup>43</sup>) This section is largely looking at political trust by which we mean the “judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are responsive, and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 358 which is “... a central indicator of public’s underlying feeling about its polity” (Newton and Norris 2000<sup>44</sup>, 53). Political trust serves as a

42 Tonkiss, F., A. Passey, N. Fenton and L.C. Hems. Trust and Civil Society. London: Macmillan, 2000.

43 Misztal, B.A. Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

44 Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions Faith, culture, or performance In S. Pharr, & R. Putnam, (Eds.), Disaffected democracies, What’s troubling the trilateral countries Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press.

conceptual device that “has been designed as a middle-range indicator of support between the specific political actors in charge of every institution and the overarching principles of democracy in which specific institutions are embedded in a given polity” (Zmerli et al., 2007, 41<sup>45</sup>). This section discusses trust in both macro-level institutions, as well as trust in particular public offices and actors at the micro or individual level.

The confidence people place on their governments come with the payment of taxes, acceptance of legislative and judicial decisions, compliance with social service programs, and support of military objectives, among others that reaffirm public faith in the state (Braithwaite V, and Levi Margaret 1998)<sup>46</sup> Trust has been studied in different forms, both at the aggregate (Chanley et al. 2000<sup>47</sup>) and individual levels (Mansbridge 1997<sup>48</sup>, Pew Center 1998<sup>49</sup>). While some orient to falling levels of trust in developed countries (Cook and Gronke 2005<sup>50</sup>), few (Ramesh 2017<sup>51</sup>) focus on South Asia. This report furthers the understandings around trust in political institutions in an emerging economy.

## I. Effective Trust

In this section, we use the measure of effective trust by subtracting the number of respondents who claimed to have ‘No trust at all’ from those who claimed to have a ‘Great deal of trust’ (see Q14, Q15, Q16, Q17, Q23, Q30 and Q35 in the questionnaire). This seeks to understand a ‘net’ level of trust that these political institutions enjoy. Figure 4.D.1 shows that the military seems to enjoy the highest levels of trust. Whether this reflects an easy patriotism or a deeper reflection of this particular institution can be further analysed. While political parties inspire lowest levels of

public trust, the prime minister still enjoys about 43 per cent of effective trust, however this is a significant dip from the last year (57 percent), albeit in other states. Interestingly, the district collector fares better on trust levels than both the Prime Minister and Tehsildar. It may point to the fact that elected institutions are not necessarily enjoy trust. The election commission, which has traditionally enjoyed high levels of trust and enjoyed 29 percent of effective trust sees a higher support (35 percent) in the states discussed in this report but it still marked by an overall erosion of trust. The Panchayat has higher levels of trusts than the parliament and the Vidhan Sabha, clustered together has elected institutions rather than elected offices.

Effective trust = (percentage of respondents who stated ‘great deal of trust’) – (percentage of respondents who stated ‘No trust at all’)

### A) States

#### (1) The Elected

In this section, we will analyse the variations in effective trust across elected institutions and offices. According to Fritz Scharpf (1999)<sup>52</sup>, citizens evaluate political institutions and actors based on two different sets of performance criteria: those related to “input” or procedural performance and those related to “output” or policy performance. The former would include institutions and actors in the executive like Prime Minister, bureaucracy, policy and the latter would include the legislative institutions like the Vidhan Sabha, Parliament and Panchayats.

On average, according to Table 4.D.1, the elected offices and the elected institutions enjoy effective

45 Zmerli, S., Newton, K., Montero, J.R., 2007. Trust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. In: van Deth, J.W., Montero, J.R., Westholm, A. (Eds.), *Citizenship and Involvement among the Populations of European Democracies. A Comparative Analysis*. Routledge, London, pp. 35–65.

46 Braithwaite Valerie, and Levi Margaret, eds. (1998). *Trust and Governance*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

47 Chanley, Virginia A., Thomas Rudolph, and Wendy Rahn. 2000. “The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 64: 239-256.

48 Mansbridge, Jane. 1997. “Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with U.S. Government.” In Nye, Zelikow, and King (eds) *Why Americans Don’t Trust Government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


49 Pew Center on the Politics and the Press. 1998. *Deconstructing Trust: How Americans View Government*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.

50 Cook, T. E. and Gronke, P. (2005), *The Skeptical American: Revisiting the Meanings of Trust in Government and Confidence in Institutions*.

51 Ramesh.R (2017) Does Trust Matter? An Inquiry on Citizens’ Trust in Public Institutions of Sri Lanka, *Millennial Asia*, 8: 2.

52 Scharpf, F. 1999: *Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press

**Figure 4.D.1: Effective Trust in Institutions**



Note: All figures are in percentages.

Effective trust = (percentage of respondents who stated 'great deal of trust') - (percentage of respondents who stated 'No trust at all')

trust of around 40 per cent. However, the disaggregation of trust across the states show staggering variation. The two southern states, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, show notably lower levels of trust across elected offices and institutions. Specifically, Andhra Pradesh registers lowest level of trust in President, Prime Minister, Chief Minister, Parliament, Vidhan Sabha and Panchayat/MC. On the other end of the scale, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra show high levels of trust in elected institutions. While Maharashtra records high effective trust, over 60 per cent, across all elected institutions, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh show similar sentiments with respect to elected offices.

## (2) Non-Elected

As we turn to the analysis of these sections, one will notice that there are consistent trends among states who enjoy high levels of trust in both elected and non-elected offices and institutions, as compared to others. Maharashtra is an interesting

anomaly as compared to all other states, as it consistently shows higher levels of effective trust (over 50 percent) across most institutions, barring the army, where it registers the lowest among the other states.

Non-elected institutions particularly in some like the bureaucracy and police, we find an alarming decline in trust. This is consistent with our last report that showed significantly lower levels of trust in police and government officials as well. This may be in keeping with the politicization, lack of transparency and corruption of the public sector in the last decades. The corrosive effects of corruption on people's trust in the actors and institutions of government are well documented (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003<sup>53</sup>; Chang and Chu, 2006<sup>54</sup>; Mishler and Rose, 2001<sup>55</sup>; Seligson, 2002<sup>56</sup>).

We will analyse this further in the sections specifically pertaining to them. Government officials, see Table 4.D.2, generally have a low level of trust with Telangana being the lowest (-13

53 Anderson, Christopher J., and Yuliya V. Tverdova. 2003. "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 91-109.

54 Chang, Eric C. C., and Yun-han Chu. 2006. "Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?" *Journal of Politics* 68(2): 259-271.

55 Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. "Trust, distrust and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies." *Journal of Politics* 59(2): 418-451.

56 Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. "Trust, distrust and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies." *Journal of Politics* 59(2): 418-451.

**Table 4.D.1: Effective trust in elected offices and elected institutions across States**

	Elected Offices			Elected Institutions		
	President	Prime Minister	Chief Minister	Parliament	Vidhan Sabha	Panchayat/ Municipal Corporation
Andhra Pradesh	-4	-4	12	-4	-2	25
Bihar	51	47	43	33	25	26
Madhya Pradesh	44	39	34	39	32	40
Maharashtra	58	46	47	62	62	65
Rajasthan	47	57	32	48	38	40
Jharkhand	66	62	48	53	43	43
Chhattisgarh	53	60	53	43	41	47
Telangana	20	24	41	19	23	34

Note: All figures are in percentages.

per cent). District collectors which are the fourth highest in average effective trust shows significant state wise variation with Maharashtra showing close to 70 percent trust in comparison to a low 24 percent in Andhra Pradesh. With regard to the tehsildar, we find similar variations between states. Table 4.D.3 shows that, while military on average enjoys 77 percent, when it is disaggregated by states, we find some variation (with Chhattisgarh registering 87 percent of effective trust which is thirty percentage higher than the lowest). In

general however, for the military in particular, the effective trust levels remain quite high across the states. That is not the case for either the police or government officials.

Interestingly, the election commission which has not scored two high on effective trust levels show wide variations across the states surveyed. Andhra Pradesh, in keeping with its low levels of trust in other institutions has 6 percent effective trust in the election commission, whereas Maharashtra remains with its high trust in institutions at 58%.

**Table 4.D.2: Effective trust in bureaucracy across states**

	Government Officials	District Collector	Tehsildar
Andhra Pradesh	1	24	18
Bihar	8	48	19
Madhya Pradesh	1	53	43
Maharashtra	18	69	68
Rajasthan	8	56	41
Jharkhand	0	35	16
Chhattisgarh	6	54	48
Telangana	-3	38	35

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table 4.D.3: Effective trust in other institutions across states**

	Military/National Army	Election Commission	Police	Political Parties
Andhra Pradesh	67	6	7	-24
Bihar	83	37	-2	0
Madhya Pradesh	81	32	0	-9
Maharashtra	57	58	13	31
Rajasthan	86	39	2	4
Jharkhand	80	32	8	-3
Chhattisgarh	87	34	10	8
Telangana	77	26	8	-21

Note: All figures are in percentages.

With reference to the courts, Table 4.D.4, we find a monotonic decline in average effective trust from the Supreme Court to High Court to District Court across all states, except Andhra Pradesh. This is the only state that registers higher effective trust for district courts as compared to High Courts and Supreme Courts (7-8 percentage point difference). We may hypothesise that the Supreme Court generally enjoys high levels of trust, perhaps because of institutional distance

Of the top five institutions that enjoy high levels of effective trust, four are ones with high citizen-institutional distance. The office of the district collector, one who is more likely to be

approached or connected with the dynamics of everyday citizenship, is the only outlier. Of the institutions with the least amount of effective trust, political parties are the worst. However there remain variations between states and we find that the difference in effective trust between Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh and Telangana is approximately 55 percentage points.

#### B) Literacy

##### (1) The Elected

The effect of education on political trust has shown mixed results. Whereas some research shows that education boosts political trust (e.g., Anderson

**Table 4.D.4: Effective trust in judiciary across states**

	Supreme Court	High Court	District Court
Andhra Pradesh	21	20	28
Bihar	57	46	30
Madhya Pradesh	55	44	43
Maharashtra	75	72	65
Rajasthan	62	53	39
Jharkhand	64	53	40
Chhattisgarh	59	57	53
Telangana	46	39	30

Note: All figures are in percentages.

and Singer, 2008<sup>57</sup>), in other work the effect of education is negative (e.g., Seligson, 2002<sup>58</sup>); and a third group of studies, education fails altogether to predict individual-level variation in political trust (e.g., Mishler and Rose, 2001<sup>59</sup>). Still others argue for the importance of the country's political and institutional context as the defining determinant (Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012<sup>60</sup>).

Our study finds a monotonic increase in effective trust as the education level of the respondent increases from non-literate to college educated. The trend in effective trust is consistent across elected offices and elected institutions. Specifically, the effective trust in Prime Minister, Chief Minister, Parliament and Vidhan Sabha show 10 percentage point difference, with better educated respondents registering higher level of effective trust than their lesser educated counterparts.

#### (2) Non-Elected

The impact of education levels on trust in public officials registers a marginal but monotonic increase in effective trust from non-literate to college educated but no significant correlation. A study by Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) find that citizens with the lowest levels of education are unresponsive to the effects of corruption; while for others political trust decreases with education. However we find, especially in the case of political parties in this survey, that the inverse is true. These results can be explored in more detail in subsequent studies.

#### C) Urban – Rural

This survey attempts to paint a differentiated picture of citizens. There are sound theoretical

and empirical reasons to think about citizens in heterogeneous rather than homogeneous terms in their process of evaluating performance of institutions and actors (Anderson and Singer, 2008<sup>61</sup>). In most developing or under-developed countries, the divide between the urban and rural is stark in terms of accessibility to basic services and governmental institutions, with development reflecting an urban bias (Bates, 1981<sup>62</sup>; Lipton, 1977<sup>63</sup>). A recent study by Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Wibbels, E. (2017)<sup>64</sup> in Africa found that citizens distant from urban centres are more likely to have more trust in government and more positive evaluations of both local and national officials. This is indicated in our tables as well where both elected and unelected offices and institutions enjoyed higher levels of trust among rural respondents.

#### (1) The Elected

Rural respondents register a consistently higher level of effective trust across elected offices and institutions. The difference in effective trust is around 5 percentage points for most of the institutions and offices, however we find that this difference is almost negligibly small with respect to chief minister.

#### (2) The Non-Elected

Rural respondents show a marginally higher level of effective trust across all non-elected institutions. The police stands in exception to this trend. However the difference between urban and rural respondents is negligible. We find similar complementarity in perception with regards to the Supreme Court. We posit that this may be due to similar distance from the institution, in terms of likelihood of interaction.

57 Anderson, Christopher J., and Matthew M. Singer. 2008. "The Sensitive Left and the Impervious Right: Multilevel Models and the Politics of Inequality, Ideology, and Legitimacy in Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4/5): 564-599.

58 Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* 64(2): 408-433.

59 Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. "Trust, distrust and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies." *Journal of Politics* 59(2): 418-451.

60 Hakhverdian, A., Mayne, Q. (2012). Institutional trust, education, and corruption: A micro-macro interactive approach. *The Journal of Politics* 74(3), 739-750.

61 Anderson, Christopher J., and Matthew M. Singer. 2008. "The Sensitive Left and the Impervious Right: Multilevel Models and the Politics of Inequality, Ideology, and Legitimacy in Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4/5): 564-599.

62 Bates, R. (1981). *Markets and states in tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

63 Lipton, M. (1977). *Why poor people stay poor: A study of urban bias in world development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

64 Brinkerhoff, D.W., A. Wetterberg, and Wibbels, E. (2017). 'Distance, Services, and Citizen Perceptions of the State in Rural Africa'. *Governance*, online: 1-21. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12271>

#### D) Religion

Religion may have an important role to play in the creation of political values and beliefs (Williams, 1999<sup>65</sup>). India has traditionally been a country with high levels of religious heterogeneity. It has been found that the members of all four of the major religions in India had professed a preference for democracy and democratic practice (Stepan, Linz and Yadav, 2011<sup>66</sup>).

##### (1) Elected

With regards to religious communities, respondents from the Christian community register consistently higher levels of effective trust in all elected institutions studied in this survey. This is in stark contrast to the Muslim community who record much lower levels of effective trust across all elected institutions. However, when we come to elected offices, we find that Hindu and Christian respondents hold similar perceptions in trust, while Muslim respondents are consistently lower. Notably, for the Prime Minister, the Muslim community has 20 per cent effective trust but Hindu and Christian respondents register more than double the value.

##### (2) Non-Elected

There are similar levels of effective trust across the bureaucracy and judiciary, in that they are higher than non-elected institutions in general. Within this category, Hindu and Christian respondents, in contrast to Muslim respondents have consistently higher levels of effective trust. There is no significant difference in community perceptions of trust when it comes to the military, police and election commission. Political parties and government officials, in general enjoy extremely low levels of trust, especially among Muslim and Christian respondents.

## II. Effectiveness and Procedural Fairness

Effective trust encompasses two main aspects – First, gaining immediate and long term compliance with decisions made by legal authorities like the courts and police, for specific interactions between public and the state apparatus. Second, encouraging general cooperation and compliance. Psychological research on procedural justice (Lind and Tyler 1988<sup>67</sup>, Tyler and Lind 1992<sup>68</sup>) and courts and police (Tyler 1990<sup>69</sup>; Tyler and Huo 2002<sup>70</sup>) finds that the public's behaviour with relation to the apparatus of law (police and courts) are powerfully influenced by subjective perceptions of fairness in the process of exercising authority by these institutions. Procedural fairness consists of quality of decision-making and quality of treatment. Both these aspects are ultimately rooted in a feeling of legitimacy i.e people believe that police and judges are entitled to be obeyed and that their actions are legitimate in particular contexts. Legitimacy is encouraged by the perception of fairness, both towards communities, as well as in individual interactions and encounters (Tyler 2003<sup>71</sup>).

This survey explores the concept of trust in the light of aspects such as effectiveness, procedural fairness and distributive fairness which have been posited to contribute to perceptions of trust. The respondents were asked their opinion on a battery of four statements pertaining to these aspects of trust.

This sections will focus on effectiveness and procedural fairness index based on Q26, Q31 and Q37 in the questionnaire. The statements for police and government officials were structured along four themes, two positive assertions including respectful interaction and quick action and two negative –undue influence by political parties and corruption with regard to bribes. For the courts,

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65 Williams, Rhys H. 1996. "Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 35(4): 368-378.

66 Stepan, Alfred, Linz, Juan J., and Yadav, Yogendra. 2011. *Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

67 Lind, E.A. & Tyler, T.R. (1988). *The social psychology of procedural justice*. N.Y.: Plenum.


68 Tyler, T.R. & Lind, E.A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 25, pp. 115 – 191).

69 Tyler, T.R. (1990). The social psychology of authority: When do people resist an order to harm others? Review essay, based on Kelman and Hamilton, *Crimes of obedience*. *Law and Society Review*, 24, 1089 - 1102.

70 Tyler, T.R. & Huo, Y.J. (2002). *Trust in the law: Encouraging public cooperation with the police and courts*. N.Y.: Russell-Sage Foundation.

71 Tyler, T. (2003). *Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law*. *Crime and Justice*, 30, 283-357.

Figure 4.D.2: Effectiveness and procedural fairness index



Note: All figured are in percentages

while the tenor of the statements remained the same, quick action and respectful comportment was replaced with whether innocence or guilt of individuals would play a role in sentencing. The latter statement effectively interrogates the perceived corruption of the courts. The responses for these statements, which varied from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’, were taken together to create an index of effectiveness and procedural fairness for Police, Courts and Government Officials. The index has scalar set of perceptions – ‘Positive’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘Negative’. For this report, we will focus only on the end of the spectrum i.e. ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ perceptions.

Figure 4.D.2 shows that while less than 20 per cent of the respondents held a positive view of the Police and Government Officials, almost ten percentage point more respondents felt negatively about the same institutions. Strikingly, almost half of the respondents held a negative perception about effective and procedural fairness of the courts, compared to only 24 per cent who held a positive view. We will analyse these numbers,

according to their respective intuitions, further in the upcoming sections.

#### A) Police

The police play an important role in the maintenance of the political system, law and order and prevent crime. This institution in general seems to lack legitimate authority and public trust in India (Jauregui 2013<sup>72</sup>), but in contemporary India their image seems to be getting worse (Sharma 1991<sup>73</sup>; Verma 2005<sup>74</sup>). This may be because of a variety of reasons, in particular the perception that they serve as “whipping boys” for a society’s greater ills (Pereira 2008<sup>75</sup>), “yes men” to more powerful figures, or as brutal and corrupt “little tyrants” (Visvanathan and Sethi 1998<sup>76</sup>; Jauregui 2010<sup>77</sup>) and this is a result of a lack of meaningful police reform in the postcolonial period (Patil 2008<sup>78</sup>). The police’s lack of legitimate authority and public trust tend to fall into two main categories: (1) The institutions origins in a colonial legacy of oppression, and (2) the fact that the police have succumbed to the forces of corruption and criminalization that have

72 Jauregui, B. (2013). Beatings, beacons, and big men: Police disempowerment and delegitimation in India. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 38, 643-669.

73 Sharma, S. P. N. Rai. 1991. *Refurbishing the Police Image*. Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh: Police Prakashan.

74 Verma, A. 2005. *The Indian Police: A Critical Evaluation*. New Delhi: Regency Publications

75 Pereira, Ml. 2008. *The Other Side of Policing*. New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing.

76 Visvanathan, S. and H. Sethi. 1998. *Foul Play: Chronicles of Corruption, 1947-97*. New Delhi: Banyan Books

77 Jauregui, B. 2010. *Shadows of the State, Subalterns of the State: Police and “Law and Order” in Postcolonial India*. PhD diss., Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL

78 Patil, S. 2008. *Feudal Forces: Reform Delayed. Moving from Force to Service in South Asian Policing*. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. [http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/feudal\\_forces\\_reform\\_delayed\\_moving\\_from\\_force\\_to\\_service\\_in\\_south\\_asian\\_policing.pdf](http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/feudal_forces_reform_delayed_moving_from_force_to_service_in_south_asian_policing.pdf)

been inherently problematic in the governance of postcolonial India (Jauregui 2013). The police in India are widely known for mass-level misconduct which reflects discriminatory treatment of social minority groups (Muslims and Dalits) (Brass 1997<sup>79</sup>; Rai 1998<sup>80</sup>; Hansen 2001<sup>81</sup>; HRW 2002<sup>82</sup>; Khalidi 2003<sup>83</sup>; Engineer and Narang 2006<sup>84</sup>)—or of widespread violent harassment and participation in organized crime (Daruwala and Doube 2005<sup>85</sup>; HRW 2009<sup>86</sup>). Corruption at all levels of government also manifests in questionable legitimacy of most state representatives in India, from elected politicians to appointed bureaucrats (Dhillon 1998<sup>87</sup>; Visvanathan and Sethi 1998; Singh 2000<sup>88</sup>). One of the more commonly held notions among police and government officials themselves is that social problems of high unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, overpopulation, and resource scarcity combine to attract the “wrong type of people” to the police forces in India (NPC 1979<sup>89</sup>; Jauregui 2010). These factors all combine to form a general negative perception that is mirrored in the study.

As Table 4.D.5 shows, a high proportion of respondents across all states hold negative perceptions about the police, except for Jharkhand which is two percentage points higher in terms of a positive view about this institution. We consider the similarity between the paired states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana and Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh interesting as they were, at one time, formally within the same state boundaries. The difference in positive and negative perception is most notable with respect to Andhra Pradesh

and Telangana (20 percentage points), closely followed by Bihar. The negative perception of police in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh is nearly identical, however, twelve percentage point more respondents hold a positive perception in the former. Whereas Bihar has a higher negative perception than positive, in Jharkhand we find that the opposite is true, albeit that the difference between positive and negative is quite minimal. For all states, the difference falls to around ten to fifteen percentage points.

A higher proportion of respondents across all caste categories hold a negative perception of the police, according to Figure 4.D.3. There is a higher difference between negative and positive perceptions among higher caste respondents that declines as move across the caste hierarchy. The Dalit and Adivasi respondents hold the lowest difference between positive and negative perceptions. This indicates a higher degree of polarisation among the upper castes as compared to others.

We see similar polarities in religious communities, in Figure 4.D.4, the differences in effective trust and procedural fairness increasing from Hindus (12 percentage points) to Muslims (16 percentage points) to Christians (17 percentage points). However the extent of difference between them is minimal.

Class attitudes to police do not show any significant variation. The same is applicable between urban and rural respondents and across literacy. However one does notice that more urban respondents

79 Brass, Paul. 1997. *Theft of an Idol*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

80 Rai, V.N. 1998. *Combating Communal Conflicts: Perception of Police Neutrality During Hindu-Muslim Riots in India*. Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh: Anamika Prakashan.

81 Hansen, T. B. 2001. *Wages of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

82 Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2002. *India: Gujarat Officials Took Part in Anti-Muslim Violence*. News Release, May 1. <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/04/30/india3885.htm> (accessed August 26, 2012).

83 Khalidi, O. 2003. *Khaki and the Ethnic Violence in India*. New Delhi: Three Essays Collective.

84 Engineer, A. A., and A. N. 2006. *Minorities and Police in India*. New Delhi: Manohar Press.

85 Daruwala, M, and C. Doube. 2005. *Police Accountability: Too Important to Neglect, Too Urgent to Delay*. New Delhi: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. [http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm\\_2005/chogm\\_2005\\_full\\_report.pdf](http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2005/chogm_2005_full_report.pdf)

86 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2009. *Broken System: Dysfunction, Abuse, and Impunity in the Indian Police*. Special Report, 1-56432-518-0. <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india0809web.pdf> (accessed August 26, 2012).

87 Dhillon, Kirpal. 1998. *Defenders of the Establishment: Ruler-Supportive Police Forces of South Asia*. New Delhi: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, in Association with Aryan Books International

88 Singh, P. 2000. *All-India Services: Dilemmas of Change*. In *The Changing Role of the All-India Services*, ed. Balveer Arora and Beryl Radin, 121–38. Philadelphia, PA: Center for the Advanced Study of India and Centre for Policy Research.

89 National Police Commission (NPC). 1979. *First Report*. February. New Delhi: Government of India

**Table 4.D.5: Index for Police by States**

Police	Positive	Negative
Andhra Pradesh	18	38
Bihar	12	28
Madhya Pradesh	25	28
Maharashtra	16	29
Rajasthan	18	27
Jharkhand	23	21
Chhattisgarh	13	29
Telangana	14	35

**Note: All figures are in percentages.**

hold negative perceptions of the police compared to ones in rural areas, however the difference is minimal ( 2 percentage points).


**B) Courts**

While we have shown in the previous tables that effective trust in the judiciary is the highest with respect to the Supreme Court, it falls substantially as we move towards the lower courts. We presume that the following figures on effectiveness and procedural fairness relate to the perception of district courts as one assumes that there is a greater likelihood of interaction with the lower

courts. As Table 4.D.6 shows, there are generally higher levels of negative perception towards the courts across all states. Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar have the least amount of effective trust in district courts and therefore the highest negative perception of procedural fairness in this institution. For instance, fifty six percentage points more respondents in Telangana hold a negative view of the courts than positive.


With respect to caste, in Figure 4.D.5, there is a higher proportion of negative perception across all caste categories. However we find the largest difference is noticed among Other Backward Classes

**Figure 4.D.3: Index for Police by Caste categories**



**Note: All figured are in percentages**

**Figure 4.D.4: Index for Police by Religion**



Note: All figured are in percentages

and Dalits. Strikingly, with regard to religion in Figure 4.D.6, we see a reversal of the trend that we saw with the police. Namely that while there is a generally high negative perception of the course, the difference is most stark among Hindus (36 percentage points) and falls significantly with respect to Muslims (31 percentage points) and Christians (11 percentage points).

Class differences with respect to trust in courts in largely similar to those with respect to the police. One does not see any significant variation between the different classes. The same is true between urban and rural respondents although a marginally higher proportion of rural respondents

(3 percentage points) hold a negative view. Literate and non-literate respondents have a clear difference in perception, though this may not be statistically significant. One does find, however, that the more literate the respondent the higher the positive perception of the court, although it has to be emphasised that this is a marginal increase.

#### C) Government Officials


This category enjoyed among the lowest levels of effective trust among all institutions. Interestingly however, when we look at the figures of negative perception in Table 4.D.7, one notices that they are not as high as we have noticed with the

**Table 4.D.6: Index for Courts by States**

Court	Positive	Negative
Andhra Pradesh	19	51
Bihar	20	57
Madhya Pradesh	29	38
Maharashtra	25	44
Rajasthan	21	54
Jharkhand	33	30
Chhattisgarh	21	52
Telangana	20	53


Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 4.D.5: Index for Courts by Caste categories**



Note: All figured are in percentages

**Figure 4.D.6: Index for Courts by Religion**



Note: All figured are in percentages

courts. In fact, in Madhya Pradesh, government officials enjoy almost equal levels of negative and positive perception. The only significant difference between perceptions is in Telangana where we see a big variation between positive and negative (27 percentage points). Interestingly, until now we have seen a similarity in perception between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana and for the first time we see a divergence in opinions between the two states: nine percentage points more

respondents in Andhra Pradesh hold a positive view of government officials than in Telangana.

With respect to caste in Figure 4.D.7, one finds that all caste categories share more negative than positive perceptions but the least amount of difference between the two are noticed among Adivasi's. The trend in religious communities in Figure 4.D.8, is similar to the one we saw with respect to the police, that is, difference between

positive and negative perceptions are lowest among Hindus (11 percentage points) and increases with Muslims (17 percentage points) and Christians (25 percentage points).

Within class, perceptions are more negative than positive across all segments. However the difference in proportion of respondents holding negative or positive perceptions sees a monotonic decline from 14 per cent among poor respondents to 9 per cent among upper class respondents. Interestingly,

more rural respondents (2 percentage points) have positive views on the government officials than urban. In terms of literacy, perceptions of trust are almost identical between both literate and non-literate respondents.

### III. Distributive Fairness


Distributive or outcome fairness refers to the way people respond to the fairness of the outcomes they receive. This concept relates to perceptions

**Table 4.D.7: Index for Government Officials by States**

Government Officials	Positive	Negative
Andhra Pradesh	20	39
Bihar	14	27
Madhya Pradesh	26	25
Maharashtra	18	28
Rajasthan	21	24
Jharkhand	21	27
Chhattisgarh	13	26
Telangana	11	38

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 4.D.7: Index for Government Officials by Caste categories**




Note: All figures are in percentages

90 Tyler, T., Rasinski, K.A., McGraw, K.M., 1985. The influence of perceived injustice on the endorsement of political leaders. *J. Appl. Soc. Psychol.* 15, 700–725.

91 Forsé, M., 2009. Macro-inequalities and micro-justice. In: Haller, M., Jowell, R., Smith, T.W. (Eds.), *The International Social Survey Programme, 1984–2009. Charting the Globe.* Routledge, London, pp. 91–105.

**Figure 4.D.8: Index for Government Officials by Religion**



Note: All figured are in percentages

of “violations in principles of fairness in the allocation of outcomes” (Tyler et al., 1985, 702<sup>90</sup>) and is conceived as an expression of deservingness. Three different principles underpin the notion of distributive justice: equity, equality and meeting the basic needs of everybody (Forsé, 2009, 100<sup>91</sup>). While all three are legitimate and complimentary criteria, societies as well as individuals of different socio-economic backgrounds may vary according to the importance they assign to these three principles (Kulin and Svallfors, 2013<sup>92</sup>; Mau and Wrobel, 2006<sup>93</sup>; Noll and Roberts, 2003<sup>94</sup>; Svallfors, 2012<sup>95</sup>). This also lends itself to a psychological model that contends that values held by individuals influence how they cognitively perceive the world (Aalberg, 2003<sup>96</sup>, 111; Hochschild, 2001<sup>97</sup>). This could mean that “Perceptions of justice determine perceptions of fact” (Headey, 1991, 593<sup>98</sup>). This also relates to the

cognitive frame of ‘perceived legitimacy’ of various institutions. The perception of equal treatment among communities is often considered as either a cause or consequence of institutional trust. In this study, perception of distributive fairness of the institutions is captured using questions on preferential or equal treatment by the Police, the Courts and the Government Officials, also mapped according to socio-economic backgrounds and their ideas on fairness of outcomes — see questions Q27, Q33 and Q38 in the questionnaire.

#### A) Rich - Poor

The proportion of respondents who feel that the poor are treated better across institutions – police, courts and government officials, are about five percent (see Figure 4.D.9). While around

92 Kulin, J., Svallfors, S., 2013. Class, values, and attitudes towards redistribution: a European comparison. *Eur. Sociol. Rev.* 29, 155–167

93 Mau, S., Wrobel, S., 2006. Justice and public opinion from a comparative perspective. *Soc. Just. Res.* 19, 379–393

94 Noll, H.-H., Roberts, L.W., 2003. The legitimacy of inequality on both sides of the Atlantic. A comparative analysis of attitudes in Canada and Germany. *Tocqueville Rev.* XXIV (2), 153–189

95 Svallfors, S. (Ed.), 2012. *Contested Welfare States. Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond.* Stanford University Press, Stanford.

96 Aalberg, T., 2003. *Achieving Justice: Comparative Public Opinions on Income Distribution.* Brill, Leiden, Boston

97 Hochschild, J., 2001. Where you stand depends on what you see: connections among values, perceptions of facts, and political prescriptions. In: Kuklinski, J.H. (Ed.), *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 313–340.

98 Headey, B., 1991. Distributive justice and occupational incomes: perceptions of justice determine perceptions of facts. *Br. J. Sociol.* 42, 581–596

thirty per cent of respondents feel that police and government officials do not discriminate based on socio-economic background, this number rises to forty eight percent with respect to courts. A majority of respondents do believe that the above institutions do discriminate based on wealth – that is the richer are treated better. Therefore the courts, in spite of high negative perception with respect to effectiveness and procedural fairness is considered the least discriminatory among the three institutions. According to Table 4.D.8, a majority of respondents across all states believe that the police and similarly, government officials, favour the rich. Although a higher percentage of respondents find the courts non-discriminatory, a majority of respondents in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan feel that the rich are nonetheless favoured by the courts.

The results do not change significantly with respect to class perception of distributive fairness of the police and government officials. There is a monotonic decline in the percentage of respondents who perceive the rich as better treated across the economic classes – from the poor to the upper class. Therefore we see that around fifty percent of the poor believe that economic background does impact fair treatment, compared to forty four percent of the upper classes.

We notice the same trend with literacy in Figure 4.D.10a-c. There is a steady increase in the proportion of respondents who feel that there is


no discrimination based on wealth. That is college educated respondents are more likely to perceive fairness in treatment by all three institutions, as opposed to those who are non-literate.

#### B) Dalit - Upper Caste

As shown in Figure 4.D.11 among caste groups, a majority of respondents feel that members of the upper caste would be treated better by the police and government officials, but not courts; fifty-six per cent of respondents feel that both Dalit and upper castes would be treated equally. This trend holds even when disaggregated among the states for all three institutions (see Table 4.D.9). The only outlier being Madhya Pradesh, where a majority of respondents feel that there will not be any caste discrimination by government officials.

Figure 4.D.a-c shows that a majority of respondents of OBC, Dalit and Adivasi backgrounds feel that members of the upper caste will be treated by the Police and Government Officials. We notice a steady decline in the proportion respondents who feel that Dalits will be treated better across the caste categories – from upper caste to Adivasi. As noticed in the previous sections, we find a steady rise in the proportion of respondents who feel that the three institutions studied in this chapter will not discriminate on the basis of the caste. Although a significant percentage of the respondents of each educational level do perceive that members of the upper caste will be treated better, this size of this group narrows with respect to courts. A majority of

**Figure 4.D.9: Distributive fairness - Rich vs Poor**




Note: All figured are in percentages

**Table 4.D.8: Distributive fairness - Rich vs Poor by States**

	Police		Court		Government Officials	
	Poor Treated Better	Both Treated Same	Poor Treated Better	Both Treated Same	Poor Treated Better	Both Treated Same
Andhra Pradesh	5	32	4	43	5	32
Bihar	10	21	9	34	11	22
Madhya Pradesh	9	38	9	53	11	40
Maharashtra	1	33	1	61	0	35
Rajasthan	2	21	3	42	3	26
Jharkhand	6	38	4	63	5	42
Chhattisgarh	3	31	2	46	3	33
Telangana	2	21	2	40	2	22

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 4.D.10a: Distributive fairness of Police- Rich vs Poor by Literacy**



Note: All figured are in percentages

respondents of every educational level feel that the either Dalits are treated better or that both caste groups are treated the same.


*C) Hindu - Non-Hindu*

In the last two sections, we noticed that there is considerable difference the proportion of respondents who feel that there will not be any discriminatory behaviour by the Police, Courts and Government Officials; the Courts had fared the best with a majority of respondents holding a favourable view of the its distributive fairness –

shown in Figure 4.D.13. With respect to religious communities, that as astounding percentage of the respondents feel the Police, the Courts and the Government Officials do not behave in a discriminatory manner; at least seventy per cent of the respondents stated this perception.


While this trend holds consistent across the states, as shown in Table 4.D.10, Bihar seems to be the outlier with significantly higher proportion of respondents, as compared to other states, stating that Non-Hindus would be treated better by all three institutions. A majority of respondents of the three

Figure 4.D.10b: Distributive fairness of Courts- Rich vs Poor by Literacy




Note: All figured are in percentages

Figure 4.D.10c: Distributive fairness of Government Officials- Rich vs Poor by Literacy



Note: All figured are in percentages

Figure 4.D.11: Distributive fairness - Upper Caste vs Dalit



Note: All figured are in percentages

**Table 4.D.9: Distributive fairness - Upper Caste vs Dalit by States**

	Police		Court		Government Officials	
	Dalit Treated Better	Both Treated Same	Dalit Treated Better	Both Treated Same	Dalit Treated Better	Both Treated Same
Andhra Pradesh	10	41	8	53	9	44
Bihar	18	28	17	40	17	30
Madhya Pradesh	10	49	10	58	10	53
Maharashtra	3	48	2	70	2	50
Rajasthan	6	38	5	54	6	40
Jharkhand	8	47	7	70	8	48
Chhattisgarh	3	40	2	53	3	41
Telangana	5	29	4	48	4	34


Note: All figures are in percentages.

religious communities, namely Hindus, Muslims and Christians, feel that the Police, the Courts and Government Officials do not discriminate on the basis of religion (see Figure 4.D.a-c). Nevertheless, a slightly smaller proportion of Muslims feel this sentiment as compared to the other two communities. Interestingly, when the respondents of each state was further disaggregated by the religious communities, we find that there is no variation among respondents from the three

major religious communities i.e. both Hindus and Muslims of Bihar and Jharkhand hold the same perception about the Police, the Courts and the Government Officials.


The literacy of the respondent seems to have effect on perception of distributive fairness, similar to that which we have noticed in the previous sections. The proportion of respondents who perceive the three institutions to be non-discriminatory increases with educational attainments.

**Figure 4.D.12a: Distributive fairness by Police- Upper Caste vs Dalit by Caste categories**




Note: All figures are in percentages

Figure 4.D.12b: Distributive fairness by Courts- Upper Caste vs Dalit by Caste categories



Note: All figured are in percentages

Figure 4.D.12c: Distributive fairness by Government Officials- Upper Caste vs Dalit by Caste categories



Note: All figured are in percentages

D) Women - Men

According to Figure 4.D.15, a significantly higher percentage of respondents feel that women are treated better by the Police, the Courts and the Government Officials. This is interesting since a significantly lower proportion of respondents perceive the other marginalised or under-privileged groups, i.e. the poor, the Dalits and the Non-Hindus, to be better treated. In a similar vein to the previous sections, the Courts are considered the non-discriminatory by a larger majority of


respondents than the other two institutions. Among the states, as shown in Table 4.D.11, Bihar registers the largest proportion of respondents who feel that women are better treated by the institutions and lowest levels for non-discriminatory treatment. This is closely followed by Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh.

Strikingly, in Figure 4.D.a-c, there is no gender-based variation in perception of the distributive fairness of the institutions. Further disaggregation

of states by gender shows that surprisingly men and women in Bihar share the same perception with regard to fairness i.e. close to 40 per cent of both male and female respondents feel that women are treated better by all three institutions. Literacy shows some effect in the proportion of respondents who feel that the institutions do not behave in a discriminatory manner; the proportion of respondents holding this view increases with

educational level. However, there is no effect of literacy on the share of respondents who feel that women are better treated. With the states, educational levels show remarkable, and possibly counter-intuitive, results. Most states show a rise in proportion of respondents who feel that women are treated better with a rise in educational level; in Bihar this is very evident.

**Figure 4.D.13: Distributive fairness - Hindus vs Non-Hindus**




Note: All figured are in percentages

**Table 4.D.10: Distributive fairness - Hindus vs Non-Hindus by States**

	Police		Court		Government Officials	
	Non-Hindus treated better	Both treated same	Non-Hindus treated better	Both treated same	Non-Hindus treated better	Both treated same
Andhra Pradesh	4	79	3	84	4	80
Bihar	16	54	15	56	18	53
Madhya Pradesh	6	74	5	77	6	73
Maharashtra	1	71	1	83	1	72
Rajasthan	4	73	5	78	5	72
Jharkhand	14	65	7	80	11	67
Chhattisgarh	4	72	3	77	3	74
Telangana	4	74	3	84	3	78


Note: All figures are in percentages.

Figure 4.D.14a: Distributive fairness of Police- Hindus vs Non-Hindus by Religion




Note: All figured are in percentages

Figure 4.D.14b: Distributive fairness of Courts- Hindus vs Non-Hindus by Religion




Note: All figured are in percentages

Figure 4.D.14c: Distributive fairness of Government Officials- Hindus vs Non-Hindus by Religion



Note: All figured are in percentages

Figure 4.D.15: Distributive fairness - Men vs Women




Note: All figured are in percentages

**Table 4.D.11: Distributive fairness - Men vs Women by State**

	Police		Court		Government Officials	
	Women Treated Better	Both Treated Same	Women Treated Better	Both Treated Same	Women Treated Better	Both Treated Same
Andhra Pradesh	17	69	12	76	12	71
Bihar	42	39	35	46	37	41
Madhya Pradesh	35	57	26	66	31	61
Maharashtra	16	69	10	82	13	73
Rajasthan	28	55	18	70	24	59
Jharkhand	36	49	26	67	33	51
Chhattisgarh	27	63	18	73	25	65
Telangana	28	60	19	73	24	65


Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Figure 4.D.16a: Distributive fairness of Police- Men vs Women by Gender**




Note: All figured are in percentages

**Figure 4.D.16b: Distributive fairness of Courts- Men vs Women by Gender**




Note: All figured are in percentages

Figure 4.D.16c: Distributive fairness of Government Officials- Men vs Women by Gender



Note: All figured are in percentages



## 5. Conclusion

How do interactions between the State and the citizen unfold in periods between elections? What characterizes interactions between citizens across class, caste and community? And what sorts of perceptions, attitudes, and opinions do everyday forms of governance engender within society? These questions are of importance in a democracy undergoing significant economic and social transformation. Governments consolidate their political mandate, outline new directions in policy, mould institutions, and routinize governance in periods between elections. New ideas emerge or older ideologies resurface in public discourse. Spaces for engagement between State and citizens either expand or contract, and extant forms of vertical and horizontal citizenship strengthen or fray in times between elections. And equally important are the perceptions, attitudes, and opinions citizens hold about others across caste, community and geography, as well as those relating to their relationship with state institutions and officials that both shape and in turn are shaped by politics and society between elections.

This report examines perceptions, public opinion, and political subjectivities of citizens in eight States, focusing specifically on social

identity, political identity, political institutions and governance. The Chapter on social identity explores how inter-caste and inter-community networks shape perceptions of social and political relations: the nature of friendships, the overlap between social and political networks, and gender equality.

The Chapter on political identity broadly focuses on the regional-national dichotomy in political expression, as well as the libertarian and majoritarian impulses that characterize the debates on freedom of expression and nationalism respectively. The Chapter on political institutions explores citizens' perceptions of their performance in public service delivery, their role in economic governance, and the degree of trust they inspire among citizens cutting across social categories.

The results for Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Telangana, the eight States covered in this study, suggest that perceptions, public opinion, political subjectivities and social attitudes indicate remarkable variation across space, community. For instance, preferences for a majoritarian form of cultural nationalism cohere around specific religious or caste identities rather than being defined by class or levels of education. Social ties, on the other hand, are produced not just by ascriptive identities but through education as well. Social identities appear to strengthen intra-group ties and opinions tend to reflect these bonds. On questions such as the most important issue facing India today there is greater unanimity across space and other socio-economic categories. In addition, issues identified as important between elections (unemployment) is markedly different from those considered important during elections (inflation). While across States there is a high awareness of both Central and State schemes, the distribution of benefits is varied. For instance, big farmers are clear beneficiaries of schemes aimed at crop insurance, while Adivasis and Dalits appear to be benefitting from housing and employment schemes. In the States covered, the 'national' appears as a stronger identity compared to the 'regional.' Yet, a significant number of respondents support the use of local languages in public places.

These results also indicate the growing importance of local governments in India given that a large number of respondents repose faith in the district collector, and a significant number approach municipal corporator or

*sarpanch* in order to get important work done. Institutions enjoy varying levels of trust. Courts enjoy high levels of trust and are associated with distributive fairness, yet seen as procedurally unfair. Police appears as among the least trusted institution, and score on both procedural as well as distributive fairness. Interpreting results proves to be trickier in the case of gender related attitudes. A majority indicate that women should prioritize home over outside work, but at the same time call for greater reservation in all jobs for women and subscribe to equal responsibility in child rearing. Contrary to the commonly held view that the medium of instruction is the driver for school choice, there appear differences among rural and urban respondents in their reasons for choice. Rural respondents are concerned with proximity and affordability of schools, while teachers and discipline emerge as primary concerns for urban residents.

Normative interpretations of the results are likely to view some - such as high levels of trust in national institutions as contributing to improved democratic deepening and governance and others - such as weak cross-caste and cross-community personal friendships, prejudicial notions about other castes or communities, and low support for liberal attitudes as markers of a dilution in the quality of democracy.

Two aspects of the analysis must be stressed here. First, the results are primarily descriptive and seek to identify broad patterns across key social groups. While inferential analysis requires controls and robustness checks, the initial results presented here open possibilities for empirically testing theoretically driven hypotheses relating to the horizontal and vertical relationships in society and politics between elections. Second, the results are a comparative analysis of eight States and cannot be generalized to a national public opinion. They can however be considered a barometer of public opinion within a State as the data allows for an analysis of political and social preferences and opinions within a single State across relevant groups. However, inter-State comparisons become increasingly meaningful as more States are covered through the next rounds of surveys, and results will approximate a national picture.

Nevertheless, the findings from the eight States help us hypothesize about the broader patterns that obtain. As has been already noted in the

previous studies (like the two rounds of South Asia study), trust in institutions can at best be described as mixed and at a middling level only. Similarly, delivery of public goods leaves a lot to be desired and yet unlike what the critics of India's public delivery system would like to believe, people are not very strongly disappointed with the system. The broader patterns of political culture however throw up more complex patterns that may require further investigation both in the States studied here and through an expansion of this study in other States. Just as the findings about institutions and delivery mechanisms have implications for the governance regime in India, the findings about citizen attitudes and values hold important lessons for contemporary India's political culture that provides the basis for the way democracy functions and what it means for citizens.

These political cultural patterns may be summarized as follow: (a) the caste-community driven social

universe and the somewhat broad-based political universe constitute the context in which citizens relate to each other; (b) More importantly, caste-community based identities are not only inward looking images of the self, they also impose deep burdens on certain communities. (c) Third, the study hints at the need to more carefully redefine the meanings and significance of ideas of freedom of expression and revisit liberal fundamentals in an Indian context (d) Fourth, the eight States under study indicate strong public support for emerging majoritarian nationalism which must be taken very seriously as it is likely to dominate both public discourse and our collective lives in the near future.

Of course, these are only patterns that emerge from an eight-State study. Yet, they give us enough intellectual stimulation to enlarge comparisons across the States of India in the subsequent rounds of the survey.



## 6. Appendices

### 6.A. Methodology

Lokniti - CSDS in collaboration with Azim Premji University (APU) conducted a round of surveys in Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Rajasthan and Maharashtra between November and December 2017. These eight states were selected because these states provided the proximity to study politics between elections closely and accurately. The study aims to capture public opinion between elections. It covers various aspects related to delivery of public services, law and order, identities, discrimination and violence, economic processes and governance and the perception of the state at various levels to which the citizens interact. The study was an attempt to know whether various social groups get access to better public services such as water, sanitation, roads, electricity among others, which group does the police protect and which does not, whether the rate of discrimination towards marginal groups have reduced over the period of time and which states do better job in providing public services. The survey in a broader perspective helps to know everyday governance and development in India.

The survey was conducted between November 10 and December 15, 2017 among 16,680 respondents in 22 assembly constituencies across eight states each. The assembly constituencies where the survey was conducted were randomly selected using the probability proportionate to size method. Thereafter four polling stations within each of the sampled constituencies were selected using the systematic random sampling method. Finally, 30 respondents were also randomly selected using the same method from the latest electoral rolls of the sampled polling stations. This procedure ensures that the selected sample is fully representative of the cross-section of voters in the country. Specially trained field investigators asked the respondents, in a face-to-face interview a detailed set of questions which could take up to 20-25 minutes. They were instructed to interview only those whose names were given to them. At some locations the non-availability of sampled respondents or difficulty in finding households necessitated replacements or substitutions.

To make the sample more representative and for the cross-community analysis, a booster was conducted in each states. The booster was conducted to perform cross-sectional analysis to ensure equal representation of targeted communities like Muslims, Dalits, Bhumihars and Yadavs in Bihar; Muslims, Dalits, Kurmis and Mahtos in Jharkhand; Muslims and Kurmis in Madhya Pradesh; Muslims, Dalits, Sahus and Kurmis in Chhattisgarh; Muslims, Adivasis, Kammas and Kappas in Andhra Pradesh; Muslims, Adivasis, Reddy and Velmas in Telangana; Muslims, Adivasis, Rajputs and Jat in Rajasthan; Muslims, Adivasis, Neo-Buddhists and Dhangar in Maharashtra. The rationale behind conducting the interviews of selected communities in the booster was to include the perspective of the dominant communities as well as to include the perception of the communities that are not adequately represented in the respective states.

### Research instruments

**Questionnaire:** The questionnaire was carefully designed and was in the language mainly spoken in the respondents' state. The translation process was carefully monitored, so that a question in one state did not have a different meaning in another. Most questions were well structured, with few exceptions of open ended questions. The questionnaire was based on six broad themes:

citizen perception and state Institutions, delivery of public services, economic policy and governance, identity, corruption, and consciousness.

**Fieldwork manual:** A Fieldwork manual has been specially designed for field investigators with general instructions in how to conduct standard interviews. It also contains question specific instructions explaining skips patterns in questions and probing levels for right responses. The manual also have numerical codes for background variables like education, occupation, caste etc. with pre codes for some open-ended questions.

### Training

**Training workshop:** A day training workshop is organized before the survey fieldwork starts at various places in the state to train the field investigators (FIs) and supervisors who carry out the fieldwork operations. State coordinators conduct an intensive and interactive workshop for training field investigators on conducting face-to-face interview based on the questionnaire. The investigators undergo an orientation programme and train rigorously about interviewing techniques and communications with the respondents. A comprehensive and detailed interviewing guide, designed on the basis of the questionnaire and survey methodology, is prepared for the interviewers.

### Field work

**Procedures:** The interviews of the selected electors are conducted at their residence or place of work. Field investigators on meeting the respondents explain the purpose of the interview, establish their identity and inform them about the expected research output of the study. The field investigators conduct the interview of the selected respondent in face-to-face interaction using the questionnaires designed for this purpose. The investigators follow the standard and accepted practices of fieldwork and information collected are kept strictly confidential.

### Data processing

**Data coding & cleaning:** All questionnaires were manually screened for consistency and quality check. The questionnaire had codes (of pre-coded questions) that were used for data punching. A team was constituted for data checking which

**Table A1: Distribution of the achieved sample**

	Assembly constituencies	Polling station	Targeted sample	Achieved sample
Andhra Pradesh	22	88	2640	2108
Bihar	22	88	2640	1956
Madhya Pradesh	22	88	2640	2073
Maharashtra	22	88	2640	2122
Rajasthan	22	88	2640	2099
Jharkhand	22	88	2640	2144
Chhattisgarh	22	88	2640	1998
Telangana	22	88	2640	2180
<b>All</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>704</b>	<b>21120</b>	<b>16680</b>

Note: All figures are in percentages.

**Table A1: Distribution of the achieved sample**

	Women		Urban		Dalit		Adivasi		Muslim	
	Census 2011	Survey								
Andhra Pradesh	49.9	50	29.6	24.8	16.4	19.5	5.1	3.4	9.6	8.2
Bihar	47.9	46.8	11.3	12.2	15.9	14.4	1.3	1.2	16.9	13.1
Chhattisgarh	49.8	46.3	23.2	15.3	12.8	15.8	30.6	28.9	2.0	1.8
Jharkhand	48.7	46.1	24	27.4	12	12.1	26.2	30.1	14.5	12.7
Madhya Pradesh	48.2	45.3	27.6	31.2	15.6	14.1	21.1	17.3	6.6	5.4
Maharashtra	48.2	48	45.2	44.5	11.8	20.1	9.3	1.8	11.5	7.8
Rajasthan	48.1	40.8	24.9	23.6	17.8	15.7	13.4	10.8	9.1	6.6
Telangana	--	46.4		43.8	14.9	19	8.8	9.1	--	11.5

Note: All figures are in percent.

checked the code and made corrections if there was any mistake made by investigators while filling the code.

**Data entry & analysis:** Codes on the questionnaire are punched into an electronic database. Punched data are then edited through a specially written edit program, which checks for eligibility criteria, range and logic errors.

The fieldwork of the study was coordinated by Dr. Rakesh Ranjan in Bihar, Profesor Harishwar Dayal in Jharkhand, Professor Yatindra Singh Sisodia in Madhya Pradesh, Professor Anupama Saxena in Chhhattisgarh, Professor E. Venkatesu in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, Prof. Sanjay Lodha in Rajsthan and Dr. Nitin Birmal and Professor Rajeshwari Despande in Maharashtra.



**Q4.** How hopeful do you feel about the way things are going in the country these days - very hopeful, somewhat hopeful or not at all hopeful?

1. Very hopeful      2. Somewhat hopeful      3. Not at all hopeful      8. Don't know/DK

**Q5.** In your opinion, what is the most important issue facing India today? (*Record the answer & consult the codebook for coding*) \_\_\_\_\_ **98.** Don't Know

**Q6.** Now I am going to name a few Central Government schemes and programmes which Central government has initiated for the benefit of the people. Have you or your family ever availed any benefit of Central government schemes?

	Benefitted	Not Benefitted	Not Heard	No Response
a. Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana	1	2	3	8
b. Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana	1	2	3	8
c. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)	1	2	3	8
d. Pradhan Mantri Jan Aushadhi Yojana	1	2	3	8

**Q7.** If you ever have difficulty in getting an important work done, whom will you first think of approaching for help? (*Do NOT read answer categories*)

01. MP      02. MLA   03. Councillor/sarpanch      04. Government official  
 05. Local political leader      06. Caste leader   07. Religious leader      08. Elder outside family  
 09. Dalal's/Touts      10. NGO's      11. Any other \_\_\_\_\_      98. DK

**Q8.** Based on your experience, how easy or difficult was it to obtain the following services - was it very easy, easy, difficult or very difficult?

	Very Easy	Easy	Difficult	Very difficult	Never tried	DK
a. Admission in a Govt. school for a child.	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. Medical treatment at a nearby Govt. hospital.	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. Garbage collection.	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. Electricity connection.	1	2	3	4	5	8
e. Water connection.	1	2	3	4	5	8

**Q9.** Total No. of family members living in the household: Above 18 years: \_\_\_\_\_ Below 18 years : \_\_\_\_\_ (*If more than 9, Code 9*)

**Q10.** (*If below 18 years*) Do your children go to government school or private school?

1. Government School      2. Private school  
 3. Some schooling from government schools and some from private schools  
 4. Few children go to government schools and few go to private school  
 5. Does not go to school any more      6. No children of school going age      9. NA

**Q10a.** *(If respondent answers with 1, 2, 3 or 4)* What are the reasons for current choice of school for your child? *(Check all applicable)* Yes No DK NA

- a. It is closer than other schools 2 1 8 9
- b. It is more affordable than other schools 2 1 8 9
- c. It has better facilities compared to other schools 2 1 8 9
- d. It has better teachers compared to other schools 2 1 8 9
- e. It has better discipline compared to other schools 2 1 8 9
- f. It has mid-day meal scheme 2 1 8 9
- g. It is the only school here 2 1 8 9

**Q10b.** *(If child does not go to school any more)* Grade/class completed before discontinuance/dropping out? \_\_\_\_\_ 99. NA

**Q11.** If you had a choice, would you send your child to a private school or a government school?

1. Private School      2. Government School      8. Don't Know/Can't Say

**Q12.** I will read out a few statements that people often make about getting work done in government offices. Please tell me which statement you agree with **the most?** *(If no answer then code 8)*

- 1. Proper documents and information are not enough, proper connections/networks are important to get work done in a government office/department.
- 2. Proper documents and information are not enough, bribes are important to get work done in a government office/department
- 3. It is possible to get work done in a government office, if one has all documents and information, without paying bribe or having connection/network

**Q13.** On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely unpatriotic and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely patriotic, On which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? **SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN** *(If no answer is given code 98)*

	Extremely unpatriotic	Extremely patriotic
a. Muslims	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
b. Christians	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
c. Hindus	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
d. Sikhs	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	

**Q14.** How much trust do you have in the following institutions – a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, not at all trust?

	A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not very much trust	Not at all trust	DK
a. President	1	2	3	4	8
b. Prime Minister	1	2	3	4	8
c. Chief Minister	1	2	3	4	8

**Q15.** And what about these institutions... how much trust do you have in them?

	A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not very much trust	Not at all trust	DK
a. Parliament	1	2	3	4	8
b. State Assembly (Vidhan Sabha)	1	2	3	4	8
c. Gram Pachayat/Nagar Palika (MCD)	1	2	3	4	8

**Q16.** I will now name few more government officials.. Please tell me how much trust do you have in them: a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, not at all trust?

	A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not very much trust	Not at all trust	DK
a. District Collector	1	2	3	4	8
b. Tehsildar	1	2	3	4	8

**Q17.** How much trust do you have in the following institutions?

	A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK
a. The military/National Army	1	2	3	4	8
b. Election Commission	1	2	3	4	8
c. Political Parties	1	2	3	4	8

**Q18.** The government should punish those who do not say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” at public functions. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether ‘fully’ or ‘somewhat’ agree or disagree*)

1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know

**Q19.** Now I am going to name a few schemes and programmes which have been launched by Andhra Pradesh government for the benefit of the people. Have you or your family ever availed any benefit of these schemes? **Benefitted Not benefitted Not heard No response**

- a. Raythu Ratham 1 2 3 8      b. Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana-NTR Nagar Scheme 1 2 3 8  
 c. Swasta vidyavahini 1 2 3 8      d. Unemployment Allowance scheme 1 2 3 8  
 e. AP NTR Videshividyardharana 1 2 3 8

**Q20.** People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote dictatorship over democracy in India. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*)

1. Fully Agree    2. Somewhat Agree    3. Somewhat Disagree    4. Fully Disagree    8. Don't know

**Q21.** On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely lazy and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely hardworking, On which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? *SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)*

	Extremely Lazy	Extremely hardworking
a. Dalits/SCs	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
b. Adivasis/STs	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
c. Upper Caste	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
d. Kamma	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
e. Kappu	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	

**Q22.** How worried do you feel about the way things are going in the country these days - very worried, somewhat worried, or not at all worried?

1. Very worried      2. Somewhat worried      3. Not at all worried      8. DK

**Q23.** How much trust do you have in police - a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much or not at all?

1. A great deal of trust      2. Quite a lot of trust      3. Not very much      4. Not at all  
 8. Don't know

**Q24.** In the last 2-3 years have you or your family ever been in a situation where you needed to contact the police, or the police contacted you?

2. Yes      1. No      8. DK

**Q24a.** (*If yes*) Did they come to your home/workplace or did you go to them?

1. I went to the police station      2. Police came to my home/workplace  
 3. They called me      8. DK      9. Not Applicable/NA

**Q25.** There are different reasons why people avoid interacting with the police, even when they have been in situations where they could have interacted with the police. Please tell me about your self, what was the **main reason** for you or your family for not interacting with the police? (*Don't read out answer categories*)

- 01. Problem could be resolved by community elders
- 02. Lawyers/ friends. associates suggested not to go to police
- 03. Didn't go to police, because it complicates the matter
- 04. Previous experience with police was bad
- 05. Police is not fair to everyone
- 06. Police extracts money
- 07. It is not good for the family name and prestige to be involved with the police
- 08. There is No Point in going to the police
- 09. Never gone/contacted police
- 10. Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_ 98. DK

**Q26.** I am now going to read out some statements about the police and the nature of the decisions made by them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (*Probe further whether strongly or somewhat agree or disagree*).

	Agree		Disagree		DK
	Strongly	Some-what	Some-what	Strongly	
a. If a citizen were to report a crime to the police, quick action would be taken.	1	2	3	4	8
b. The police in the state generally take bribes.	1	2	3	4	8
c. The decisions made by the police are unduly influenced by political parties/politicians.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Police generally treats people with respect.	1	2	3	4	8

**Q27.** Now I will read out a few situations of people from different social backgrounds going to the police. Which group do you think the police will treat better? (*Ask questions one by one*)

- a. A Rich person or a Poor person?    **1.** Rich            **2.** Poor            **3.** Both treated same    **8.** DK
- b. An Upper caste or a Dalit?            **1.** Upper caste    **2.** Dalit            **3.** Both treated same    **8.** DK
- c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu?            **1.** Hindu            **2.** Non-Hindu    **3.** Both treated same    **8.** DK
- d. A Man and a Woman?                **1.** Man            **2.** Woman        **3.** Both treated same    **8.** DK

**Q28.** The government should punish those who eat beef/cow meat. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)

- 1. Fully Agree    2. Somewhat Agree    3. Somewhat Disagree    4. Fully Disagree    8. DK



**Q34.** The government should punish those who don't stand for national anthem at public places. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'some what' agree or disagree*)  
 1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree 4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know

**Q35.** How much trust do you have in government officials - a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much or not at all?  
 1. A great deal of trust 2. Quite a lot of trust 3. Not very much  
 4. Not at all 8. Don't know

**Q36.** In the past two years have you or your family contacted a government officials to resolve matter/ dispute?  
 2. Yes 1. No 8. DK

**Q37.** I am now going to read out some statements about the government officials and the nature of the decisions taken by them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (*Probe further whether strongly or somewhat agree or disagree*).

	Agree		Disagree		DK
	Strong-ly	Some-what	Some-what	Strong-ly	

a. If a citizen approached with a problem, quick action would be taken.	1	2	3	4	8
b. The government officials in the state generally take bribes.	1	2	3	4	8
c. The decisions taken by the government officials are unduly influenced by political parties/politicians.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Government officials generally treats people with respect.	1	2	3	4	8

**Q38.** Now I will read out a few situations of people from different social backgrounds going to the government officials. Which group do you think the government officials will treat better? (*Ask questions one by one*)

a. A Rich person or a Poor person?	1. Rich	2. Poor	3. Both treated same	8. DK
b. An Upper caste or a Dalit?	1. Upper caste	2. Dalit	3. Both treated same	8. DK
c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu?	1. Hindu	2. Non-Hindu	3. Both treated same	8. DK
d. A Man and a Woman?	1. Man	2. Woman	3. Both treated same	8. DK

**Q39.** I will name few forums through which it is possible to resolve a dispute between you and another party. Could you please tell me which one of these forums you will most likely to go to resolve the following disputes? Family Neighbourhood/ Caste/Community NGO Police Court DK member village elder organization

a. Property dispute 1 2 3 4 5 6 8	b. Marriage dispute 1 2 3 4 5 6 8
c. Neighbourhood dispute 1 2 3 4 5 6 8	d. Domestic violence 1 2 3 4 5 6 8



**Q44.** People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are making fun of religious communities other than their own. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*)

1. Fully Agree            2. Somewhat Agree        3. Somewhat Disagree  
4. Fully Disagree        8. Don't know

**Q45.** On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely violent and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely peaceful, on which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? *SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)*

	Extremely violent	Extremely peaceful
a. Dalits/SCs	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
b. Adivasis/STs	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
c. Upper Caste	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
d. Kamma	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
e. Kappu	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
f. Muslims	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
g. Christians	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
h. Hindus	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	
i. Sikhs	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	

**Q46.** People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are criticizing elected leaders. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*)

1. Fully Agree    2. Somewhat Agree    3. Somewhat Disagree    4. Fully Disagree    8. Don't know

**Q47.** How regularly do you do the following for News – daily, sometimes, rarely or never?

	Daily	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	DK
a. Watch Doordarshan	1	2	3	4	8
b. Watch Private News Channels	1	2	3	4	8
c. Watch Local language television channel	1	2	3	4	8
d. Read Hindi Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
e. Read English Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
f. Read Local language newspaper	1	2	3	4	8

**Q48.** How much trust do you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not a lot of trust or no trust at all?

	Great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not a lot of trust	No trust at all	DK
a. Doordarshan	1	2	3	4	8
b. Private News Channels	1	2	3	4	8
c. Local language television channel	1	2	3	4	8
d. Hindi Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
e. English Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
f. Local language newspaper	1	2	3	4	8

**Q49.** Of the different sources of information such as TV, newspaper, internet and radio, which source would you refer to **first** for reliable and accurate information?

1. TV                      2. Newspaper                      3. Internet  
4. Radio                      5. All                      6. None                      8. DK

**Q50.** People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they are promoting violence against people from other communities. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree*)

1. Fully Agree                      2. Somewhat Agree                      3. Somewhat Disagree  
4. Fully Disagree                      8. Don't know

**Q51.** When we ask people how they would identify themselves, some say they are only Telugu and others feel they are only Indian. While some feel they are more Telugu and less Indian and other feel they are more Indian and less Telugu. How do you identify yourself?

1. Only Telugu                      2. Only Indian                      3. More Telugu less Indian  
4. More Indian less Telugu                      5. Both equally                      8. DK

**Q52.** Suppose there are two leaders from same political party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your **caste** while the other from a different caste. Whom would you be willing to contact first?

1. Leader from same caste                      2. Leader from different caste  
3. Will not make any difference                      8. DK

**Q53.** Suppose there are two leaders from same political party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your **religion** while the other from a different religion. Whom would you be willing to contact first?

1. Leader from same religion                      2. Leader from different religion  
3. Will not make any difference                      8. DK

- Q54.** Some people feel it is acceptable to speak in any language in public places while others feel that people should speak only in the local language in public places. What is your opinion on this issue?
1. Speak any language                      2. Speak local language                      8. Can't say
- Q55.** People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they promote the use of violence against the Indian state. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (**Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree**)
1. Fully Agree                      2. Somewhat Agree                      3. Somewhat Disagree  
4. Fully Disagree                      8. DK
- Q56.** In many parts of India, large parts of agricultural and forest land are acquired to build a factory, a road, railway lines, bus stand, airport, pipelines, dams. Often local villagers protest against these acquisitions: Now, I am going to read out pairs of statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with the most.
- (1) Local villagers/landowners should give up their land in the larger interest of development.  
(2) The government should be allowed to use force to displace local villagers/landowners.
1. Agree with one (1)                      2. Agree with two (2)                      8. No Opinion
- a.
- (1) Local villagers/landowners should be allowed to resist the government by violent methods.  
(2) Local villagers/landowners should be allowed to continue their protest in a peaceful manner.
- b.
1. Agree with one (1)                      2. Agree with two (2)                      8. No Opinion
- (1) Disputes over land between the government and local villagers/landowners should be settled by the court.  
(2) The courts have no role to play in these disputes over land between the government and the local villagers/landowners.
1. Agree with one (1)                      2. Agree with two (2)                      8. No Opinion
- Q57.** The government should punish individuals or groups that use violence or violent means against others in the name of cow protection . Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (**Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree**)
1. Fully Agree 2. Somewhat Agree 3. Somewhat Disagree  
4. Fully Disagree 8. Don't know
- Q58.** How would you describe your social class? Are you in the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?
1. Lower class                      2. Working class                      3. Middle class                      4. Upper class                      8. DK

**Q59.** Compared to your parents, do you think it is easy or hard for you to move up the income ladder? *(Probe whether a great deal easier, moderately easier or a great deal harder or moderately harder)*

1. A great deal easier                      2. Moderately easier                      3. A great deal harder  
4. Moderately harder                      5. Neither easier nor harder 8. DK

**Q60.** People should be allowed to express their opinion freely even if they demand independence for a certain part of India. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? *(Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)*

1. Fully Agree                      2. Somewhat Agree                      3. Somewhat Disagree  
4. Fully Disagree                      8. Don't know

**Q61.** I am now going to read out some statements about men and women and their place in the family. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. *(Probe further whether 'strongly' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)*

	Agree	Disagree	DK	Strongly Somewhat	Somewhat Strongly
a. A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work.	1	2	3	4	8
b. It is up to women to decide whom to get married to.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Educating boys is more important than educating girls.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Men should be paid more than women even if it's the same job.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Women should have 50% reservations in all jobs.	1	2	3	4	8
f. Women should have the right to decide to get married or not.	1	2	3	4	8
g. Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing.	1	2	3	4	8

**Q62.** Sexual relationship between two men or two women should be accepted in society. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? *(Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agree or disagree)*

1. Fully Agree                      2. Somewhat Agree                      3. Somewhat Disagree  
4. Fully Disagree                      8. Don't know

**Q63.** How safe are women in this city (city/town/village) in the following situations? Would you say that women are safe or unsafe? *(Probe further whether 'very' or 'somewhat' safe or unsafe)*

	Safe	Unsafe	DK	Very Somewhat	Somewhat Very
a. When they go out after sunset.	1	2	3	4	8
b. How safe are women at the place where they work.	1	2	3	4	8
c. How safe are women from beating etc. (maar/pit) from their family members inside their home.	1	2	3	4	8

## Background Data

### Personal Information

**Z1.** Now let us talk about this village/ town you live in. How long have you lived here? (If not all life, probe for number of years lived here)

1. Less than 5 years      2. 5 to 10 years      3. More than 10 years      4. Entire life

**Z1a.** (*If Not all life*) Where did you come from?

Name of State: \_\_\_\_\_ 99. Not answer

**Z2.** Occupation? (*Record exactly and consult codebook & if retired, try to ascertain his/her previous occupation. If student or housewife, then note down that as well*)

**a.** What is your Occupation? \_\_\_\_\_ **98.** No response

**b.** What is your mother's occupation? \_\_\_\_\_ **98.** No response

**c.** What is your father's occupation? \_\_\_\_\_ **98.** No response

**Z3.** How is payment for your work calculated? Do you have an hourly wage, a daily wage, fixed weekly salary, or a fixed monthly salary or is it calculated some other way?

1. Hourly wage      2. Fixed daily wage      3. Fixed weekly salary

4. Fixed monthly monthly      5. In an other way      6. I am not working

8. Don't know

**Z4.** What is your Caste/Jati-biradari/Tribe name? \_\_\_\_\_  
(*Consult code book for code*)

**Z4a.** And what is your caste group? (*Double check and consult code book*)

1. Scheduled Caste (SC)      2. Scheduled Tribe (ST)

3. Other Backward Classes (OBC)      4. Other



d. Computer/laptop	1	2
e. Washing machine/Microwave/Fridge	1	2
f. Fan/Cooler	1	2
g. TV	1	2
h. Mobile phone	1	2
i. LPG gas	1	2
j. Motorised pumping set for irrigation	1	2
k. Tractor	1	2
l. Handpump inside the house	1	2
m. Power back up (Invertor/Generator, etc.)	1	2

**Z10.** Livestock **Total Number**

a. Goat /sheep/pig: -----

b. Cow/Oxen /buffalo/Camel: -----

c. Any other: -----

**Z11.** Total monthly household income - putting together the income of all members of the household? *(Record exact amount in Rupees. If respondent does not give any amount then record 000000) Mobile/ Telephone number of the respondent*-----

## 6.C. Institutions to approach for settling disputes

**Table 6.C.1: Preference for institution for settling property dispute by class**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Poor	39	32	10	1	5	9	4
Lower	39	27	9	1	9	11	4
Middle	41	27	8	1	9	12	3
Upper	47	23	6	1	9	12	4

**Table 6.C.2: Preference for institution for settling marriage dispute by class**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Poor	35	34	15	1	7	5	4
Lower	36	31	15	1	9	5	4
Middle	37	30	16	1	7	5	3
Upper	45	25	13	1	7	6	3

**Table 6.C.3: Preference for institution for settling neighbourhood dispute by class**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Poor	18	50	10	2	13	2	5
Lower	18	45	11	3	17	3	4
Middle	18	48	9	3	16	4	3
Upper	22	40	7	3	19	5	4

**Table 6.C.4: Preference for institution for settling dispute related to domestic violence by class**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Poor	47	24	8	2	13	2	5
Lower	41	22	8	3	17	4	5
Middle	43	21	8	2	15	5	5
Upper	44	16	6	3	19	7	5

**Table 6.C.5a: Preference for institution for settling property dispute by level of educational attainment**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Non Literate	40	30	10	1	7	7	5
Upto Primary	38	31	8	1	8	10	4
Upto Matric	40	28	9	1	8	11	3
College and above	44	24	6	1	8	13	3

**Table 6.C.5b: Preference for institution for settling marriage dispute by level of educational attainment**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Non Literate	35	32	17	1	7	4	5
Upto Primary	36	33	15	1	7	5	3
Upto Matric	38	30	15	1	7	5	4
College and above	41	29	13	1	7	6	3

**Table 6.C.5c: Preference for institution for settling neighbourhood dispute by level of educational attainment**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Non Literate	17	52	10	2	13	2	5
Upto Primary	18	49	9	3	15	3	4
Upto Matric	18	46	9	3	16	4	4
College and above	20	43	9	3	17	4	3

**Table 6.C.5d: Preference for institution for settling dispute related to domestic violence by level of educational attainment**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Non Literate	44	23	8	2	13	3	6
Upto Primary	45	21	7	3	15	4	5
Upto Matric	43	22	8	3	15	5	5
College and above	45	19	7	3	18	5	4

**Table 6.C.6a: Preference for institution for settling property dispute by locality**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Rural	38	31	10	1	7	10	4
Urban	48	21	5	1	9	12	4

**Table 6.C.6b: Preference for institution for settling marriage dispute by locality**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Rural	35	33	16	1	7	5	4
Urban	44	25	13	1	7	6	4

**Table 6.C.6c: Preference for institution for settling neighbourhood dispute by locality**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Rural	18	50	10	3	13	2	4
Urban	20	40	7	3	21	5	4

**Table 6.C.6d: Preference for institution for settling dispute related to domestic violence by locality**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Rural	46	24	8	3	13	3	5
Urban	40	14	7	2	22	8	6

**Table 6.C.7a: Preference for institution for settling property dispute by gender**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Male	40	28	9	1	8	11	3
Female	41	28	8	1	7	10	4

**Table 6.C.7b: Preference for institution for settling marriage dispute by gender**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Male	36	32	15	1	7	5	3
Female	39	30	14	1	7	5	4

**Table 6.C.7c: Preference for institution for settling neighbourhood dispute by gender**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Male	17	48	10	3	16	3	4
Female	20	47	9	3	14	3	4

**Table 6.C.7d: Preference for institution for settling dispute related to domestic violence by gender**

	Family Member	Neighbourhood / Village Elder	Caste / Community Organization	NGO	Police	Court	DK
Male	43	21	8	3	16	4	5
Female	45	21	7	3	14	4	6

## 6.D. State Schemes asked in Survey

### A) Agriculture Schemes in states

Andhra Pradesh	Raythu Ratham (2017)-tractors and some implements will be distributed to small and marginal farmers
Bihar	Mukhyamantri Tivra Beej Vistar Yojana (2017)-will provide farmers with seeds at half the price for tehlani pulse crops
Madhya Pradesh	Mukhyamantri Bhavantar Bhugtan Yojana (2017)-to provide compensation whenever the price of the produce falls below the minimum price
Maharashtra	Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Shetkari Sanman Yojana (2017)-Loan Waiver Scheme for farmers
Rajasthan	Agriculture Produce Deposit Loan Scheme
Jharkhand	Attract Rural Youth in Agriculture (ARYA) scheme (2017)-aims to bring a green revolution in the state and will attract youth in agriculture by making them skilled and self dependent in agriculture.
Chhattisgarh	Saur Sujala Yojana (2016)-provide powered irrigation pumps to farmers at subsidized price
Telangana	Crop Investment Subsidy Scheme (2017)-farmers will get Rs.4000 per acre to buy fertilizers

### B) Housing schemes in states

Andhra Pradesh	PMAY-NTR Nagar Scheme-1.93 lakh houses to be made for urban poor. AP Housing dept aim is that no poor household would be left with a pucca house
Bihar	Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY-G) Gramin in Bihar
Madhya Pradesh	Atal Ashraya Yojana (2016)-20 housing schemes have been sanctioned, a loan subsidy will also be given to the beneficiaries
Maharashtra	Ramai Awas Yojna state give financial help to build housing for the poor rural people of below poverty line SC is the primary object of this project.

Rajasthan	Mukhyamantri Jan Awas yojna (2015)-aim to achieve housing for all and provide housing to the EWS and LIG
Jharkhand	Jharkhand Birsa Awas Yojana (2017)-aim to provide houses for primitive tribes of the state
Chhattisgarh	Housing Board- Atal Vihar Yojana-different kinds of flats for economically weaker sections
Telangana	2BHK Housing Scheme-2.60 lakh affordable houses are to be made available

### C) Employment Scheme: MGNREGA and State Employment Scheme

Andhra Pradesh	No employment scheme exist while survey was being conducted
Bihar	Mukhyamantri Shram Shakti Yojana(2017)-provide training and financial assistance in the form of low interest loans to the unemployed
Madhya Pradesh	Mukhyamantri Yuva Swarozgar Yojana (2014)-help get loans from banks to set up small businesses
Maharashtra	<i>Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme</i>
Rajasthan	Mukhyamantri Kaushal Anudaan Yojana Loan Scheme for Skill Development Training
Jharkhand	Udyami Sakhi Mandal Yojana (2017)-will provide financial assistance to women who want to set up their own small business,
Chhattisgarh	Mukhyamantri Rojgar Srujan Karyakram (2017)-to provide easy loans to youth to set up their own businesses
Telangana	Self Employment scheme (2016)-government will give subsidy for setting up small businesses

### D) Health schemes in states

Andhra Pradesh	Swasta vidyavahini (2016)-under this scheme, nutritious foods will be distributed to school students across the state, nearly 45000 medical students and other from the nursing stream will go from place to place spreading awareness and create a health data base of the people.
Bihar	Mukhyamantri Chikitsa Sahayta Kosh Yojana (2017)- poor patients can avail healthcare with more ease, covers patients with incurable diseases as well, government will pay medical expenses to follow up with the treatment as well,
Madhya Pradesh	Deen Dayal Antyoday Upchar Yojana (2004)- provide free healthcare to poor families
Maharashtra	Medicine Mahatma Jyotiba Phule Jan Arogya Yojana- Originally it was called Rajiv Gandhi Jeevanadyayee Yojana but in 2016 RGJY was restructured as launched as MJPJAY. It provides medical cover for BPL and other lower income groups holding ration cards etc.
Rajasthan	Bhamashah Swasthya Bima Yojana Rajasthan Udyami Sakhi Mandal Yojana (2017)-will provide financial assistance to women who want to set up their own small business,
Jharkhand	Mukhyamantri Health Insurance scheme(2017)-people from BPL to APL will be insured under this scheme
Chhattisgarh	Chirayu Yojana(2014)-free health screening to children till the age of 18, under the National Child Health Programme
Telangana	Aarogyasri scheme(2015)-community health insurance scheme, provides financial protection to BPL families (includes employees health scheme)

### E) Education schemes in states

Andhra Pradesh	AP NTR Videshvidyadharana (2017)-financial assistance will be given to selected students of Backward communities for studying overseas, coaching for competitive exams is also given to those who cannot afford
Bihar	Bihar Student Credit Card Scheme
Madhya Pradesh	Mukhyamantri Medhavi Vidyarthi Yojana(2017)-scholarship scheme for meritorious 12th grade students in MP.
Maharashtra	Rajarshi Shahu Maharaj Fee Pratipurthi Yojana
Rajasthan	Mukhyamantri Nishulk Coaching Yojana(2017)-will provide free coaching to students to take admission in the IITs,IIMs, law and national medical institutions
Jharkhand	Loan scheme for SC/ST students(2017)-will give loans to those SC/ST students who want to pursue higher education
Chhattisgarh	Saraswati Cycle yojna(2005)-free cycles are given to SC,ST,BPL girls enrolled in 9th class/ Student Insurance Plan
Chhattisgarh	Chirayu Yojana(2014)-free health screening to children till the age of 18, under the National Child Health Programme
Telangana	Aarogyasri scheme(2015)-community health insurance scheme, provides financial protection to BPL families (includes employees health scheme)





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