


SOCIETY & POLITICS BETWEEN ELECTIONS

————— A REPORT - 2017 —————



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
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States Surveyed





1. Introduction

The problems of India's development and governance are routinely linked to the logic of India's electoral democracy. As a result, a great deal is known about elections, but paradoxically our knowledge of politics and society between elections is relatively underdeveloped. As much as anything else, development and governance outcomes are shaped by how the government functions between elections: including, how it relates to citizens on a regular basis; how it provides routine public services to them; and how public order is maintained. Further, governance process are nested in the social and political relationships between citizens inter se and with government functionaries.

Elections are episodic; governance is routine. Since the mid 1990s, the National Election Studies have systematically researched electoral behavior in India, covering the 1996, 1998, 2004, 2009 and 2014 parliamentary elections (see, for instance, Asian Survey (volume 52, issue 2, 2012), and special issues of Economic and Political Weekly 2004 (51), 2009(39) and 2014 (39)). In addition, numerous State Assembly election studies have also been conducted. These and other studies show that even marginal citizens of India are wooed at the time of elections (Bannerjee, 2014; Ahuja and Chhibber, 2012). But what happens to state-citizen interaction once elections are over?

The normal assumption is that a great deal of distance marks state-citizen interaction between elections. What is the nature of this distance? In what way do political actors engage or disengage with citizens? In what ways does the bureaucracy step into this void? What explains the distance between political actors and citizens in everyday governance? Is the state closer to its citizens in some parts of India, but not in others? Which classes and groups are served better? Equally, how do different groups of citizen view the state and do such perceptions differ in different parts of the country? Our current insights into these questions are based on studies in specific parts of India and in particular fields of citizen–state interaction (Gupta, 2012). There is an urgent need to go broader and study nationwide governance patterns across a whole range of issues.

The Electoral and the non-electoral

Let us begin with our knowledge of elections. What has the voluminous electoral data taught us? Many things can be said, but to appreciate its distinctive contribution, consider just one example. We now know for sure that since the late 1980s and early 1990s—the economically poorer, the lower castes and the less educated citizens of India—have voted as much as, or more than, the economically richer, the upper castes and the more educated (Yadav, 2000). One should, however, note that in the 2014 elections, the middle classes returned to the election booth in a big way (Sridharan, 2014). But we will have to wait till the 2019 and 2024 general elections to know whether this is a new trend breaking away from the one established in 1989. Democratic theory, developed and tested in the West, has always said the opposite: the more educated and the richer citizens vote more than the less educated and the poorer (Verba and Nie, 1972).

This Indian defiance of a basic canon of democratic theory is grounded in robust empirical evidence. Since the mid-1990s, Lokniti, an all-India network of social scientists with its headquarters at Delhi's Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), has regularly produced data at the parliamentary and state level. They conclusively demonstrate that in voting, if nothing else, India's democracy has developed an unmistakable plebian bent. The body of data generated by the Lokniti-CSDS

collaboration, spanning units in each state, has led to articles in newspapers and journals as well as books (Jaffrelot and Kumar, 2009; Chhibber, 2014; Thachil, 2014). In addition, articles have regularly appeared in *The Hindu*, *Indian Express* and *Economic and Political Weekly*. By now, Lokniti data has become the benchmark of electoral research in India and the developing world, and the insights such data has generated have shaped our understanding and knowledge of Indian elections.

No systematic nationwide studies have been undertaken about politics and society between elections. Lokniti did conduct surveys on a national basis that did not coincide with the electoral cycle: for example, a study entitled *State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA)* in 2005 and 2013, as also its *State of the Nation Surveys* in 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 (www.lokniti.org). Other sources of survey data - for example, the National Sample Survey (NSS) and National Family Health Survey (NFHS) - deal with economic matters and demographic information such as consumption, employment, maternal health and reproductive behavior.

However, we still don't know enough about which social groups (castes, tribes, religious communities, classes, gender) get better public services (water, sanitation, roads, electricity, irrigation, education, medical care); which groups does the police protect, and which ones it does not, in times of need; in which states, marginal groups face less discrimination from government agencies and fellow citizens than in other states; which states do a better job of providing public services? These questions are at the heart of a fuller understanding of the problems of everyday governance and development in India.

Some have indeed studied the failure of government schools, for example in Bihar (Muralidharan and Prakash, 2013) or the relative success of government health services, for example, in Tamil Nadu (Dasgupta et. al., 2010). But our basic point remains: our knowledge of such matters - for India as a whole, at the state-level, or urban-rural variations, as well as variation across policy domains - is meagre. To generate such knowledge we need a data gathering effort that allows a nationwide understanding of everyday development and governance.

The key issues

Substantively, the following sorts of issues, directly addressing governance, development and public policy, are of great relevance here. An illustrative list of enquiries is set out below:

(a) Delivery of public services and public order:

What communities receive what sorts of public services (for example, education, health and sanitation, power, transport, irrigation)? What are the mechanisms that promote or hinder service delivery? In what ways are services unevenly distributed across space? What roles do political agents and/or community engagement play in service delivery? What strategies do citizens deploy to engage with the state? What are the state-level and urban-rural variations?

(b) Identity and consciousness: What are the primary identities – national, sub-national, religious, caste, urban-rural – in different parts of the country? Are urban identities different from rural identities? Is the South different from the North in the way caste and religious identities are experienced and expressed? How do religious, caste and linguistic identities interact? Which one becomes dominant in which part of the country and how?

(c) Discrimination and violence: Which communities face discrimination from the state and/or fellow citizens? Which ones face violence from the state and/or fellow citizens? Is there a state-level difference? Is there an urban-rural difference? For instance, Ambedkar had famously argued that the village is a cesspool for Dalits in particular (and, arguably, for lower castes in general) and the city would offer them a better life. Is that true? Which states provide evidence for Ambedkar's claim, and which ones do not? Similarly, in which states do minorities face acute deprivation? Is there a relationship between discrimination by state authorities and discrimination by fellow citizens?

(d) Citizen perception of state institutions:

How do citizens perceive state institutions and their capacity to govern? Does this vary by social category? To what extent do citizens trust the (a) legislature (b) executive (c) judiciary (d) bureaucracy and (e) police (f) army? Do citizens relate to parts of the state machinery – different departments and across hierarchies – differently? Is there a state level or urban-rural variation in

perceptions? These questions are centrally related to the legitimacy of the state and the citizens' sense of belonging.

(e) Economic process and governance: How is economic regulation by the state experienced by citizens? Do traders, hawkers, and street vendors face harassment, by whom and of what kind? How do citizens secure building and business approvals from the state? What are citizen attitudes toward taxation? Are there varying levels of corruption in government-business and farmer-government interface in different states? Which states are better and how? How do citizens relate to global economic networks? How do they understand the impact of global forces on their lives? Does this vary from state to state and city to city? What are the emerging forms of governance as previously agricultural labour shifts to industry? In what ways do economic communities engage with the state?

The Azim Premji University and Lok Niti will conduct three annual surveys titled 'Politics and Society between Elections' across 24 States and Union Territories. This is the Report of the first survey conducted in 2016 in the States of Karnataka, Gujarat, Haryana and Odisha. In the Chapters below we report a summary of our findings.

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
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2. Social Identity

2. A. Ties that bind: social universe and political networks

Our social identities are produced by our membership in social groups and the perceptions that arise from such membership. Membership in social groups may be ascriptive or acquired with different perceptions of the status and legitimacy. As political theorists have argued, these identities are often unstable and malleable depending on levels of in-group and out-group interaction and shaped by the economic and political contexts in which it is produced.

In this section, we explore the nature of social identity in the four states surveyed. We focus on the two key ascriptive identities that are taken to be the axes of political life in India: caste and religion. Castes form an interlocking system of endogamous groups within Hinduism, and beyond. Caste is often explained as a form of social stratification that arose from interdependence relationships within a village *jajmani* system but continues to determine access to educational and economic opportunity. Ritual and social hierarchies that constitute the caste system affect perceptions of status and dignity that shape perception of dignity and status. Caste identity remains a resilient and decisive force in Indian society and politics over the last century. While there has been significant work on caste based political mobilization and the experience of caste discrimination, there has been less attention paid to the nature of inter-caste association and mingling. In this section, we explore the nature of inter-caste and intra-caste social networks across the four states. We briefly

investigate whether caste identity shapes how members express their political views and relate to the everyday state and governance.

In recent years, religious identity has gained political and social salience relative to all other forms of identity both in India and across the world. While communalism is not a new phenomenon, we have witnessed a further escalation of the fear, suspicion and hatred generated by communalism post-1990s across India. Given that the various communities have 'lived together separately' (Mushirul Hasan and Asim Roy: 2006), it needs to be seen what is the extent of such segregation in terms of forging social and political networks, and the nature of stereotypes that float regarding the 'other' communities. While there has been focused work on religious political mobilization and voting behaviour, there is relatively less understanding of the extent to which religious identity shapes everyday social interactions and political views. By comparing these associations across the four states and in urban and rural settings, this section develops sharp insights into the nature of religious identity in India.

As these results are based on a survey conducted 'between elections', it gives us a sense of social identities during periods of relatively routinised politics and governance. These identities may well become more volatile and polarized around elections. By developing an overarching sense of how inter-caste and inter-religious networks function and shape social relations across rural and urban India between elections we develop what may be a useful baseline to contrast with these relations in other periods. This Chapter gives us some insights into the nature of social capital in India. We ask if trust and cooperation are significantly ordered around caste and religion or relatively unaffected by it? In the light of the discussion on majoritarian nationalism in later chapters, the nature of social and political networks formation around institutions of caste and religion is a critical question for Indian politics.

Social networks across caste, religion and gender

This section throws light on the social worlds inhabited by members of different communities across the four states. As there is a close

relationship between the social and the political, we seek to understand the nature and evolution of sociabilities across caste, religion, gender. This report relies on the survey respondents' perceptions over the kinds of socialities that exist in the society. First, we ask respondents if they have close friendships with individuals from other communities and gender. We then ask separately if the respondent has close friendships with members of other social groups: Dalit, OBC, or a Muslim and so on. As respondents could have close friends from more than one caste or religious group, the total number of close friends of an individual respondent often exceeds one.

Though the question does not illustrate or clarify as to what constitutes 'close friendship', the responses help us identify interesting patterns in the perceptions of social interaction among different castes, religions and gender. We have excluded 'Don't Know' responses unless 25 percent or more of the respondents respond in this manner to the question.

Caste and Tribe Connections

Table 2a.1 reports the responses of members of all communities on the caste background of their close friends. Upper castes and OBCs have most frequently been mentioned as close friends across all states, with the number of OBCs being marginally higher than that of Upper castes. Dalits were reported as friends in significantly high numbers by other castes, but relatively lower than OBCs and Upper caste. However, least number of respondents report an Adivasi to be their close friend. Across the states, the number of respondents who report Adivasi close friends is considerably lower than all other groups. While one may attribute these lower percentages to the lower population of Adivasis in aggregate terms, we must explore levels of inter-mixing across groups as we shall do below. Significantly, there is considerably less variation between those reporting Dalit, OBC and Upper Caste friends across the four states. This consistency however breaks down when we review the responses in each state.

While the highest number of respondents from Odisha report having an Adivasi friend, Haryana reported the lowest number. While these exceptionally high and low numbers from Odisha and Haryana can be partially attributed

Table 2a.1: State-wise reporting of a close friend from various caste groups

	Close friend from Dalit community	Close friend from Adivasi community	Close friend from OBC community	Close friend from Upper caste
Gujarat	54	41	78	68
Haryana	64	5	66	73
Karnataka	66	41	71	63
Odisha	50	56	57	63
All	59	37	68	66

Note: All figures are in percent; since a single respondent could have a close friend from more than one caste group the total does not add up to 100

to demography, Gujarat with a sizable Adivasi population (15%) reports low levels of inter-caste interaction between Adivasis and other castes. The proportion of Gujarat respondents who cite an Adivasi as close friend is lower than those who report a Dalit as a friend, despite the fact that the Adivasi population is more than double the Dalits in the state. This suggests that population alone does not explain variation in the social networks of groups and differences in social engagement may also play a role.


In terms of mentioning Dalits as their close friend, more than half of the respondents answered affirmatively. It is crucial to note that in Karnataka, respondents mentioning that they had Dalits as friends was marginally higher than the number of respondents mentioning upper caste as close friends.

Figure 2a.1 presents a caste-wise break up of this data. Clearly there is a correlation between respective castes and friendships. Across castes and states, most number of respondents have mentioned that they are close friends with people from their own caste. Adivasis here show the propensity of being the community with extremely thick intra-community links with very high number of Adivasi respondents saying that they have close friendships with other Adivasis.

The numbers however, of other castes reporting Adivasis as their close friends plummets sharply. The low number of Adivasis being reported could be a function of lower social and economic mobility among the Adivasis across states whereby they still inhabit spatially bound tribal societies. As all other castes, report upper caste and OBCs as close friends (as evident in Figure 2a.1), this might be a sign of greater social mobility and greater access that these castes enjoy.


Further, when the data is split into rural and urban respondents in order to assess if urbanisation has had an impact on inter-group mixing we notice two significant trends. First, the numbers of Adivasis who claim to have Adivasi close friends declines in urban areas. As fewer Adivasis have moved into urban areas, it appears that their levels of intra group mixing decreases while their inter group mixing is still limited. Secondly, the number of upper castes who declare Dalits as their close friends falls in urban areas. This suggests that we should reexamine the common assumption that cities provide greater possibilities of intermingling across communities. (Figure 2a.2). Urban areas appear to weaken intergroup mixing among and may be recreating higher levels of segregation and ghettoization.

Figure 2a.1: Respondents (by caste groups) who reported a close friend from various caste groups



Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 2a.2: Reporting of a close friend from Dalit and Adivasi communities by location



Note: All figures are in percent.

Religion Connections

Table 2a.2 gives us a sense of how different religious groups have reported other communities as close friends. Hindus have been noted as close friends across all communities owing to their numerically dominant status. Haryana had a miniscule number of respondents who mentioned having Christians as their close friends which mirrors the negligible number of Christians in

Haryana. In Odisha and Gujarat, around one-fifth of the respondents have mentioned having a Christian as a close friend. When asked if one has a Muslim close friend, one-third of the respondents in Gujarat, Haryana and Odisha respond affirmatively, while in Karnataka as many as half the respondents do so. This is despite Muslims being only 13 percent of the population.

Table 2a.2: State-wise reporting of a close friend from various religious groups

	Close friend from Hindu community	Close friend from Muslim community	Close friend from Christian community
Gujarat	93	39	23
Haryana	90	33	7
Karnataka	87	51	36
Odisha	85	32	21
All	89	39	22


Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 2a.3 is a religion wise break-up of respondents from different religions identifying individuals from other religions as close friends. As in the case of caste, large numbers of Hindus and Muslims have mentioned people from their own religions as close friends. While this very high for Hindu respondents, it rises marginally for Muslim respondents. However, Christians show a relatively lower level of intragroup mixing and a higher level of inter religious mixing with Hindus. Significantly, while almost three-fourth of the Muslim respondents have acknowledged having Hindus as close friends, approximately one-third of the Hindu respondents have mentioned Muslim friends. It is unclear if this gap is produced by the

difference in population of the two communities or a difference in perception.


Figure 2a.4 displays variations in group mixing across religions in rural and urban areas. The number of urban Hindu respondents who have Muslim friends is higher compared to rural Hindu respondents. Similarly, friendships between Christians and Muslims increase in urban settings. However, the numbers remain stable for Muslim respondents who mention having Muslims as close friends across rural and urban areas. The relative isolation of Muslim respondents in urban areas may hint at significant constraints on Muslim integration in urban areas as well.

Figure 2a.3: Respondents (based on religion) that reported a close friend from various religious groups



Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 2a.4: Reporting of a close friend from Muslim and Christian communities by location



Note: All figures are in percent.

Gendered publics

In the previous section we saw that personal friendships are influenced by caste and religion. This is even more the case with friendships across gender. Quite like caste and religion, men and women appear to be inhabit exclusively masculine and feminine social worlds.

Table 2a.3 shows whether men or women report close friends from the opposite sex across the four states. Consistently across all four states, the numbers are low with men in Gujarat reporting the largest number of inter-gender friendships. When women are asked about male friendships the numbers drop further with a low of 12 percent of Haryanvi women and a high of 19 per cent of Odisha women acknowledging male friendships. Figure 2a.5 segregates the gender data along

rural and urban respondents. There is a marginal increase in the number of men and women who report close friends from the opposite gender from rural to urban settings, though not as high as one may expect.

Earlier we noticed that the number of respondents from marginalised castes or communities who report friends from the dominant community is significantly higher than the opposite. We suggested that this may be the result of the visibility and overarching presence of the dominant community in the public sphere. In the case of gender however, the overall number of women reporting close friendships with men is lower, which suggests that women's access to the public social spaces remains constricted.

Table 2a.3: State-wise reporting of a close friend from the opposite gender

	Men having close female friend	Women having close male friend
Gujarat	24	14
Haryana	18	12
Karnataka	21	18
Odisha	22	19
All	21	16


Note: All figures are in percent.

In the section above we've explored the nature of inter-group and intra-group interaction across caste, religion and gender lines. In conclusion a few trends may be noteworthy. Urbanisation seems to have had little impact on the nature of these interactions across all three social categories which suggests that the nature of urbanization in India needs more careful enquiry. While there are some signs that inter-caste friendships have increased, gender and religious identities do not appear to be malleable. This may suggest that religious and gender segregation continues to structure inter-personal interaction and access to the public sphere. Finally, these social conditions are not conducive to the realization of the constitutional and political values of liberty and fraternity and are worthy of serious political attention.

Political networks: patron-client relationships across communities

In this section we move from evidence of social interaction and friendship across caste, religion and gender to examine if these social categories shape access to political leadership in India. Table 2a.4 presents respondent's preferences on the political leader they would approach to get work done across the four states. More than half of the respondents would approach leaders from their own caste and less than a third were indifferent to the caste of the leader. The variation of preferences between the states is marginal.

Figure 2a.5: Reporting of a close friend from the opposite gender by location



Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 2a.4: State-wise preference for approaching a leader from their own caste for work-related matters

	Approaching a leader from same caste	Approaching a leader of different caste	No Difference
Gujarat	64	4	32
Haryana	53	6	41
Karnataka	61	7	32
Odisha	56	2	42
All	59	5	37


Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 2a.5: Caste-wise preference for approaching a leader from their own caste for work-related matters

	Approaching a leader from same caste	Approaching a leader of different caste	No Difference
Dalit	61	6	33
Adivasi	72	2	26
OBC	59	4	37
Upper caste	54	5	41

Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 2a.6: Preference for approaching a leader from their own caste for work-related matters by location



Note: All figures are in percent.

Next, in Table 2a.5, we break down the respondents preferences by their caste status. First, a high number of Dalit and Adivasi respondents prefer to approach leaders from their own caste and tribe respectively. While other research suggests that reserved seats in legislature from joint electorates has weakened the bond between Dalit and Adivasi leaders and their communities, our data suggests that these leaders may nevertheless provide these communities critical access to the political system. In the previous section we observed that Adivasis remain a close knit community and this may partially explain their preference for Adivasi political leaders. Secondly, the numbers of OBCs and upper castes who prefer leaders from their own

community are marginally lower. Significantly, upper caste respondents show the least preference to work with leaders from their own community.

An examination of how these preferences change across rural and urban areas, in Figure 2a.6, reveals that urban respondents are relatively indifferent to the caste status of their leaders. In the previous section we noted that inter-caste relationships do not vary significantly across urban and rural areas and caste shapes social life. Hence, it may be that in urban areas different political conditions including the increased number of political actors and platforms dilute the direct patron-client or community relationship between respondents and their leaders.

Religion continues to play a significant role in Indian political life. When we ask respondents whether they would approach a leader who belongs to their religion in order to get their work done (given that both options are equally competent to get the work done), Table 2a.6 shows that more than half of them would prefer a leader from the same religious background. Karnataka, was the only state where at least 10 per cent preferred to approach leaders from a different religion.

When this data is organized by religion, in Table 2a.7 we see that while Hindus clearly prefer to approach Hindu leaders, almost half the

Christian and Muslim respondents were open to approaching leaders irrespective of their religion. It is striking that the two minority communities had the highest number of respondents who said that the religion of the leader did not matter when it came to getting the job done.

Like with caste, we find that the religious identity of a leader matters more for rural than for urban respondents. Figure 2a.7 shows that more than 50 per cent of urban respondents were either unconcerned with the religious identity of the leader or positive about approaching leaders from other religions.

Table 2a.6: State-wise preference for approaching a leader from their own religion for work-related matters

	Approaching a leader from same religion	Approaching a leader of different religion	No Difference
Gujarat	62	5	32
Haryana	52	5	43
Karnataka	59	10	32
Odisha	58	1	41
All	58	5	37

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 2a.7: Religion-wise preference for approaching a leader from their own religion for work-related matters


	Approaching a leader from same religion	Approaching a leader of different religion	No Difference
Hindu	60	5	35
Muslim	51	4	45
Christian	47	6	48

Note: All figures are in percent.

In this section we examined the effect of caste and religious identity on the affinity that respondents have with their political leaders. Overall we may conclude that the ascriptive identities of caste and religion continue to shape political affinity. With the exception of the Christian community, a majority of respondents across states prefer leaders who share their caste or religious

identity. However, identity based political affinity breaks down in urban areas. This is particularly significant as social relations and discrimination based on caste and religion don't show a similar variation across urban and rural areas. In the next part of this Chapter we turn to assess the nature of social discrimination and stereotyping in these four States.

Figure 2a.7: Preference for approaching a leader from their religion for work-related matters by location



Note: All figures are in percent.

2. B. Discrimination and stereotypes

This part of the Chapter broadly looks at the nature and form that discrimination takes in these four states. Stereotyping is just one way in which discrimination works its way into the social practices of discrimination. Political theorists have consistently argued that to construct the self, one needs to differentiate oneself from an ‘other’. Social identities on the basis of nationality, religion, caste or race get constructed by differentiating themselves from their respective ‘others’. Apart from the cultural basis for these identities, the social, economic and political context also shapes the attitudes, beliefs and structure of these varied identities. The stereotypes that different groups have tells us a great deal about the nature and likelihood of inter-group interaction.

This survey was designed to understand the nature of ‘social distance’ between various groups in Indian society. In the sections above, we explored social relationships (with a focus on close friendships) between people from different castes, religions and gender. Further, we examined if caste and religion shape the nature of access and affinity to political leaders. This section will focus on mapping the nature and extent of prejudice and stereotypes among different social groups.

First, we study prejudice against the lower castes and tribes particularly Dalits, Adivasis and Other Backward Classes. Second, we ascertain how the dominant castes in each State are perceived.

Do respondents support state assistance to economically weaker sections within dominant castes? Third, what stereotypes of castes and religious communities are commonplace? Next, we explore popular understandings of gender equality and patriarchal norms. Finally, we examine public perception about safety of women in various contexts.

Prejudice against lower castes – Dalits, Adivasis and OBCs

Despite official support for affirmative action, the social and economic marginalization of Dalits, Adivasis and other backward classes continues to be of serious public concern. Caste is reproduced in Indian society through overt discrimination and violence, and covert forms of exclusion and stereotyping. Dalits and Adivasis are often stereotyped and ridiculed as ‘*sarkari damaad*’ (government’s son-in-law) suggesting that they are lazy people without merit who gain undeserved benefits from the reservation policy.


The survey gave respondents a choice between two reasons for backwardness persisting among Dalits and Adivasis: unfair treatment or that they do not try as hard as they should. Across the four states opinions were equally divided between these two reasons with a marginally higher number of respondents attributing Adivasi backwardness to unfair treatment. However, there are significant inter-State variations. In Gujarat and Odisha, respondents were relatively more likely to attribute backwardness to unfair

treatment while in Haryana a higher number of respondents identified lack of effort as the primary reason (Figure 2b.1).

When we disaggregate responses by the social group of the respondents, high numbers of upper and dominant caste respondents understand Dalits and Adivasi backwardness to be the result of the lack of hard work and enterprise.

Notably, dominant caste respondents are more likely to choose this explanation than upper caste respondents. While most Dalit and Adivasi respondents identify unfair treatment as a reason for their backwardness, almost a third feel that it is due to a lack of effort. Significantly, a number of respondents have chosen not to register their opinion or do not have an opinion especially in Gujarat and Haryana. (Table 2b.1).

Figure 2b.1: State-wise opinion on backwardness of Dalits and Adivasis



Note: All figures are in percent; the rest did not express any response.

Table 2b.1: Opinion on backwardness of Dalits and Adivasis across caste groups

	Why Dalits are backward		Why Adivasis are backward	
	Unfair Treatment	Lack of effort	Unfair Treatment	Lack of effort
Upper Caste	36	45	31	43
Dominant caste	32	53	30	50
Upper OBC	32	32	30	30
Lower OBC	41	38	43	32
Dalit	51	29	45	29
Adivasi	52	27	58	24

Note: All figures are in percent; the rest did not express any response.

In Table 2b.2 we disaggregate responses by the respondents' location in an urban or rural area. While a majority of rural respondents believe that unfair treatment against Dalits and Adivasis is the primary reason for their backwardness, a majority of urban respondents suggest that backwardness is the result of a lack of effort. In earlier sections we noted that the levels of social interaction between caste groups did not increase in urban areas. Here we find that urbanisation appears to change the respondents understanding of backwardness among Dalits and Adivasis.

In the last two years, numerous states across the country have witnessed mass protests in which specific dominant castes - Patels in Gujarat, Jats in Haryana and other North Indian states, Kapus in Andhra Pradesh, Marathas in Maharashtra - have

demanded inclusion into the OBC category so that they may receive preferential treatment. These claims are justified on the grounds that only few amongst these dominant groups have acquired political and economic power while the rest were disadvantaged.


This survey indirectly assessed how deeply these views were shared by asking respondents whether they believed that: dominant castes have acquired immense political and economic power and do not need any special assistance, or that few among the dominant castes have acquired political and economic power, while a majority is underprivileged. Dominant castes were identified as the Patels in Gujarat, Jats in Haryana, Vokkaligas and Lingayats in Karnataka and Khandayats in Odisha.

Table 2b.2: Opinion on backwardness of Dalits and Adivasis by location

	Why Dalits are backward		Why Adivasis are backward	
	Unfair Treatment	Lack of effort	Unfair Treatment	Lack of effort
Rural	43	35	41	34
Urban	35	44	35	39

Note: All figures are in percent; the rest did not express any response.

Figure 2b.2: State-wise opinion on state assistance to dominant castes




Note: All figures are in percent; the rest did not express any response.

Table 2b.3: Opinion on state assistance to dominant caste by various caste groups

	No state assistance required for dominant castes	Dominant castes need state assistance
Upper Caste	34	47
Dominant caste	25	55
Upper OBC	33	27
Lower OBC	39	35
Dalit	37	33
Adivasi	31	25

Note: All figures are in percent; the rest did not express any response.

Figure 2b.3: Opinion of state dominant castes on state assistance to them



Note: All figures are in percent; the rest did not express any response. Net Agreement is calculated by subtracting disagreed from agreed on state assistance for dominant castes.

Overall, we found that almost 35 per cent of the respondents expressed the view that a majority of dominant castes were underprivileged and deserved state assistance. Almost 30 per cent took the opposite view. Significantly, close to one third of the respondents did not express an opinion indicating high levels of ambivalence.

There is significant variation across the States. Gujarat is the only state where a substantially higher proportion of respondents (34 per cent) said there is no need for providing special assistance to Patels. It was also the State with the highest proportion of respondents not expressing a view on this question. In Haryana and Odisha, close to half of the respondents believe that only a few have benefited among these dominant

castes and state assistance must be provided. In Karnataka, respondents were evenly divided between the two views, perhaps because sections of the dominant castes, Vokkaligas and Lingayats, are included within the OBC quota in the state (Figure 2b.2).

Not surprisingly, responses to this questions varied by the social identity of respondents. More than half of the upper castes and six out of ten dominant caste respondents supported state assistance for dominant castes. We noted earlier that these caste groups understand Dalit and Adivasi disadvantage to be due to the lack of effort on their part. Significantly a majority of Dalits, Adivasis and other backward classes supported the opposite view that dominant castes did not

deserve special state assistance. The proportion of Adivasi respondents who do not express their opinion is the highest among all social groups (Table 2b.3).

However, significant state level variations can be seen even among dominant castes. As Figure 2b.3 shows, while Jats in Haryana and Patels in Gujarat overwhelmingly support the view that States must assist the dominant castes, Khandayats in Odisha hold the same view albeit in smaller number despite the fact that Khandayats have acquired OBC status in the state.

In Karnataka the two dominant castes, Vokkaligas and Lingayats, sections of who already have acquired OBC status, are more ambivalent on the issue. While there is no clear opinion among Vokkaligas, a higher proportion amongst Lingayats support the idea that they should get state assistance. The sharp divergence of dominant caste attitudes in Karnataka presents a sharp contrast to the other States in the survey and deserves greater analysis. (Figure 2b.3).

Stereotyping social and religious communities

Contemporary political developments and


controversies on the question of nationalism prompted us to include questions on perceptions of patriotism and the use of violence by various religious communities in India. Hindutva ideologues often distinguish loyalty to one’s holy land (*poonyabhoomi*) and fatherland (*pitrabhoomi*) to claim that as the holy land of Christians and Muslims lie outside the country, their patriotism is incomplete. Hence, they conclude that only Hindus can be loyal to the nation. While these claims are rife in political discourse we want to investigate if this has travelled into our everyday popular consciousness.

Table 2b.4: State-wise perception of Hindus on patriotism of various religious groups

	Highly patriotic			
	Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikh
Gujarat	15	23	71	50
Haryana	9	14	82	69
Karnataka	15	13	57	29
Odisha	12	30	85	47

Note: All figures are in percent; no responses are set as missing.

Figure 2b.4: Assessing each other’s patriotism



Note: All figures are in percent; no responses are set as missing.

In this survey, respondents were presented with a ladder scale (1 – 10) to indicate how patriotic they considered members of various religious communities to be. Here 1 indicates that the community is considered extremely unpatriotic while 10 signifies that it is considered extremely patriotic.

Overall, across the four States, Hindu respondents expressed the view that Hindus and Sikhs had higher levels of patriotism than Christians and Muslims. (Table 2b.4) Significant variations are visible across States. The widest gap between perceptions of patriotism of Hindus, Muslims and Christians is in Haryana. Respondents in Odisha saw Hindus as very patriotic and Muslims as least patriotic. Significantly, while Gujarat followed the same trends it does not appear to be as polarized on this question as Haryana or Odisha. Surprisingly, Karnataka also followed the same trends though respondents ascribed lower levels of patriotism to all communities which suggests that it was not as salient an issue as in other States. As the religious composition of these four states is quite different – high proportion of Sikhs in Haryana and Christians in Odisha – it is likely that these demographic factors need to be factored more fully into the analysis.

Table 2b.5: Perception on how violent/peaceful different religious communities are

	Mostly violent	Moderately peaceful	Mostly peaceful
Muslim	33	41	17
Christians	12	50	25
Hindus	3	27	62
Sikhs	7	45	35

Note: All figures are in percent.


Next, we analyze the perception of respondents from each community regarding levels of patriotism across communities (Figure 2b.4). All religious groups except Christians consider themselves to be the most patriotic community. Christians consider themselves relatively less patriotic than the Hindus. The belief that Muslims are not more patriotic is present among all religious groups except Muslims themselves. While Hindus think Muslims are the least patriotic community, Muslim respondents consider Hindus to be highly patriotic. The perception of the Sikh community deserves attention. Surprisingly, Hindus do not regard Sikhs to be highly patriotic, while Sikhs regard Muslims to be less patriotic than the Hindus. Both Hindus and Sikhs consider Christians to be relatively less patriotic. (Figure 2b.4).

We also presented respondents with a similar ladder scale to indicate how peaceful/violent they considered various religious communities to be. 1 on the scale indicated that a community was extremely violent and 10 indicated that it was extremely peaceful. The perception of whether a community was prone to violence mirrored the perception on patriotism of various religious groups. Overall Muslims are perceived to be most violent and Hindus were considered most peaceful. Christians are regarded as moderately or mostly peaceful. Sikhs are perceived to be more peaceful than the Christians but nowhere close to the figures for the Hindu community (Table 2b.5).

However, there is considerable inter-state variation in the Hindu perception of violence among communities. In Odisha and Haryana, almost half the Hindu respondents expressed the view that Muslims were the violent community. Less than a third of Karnataka Hindus took the view that Muslims are prone to violence. Two out of ten Hindus in both Odisha and Haryana considered Christians as a violent community.

Figure 2b.5: State-wise perception of Hindus about how violent different religious communities are

Note: All figures are in percent; no responses are set as missing.



However, while Odisha has a significant Christian minority and a history of political controversy around conversion, Haryana has a miniscule Christian minority. (Figure 2b.5).

Table 2b.6: Perception of religious communities about how violent other religious communities are

	Considered to be mostly violent			
	Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikhs
Hindu	40	16	3	8
Muslim	5	4	4	9
Christian	37	2	1	8
Sikh	43	10	4	4

Note: All figures are in percent; no responses are set as missing.

Table 2b.7: State-wise perception of Muslims about how violent other religious communities are

	Considered to be mostly violent			
	Muslim	Christian	Hindu	Sikhs
Gujarat	10	1	9	14
Haryana	3	7	3	5
Karnataka	5	5	4	9
Odisha	1	3	2	7

Note: All figures are in percent; no responses are set as missing.

When the data is analyzed taking into account the respondents' religion, apart from Hindus and Sikhs, significant number of Christians too consider Muslims as violent. Hindus and Sikhs seem to consider Christians to be relatively more violent as compared to them. Significantly, Muslims do not perceive any community to be violent (Table 2b.6). However, among Muslims, minor inter-state differences in perception were observed. Compared to other states, 10 per cent of Muslims in Gujarat considered themselves to be violent, but saw the Sikhs to be the most violent community. While generally Hindus do not perceive the Muslims to be violent, in Gujarat nearly 10 per cent of Muslim respondents saw Hindus to be a violent community. (Table 2b.7).

In conclusion, the analysis above on the perceptions of various religious communities on patriotism and tendency towards violence suggest that political discourse has influenced popular perceptions of communities inter se. The deep fissures of partition and the political momentum of Hindu nationalism finds popular expression. The sharp contrast between a community's self-image and the perception by other communities suggests that in the absence of significant levels of inter-mixing and social interaction these prejudices and stereotypes may be remarkably resilient.


Gender equality and support for patriarchal social norms

In the last section of this Chapter we turn to perceptions of gender equality and patriarchal social norms. The survey sought respondents' views on numerous statements related to gender equality: like equal pay for equal work; reservation for women in employment; women's education and their freedom to take important life decisions. A quick glance at Figure 2b.6 which presents the responses to the seven statements shows that most respondents supported gender equality, except to say women should prioritize home over outside work.

This support for gender equality varies along different dimensions. Support is higher for equal responsibility for child rearing and the individual freedom to choose their life partner and marriage. Support drops marginally for equal education for men and women and equal wage for equal work. Further, there are significant inter-state differences on support for gender equality. Both Karnataka and Odisha show strong support with emphasis on individual freedom in Karnataka and social equality like equal education and wages in Odisha. Respondents in Haryana and Gujarat show weaker support for gender equality except for reservations in the work place and responsibility for child rearing.

For a clearer understanding, an index was constructed to measure overall level of support for gender equality after clubbing six dimensions mentioned in Figure 2b.6 Those who did not support any dimension or at least two dimensions were put in the category of 'low support for gender equality'; support for three or four dimensions was categorized as 'moderate support

Figure 2b.6: State-wise opinion on various parameters of gender equality




Note: All figures are in percent.

for gender equality'; and support for five or all six dimension was categorized as 'high support for gender equality'. Overall, 37 percent of all respondents express high support for gender equality. Respondents from Odisha followed by Karnataka express high support for gender equality, whereas Gujarat expresses lower support

for gender equality than Haryana. The highest percentage of respondents express moderate support for gender equality. Only Odisha had more respondents expressing high support than moderate support for gender equality (Figure 2b.7).

Figure 2b.7: State-wise perception on gender equality



Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 2b.8: Perception on gender equality by caste groups

	Low support for gender equality	Moderate support for gender equality	High support for gender equality
Hindu	17	46	37
Upper Caste	14	41	45
<i>Dominant caste</i>	11	43	46
Upper OBC	19	52	29
Lower OBC	15	46	40
Dalit	17	49	34
Adivasi	29	43	28
Muslim	14	44	42
Christian	7	55	37
Sikh	23	41	36

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 2b.9: State-wise perception of Muslims on gender equality

	Low support for gender equality	Moderate support for gender equality	High support for gender equality
Gujarat	23	46	32
Haryana	22	63	15
Karnataka	10	46	44
Odisha	2	29	69

Note: All figures are in percent.

When support for gender equality is disaggregated along religion, caste and tribal communities we find that Muslims express the highest support

for gender equality, while Sikhs showed the lowest levels of support. Among Hindus, upper and dominant castes express higher levels of support while Hindu Adivasis express lower levels of support. (Table 2b.8). There is considerable variation in Muslim opinion on gender equality across States. Seven out of ten Muslims from Odisha were highly supportive of gender equality, whereas Muslims from Haryana took a far more conservative view. So it appears that location has a substantial influence on religious identity and it would be a mistake to assume a monolithic religious identity. Next, we turn to what women themselves think of gender equality (Table 2b.9).


Table 2b.10: Perception on gender equality among men and women

	Low support for gender equality	Moderate support for gender equality	High support for gender equality
Men	18	48	34
Women	16	44	41

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 2b.10 confirms that while women in general do support greater equality with men, the difference in levels of support is not too significant. With higher levels of education women express higher support for gender equality norms. The levels of education attainment clearly shift women's attitudes to gender equality. A majority of women who have secured matriculation or college education express high support for gender equality norms. (Table 2b.11) Almost 50 per cent of urban men and women express high support for gender equality norms with less than 10 per cent at low levels of support. In rural areas high support falls to 30 per cent while low levels of support rises to almost 20 per cent. Unlike caste and religious identity where the urban or rural location had a marginal impact, urbanization appears to reshape attitudes to gender equality. (Table 2b.8)

Figure 2b.8: Perception on gender equality by location



Note: All figures are in percent.

Women safety – public perception on crime against women

We conclude this section on gender equality with the results of our survey into public perceptions on women’s safety in the four states. Respondents were asked how safe they felt women were three spaces – occupying places after sunset, their place of work and domestic violence at home.

Table 2b.11: Perception on gender equality by levels of education

	Low support for gender equality	Moderate support for gender equality	High support for gender equality
Non-literate	28	45	27
Upto primary	18	48	34
Upto matric	12	49	39
College & above	9	43	48

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 2b.12: State-wise opinion on women safety

	Going out after sunset	Place of work	Domestic violence
Gujarat	80	75	65
Haryana	68	72	80
Karnataka	34	47	30
Odisha	41	62	60
All	54	64	58

Note: All figures are in percent.

Overall, a little over half the respondents felt that women were safe in all spaces. More respondents perceive workplaces to be safe and public spaces at night to be relatively unsafe. The high levels of safety reported in Gujarat and Haryana suggest that this could be an upper bound due to social desirability bias and the possibility of aversion among female while responding to these question. The inter-state differences in perception is wide and unexpected. More than 75 per cent of Gujarat reports that women are safe in public spaces and the work place while 80 per cent of Haryana reports that women are safe at home. Generally Haryana reports high safety levels despite the general concern with women’s safety in that state. Surprisingly, Karnataka expresses the lowest levels of public perception about women’s safety.

Less than half felt that women were safe at work, and only three out of ten felt women were safe from domestic violence (Table 2b.12). The sharp contrast between generally accepted views on women's safety across these four States and the self-perception of the respondents in these States deserve close scrutiny.

One explanation could be that men and women have different perceptions about women's safety? There are significant gender based differences in responses in all the four states. Generally women are less likely to believe that they are safe than men, with the widest difference of 8 percent between male and female perceptions of the risk of domestic violence (Table 2b.13).

In this Chapter, we have reported results of the survey on social distance between social groups; political patronage and affinity between leaders and various social groups; prejudices and stereotypes among various groups especially with respect to patriotism and affirmative action and attitudes to gender equality and the safety of women. In conclusion we may observe that social distance between caste and tribe groups

remain significant in rural and urban areas. Stereotypes and prejudices about Dalits and Adivasis persist, yet upper caste and dominant caste groups are inclined to support affirmative action for dominant caste groups. The survey confirms high levels of negative sentiment about the Muslim community among other religious groups: denying their patriotism and affirming their tendency towards violence. However, historical attitudes towards gender equality appear to be changing with significant support for women to make critical life choices and to enter the workplace. While educated women express significant support for a changing gender role, there is popular denial of the nature and extent of violence faced by women in the workplace and at the home. Taken together the survey presents a contradictory and complex picture of the nature of social relations in these spheres: spheres of social interaction around caste and religion appear to be impervious to change and prejudices and stereotypes may be deepening, whereas on gender issues there is reason to hope that education and urbanization can lead to substantial and enduring change.

Table 2b.13: State-wise opinion on women safety by gender

		Going out after sunset	Place of work	Domestic Violence
Gujarat	Men	82	78	70
	Women	77	72	60
Haryana	Men	72	75	82
	Women	60	68	79
Karnataka	Men	34	47	32
	Women	33	46	27
Odisha	Men	40	64	63
	Women	42	59	56
All	Men	58	66	62
	Women	53	61	54

Note: All figures are in percent.



3. Political Identity

Introduction

In Chapter 2 above we reported the results of the Survey on the contours of social identity in the four States. In Chapter 3 we move from social to political identity with a focus on three facets of our collective identity: support for the freedom of expression; national and regional identity and majoritarian nationalism. While these facets of political identity are linked to each other and to social identity, we do not develop an explanation or theory of this relationship in the Chapter. Instead we focus on reporting in detail the respondents' views on these issues while paying attention to State, social group and levels of education. We begin by exploring the nature of support for freedom of expression in the four States.

3. A. Freedom of expression

The Constitution of India in Article 19(1) provides that all citizens have the right to the freedom of speech and expression. As the Supreme Court notes in *Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras*, (1950), “Freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all


democratic organizations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the process of popular government, is possible.” Democratic theorists has long argued that democracy is meaningless without freedom of speech and expression - the right to express one’s views and opinions freely through words, in writing or through other visual forms, and all forms of communicable media - without restrictions or fear of repression by the state. Rights guaranteeing the freedom of expression also contribute to enhancing human capacities a key indicator of development. Yet, in India, freedom of expression is not unconditional. The First Amendment imposes a set of “reasonable restrictions” on the freedom of expression that curtail public speech against the “interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”

Many have argued that the breadth of these reasonable restrictions allow for constitutional interpretation upholding several legal restrictions. The provisions of the Indian Penal Code relating to sedition, criminal defamation, and hate speech are frequently misused to muzzle dissenting opinions. These claims are not entirely unjustified as recent events suggests. A number of writers, artists, journalists, activists, and sometimes even students and academic researchers have been charged with sedition. Further, we’ve witnessed a surge in vigilante social enforcement of restrictions on speech through public attacks, either physically or on social media.

In this section, we examine public opinion relating to freedom of expression, and the support for the curbs placed by the state. Six questions tap into popular opinion on the limits to freedom of expression: should people with the following views be allowed to express their ideas freely in public? A person who (a) Wants to replace Indian state by violent means; (b) Advocates violence against people from different communities; (c) Advocates independence for any part of India; (d) Makes fun of religious communities other than his/her; (e) Wants to replace democracy with military dictatorship; (f) Criticises elected leaders. Of these, the first four questions attempt to gauge respondents’ views on the extent of support for the restrictions placed on the freedom of expression. Respondents who disagree with first two and agree with the third and fourth, are seen as expressing support for the restrictions imposed by the state. In contrast, respondents who agree with the first two and disagree with the third and fourth are seen as those who are not supportive of such restrictions. The final two questions are neutral.

Using these six questions we construct three indices that capture these dimensions of the debates relating to freedom of expression and its limits in India. We examine cross-state variation in the three indices and by levels of education. The first index combines the first two questions on whether persons wanting to replace the Indian state by violent means or incites violence against other communities should be allowed to express their opinions freely.

Figure 3a.1: State-wise attitudes toward freedom of expression (index 1)



Note: All figures are in percent; the rest did not express any response.

Respondents who agree to both questions are adopt a libertarian view of freedom of expression. This view, primarily considered a product of American thought, suggests that there should be no restrictions placed by the state on the freedom of expression. We term this position as Strong Libertarian. On the other end, the respondents who disagree with both questions and support constitutional restrictions are termed as Weak Libertarian; those who agree on one, and disagree on the other are seen as adopting a Moderate Libertarian position.

We find that about 38 percent of all respondents support these restrictions placed on freedom of expression. About a quarter respondents adopt a moderate position, while only about 13 percent support a libertarian position that calls for no restrictions on freedom of expression. The variation across States is considerable. Odisha has the largest proportion of respondents who support curbs on freedom of expression followed by Haryana. In Karnataka, only one in five respondents support such restrictions. The proportion of respondents who support a strong libertarian position in Karnataka is more than twice that number in Gujarat which has the next highest proportion of respondents adopting a similar position. Odisha, on the other hand, has the lowest proportion of respondents who take a strong libertarian position. The reasons for strong libertarian views observed in Karnataka are unclear and warrant further analysis. Note that, with the exception of Karnataka, between a quarter and just less than 40 percent of respondents don't have an opinion on either question (Figure 3a.1).

Surprisingly, we find that close to half the respondents with a college education or above support restrictions on freedom of expression. In fact, we find that as levels of education increase so does support for restrictions on free speech. We find with higher levels of education and fewer respondents adopt a strong libertarian position; however the proportions are smaller ranging from 11 to 16 percent. However, the proportion of respondents with no opinion is highest among non-literates, approximately 44 percent (Table 3a.1).

We construct the second index by combining responses to whether persons advocating independence for any part of India and those

making fun of other religious communities should be allowed to express their opinions freely. These two questions also reflect the curbs imposed on the freedom of expression by the First Amendment, but their legal interpretation is broad and application arbitrary.

Table 3a.1: Attitudes toward freedom of expression (index1) by levels of education

	Strong libertarian	Moderate libertarian	Weak libertarian	Don't know
Non-Literate	11	22	23	44
Upto primary	12	24	35	29
Upto matric	14	25	46	15
College & above	16	25	49	10

Note: All figures are in percent.

As with the previous index, respondents agreeing with both questions are categorized as strong libertarian, and those disagreeing with both are seen as weak libertarians. We find strong support for the restrictive view of freedom of expression. About forty percent of respondents support curbs on what people can express in public. Almost one in four respondents supports a moderate position while 11 percent a libertarian one (Table 3a.2).

The distribution of support for curtailed freedom of speech and expression is very similar to that for the first index. Almost half the respondents with an education level college and above support a restrictive view. The libertarian position is supported by only 13 percent of respondents with a college level education (Table 3a.3).

The third index includes the questions on whether persons wanting to replace India's democracy with a military dictatorship should be allowed to express their opinions freely and whether public criticism of elected leaders should be allowed. Unlike the other questions considered above, these two do not fall in any of the permitted exceptions to the right free speech inserted by the First Amendment. Agreement on both questions is considered a strong libertarian position. Disagreement on both is termed a weak libertarian position. We use the same scale as in the previous indices since a weak libertarian position suggests that respondents expect the state to

sanction those who either want to replace India’s democracy with a military dictatorship or publicly criticize elected leaders (Figure 3a.2).

Table 3a.2: State-wise attitudes toward freedom of expression (index 2)

	Strong libertarian	Moderate libertarian	Weak libertarian	Don't know
Gujarat	14	23	25	38
Haryana	8	22	44	26
Karnataka	18	31	38	13
Odisha	3	20	52	25
All	11	24	40	25

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 3a.3: Attitudes toward freedom of expression (index 2) by levels of education

	Strong libertarian	Moderate libertarian	Weak libertarian	Don't know
Non-Literate	10	19	26	45
Upto primary	11	22	36	31
Upto matric	10	27	46	17
College & above	13	27	50	10


Note: All figures are in percent.

On these questions, respondents with a college education or above are more likely to be strong libertarian than non-literates. However, there are greater proportions of weak libertarians across all levels of education (Table 3a.4).

Next, we disaggregate the indices and examine the distribution of responses to individual component questions across the four States. The first set of responses pertains to whether respondents agree that people who advocate independence for any part of India should be free to express this view. We find a relatively high percentage (31%) of respondents do not have an opinion on this issue. Don't know responses vary between 15 percent in Karnataka to 45 percent in Gujarat; and exceeds the proportions on either Agree or Disagree in Gujarat.

The difference between the Disagree and the Agree responses indicates that larger proportions of respondents favor a restrictive view of freedom of speech and expression. This difference is least for Gujarat (5%) and highest for Odisha (43%). Overall a third of respondents support a weak libertarian position and a similar number support an moderate libertarian position. About 16 percent of respondents indicate a strong libertarian view. Once again we find that the proportion of respondents adopting a strong libertarian position is much higher in Karnataka (36%) than in any of the other States. In fact, it is about three times the number in Gujarat, four times the number

Figure 3a.2: State-wise attitudes toward freedom of expression (index 3)



Note: All figures are in percent.

in Haryana, and seven times in Odisha. Close to three quarter of respondents in Odisha are weak or moderate libertarian, while a similar number in Karnataka are moderate or strong libertarian.

When we consider responses to the question whether people should be free to express the opinion of replacing democracy with military dictatorship, we find once again that relatively large numbers of respondents do not have an opinion. This ranges between a third and close to half the respondents. The exception is Karnataka where only 15 percent of respondents express an inability to answer the question. More generally, we see that more respondents tend to disagree rather than agree, and the difference is about 14 percent.

Table 3a.4: State-wise attitudes toward freedom of expression (index 3)

	Strong libertarian	Moderate libertarian	Weak libertarian	Don't know
Non-Literate	12	24	23	41
Upto primary	13	30	30	28
Upto matric	18	31	37	14
College & above	20	39	32	9

Note: All figures are in percent.

This number varies across the states with the highest for Odisha (46%) followed by Gujarat and Haryana. In Karnataka, however the difference is about 21 percent in favor of allowing a person to express their views on the political system. When it comes to the freedom to criticize elected leaders, we find that respondents are about evenly divided i.e. the difference between those who disagree and agree is about 2 percent. In three states, Gujarat, Haryana and Odisha more respondents tend to disagree rather than agree. In Karnataka however, we find a substantial proportion of respondents who agree that public expression of criticism of political leaders should be permissible.

We find more respondents disagreeing on the question of whether people should be allowed to express views that make fun of other religious communities. The difference between those disagreeing and those agreeing is about 43


percent. We find this pattern across all four states. The difference is largest in Odisha (64%) and lowest in Gujarat (27%). Respondents in Karnataka also support a restrictive position on freedom of expression when it involves issues that might hurt the religious sentiments, diverging from their responses to other questions (where respondents tend to adopt libertarian positions).

In this section we've reported the attitudes and preferences of respondents across the four States on freedom of speech and expression. Barring Karnataka, the three other States express a restrictive view of the scope of the freedom of speech and expression and are willing to allow serious exceptions to the right irrespective of whether these restrictions are permitted by the Constitution or not. While higher levels of education prompt respondents to express a view on these questions, it also encourages them to encourage more State regulation of speech. Finally, respondents are acutely sensitive to the content of speech that can be subject to regulation. As we see later in the Chapter, high levels of support for nationalism corresponds with the willingness to subject speech to restrictions based on the 'national interest.'

3. B. The nation or the region?

Given the historical and ongoing battles over territorial political units in India, it's not surprising that political identities have been constantly shaped and reshaped by changing political boundaries. Political identities may be temporary or enduring as they are constructed through material and cultural politics and controversies. As India is a land of diverse multitudes – castes and tribes, religions, languages and political affinities – the form and nature of political identities is in a state of ferment. We build on significant work that has already been published on the 'state-nation' models of political identity construction in India to ask if this model continues to hold explanatory power despite the tectonic shifts in Indian politics in the last few years. Moreover, we are keen to explore how national and regional identity is negotiated by various States in the Union – some of whom have had strong regional parties and others do not. We are keen to explore if the new evocative brand of majoritarian nationalism pushes aside regional identity or coexists with it in a new way. This

Figure 3b.1: State-wise preference for a regional or national identity



Note: All figures are in percent.

section will report respondents views from across four states as to their primary political identity – national or regional; their perceptions of other communities and their attitude and perspective on the use and importance of regional languages.

Figure 3b.1 presents State wise data as to whether the residents of the State perceive themselves to be more regional or more national. If we club responses for more national and for equally regional or national, a majority of respondents are comfortable with their national identity. Odisha displays a strong regional identity with half the respondents endorsing their regional identity over their national identity. Respondents from Haryana, on the other hand, emphasize their national rather than regional identity. Curiously, respondents from Gujarat see themselves as more regional than national. Karnataka has almost equal number of respondents spread across the three categories. Despite the strong push for a singular national identity that displaces regional identities, it is significant that majorities in all States barring Haryana express a regional identity. So long as these two identities are seen as a complementary rather than antithetical the coexistence of these identities is assured.

When regional and national identity is disaggregated by religion (Table 3b.1) we observe that Hindus are split almost equally between their national and regional identities. However, almost

a majority of Christians and Muslims identify strongly with their national identity rather than their regional identity. While almost a third of respondents across religions are comfortable with a dual regional and national identity, the minority preference for national over regional identity deserves careful exploration.

When we track preference for a regional or national identity among respondents in urban and rural areas (Table 3b.2), we find that rural respondents feel closer to their regional identities but almost half the urban respondents express a preference for their national identity. Significantly almost equal proportion of rural (23 percent) and urban respondents (27 percent) feel equally regional and national.

Regional identity in India has been historically associated with a regional language. Though new forms of regional identity continue to emerge, as State formation has been based on regional languages, we probed respondents' attitudes towards regional language. Overall, almost two out of three respondents prefer the use of the state language in public places. (Figure 3b.2) In Karnataka an astonishing 85 percent of respondents preferred the use of Kannada in public spaces, almost 20 percentage higher than Gujarat and Odisha. Only one fourth of the respondents preferred Haryanvi over Hindi in public places.

Table 3b.1: Preference for a regional or national identity by religious groups

	More regional	Equal regional & national	More national
Hindu	38	24	37
Muslim	22	31	47
Christian	16	30	53

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 3b.2: Preference for a regional or national identity by location

	More regional	Equal regional & national	More national
Rural	41	23	35
Urban	23	27	50

Note: All figures are in percent.

Though one may expect that the preference for the State language may be higher in rural areas, Table 3b.3 shows that substantial majority of respondents in both areas prefer the State language with an overwhelming 78 percent of rural respondents indicating this preference.

To conclude, the responses on the questions on national and regional identity and preference for the State language taken together suggests that

a substantial number of respondents who prefer the use of the State language over Hindi in public spaces nevertheless express an affinity for their national identity. So though respondents identify themselves definitively and clearly with their regional language they do not see any friction with them simultaneously espousing a strong national identity.

Table 3b.3: Opinion on use of language in public places by location


	State language	Language other than state language
Rural	78	22
Urban	64	36

Note: All figures are in percent.

3. C. Whose “Nation” is it anyway? Contrasting liberal and majoritarian nationalism


Over the past decade the constituent ideas of Indian nationalism have been intensely and systematically contested in the public arena. Several events and campaigns in public spaces, universities and in civil society gatherings confirm this ongoing contest. Legislative actions that ban the consumption of certain foods, arrests based on charges of sedition targeting students and activists, public attacks on those who do not say ‘Bharat Mata ki jai’ or stand while the

Figure 3b.2: Opinion on use of language in public places



Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 3c.1: State-wise distribution of liberal and majoritarian attitudes



Note: All figures are in percent.

national anthem is played starkly demonstrate the diverging attitudes on what constitutes ‘national’ and ‘anti-national’ behaviour. In some instances, such as the Supreme Court ruling on respecting the national anthem or in interpreting certain political speeches as seditious, state institutions have actively intervened in defining, at least in part, what constitutes nationalism. At other times, such as the Dadri lynching, the physical assault on citizens who do not stand for the national anthem, the several *gaurakshaks* vigilante enforcement of cow protection, or *ghar-wapsi*, the impetus for defining the terms of nationalism in public discourse arises from organized social and political groups seeking to enforce their version of nationalism. These contests suggest that popular views on nationalism are in a flux. Is a new brand of nationalism emerging in India? Is this nationalism shared by all castes and community groups? In other words, is a liberal nationalism giving way to a “majoritarian” or illiberal nationalism? These are questions of fundamental importance for a constitutional democracy, especially one in a developing country that binds diverse social, religious and linguistic communities.

In this section we examine responses to a set of questions that maps perceptions of nationalism across the four states. The questions used to explore the differential perceptions of nationalism are as follows: Government should punish those who (a) do not respect the cow (b) do not say Bharat Mata ki Jai at public functions, (c) eat beef

or cow meat (d) do not stand while the national anthem is being sung and (e) engage in religious conversions. The responses to this set of questions range from ‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree,’ and indicate whether a respondent’s position on nationalism is majoritarian or liberal. So respondents who agree to these questions support a more majoritarian nationalism relative to those who disagree.

We construct a liberal-majoritarian nationalism index that measures the degree of agreement for a respondent across these five questions. A respondent who agrees to three or more of these questions expresses a majoritarian nationalism, while one disagreeing with all five espouses a liberal nationalism. Those who agree with one or two of these questions espouse a weak majoritarian or weak liberal nationalism. Admittedly the index does not disentangle the different forms of nationalism, i.e. ethnic versus territorial, or religious versus constitutional. However, we believe that this index, by including a battery of questions on a broad range of issues in current public discourse provides a snapshot of where respondents stand on the role of the state in the enforcement of a particular brand of nationalism.

Our goal is to examine patterns and variations in this nationalism index across the states and three socio-economic characteristics: caste, levels of education, and whether the respondent is a rural or urban resident. Overall, we find that

almost three-fourth of the respondents express a majoritarian form of nationalism. Only about six percent of respondents subscribe to a strong liberal nationalism and a further seventeen percent take a weak liberal nationalist position. Only about five percent of respondents either don't know or refuse to express their position.

When comparing proportions across the four States, we find that large numbers, more than three-quarters, of respondents in three states (Haryana, Karnataka, and Odisha) adopt a majoritarian position on nationalism. Significantly, Gujarat has the lowest proportion of respondents who express a majoritarian nationalist view but the largest proportion of those who respond saying they don't know. This is despite the sustained polarization of politics in Gujarat in the last two decades.

Despite the promising liberal nationalism in Gujarat, the overall proportion of respondents in the four States who adopt the liberal view of nationalism is dismally low. Nine percent or less respondents across the States express a liberal position (Figure 3c.1) on the role of the State in enforcing nationalism. Broadly, a majoritarian nationalist sentiment clearly enjoys substantial sway over the populations in these States. If this is true in other States as well, this has serious implications for the future of India's constitutional democracy.

Table 3c.1 presents the distribution of attitudes across Hindu caste groups. While there are some differences among these social groups, with the exception of Adivasis, more than two-thirds of respondents in all groups adopt a majoritarian position. The difference between Dalits and Upper Castes who adopt the majoritarian view is only 6 percent. This is surprising since the beef ban is salient to Dalit food practices, yet large numbers of Dalit respondents fully support the idea that beef consumption warrants State punishment.

Notably, while little more than half of Adivasi respondents express a majoritarian attitude, at least 5 percent more Adivasi respondents adopt a liberal nationalism position than Upper Caste Hindus. Overall we find that the majoritarian nationalism finds strong purchase across Hindu caste and community groups and there is no significant variation among them.

Table 3c.1: Liberal and majoritarian attitudes among Hindu caste groups

	Liberal	Weak liberal	Majoritarian	Don't know
Dalit	3	14	78	5
Adivasi	9	22	55	14
Peasant Proprietors	4	16	76	4
Upper OBC	4	17	74	5
Lower OBC	5	13	77	5
Upper Caste	4	10	84	2

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 3c.2: Distribution of liberal and majoritarian attitudes across levels of education

	Liberal	Weak liberal	Majoritarian	Don't know
Non-Literate	6	17	66	11
Upto primary	6	17	71	6
Upto matric	7	16	74	3
College & above	6	16	76	2

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 3c.2 shows the distribution of the index across respondents categorized by their level of education. Relatively large numbers (greater than half) of respondents across all education levels hold the majoritarian position. Greater numbers of those with no schooling or only up to the level of primary school say they don't know or don't have a view on these nationalism questions. The numbers of respondents across all levels of education who hold a liberal view of nationalism is stable between six and seven percent. A striking finding is that the highest proportion of respondents holding a majoritarian nationalist position are among those college educated and above. Unlike other societies, there appears to be no correspondence between higher levels of education and a liberal view of nationalism. The opposite trend suggests modern education in these States has failed to communicate the values of a constitutional nationalism.

Cities as centres of economic production and culture bring together citizens of multiple persuasions who engage with one another in a variety of social spaces. While some scholarship suggests that social heterogeneity is associated with higher levels of conflict and an inability to overcome collective action problems, another strand of thought proposes that horizontal citizenship strengthens and a ‘national’ community emerges as a consequence of greater diversity. It is, thus, often claimed that cities and urban centers tend to be the bastions of modern liberal thought relative to the traditional village. In our survey of four States, there is support for such a claim, albeit weak support. Figure 3c.2 indicates that a 4 percent fewer urban respondents hold the majoritarian nationalist view compared to rural respondents. 2 percent more urban respondents express a liberal nationalist view than rural respondents.

In the concluding part of this section report responses to the individual components of the liberal-majoritarian index. Disaggregating the index allows us to examine variation in the components of the index, and focus on the varieties of nationalist positions that the survey questions capture. The first can be broadly referred to as a cultural nationalist position, one that bears an overt ethnic stamp. Three questions in our index are indicative of cultural nationalism. Two relate to opinions on issues pertaining to the cow: whether the state should punish those who do not respect the cow, and those who eat beef. The third asks whether the state should punish those who engage in religious conversions. All


three issues are significant for Hindu caste and community groups in India, and have been key axes of political polarization.

We find that close to three-fourths of the respondents support a cultural nationalist position on the twin issues of respect for the cow and the consumption of beef i.e. the position that the state should punish those who do not respect the cow or eat beef. Greatest support for this position is evident in Haryana, about 9 out of 10 respondents, followed by Karnataka and Odisha which are closer to the overall average. Significantly, Gujarat shows the lowest numbers here, between 55 and 60 percent respondents supporting a cultural nationalist view. The majority support for State punishment on the two issues that relate to the cow suggest a substantial cultural nationalist view in these four States.

On the issue of religious conversions, there is a decline in the proportion of respondents who support the view that the State should punish those who engage in religious conversion. Overall, about two-thirds of respondents hold this position. In Odisha, the proportion of respondents that support State action against religious conversion is the highest. This is significant as religious conversion among the Adivasi population in Odisha has been an issue of deep political polarization over two decades.

The second element of the index can be broadly thought of as territorial nationalism: the form of nationalism that is directly or indirectly associated with attitudes towards the Indian nation-state; its geographic boundaries, cultural

Figure 3c.2: Distribution of liberal and majoritarian attitudes by location



Note: All figures are in percent.

symbols and icons related to territoriality. The two questions that capture this element of nationalism in the survey include whether the State should punish those who do not say 'Bharat Mata ki Jai' in public functions, and those who do not stand for the national anthem. We find similar patterns to those observed for cultural nationalism across all four States. More than two-thirds of respondents support a strong territorial nationalist position, that the State should punish those who do not respect the slogans and emblems of territorial nationality. The largest proportions of respondents adopting a majoritarian view are either from Haryana or Karnataka, followed by Odisha. One in four respondents in Gujarat supports a liberal position. However, Gujarat, as noted earlier, also has the highest number of respondents with don't know responses.

There are strong indications that currents of both cultural and territorial nationalism are strong within a large proportion of the population in the four States. Do these two notions of nationalism co-exist and complement each other or will one predominate and push out the other is a puzzle that needs further investigation. If these trends persist in the second and third round States in the survey, then a major revision of our ideas of Indian nationalism in political and social theory may be necessary.

Conclusion

In this Chapter we have reported results of the survey on three aspects of political identity in the four States. First, we noted that barring the support for strong free speech protection in Karnataka, the three other States were very comfortable with strong State regulation of the content of free speech embracing and going beyond the current constitutional position. Next we found that regional and national identity coexist in the four States with a bias towards a regional identity in Odisha and Gujarat and a strong national identity in Haryana. Notably, religious minorities and urban residents favour their national identity. However, preference for regional language in public places over Hindi is very strong in Karnataka though the respondents are comfortable with a national identity. Thirdly, we reported that majoritarian nationalism finds strong support within the four States and even Dalit respondents appear to endorse State enforcement of majority cultural norms. This support for majoritarian nationalism is evenly spread between ideas of cultural and territorial nationalism. Levels of education and urban residence does not appear to shape norms of cultural and territorial nationalism.



4. Political Institutions

4. A. Ascertaining citizen preferences

In the earlier sections, we reported our findings on how people identify themselves in the social and political domains. It is within these socio-political realities that institutions embed themselves, and their functioning is bound to be influenced by the external environment. But institutions are constructed to support specific functions, with a view to advancing the larger interests of society. In this section, we concern ourselves with various dimensions that pertain to the 'performance' of these institutions. As with the earlier sections, we report performance based on a combination of factual as well as opinion data from our surveys conducted across the four states of Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka and Odisha.

Performance tends to be a fluid concept unless it is benchmarked alongside a clear set of objectives. To avoid confusions emerging from varied interpretations, we lay out specific objectives, which together form our guiding framework for examining performance:

- Institutions should be guided by the preferences of the people
- Institutions should be accessible to people

- Institutions should be efficient and service should be trouble-free
- Institutions should be inclusive, and cater to all sections of society

One way to identify the issue preferences of citizens is by understanding their perspective on what the important issues of the day are. We operationalized this in the survey questionnaire by asking respondents to reveal their views on ‘the most important issue facing India today’. The response rate was encouraging as more than eight out of ten respondents gave a specific response to this question despite its open-ended structure. We, thereafter, coded these responses into acceptable categories for ease of analysis. Cumulating the individual preferences across states would give us a sense of the kinds of issues that are rated high on priority by a large number of people. But given the large and diverse nature of even the four states under consideration here, it is expected that there would be considerable heterogeneity in preferences. We, therefore, also mapped out the variations in preferences across the socio-economic groupings of caste, religion and class.

Aggregate preferences


It is important to note that since this was an open-ended question, citizens revealed their ‘top-of-the-mind’ choices. Without any priming, respondents were free to cite the issue that was

important to them. As a result, issues cut-across the categories of relatively chronic problems such as employment and poverty, to more proximate developments such as demonetisation. Figure 4a.1 reports the percentage of respondents corresponding to the issues. This shows that between 8 to 15 percent of respondents cited unemployment, poverty and lack of infrastructure as the most important issue. The demonetisation issue, however, topped the list in issue salience (about 16 percent), perhaps due to the proximate timing of the survey to the policy announcement of demonetisation. About 15 percent of respondents cited law and order, lack of development and issues related to agriculture to be the most important issue facing India.

The responses also show a fair degree of variation across the four states, as illustrated in the Table 4a.1. Demonetization emerges as the most important issue in Gujarat (about 22 percent) likely due to the relatively large trading community in the state. One in three respondents in Haryana, on the other hand, consider unemployment as the most important issue.

Note: All figures are in percent. Physical infrastructure includes road, housing, water facilities and sanitation; Social infrastructure includes health, education and food; other issues such as law & order, lack of development, agricultural issues etc.

Figure 4a.1: Issues worrying the people of the four states



Note: All figures are in percent. Physical infrastructure includes road, housing, water facilities and sanitation; Social infrastructure includes health, education and food; other issues such as law & order, lack of development, agricultural issues etc.

Table 4a.1: State-wise breakup of concerned issues

	Demonetisation	Unemployment	Poverty	Physical infra	Social infra	Corruption	Price rise
Gujarat	22	11	9	8	1	7	10
Haryana	8	32	10	6	3	11	5
Karnataka	20	9	18	11	4	5	2
Odisha	13	12	14	8	10	2	3

Note: All figures are in percent. Infr stands for infrastructure.

Table 4a.2: Issue preferences among Dalits and Adivasis

	Physical infrastructure	Social infrastructure	Unemployment	Poverty	Corruption	Demonetisation
Dalit	10	5	16	13	4	11
Adivasi	11	7	8	15	3	9

Note: All figures are in percent.

Poverty and social infrastructure appear to be issues of concern in Odisha, while poverty and physical infrastructure such as roads, electricity and water provision are seen as most important issues in Karnataka.

An interesting finding is that people prioritize different concerns/issues during the time of elections when they cast their votes compared to periods between elections. Comparing responses to similar questions from the National Election Survey (2014), we find that respondents consider issues such as corruption and price rise as the most important ones while voting in 2014, while demonetization and unemployment emerge as the most important issues. For instance, in Gujarat and Haryana price rise was the most important issue while voting in 2014 elections. However, in Gujarat people are still concerned about the issue of price rise as 10 percent of respondents report price rise as the important issue between elections. In Haryana, however, respondents have shifted their concerns from price rise to employment. During 2014 Lok Sabha elections 20 percent of the respondents in Haryana said that price rise was the important issue while voting; but in present study only 5 percent reported price rise as an issue. For 32 percent of the respondents in Haryana unemployment was the important issue. On the other hand, in Odisha and Karnataka, citizens were more concerned about the physical infrastructure during 2014 Lok Sabha Elections and this issue has remained important to them in

the current survey. Concern over Issues of price rise and corruption which were prevalent during the time of election were not as important as other issues between the elections in Odisha and Karnataka.

Variation in concerns across socio-economic groupings

Among the socio-economic categories that we analysed, we find that economic class associates with variation in the responses. While respondents belonging to the lower class tend to consider poverty, physical and social infrastructure as the most important issues, wealthier respondents give higher weightage to corruption, unemployment and demonetization. We speculate that it may be because the respondents from different classes view their day-to-day struggles as a mirror to the problems faced by the country.

We also looked for variation in preference along the categories of caste and religion. Table 4a.2 presents the most important issue cited by Dalit and Adivasi respondents. Dalits and Adivasis give importance to poverty and the deficits in the physical and social infrastructure. This differs from the preferences of the upper and dominant castes who give salience to unemployment, corruption and demonetisation. There are also inter-state differences with regard to the preferences of Dalits and Adivasis. For instance, Dalits from Haryana give higher weightage to

unemployment, while Dalits in Karnataka consider poverty as the most important issue. In Odisha, Dalits were concerned primarily with social and physical infrastructure. Similarly, relatively more numbers of Adivasis in Karnataka reported demonetization as an important issue compared to Adivasis in the other three states. In Odisha, the state with a large Adivasi population, social and physical infrastructure was cited as most important. Adivasis from Gujarat, however, gave priority to physical infrastructure. Demonetisation appears to be most cited by respondents from the Muslim and Christian communities as compared to the population average. Is this because demonetisation has had a larger impact on occupations that people from these communities tend to pursue? This needs to be investigated. As with caste, there is inter-state variation in the responses from Muslims. For instance, 2 out of 5 Muslim respondents from Haryana cited unemployment as the big issue, whereas in Odisha and Karnataka, Muslims gave priority to poverty. In the case of Gujarat, demonetisation formed the big issue with nearly half the state's Muslim respondents considering it the most important.

Citizen-defined public priorities


In the earlier section we touched upon the issue preferences of citizens. This has brought light to the aggregate preferences of citizens in the four states, as well as preference variation across socio-economic groupings. But while the problem areas as perceived by citizens have been identified, it is not clear as to who citizens expect would address the problems. Is the government the sole agency

for acting on all issues faced by the citizens or has the responsibility somewhat shifted now to also include the private players? What then should be the new role for the government within this transformed setting? Our survey attempts to gauge this perception of public priorities by eliciting responses to a question on what is the most important responsibility of a government towards its citizens. Figure 4a.2 illustrates the spread of responses.

To our surprise, we found that more than one-third of the respondents chose not to record a response, which is double the number of no responses on the issue preferences question. Among those who responded, unemployment was prioritized as the highest responsibility, followed by social and physical infrastructure.

There are also interesting trends observed when we simultaneously analyse the responses to the question on important issues with the question on what the government should be held responsible for. In the case of the salient issues of unemployment and infrastructure (physical/ social), roughly the same proportion of respondents identified them as important issues, as well as regarded them as important governmental responsibilities. In contrast to this, the issues of demonetisation and poverty were high up on the issues scale but respondents were more reluctant to fix governmental responsibility for them. Why are citizens ready to fix overnmental responsibility for some issues, but not so strongly for others? Is it because they are cynical of the government's ability to deliver in

Figure 4a.2: Citizen-defined public priorities in aggregate terms




Note: All figures are in percent. Physical infrastructure includes road, housing, water facilities and sanitation; Social infrastructure includes health, education and food; Other issues such as demonetisation (2%), corruption (2%) and price rise (2%), development, agricultural issues etc.

Table 4a.3: State-wise public priorities of citizens

	Physical infrastructure	Social infrastructure	Unemployment	Poverty	Law & order	No response
Gujarat	7	8	13	4	5	50
Haryana	2	8	23	6	3	27
Karnataka	12	15	4	5	2	43
Odisha	11	22	16	4	7	21

Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 4a.3: Public priorities of Dalits and Adivasis



Note: All figures are in percent.

these areas, or do they believe that acting in these domains does not constitute the responsibility of the government? These are interesting conjectures that the survey results bring up, which need to be examined in further detail.

We next turn to analyze inter-state variation in the public priorities cited by citizens. Table 4a.3 shows public priorities vary across states. While in Odisha and Karnataka people prioritized public provision of physical and social infrastructure, in the case of Haryana close to a quarter of respondents considered unemployment to be of prime importance. Gujarat topped the list in the proportion of no responses, which accounted for half the responses from the state.

Public priorities across socio-economic groupings

We disaggregated the responses relating to public priorities along the categories of economic class, caste and religion. The trends in priority across economic class mirrored the pattern that was earlier observed for issue preference. Respondents

belonging to the lower class expected the government to prioritize social and physical infrastructure as well as poverty, while the upper classes gave more priority to unemployment.

Across caste groups, we find a consistent priority to government intervention in the area of employment generation. Infrastructure is another area that was frequently cited by respondents from all castes, though there is variation in the kinds of infrastructure demanded. While the dominant castes and Dalits give priority to social infrastructure, Adivasis tend to prefer physical infrastructure, as illustrated in the Figure 4a.3.

There is notable variation across states with regard to the public priorities of Dalits and Adivasis. While Dalits from Odisha and Karnataka give more attention to social infrastructure, in Haryana and Gujarat they prefer that government focus on unemployment. Similarly, we find that larger shares of Adivasis from Odisha and Karnataka prioritized social and physical infrastructure relative to the other states.

Table 4a.4: Public priorities of Muslims and Christians

	Physical infrastructure	Social infrastructure	Unemployment	Price rise	Poverty	Law & order
Muslim	9	11	20	3	7	4
Christian	15	16	11	4	10	4

Note: All figures are in percent.

Along religious lines also there is perceptible difference, as shown in Table 4a.4. We find that Muslim respondents give much higher priority to employment than the average respondent. Likewise the emphasis on the government to provide physical and social infrastructure is much higher for Christians. This finding has to be qualified for cross-state differences in the responses, particularly because the minority population is unevenly spread across the four states. For instance, the thrust for government facilitated employment by Muslims is high for Gujarat, Haryana and Odisha, but curiously not so high for Muslims in Karnataka, where they prioritize physical and social infrastructure. It is instructive that the cross-state variations in Muslim priority for employment mirror the trend in the population, although in aggregate terms Muslims give higher priority to employment generation.

In summary, this section on citizen preferences and public priorities reveals many different patterns that are worthy of close attention. Firstly, we find that when asked to identify the most important national issue, most people respond and reveal a clear choice. Less than a quarter of respondents cited the more proximate issue of demonetisation but a large number of respondents are worried about the chronic issues of unemployment, infrastructure and poverty. We find considerable variation in preferences across states, with respondents in Haryana showing high preference for unemployment, while in Karnataka and Odisha respondents were more concerned about poverty. The preference variation across socio-economic categories is also instructive. This is particularly visible in the case of class, where the lower class revealed an issue preference for infrastructure and poverty, while the upper class respondents mention about unemployment, demonetisation and corruption. A contrast is also observed between the responses of Dalits/

Adivasis and the upper castes. With regard to religion, we find that minority communities such as Muslims and Christians consider demonetisation to be the most important issue.

We find similar patterns in the public priorities reported by respondents, although the number of 'no responses' was high (about a third). Unemployment, social infrastructure and physical infrastructure top the list in that order. It is, however, revealing that two issues, demonetisation and poverty, that are high on the preference list are cited by fewer respondents as the most important public priority. This could provide clues to how citizens perceive the role of the government within the altering public-private governance landscape in India.

4. B. Access to public services

The earlier section drew out the opinions of respondents on what they believe should be the priorities for the government of the day. These priorities could spring from an ideological orientation towards what a government should or should not do, but in the Indian context it seems more plausible that they were influenced by their exposure to practical issues of governance in their 'everyday' life. This section attempts to bring light to some aspects relating to the day-to-day experiences of citizens with governance, with particular focus on citizen access to public services.

There are more than one dimensions to access, and in this report we cover two dimensions: (1) Access to information about the services, and (2) Access to services. These two dimensions form two ends in the chain of public service delivery. Lack of information regarding a public service would quite naturally exclude a large number of people from even knowing about the service or what they may expect from it. But even if they know what to expect, the limited capacities of the public

machinery may not be able to deliver as per their expectations. The present study has gathered factual and opinion data from citizens regarding their experience with accessing public services.

Access to information

We asked respondents whether they heard of specific government schemes and if they had availed of these schemes. Table 4a.1 presents the state-wise breakup of responses reflecting an awareness of schemes.

We find that a very high number of respondents, 8 out of 10, are aware of various government schemes. The overall awareness was highest for the educational scholarship scheme and least for the skill development programmes. Across states, we find that awareness was relatively low in Gujarat, but very high in the case of Karnataka and Odisha. Further, awareness was high across respondents from different socio-economic categories, suggesting that access to information, at least in the form of basic awareness of schemes is not a problem. We now turn to the issues pertaining to the access to the services.

Access to services


We aggregate and report across three scheme categories: economic schemes, agricultural schemes, and social protection schemes. We find variation in beneficiaries of social protection schemes that include housing, medical insurance and educational scholarship. For instance, of those who are aware of educational scholarship schemes, two out five availed the benefits from such schemes. Almost half of the respondents from the Gujarat and Karnataka claim benefits from educational scholarships. Other than education, close to a quarter of respondents availed the benefits of both medical insurance scheme and housing scheme. The proportion of beneficiaries of medical insurance scheme is higher in Odisha compared to the other states. About 43 percent of those who had heard of this scheme had also availed the benefits. Similarly respondents from Odisha and Karnataka availed the benefits of housing schemes, with a larger proportion in the latter. Thirty eight percent of the respondents in Karnataka availed the benefits of housing scheme followed by 33 percent in Odisha (Figure 4b.1). Constructing a social

Table 4b.1: State-wise awareness about government schemes

	Gujarat	Haryana	Karnataka	Odisha	All
Housing	84	92	97	99	93
Medical insurance	80	94	96	97	91
Educational scholarship	89	95	96	95	94
Employment	83	95	99	91	92
Pension	81	98	96	99	93
Skill development	70	79	92	84	81
Accidental crop insurance	74	91	95	94	88
Crop subsidy	75	90	96	96	89
Fertilizer subsidy	76	89	95	97	89
Average awareness	79	91	96	95	90

Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 4b.1: State-wise self reported beneficiaries of policies related to social protection schemes




Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 4b.2: Index of self reported beneficiaries of social protection schemes across states

	Not at all benefitted	Benefitted from 1 scheme	Benefitted with 2 and all three schemes
Gujarat	47	40	14
Haryana	71	20	10
Karnataka	30	31	39
Odisha	41	33	27
All	46	31	23

Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 4b.2: State-wise self reported beneficiaries of economic welfare policies



Note: All figures are in percent.

protection scheme index using the above three schemes, we find that in Haryana 71 percent of the respondents have not at all benefitted from any of these schemes. On the contrary, 39 percent of the respondents in Karnataka availed at least two policies related to social protection (Table 4b.2).

The government has also introduced policies to provide both livelihood opportunities and a safety net with schemes focusing on employment, pension, and skill development. Data indicate that the highest proportion of respondents indicate benefits from pension schemes. Thirty nine

percent claimed have availed the benefits of this scheme whereas only one of five respondents avail the benefits of employment scheme. The government has initiated a scheme to train youth for more and improved employment opportunities. We find that only nine percent of respondents claim benefits from this scheme. Similar to the social protection schemes, more respondents from Karnataka claim to benefit from these economic policies. Following them, respondents from Haryana claim benefit from these economic schemes. Almost half of the respondents said that they benefit from pension schemes (Figure 4b.2). Combining the economic schemes, we find that 24 percent of the respondents from Karnataka benefit from at least two schemes, while 82 percent of respondents from Gujarat say that they do not benefit from any economic scheme (Table 4b.3).


In recent times, India has witnessed agriculture crisis due to crop failure, high production cost with low return rate and lack of basic agrarian infrastructure. Therefore, the government has introduced some policies to motivate farmers in agriculture sector such as crop subsidy, accidental crop insurance and fertilizer subsidy. While most respondents are aware of these schemes, we find state variation in awareness. For instance, a quarter of respondents in Gujarat are unaware of agricultural schemes. Once again we find that between 17 and 12 percent respondents in Karnataka and Odisha claim to benefit from two or more of these schemes, while more than 80 percent of respondents in Haryana and Gujarat indicate that they have not benefitted from any of these schemes. (Figure 4b.3 and Table 4b.4).

Table 4b.3: Index of self reported beneficiaries of economic welfare policies across states

	Not at all benefitted	benefitted from 1 scheme	benefitted with 2 and all three schemes
Gujarat	82	13	6
Haryana	47	38	16
Karnataka	34	42	24
Odisha	58	36	6
Overall	55	32	13

Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 4b.3: State-wise self reported beneficiaries of agricultural policies



Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 4b.4: Index of self reported beneficiaries of agricultural policies across states

	Not at all benefitted	Benefitted from 1 scheme	Benefitted with 2 and all three schemes
Gujarat	84	9	8
Haryana	87	6	7
Karnataka	65	17	17
Odisha	76	12	12
All	78	11	11

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 4b.5: Self reported beneficiaries of government policies by caste groups

	Social protection policies	Economic Policies	Agricultural Policies
Upper Caste	41	50	19
Dominant caste	48	51	29
Upper OBC	57	35	27
Lower OBC	59	53	30
Dalit	62	48	17
Adivasi	65	35	24
Muslims	45	35	10
Christian	66	67	18

Note: All figures are in percent.

A pertinent question which needs to be answered here is if these policies are meeting goals through providing the benefits to the targeted population. While analyzing the social-economic background of the beneficiaries of these policies, we find that among various castes and communities, Muslims benefit the least from all these schemes. However, marginal caste groups – Dalit, Adivasis and lower OBCs report getting benefits from social protection schemes but not from the economic schemes. An interesting point is that upper OBCs (along with lower OBCs) are more likely to report benefits from agricultural schemes rather than economic schemes (Table 4b.5).

We also find that the exclusion of Muslims is not consistent in all states. Muslims in Karnataka report benefits from all three types of schemes. On the other hand, Muslims in Gujarat report benefits from schemes such as housing, medical insurance and educational scholarship but not

from economic and agricultural schemes.

Overall, Adivasis and Dalits report benefits from policies related to social protection basic amenities but less so from economic policies. However, two out of three Adivasis in Karnataka report benefit from economic policies. On the other hand, three of five Dalits in Haryana report not having received benefits from social protection schemes but about half report benefitting from economic policies.

Four out of five respondents report not benefitting from agriculture policies. While examining the relationship between beneficiaries and land-ownership, we find that about thirty-five percent of owner cultivators and twenty-two percent of tenant cultivators report having received benefits from agricultural schemes such as crop insurance, crop and fertilizer subsidy. However, seven out of ten owner cultivators in Haryana, Gujarat

and Odisha report not having availed benefits from agricultural policies, but half of the owner cultivators in Karnataka claimed to avail these benefits (Table 4b.6).

Table 4b.6: State-wise owner cultivators who availed the benefits of agricultural schemes

	Not at all benefitted	Benefitted from 1 scheme	Benefitted with 2 and all three schemes
Gujarat	70	16	15
Haryana	71	14	15
Karnataka	53	23	24
Odisha	73	15	11

Note: All figures are in percent.

While looking at the economic class of the respondents, it was observed that poor are the least beneficiaries of these schemes. Basically, all these policies were made keeping poor section of society in mind, yet they are not getting the fruits of these policies. Similarly, non-literates and people having less education have not received the benefits of all these schemes, while the better educated respondents report benefits from these schemes.

People's experience in availing services

People face different experiences while availing public services like healthcare facilitates education, electricity, water and sanitation. For some sections of society, availing these services is easy whereas some find it difficult. Therefore, it

becomes important to see whether these services are equally distributed among people or only privileged sections of the societies are getting it. In the survey, we ask people to share their experience about availing these services. Overall, getting admission for a child in government school was the easiest in all states but people shared different experiences in availing services such as getting medical treatment in government hospitals, sanitation, electricity and water connection.

In Haryana, availing medical treatment in government hospitals was more difficult whereas in Odisha and Karnataka availing this service was comparatively easier. However, in Odisha disposing garbage was the difficult task. Only 37 percent of the respondents from Odisha say it is easy, whereas in Haryana and Karnataka about 65 percent and 61 percent, respectively, say it is easy. Overall, 60 percent of the respondents say that getting an electricity connection is easy and responses are similar in each state except Haryana where 47 percent say it is easy. Getting water connections is reported to be a difficult task in Odisha, with only two out of five respondents saying easy. We also find that for every third person availing water connection is difficult (Table 4b.7).


We create an index of 'access to public services' merging the responses of those who said availing aforesaid services was easy. Overall 9 percent of respondents said availing these services was not at all easy whereas 19 percent said it was very easy. About 17 percent of respondents in Gujarat report difficulties in availing services. On the contrary, availing services is easiest in Karnataka,

Table 4b.7: Easy access to public services

	Admission in a government school	Medical treatment in government hospitals	Garbage collection	Electricity connection	Water connection
Gujarat	85	68	57	63	65
Haryana	89	53	65	47	60
Karnataka	89	73	61	63	66
Odisha	94	74	37	65	41
All	89	67	57	60	59

Note: All figures are percentage. Very easy and easy answer categories are merged together. Never tried and no response were excluded.

Figure 4b.4: Index of access to public services



Note: All figures are percentage. Index was created after counting the score of those who said it was easy to avail these services.

and 29 percent of the respondents support this view. However, in Odisha availing these services was not as easy as Karnataka. Only 9 percent of respondents from Odisha said availing services was very easy (Figure 4b.4).

Table 4b.8: Experience of service delivery across people from socio-economic background

	Easy access to public services
Rural	57
Urban	65
Non-literate	46
Upto primary	60
Upto matric	65
College & above	69
Poor	50
Lower	60
Middle	64
Upper	65

Note: All figures are in percent


Availing these services is found to be easy in urban relative to rural areas. Sixty five percent of the respondents from urban localities said that availing these services was either easy or very easy whereas 57 percent from rural areas said the

same, an 8 percentage point difference. However, in urban Haryana availing these services is found to be more difficult than in rural areas. Other factors such as level of education, economic class and caste-community of the respondents also have an impact on their experience in availing public services. Data suggest that availing public services is easier for people belonging to upper class and those who are highly educated. Forty six percent of the non-literate said that availing public services was easy or very easy whereas 69 percent of the college educated asserted that it was easy or very easy to avail services. Similarly, half of the respondents said it was easy to avail public services while 65 percent of the upper class respondents said the same (Table 4b.8).

Social group a person belong to also play a role in receiving public services. For a person who is placed high on social ladder, found it easy to avail these services; while marginal sections of the society did not get these public services easily.

Data indicate that getting public services is more difficult for Adivasis. Only 6 percent of them said it was very easy to obtain public services while 19 percent said it was very difficult (Figure 4b.5). Almost two out of five Adivasis in Gujarat said it was very difficult for them to get services and similar feeling is shared by Adivasis of Odisha as most of them say their experience was not very positive. On the other, Adivasis from Karnataka do not report facing difficulty while obtaining public services.

Figure 4b.5: Experience of service delivery by castes/communities in states



Note: All figures are in percent

Whom to approach to get work done?

Various political and non-political actors play a role, in one way or another, in providing public services; and citizens seek help from them to get their work done. However, from the survey it is evident that people approach politician/political actors to get their work done more than community leaders. More likely, they approach their councilor or sarpanch to get their work done if they face any difficulty. A little more than one third of the total respondents preferred councilor or sarpanch to approach to get their work done and six percent said they will approach their MLA. Only one percent of them were willing to approach their MP. To substantiate this point we can infer data of trust in various institutions. Data indicates that people have more trust in local government/bodies than upper bodies.

There are state level variations on these responses. For instance, in Karnataka people prefer local political leaders over elected leaders. However, in Karnataka proportionally more people said they approach their MLA if they want their work to be got done. Only 15 percent said that they approach councilor or sarpanch. Fifty seven percent from Odisha and 47 percent from Haryana said that they would approach councilor or sarpanch. Fourteen percent of respondents from Odisha also asserted that they would approach elder outside their families and 8 percent in Haryana said the same. A deviation in responses could be seen in Gujarat, where 28 percent of the respondents prefer approaching community members such as caste-community

leaders and elderly in community and about a quarter of respondents said they would approach others (Table 4b.9). In rural society people prefer to approach sarpanch and local political leader whereas in urban localities, preference is given to government official and other references. Economic class of the respondents also has an impact on their preferences. People from poor economic class preferred to approach sarpanch/councilor and caste-community elderly or leaders whereas upper classes try to approach government officials or use other sources to get their work done. As compared to poor, upper class people have preferred to approach MP and MLA. When we look at the caste communities of the respondents, Muslim compared to other communities approach communities leaders or elderly to get work done.

Table 4b.9: Political and non-political sources, people approach for getting work done

	MP	MLA	Councilor/sarpanch	Caste/religious leader	Elder outside your family
Gujarat	1	3	27	18	10
Haryana	1	6	47	1	8
Karnataka	3	12	15	10	10
Odisha	0	1	57	6	14
Overall	1	6	36	10	11

Note: All figures are in percent. Rest no response

4. C. Economic governance

In the post-reform era, no policy issue has come to dominate the political landscape as has the economic governance of land. The constant demand for land in order to build large-scale infrastructure projects such as roads, waterways, dams, power plants, and accumulate other forms of physical capital such as factories generally considered to generate employment and increase standards of living, often contends with the willingness of farmers to give up their land. Given the economic and symbolic attachment of farmers to their land as well as the significance of rural constituencies to political leaders during elections, addressing the issue of rights over (agricultural) land, and the boundaries of eminent domain emerge as central tasks of economic governance between elections.

At the heart of the debates on land acquisition lies the scope of eminent domain powers exerted by the state. Does democratic governance imply self-imposed limits to the boundaries of eminent domain? Or does the state have the rights to acquire privately owned land without consent for projects deemed 'developmental' or in the 'national interest'? In India, comprehensive reform in land acquisition was passed in the form of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (2013), replacing the colonial era law, the Land Acquisition Act (1894). In contrast to the 1894 law, the 2013 Act narrowly defines 'public purpose,' or the types of projects for which land (including multi-cropped land) can be acquired. It requires the consent of 70-80 percent of landowners if the project is for a private company or a public-private partnership.

The level of compensation is set at two to four times the prevailing market prices, and the 2013 Act also prescribes a set of minimum norms for the resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons. Additionally, a social impact assessment (SIA) in order to determine the potential benefits and the social costs is made mandatory. A recent amendment, The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Second Amendment) Bill, introduced in 2015 modifies certain provisions of the 2013 Act.

Most significantly, the Amendment exempts the following categories of projects from certain provisions of the 2013 Act: (i) defence, (ii) rural

infrastructure, (iii) affordable housing, (iv) industrial corridors, and (v) infrastructure including PPPs where the government owns the land. While the 2013 Act greatly curtailed the powers of eminent domain, the 2015 Amendment seeks to expand the same. Since land acquisition is a concurrent subject, several states have also enacted laws to regulate land acquisition. Gujarat for instance, was one of the first states to modify the 2013 Act in line with provisions in the 2015 Amendment. Yet, a succession of protests across states by local farmers, unions, and activists suggests significant opposition to the proposed amendment, limiting the ability of several other states that have actively sought to bring changes to the laws governing land acquisition.

While there are multiple accounts of popular opposition to land acquisition by the state across the states in India, little is known about how citizens perceive the validity of actions undertaken by the state, what they think are legitimate forms of popular resistance toward state action that involves land appropriation, and acceptable state responses to opposition. We examine these issues using a set of six questions: (a) should local villagers give up their land in the larger interest of development? (b) should the government should be allowed to acquire fertile agricultural land? (c) should local villagers be allowed to continue their protest in a peaceful manner? (d) should the local villagers be allowed to resist the government by violent methods? (e) should these disputes should be settled by the court? (f) should the government be allowed to use force to displace locals?

The responses to this set of questions range from 'fully agree' to 'fully disagree,' and measure a set of opinions on: states' rights of land acquisition, peaceful and violent forms of resistance to land acquisition, and finally, the mechanisms of conflict resolution: institutional or use of force. Each of these sets of questions reflects public opinion on the boundaries of eminent domain, whether expansive and favoring the state or narrow, limiting state authority over acquisition of private, and particularly agricultural, land. We combine the six questions into three indices that broadly capture the above dimensions of public opinion on the scope of state authority. As with other indices reported in this volume, the index measures the degree of agreement for a respondent across these sets of two questions.

We then examine the variation in these indices across states, location (whether urban or rural) and occupational status, with a focus on agricultural labor and land ownership. The overall proportions suggest that little more than a third of respondents favor a moderate position on the powers of state action. That is, they occupy a position that accords a conditional expansion of eminent domain. About a third of respondents support a strong liberal position calling for a limit on state authority over land acquisition. The most support for expansive state power exists in Haryana followed by Karnataka and Odisha (Table 4c.1). This result appears to support a view that the rapid urbanization and concomitant growth in land prices around the National Capital Region has increased the willingness of agricultural land owners in Haryana to hold the position supportive of land acquisition. The greatest support for limiting the scope of state authority is found in

Odisha. About 38 percent of respondents support a strong economic liberal position that stresses individual economic rights over state control. One possible explanation is that the presence of a relatively large Adivasi population, among the most affected groups as their livelihoods are located on mineral rich lands, has a significant impact on public opinion. Support for an expanded state is lowest in Gujarat, while close to a third of respondents don't express an opinion.


We do not find large differences across rural and urban respondents. As we expect, urban respondents are more likely to favor a state that has power to acquire land, including fertile agricultural land, for development projects. However, this difference is about 3 percentage points. Similar to the previous results, close to a third of respondents support a moderate position on these issues (Figure 4c.1).

Table 4c.1: State-wise opinion on state authority over land acquisition

	Strong liberal	Moderate	Weak liberal
Gujarat	33	25	15
Haryana	8	48	35
Karnataka	36	34	25
Odisha	38	32	24
All	30	34	24


Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

Figure 4c.1: Opinion on state authority over land acquisition by location



Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

Figure 4c.2: Opinion on state authority over land acquisition by occupation



Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

Table 4c.2: State-wise opinion on rights of the locals to protest against state actions to acquire land

	Strong liberal	Moderate	Weak liberal
Gujarat	20	41	11
Haryana	33	45	9
Karnataka	48	31	15
Odisha	17	61	13
All	30	44	12

Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

An obvious lens through which to view responses to land acquisition is the occupational category to which the respondent belongs. We expect to observe differences in responses across occupational categories, especially in agriculture. Owner cultivators are likely to occupy a different position on state authority relative to tenant cultivators or agricultural wage labor. Similarly, respondents in non-agro based occupations are also likely to exhibit preferences different from those in agrarian occupations.

Our expectations are only partially borne out. We find that across agricultural occupation groups, the lowest proportion of respondents adopting a strong liberal position is among tenant cultivators. The same group also has the highest proportion of respondents supporting an expanded eminent domain. We suspect that the non-landowning status of tenant cultivators likely influences their position. That is, tenant cultivators are more likely to perceive greater security where the state is involved in significant ways. However, we find that agricultural labor, a group that likely faces

similar insecurities as tenant cultivators, instead support a strong liberal position. About a third of agricultural labor supports a limited role for the state and only about nineteen percent adopt a weak liberal position.

We don't observe a large difference between owner-cultivators and agricultural labor. About a quarter respondents among owner cultivators support the view that that state has the right to acquire land i.e. a weak economic liberal position. While close to a third of owner cultivators and agricultural labor support limiting eminent domain, less than a fourth of respondents from other non-agricultural occupations support this view. We also find that between 33 and 35 percent of the respondents favor a moderate view suggesting support for a partial expansion of state authority (Figure 4c.2).

The second index we constructed includes questions on the extent of support to peaceful and violent forms of resistance from local villagers. This measures the extent to which respondents support the rights of the local residents to protest

state actions aimed at acquiring land. Individuals agreeing on both question i.e. those who support all forms of resistance, violent and peaceful, are considered strong liberal. Respondents disagreeing with both are labeled weak liberal. Those who agree with one question but not the other are moderate liberal.

Again, we are guided by the intuition that those who support the rights of farmers and the affected groups to express discontent through protest favor preserving individual rights over state authority over those rights. Those not supporting the rights to protest are assumed to support a view that cedes a space occupied by individual rights to state authority. Once again, we find that the bulk of respondents express a moderate view. About 44 percent of the respondents support one form of protest, and we find that more respondents support the right of farmers to protest peacefully over violent resistance.

While close to a third of respondents support protests, both peaceful and violent, only about 12 percent of respondents are opposed to all forms of resistance. This suggests that respondents in the four states again express conditional support for protests against land acquisition by the state. When we consider cross-state variation, we find that the most support for rights to protest in Karnataka.


Close to half the respondents adopt a strong liberal position i.e. support both peaceful and violent forms of protest. One possible explanation is that the presence of a high number of Special Economic Zones in Karnataka influences a relatively stronger liberal attitude among respondents in the state. This is relatively low in Gujarat and Odisha

(between 17% and 20%), but close to a third of respondents in Haryana. With the exception of Karnataka we find that the largest proportions of respondents in the other three states occupy the moderate position. Close to two thirds of respondents in Odisha adopt the middle ground, and support one form of protest, and the numbers are large in Gujarat (41%) and Haryana as well (45%). Opposition to all forms of resistance is relatively low across all states ranging from about 15 percent in Karnataka to 9 percent in Haryana.

This suggests that respondents across all four states broadly support the view that farmers and those affected adversely by policy are within their rights to protest against the actions of the state. When observed across occupational categories, we find that almost a third of owner cultivators support both peaceful and violent forms of protest. The proportion of respondents who are agricultural workers supporting a strong liberal position is also about third.

We find that the opposition to all forms of protest, i.e respondents adopting a weak liberal position does not exceed 12 percent. Once again we find relatively similar proportions of owner cultivators and agricultural wage labor adopting a weak liberal position. Across all occupational categories the largest proportion of respondents falls in the moderate liberal category (Figure 4c.3). Then we examine responses across location, we find a similar pattern of large proportions in the middle for both urban and rural respondents. Support for both forms of protests is marginally greater among rural respondents. However, opposition to all forms of protest is relatively low across both types of respondents, about 13 percent or less (Table 4c.3).

Figure 4c.3: Opinion on rights of the locals to protest against state actions to acquire land by occupation




Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

Table 4c.3: Opinion on rights of the locals to protest against state actions to acquire land by location

	Strong Liberal	Moderate	Weak Liberal
Rural	31	43	11
Urban	28	47	13

Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

Figure 4c.4: State-wise preference for institutional dispute resolution



Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

The third index captures the degree of support for institutional forms of conflict resolution over land acquisition that involves the use of force. This measures the extent to which respondents prefer to use the courts for dispute resolution and their preference for land acquisition without the use of force by the state, i.e. agree with the question that institutions such as courts should be used for mediating conflicts, and disagree with the question that the state should be allowed to use force.

The index ranges from a weak preference for institutional resolution to strong preference. A weak preference suggests that respondents support the use of force by the state in land acquisition and do not support a legal recourse (i.e. agree that the state should be allowed to use force and disagree that courts be involved). As before, we label the weak institutional support position as weak liberal. A moderate preference suggests that a respondent prefers either a court based resolution or the non-use of force in land acquisition i.e. one of the two, and a strong preference indicates that the respondent prefers both. These are labeled moderate and strong liberal.

Our reasoning is that strong liberal ideas are characterized by a preference for institutional mechanisms that check state authority while a weak liberal position allows for expansive state action including the use of force in order to implement policy and resolve conflicts. Note that a respondent's preference for the non-use of force (and a preference to not have a court based outcome) does not directly suggest support for an institutional resolution but only indirectly so. We assume that the preference for a non-violent approach to conflict resolution involves an expectation of a certain degree of institutional involvement. However, we do acknowledge that the empirical measures do not fit in cleanly with the theoretical concepts of political and economic liberalism.

We find that overall more than three-quarter of respondents hold a moderate to strong preference for institutional dispute resolution i.e. are either moderate or strong liberal. That is, these respondents are more likely to support the role of courts in resolving disputes and a peaceful, likely consultative process of land acquisition.

About six percent of respondents express a weak institutional preference, that is support the use of force by the state to acquire land, and not support courts as conflict adjudicators.

The variation is similar across all four states. Larger proportions of respondents can be identified as adopting a strong liberal position. The highest proportion is in Odisha where little more than half the respondents express strong institutional preferences. The lowest share is in Gujarat, which is still close to a third of respondents. Respondents in Haryana and Karnataka also support a strong institutionalist position on dispute resolution (Figure 4c.4).

When looking across occupational categories we find that just more than half of tenant-cultivator respondents exhibit a strong institutional preference, followed by respondents from non-agricultural occupations. There is a ten percentage point difference between these two groups. While about 36 percent of agricultural workers support a strong institutional position, among the four groups they represent the lowest proportion. However, their numbers are very similar to those of owner cultivators a pattern observed earlier (Table 4c.4).

Interestingly we find a difference among rural and urban respondents with regard to these preferences. More numbers of urban respondents are likely to express a strong preference for institutions compared to rural respondents, and this difference is about 6 percentage points. However small but equal proportions, less than five percent, of both types of respondents support weak institutionalist position.

4. D. Institutions and trust

Constitutional democracies thrive when their institutions enjoy high levels of popular trust. An erosion of trust in public institutions can have serious repercussions on the quality of democracy. While previous surveys have shown varying degrees of trust in political institutions in India, in this section we explore how trust is distributed across various institutions, and to what extent socially diverse classes and communities trust institutions. This functions as a central indicator of perceptions of integration and equal treatment. Further, we assess and review whether levels of trust vary significantly across the states and explore how we may explain these variations. We first ask whether trust in institutions varies across the institutional and democratic pedigree

Table 4c.4: Preference for institutional dispute resolution by occupation

	Strong Liberal	Moderate	Weak Liberal
Owner-Cultivator	38	42	6
Tenant-Cultivator	51	26	4
Agricultural Labor	36	40	7
Other non-Agriculture	41	38	5

Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

Table 4c.5: Preference for institutional dispute resolution by location

	Strong Liberal	Moderate	Weak Liberal
Rural	38	39	6
Urban	44	36	6

Note: All figures are in percent. Rest did not express their opinion.

across the states surveyed. Then we look into effective, procedural, and distributive fairness of the institutions as potential explanatory factors. The Table 4d.1 shows the effective trust in elected institutions. ‘Effective trust’ was constructed by subtracting the number of respondents who claimed to have ‘No trust at all’ from those who claimed to have a ‘Great deal of trust’. This seeks to understand a ‘net’ level of trust that these political institutions enjoy. A quick look at the effective trust enjoyed by institutions confirms that the Army enjoys the highest levels of trust among all the institutions compared with just about 2 in 10 respondents expressing any doubts about the institution. The executive government actors led by the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister enjoy high trust by a little more than half the respondents and a little more than a third of respondents respectively. Gram Panchayats and Nagar Palikas, which exercise executive powers and function as a deliberative assembly, enjoy higher levels of trust than the Parliament and State Assembly.

The Election Commission which in previous surveys enjoyed exceptionally high levels of public trust in India has witnessed a significant decline in the four states surveyed. On average the lowest levels of trust is seen among Government Officials, Police and Political Parties. This is interesting in light of following sections on effectiveness and fairness, where government officials and police, generally enjoy higher levels of trust than the courts. However, remarkably, the District Commissioner and the Tehsildar enjoy much higher levels of trust than the other executive functionaries. Political parties suffer from the lowest levels of public trust across all state and political institutions though this shows considerable variation across the four states surveyed (Table 4d.2).

Significantly, trust in the court system extended almost uniformly across the levels starting with the Supreme Court down to the District Court. Interesting variations can be seen across the states with Haryana and Odisha holding highest levels of trust and Gujarat the least (Table 4d.3).

Table 4d.1: Effective trust in elected institutions

	President	Prime Minister	Chief Minister	Gram Panchayat/ Nagar Palika	Parliament	State Assembly
Gujarat	23	28	19	32	15	22
Haryana	50	70	50	43	36	41
Karnataka	42	58	23	37	33	23
Odisha	41	58	51	38	27	39
All	39	53	35	38	28	30

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 4d.2: Effective trust in non-elected institutions

	National Army	Election Commission	Police	Government Officials	District Collector	Tehsildar	Political Party
Gujarat	73	23	-10	-1	32	29	-11
Haryana	96	37	-16	-6	38	21	-18
Karnataka	74	22	-4	3	42	34	4
Odisha	81	36	15	17	44	42	-5
All	81	29	-3	4	39	32	-7

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 4d.3: Effective trust in judicial institutions

	Supreme Court	High Court	District Court
Gujarat	45	34	28
Haryana	73	65	59
Karnataka	51	39	34
Odisha	69	65	57
All	59	50	44

Note: All figures are in percent.

We see interesting variations in trust decreasing as we move across various institutions. Gujarat consistently shows lower levels of trust in all institutions irrespective of whether they are democratic elected or unelected institutions. Haryana consistently show high levels of trust across most institutions. Odisha shows a great degree of trust in both the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister’s office, rather than any other institutions except the Army. The level of trust in the chief minister’s office may be indicative of a stable run of Naveen Patnaik’s regime. Gujarat poses surprisingly variations in its trust Prime Minister and Chief Minister, compared to the Parliament and State Assembly. For the office of President, Gujarat has the lowest level of trust and Haryana the highest with Karnataka and Odisha reflect middling levels of trust. Karnataka also, interestingly, shows the largest gap in trust between the office of Prime Minister, and the office of Chief Minister.

Among the states, Karnataka has the highest level of trust in all levels of the court, while Gujarat has the lowest. While Haryana and Odisha are almost on par when it comes to their trust in the Supreme Court, one finds that Haryana is less likely to trust the district court, as compared to Odisha, whose trust levels remain consistent across levels. There is a stark erosion in the level of trust enjoyed as we move across army, election commission and political parties. The largest decrease is seen in Haryana with 65 percentage point between Army and Political Parties.

It appears from the study that out of the four states polled, Odisha has the highest level of trust in the police. Interestingly, this is also the state with the highest number of Adivasis. While Karnataka and Haryana are on par, in terms of

their levels of trust in the police, Gujarat polled significantly lower. With respect to Odisha, findings stayed consistently high with regard to corresponding trust in the government officials, while trust levels increased marginally for Karnataka and significantly in Haryana. Interestingly, Gujarat, which has a slightly lower state GDP than Karnataka, has significantly less trust in both its police and government officials.

Trust in police, government officials and judiciary

In order to explore the patterns of trust further, the survey asked respondents to evaluate four statements for each institution, namely Police, Courts and Government Official. The statements for police and government officials were structured along four themes, two positive assertions including respectful interaction, quick action and two negative: undue influence by political parties, corruption with regard to bribes. For the courts, while the tenor of the statements remained the same, quick action and respectful comportment was replaced with whether innocence or guilt of individuals would play a role in sentencing. The latter statement effectively interrogates the perceived corruption of the courts.

statements show contradictions in the perceived trust and corresponding effectiveness of institutions. For example, while a large number of respondents across the states believe that the police and government officials would take quick action if citizens encounter a problem, they also have low expectations of being treated with respect in their interactions with public institutions. While the police and bureaucracy, enjoy similar levels of trust, respondents continue

to believe that these institutions are compromised by bribes and political parties. The state-wise variations mirror this paradox. For instance, high proportions of respondents in Karnataka believe that the police are both effective as well as corrupt (i.e. take bribes). Among the states, Odisha and Karnataka had the highest proportion of respondents who believe that the police are both effective and procedurally fair, while far fewer respondents in Haryana believe the same. When it comes to judicial effectiveness and procedural fairness, 9 out of 10 respondents in Gujarat believe that innocent people are likely to be convicted and that the guilty go free. This is consistent with previous tables where Gujarat demonstrated lower levels of trust in the courts compared to the other three states. A relatively high proportion of respondents in Gujarat and Karnataka believe that courts are compromised by political parties and politicians. On the other hand, relatively high proportion of respondents in Haryana indicate faith in the effectiveness and procedural fairness of the courts, followed by Odisha.


Nine out of ten respondents in Odisha believe that government officials respond to people’s problems and about 7 in 10 believe that they treat people with respect. In contrast, Gujarat has the lowest proportion of respondents who view government

officials as responsive, and Haryana which saw the lowest numbers with regard to responsiveness of government officials and Haryana registers the lowest proportion on on the question of respect towards citizens.

The responses of the effectiveness and procedural fairness statements for Police, Courts and Government Officials were aggregated for each institution in order to create an index of institutional effectiveness and procedural fairness (IEP). The responses were aggregated in terms of positive and negative affirmations and indexed into three perception groups: Negative, Somewhat Positive and Positive. The findings show the proportion of the respondents that held largely positive perception of various institutions.

A quick look at the results shows that on average courts are generally perceived more positively than government officials or the police. While the perception levels are rather consistent across states and institutions, Haryana sees a spike with respect to courts. Gujarat consistently has the lowest number in positive perception of police, government officials and courts. Interestingly, these results align with levels of trust that we see across institutions in Gujarat (Figure 4d.1).

Figure 4d.1: Distribution of perceptions of effectiveness and procedural fairness of police, court and government officials



Note: All figures are in percent. The respondents not captured in the bar graphs either responded with ‘Somewhat Positive’ or ‘Negative’ perception of effectiveness and procedural fairness.

Table 4d.4: Distribution of perceptions of effectiveness and procedural fairness of the institutions by caste groups

		Police	Courts	Government officials
Dalit	Gujarat	3	5	4
	Haryana	7	15	6
	Karnataka	3	1	3
	Odisha	9	10	4
	All	7	10	6
Adivasi	Gujarat	1	1	1
	Karnataka	1	4	2
	Odisha	5	9	6
	All	2	4	3
Muslims	Gujarat	2	2	1
	Haryana	3	18	2
	Karnataka	5	6	3
	Odisha	6	9	8
	All	5	12	5

Note: All figures are in percent.

In contrast to general levels of positive perceptions among the bureaucracy, courts and police, the results are more nuanced when we look at the historically disadvantaged populations of Dalit, Adivasi and Muslim. The survey shows that the courts fare much better than the police or government officials consistently, except for Dalits in Karnataka and Adivasis of Gujarat. The survey finds that, on average, Dalits are more positively disposed to all three institutions, compared to the other communities. Dalit and Muslims in Haryana in particular have higher levels of confidence in the courts, compared to the same populations in other states. Since Haryana has no known Adivasi population, the sample did not contain any Adivasis and hence there are no results. In contrast, Odisha which has the highest number of Adivasi respondents (432 respondents), compared to other states, generally showed a more positive disposition to the institutions. Curiously, Gujarat consistently had the least positive perceptions across institutions and has the highest proportion of No Opinion responses for Adivasis (65%) and Muslims (44%). Furthermore, of the 317 Adivasi respondents in Gujarat, only 1 person had a very positive perception of the institutions. (Table

4d.4) The survey also finds that the proportion of respondents with a positive perception of courts increases across levels of education (non-literate to college-educated) in three states, Gujarat excepted. Four out of five college respondents in Gujarat perceive courts as ineffective and procedurally unfair. However, the relationship between literacy and positive perception is not as distinct for the other institutions.

Distributive fairness

The perception of equal treatment among communities is often considered as either a cause or consequence of institutional trust. Distributive fairness is especially important for marginalised or minority groups in society since impartial treatment may relate to 'perceived legitimacy' of various institutions. Perception of distributive fairness of the institutions is captured using questions on preferential or equal treatment by Police, Courts and Government Officials. Respondents were asked which group (rich or poor; Hindu or non-Hindu) would be treated better or whether both groups will receive equal treatment. The survey results show the perception

of procedural fairness of the different institutions often translates to corresponding levels of trust. However, in unpacking questions of distributive fairness, results suggest that higher a respondent is on the social hierarchy, more likely is this respondent to hold the view that people are treated equally by public institutions. In addition, communities inclined to believe that they are recipients of preferential treatment are likely to hold this view for all institutions.

The survey finds that perception of equal treatment by police is highest, on average, between Men-Women and Hindu-Non-Hindu compared to any other group-pair. With respect to preferential treatment of marginalised communities, about 3 in 10 respondents believe that women are treated better than men by the police. State-wise breakdown of the numbers show that this perception of women being treated better is largest in Haryana with 4 out of 10 respondents subscribing to it. Interestingly, Karnataka, which has the least number for the same perception, has the highest proportion of respondents with the belief that both men and women are treated equally by the police (Figure 4d.2).


More than half the respondents believe that both Hindus and Non-Hindus are treated equally by the Police and a drastically smaller number stated that the Non-Hindu communities are treated better. Among the states, Odisha has the highest numbers for perceived equal treatment of Hindus and Non-Hindus (close to 7 out of 10 respondents), however one finds that consistently more than half the respondents of each state subscribe to the same. Within Rich-Poor group pair, one finds the

lowest number of respondents who perceive equal treatment and preferential treatment of the poor.

Furthermore, Karnataka has a relatively higher proportion of respondents who believe that the disadvantaged group will be treated better (except in the Men-Women pair where Haryana has the highest), especially with regard to Dalits being treated better by the Police in the state. According to the caste census of Karnataka, taken in 2011, Scheduled castes also form the biggest caste group in this state.


With respect to courts, the results show a significant increase in average proportion of respondents who believe both groups will receive equal treatment across all states and group-pairs compared to police and government officials. This could perhaps be attributed to the idea of neutrality and fairness that is associated with the judicial system. The highest percentage point increase between police and courts is seen in Rich-Poor pair (17% points) followed by Upper Caste-Dalit pair (13% points). Across all pair groups, Odisha has the highest proportion of respondents who believe that both groups will be treated equally. Similar to the trend in police, Karnataka has the highest proportion of respondents who believe that the minority or disadvantaged community received better treatment, particularly Dalit populations which remains consistent with its belief in preferential treatment with respect to the police. The number of respondents who believe that women receive preferential treatment has declined significantly for courts vis-a-vis the other institutions (Figure 4d.3).

Figure 4d.2: Preferential treatment by police




Note: All figures in percent.

Figure 4d.3: Preferential treatment by courts



Note: All figures are in percent.

Figure 4d. 4: Preferential treatment by government officials



Note: All figures are in percent.

On average, the proportion of respondents who believe that government officials treat disadvantaged communities better or that they treat both communities equally is more or less similar to the patterns observed for the police. In the case of treatment of women by government officials, results show an increase in number in respondents who believe that there will be equal treatment of men and women and a decrease in those who perceive preferential treatment of women. Similar to police and courts, Karnataka has a higher proportion of respondents who believe that the marginalised groups receive preferential treatment, across all groups especially for Dalits. Odisha has the highest proportion of respondents who believe that both groups are treated equally across categories while Gujarat has the most “No Opinion” responses among the states (Figure 4d.4).

Rich or poor

The survey finds that the rich are perceived to be treated better across all institutions. Table 4d.5 analyses the effect of class on perceptions of preferential treatment. The Tables show that majority of the respondents across classes believe that state institutions would mete out preferential treatment according to income and class with larger proportion of respondents holding the perception that rich will be treated better. The belief that both groups will be treated equally increases almost linearly with class. One notices that the richer classes tend to have higher numbers of respondents who believe that rich and poor are treated equally. The highest numbers of equal treatment perception is with respect to courts and specifically the upper class.

Table 4d.5: Opinion on preferential treatment of poor or equal treatment by public institution across economic class

	Police			Courts			Government Officials		
	Poor	Equal	Don't Know	Poor	Equal	Don't Know	Poor	Equal	Don't Know
Poor	3	14	8	2	27	20	2	16	11
Lower	2	17	7	2	32	12	2	19	8
Middle	3	17	6	2	35	10	3	20	6
Upper	5	20	4	5	40	6	6	22	4
All	3	17	6	3	34	12	3	19	7

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table 4d.6: Opinion on preferential treatment of Dalit or equal treatment by public institution across caste groups

	Police			Courts			Government Officials		
	Dalit	Equal	Don't Know	Dalit	Equal	Don't Know	Dalit	Equal	Don't Know
Upper Caste	10	34	8	8	50	9	9	37	8
Dalit	7	30	8	6	41	11	7	23	12
Adivasi	4	23	12	4	30	34	6	21	20
OBC	7	34	10	7	45	13	7	36	10
All	7	30	9	6	42	17	7	29	13

Note: All figures are in percent.

Further analysis based on literacy shows that the number of respondents who believe that the institutions treat both the rich and poor equally increases with education. The survey finds that Odisha has the highest increase (25% points) between the non-literate and college educated respondents who believe that there is no preferential treatment with respect to wealth by courts. This seems to coincide with high levels of trust and positive effectiveness and procedural fairness perception seen in Odisha for police, government officials and courts.

Upper caste or Dalit

The survey found that more than a third of the respondents held the belief that both upper caste and lower caste will be treated equally by the police and government officials and close to half the respondents felt the same about the courts.

Table 4d.6 seeks to analyse the results through caste groups.

The survey finds higher proportions of Upper Caste and OBC respondents believe that upper castes and Dalits are treated equally by state institution. Across the caste groups, upper caste respondents were most likely to hold the view that that Dalits are treated better by all institutions. Adivasis are least likely to perceive equal treatment across the institutions, and they also are most likely to not have an opinion on distributive fairness.

In keeping with the results of the previous tables, the survey also finds that respondents with higher levels of education more likely to believe that upper castes and Dalits are treated equally by all institutions. The increase across educational levels is most striking in Odisha (40% point) with

regard to the courts where 3 in 4 college educated respondents believe that the courts were likely to treat Dalits and upper caste members equally. Interestingly, more than half the respondents in Odisha had either a somewhat positive to largely negative perception of effectiveness and procedural fairness of courts.

Hindus or non-Hindus

The tables earlier had shown that over half of the respondents, in every state and across the institutions, felt that Hindus and Non-Hindus are be treated equally. The numbers were highest among respondents from Odisha across the three institutions. The Table 4d.7 looks at the community wise breakdown of perceptions of distributive fairness.

In contrast to trends in caste and class, where relative social hierarchy played a role in determining the perception of preferential treatment, one finds that higher proportion of respondents from minorities like Christians and Muslims subscribed to equal treatment perception across the institutions. Respondents with “No Opinion” responses were also marginally fewer than their Hindu counterparts, with the exception of courts. Within above mentioned religious communities, inter-state variation shows that more than 2 out of every 5 respondents in each state believe that both Hindus and Non-Hindus are treated equally across institutions, with the numbers peaking among respondents from Odisha.

With regard to literacy, the survey finds that the more literate the respondents were, the more likely they were to believe that Hindus and Non-Hindus were treated equally by institutions. The numbers were particularly high among school-educated and college-educated respondents from Odisha. In keeping with other group-pairs, Odisha also has the largest increase (40% point) between the non-literate and college educated who believed that both communities were treated equally.

Men or women

The earlier findings on preferential treatment between men and women showed that close to half the respondents in the case of police and more than half the respondents for courts and government officials held the view that both men and women are treated equally by the institutions. Also, of all the historically disadvantaged communities, a significantly larger number of respondents felt that women are treated better than men across the institutions. The results show that men are more likely to say that women are treated better and that both women and men are treated equally, across the three institutions. Interestingly, more than half the female respondents for courts and government officials subscribe to the belief that women are treated equally by the institutions; in the case of police the numbers were only marginally less than half. Also, on average, close to 2 out of every 10 female respondents stated that they believe women are treated better (Table 4d.8).

Table 4d.7: Opinion on preferential treatment of non-Hindus or equal treatment by public institution across religious groups

	Police			Courts			Government Officials		
	Non-Hindu	Both	Don't Know	Non-Hindu	Both	Don't Know	Non-Hindu	Both	Don't Know
Hindu	5	57	15	5	62	17	5	58	16
Muslim	3	63	14	3	70	15	4	64	13
Christian	0	65	11	4	63	13	1	65	13
Other	7	55	8	3	69	12	9	52	8
All	4	60	12	4	66	14	5	60	13

Note: All figures are in percent.


Table 4d.8: Opinion on preferential treatment of women or equal treatment by public institution across gender

	Police			Courts			Government Officials		
	Women	Both	Don't Know	Women	Both	Don't Know	Women	Both	Don't Know
Men	33	48	10	21	59	13	27	54	12
Women	27	47	26	16	55	20	22	52	16
All	30	47	18	19	57	16	24	53	14

Note: All figures are in percent.

With respect to literacy, the trend was similar for equal treatment i.e. the more educated the respondents were, the more likely that they were to have a perception of equal treatment between men and women, across institutions. Curiously, however, the results showed that more number

of school and college educated respondents from Gujarat and Haryana held the belief that women were treated better than the non-literate respondents. In Karnataka and Odisha, with higher education, lesser number of respondents stated that women were treated better.



Conclusion

How do interactions between the state and the citizen unfold in periods between elections? What characterizes interactions between citizens across class, caste and community? And what sorts of perceptions, attitudes, and opinions do everyday forms of governance engender within society? These questions are of importance in a democracy undergoing significant economic and social transformation. Governments consolidate their political mandate, outline new directions in policy, mould institutions, and routinize governance in periods between elections. New ideas emerge or older ideologies resurface in public discourse. Spaces for engagement between state and citizens either expand or contract, and extant forms of vertical and horizontal citizenship strengthen or fray in times between elections. And equally important are the perceptions, attitudes, and opinions citizens hold about others across caste, community and geography, as well as those relating to their relationship with state institutions and officials that both shape and in turn are shaped by politics and society between elections.

This report examines perceptions, public opinion, and political subjectivities of citizens in four States, focusing specifically on social identity, political identity, and political institutions. The Chapter on social identity explores how inter-caste and inter-community networks shape perceptions of social and political relations: the nature of friendships, the overlap between social and political networks, notions of prejudice and stereotypes, and gender equality.

The Chapter on political identity broadly focuses on the regional-national dichotomy in political expression, as well as the libertarian and majoritarian impulses that characterize the debates on freedom of expression and nationalism respectively. The Chapter on Political institutions explores citizen perceptions of their performance in public service delivery, their role in economic governance, and the degree of trust they inspire among citizens cutting across social categories.

The results for Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, and Odisha, the four States covered in this study, suggest that perceptions, public opinion, and political subjectivities range from polarity to uniformity across caste, community, geography, and in some instances, class and gender. Groups are surprisingly united across some issues while some other issues expectedly continue to polarize. For instance, preferences for a majoritarian nationalism and restrictions on freedom of expression are uniformly expressed across caste, and class as does a preference for a leader from the same caste or community. Some other issues such as perceptions of specific communities as violent or not patriotic and other stereotypes or state support for specific castes divide groups sharply.

Instances of unity in awareness of public schemes co-exist with divisions in perceptions over who receives benefits from public policy, or who receives preferential treatment in state institutions. Middle ground positions also find expression across a number of issues. For instance, regional identities are not imagined to be in opposition to national identity, and political identity emerges as an amalgam of both. Similarly, moderate liberal views are consistently associated with the role of state institutions in economic governance. In some other cases, patterns appear stronger within specific communities and relatively diffuse in

others. For instance, social identities appear to bind certain groups i.e. intra-group ties, stronger than other groups, and opinions tend to reflect these bonds. Normative interpretations of the results are likely to view some - such as high levels of trust in national institutions as contributing to improved democratic governance and others - such as weak cross-caste and cross-community personal friendships, prejudicial notions about other castes or communities, and low support for liberal attitudes as markers of a dilution in the quality of democracy.

Two aspects of the analysis must be stressed here. First, the results are primarily descriptive and seek to identify broad patterns across key social groups. While inferential analysis requires controls and robustness checks, the initial results presented here open possibilities for empirically testing theoretically driven hypotheses relating to the horizontal and vertical relationships in society and politics between elections. Second, the results are a comparative analysis of four states and cannot be generalized to a national public opinion. They can however be considered a barometer of public opinion within a State as the data allows for an analysis of political and social preferences and opinions within a single state across relevant groups. However, inter-state comparisons become increasingly meaningful as more States are covered through the next rounds of surveys, and results will approximate a national picture.

Nevertheless, the findings from the four states help us hypothesize about the broader patterns that obtain. As has been already noted in the previous studies (like the two rounds of South Asia study), trust in institutions can at best be described as mixed and at a middling level only. Similarly, delivery of public goods leaves a lot to be desired and yet unlike what the critics of India's public delivery system would like to believe, people are not very strongly disappointed with the system. The broader patterns of political culture however throw up more complex patterns that may require further investigation both in the states studied here and through an expansion of this study in other states. Just as the findings about institutions and delivery mechanisms have implications for the governance regime in India, the findings about citizen attitudes and values hold important lessons for contemporary India's political culture that provides the basis for the way democracy functions and what it means for citizens.

These political cultural patterns may be summarized as follow: (a) the caste-community driven social universe and the somewhat broad-based political universe constitute the context in which citizens relate to each other; (b) More importantly, caste-community based identities are not only inward looking images of the self, they also shape stereotypes and prejudices imposing deep burdens on certain communities. (c) Third, the study hints at the need to more carefully redefine the meanings and significance of ideas of freedom of expression and revisit liberal fundamentals in an Indian context (d) Fourth, the four states under study indicate strong public

support for emerging majoritarian nationalism which must be taken very seriously as it is likely to dominate both public discourse and our collective lives in the near future.

Of course, these are only patterns that emerge from a four-State study. Yet, they give us enough intellectual stimulation to enlarge comparisons across the States of India in the subsequent rounds of the survey.



Appendices

Appendix 1: Method note: Politics and society between elections 2016

Lokniti - CSDS in collaboration with Azim Premji University (APU) conducted a round of surveys in Gujarat, Odisha, Karnataka and Haryana in November - December 2016. These four states were selected on the basis of one from each geographical zone and also because these four states provided the proximity to study politics between elections closely and accurately. The study aims to capture public opinion between elections. It covers various aspects related to delivery of public services, law and order, identities, discrimination and violence, economic processes and governance and the perception of the state at various levels to which the citizens interact. The study was an attempt to know whether various social groups get access to better public services such as water, sanitation, roads, electricity among others, which group does the police protect and which does not, whether the rate of discrimination towards marginal groups have reduced over the period of time and which states do better job in providing public services. The survey in a broader perspective helps to know everyday governance and development in India.

The survey was conducted between November 21 and December 1, 2016 among 7,770 respondents in 21 assembly constituencies across four states each. The assembly constituencies where the survey was conducted were randomly selected using the probability proportionate to size method. Thereafter four polling stations within each of the sampled constituencies were selected using the systematic random sampling method. Finally, 30 respondents were also randomly selected using the same method from the latest electoral rolls of the sampled polling stations. This procedure ensures that the selected sample is fully representative of the cross-section of voters in the country. Specially trained field investigators asked the respondents, in a face-to-face interview a detailed set of questions which could take up to 20-25 minutes. They were instructed to interview only those whose names were given to them. At some locations the non-availability of sampled respondents or difficulty in finding households necessitated replacements or substitutions.

To make the sample more representative and for the cross-community analysis, a booster was conducted of 500 respondents in each states except Karnataka. The booster was conducted to perform cross-sectional analysis to ensure equal representation of targeted communities like Muslims, Dalits, Patels, Adivasis and OBC Kshtriyas in Gujarat, Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis and Khandayats in Odisha and Muslims, Dalits, Jats, Punjabi Khatri and Sikhs in Haryana. However, the booster was not conducted in Karnataka, as the sample was well representative beforehand. The rationale behind conducting the interviews of selected communities in the booster was to include the perspective of the dominant communities as well as to include the perception of the communities that are not adequately represented in the respective states.

Research instruments

Questionnaire: The questionnaire was carefully designed and was in the language mainly spoken in the respondents' state. The translation process was carefully monitored, so that a question in one state did not have a different meaning in

another. Most questions were well structured, with few exceptions of open ended questions. The questionnaire was based on six broad themes: citizen perception and state Institutions, delivery of public services, economic policy and governance, identity, corruption, and consciousness.

Fieldwork manual: A Fieldwork manual has been specially designed for field investigators with general instructions in how to conduct standard interviews. It also contains question specific instructions explaining skips patterns in questions and probing levels for right responses. The manual also have numerical codes for background variables like education, occupation, caste etc. with pre codes for some open-ended questions.

Training

Training workshop: A day training workshop is organized before the survey fieldwork starts at various places in the state to train the field investigators (FIs) and supervisors who carry out the fieldwork operations. State coordinators conduct an intensive and interactive workshop for training field investigators on conducting face-to-face interview based on the questionnaire. The investigators undergo an orientation programme and train rigorously about interviewing techniques and communications with the respondents. A comprehensive and detailed interviewing guide, designed on the basis of the questionnaire and survey methodology, is prepared for the interviewers.

Field work

Procedures: The interviews of the selected electors are conducted at their residence or place of work. Field investigators on meeting the respondents explain the purpose of the interview, establish their identity and inform them about the expected research output of the study. The field investigators conduct the interview of the selected respondent in face-to-face interaction using the questionnaires designed for this purpose. The investigators follow the standard and accepted practices of fieldwork and information collected are kept strictly confidential.

¹ However, few limitations still remain in spite of carrying out booster of communities.

Data processing

Data coding & cleaning: All questionnaires were manually screened for consistency and quality check. The questionnaire had codes (of pre-coded questions) that were used for data punching. A team was constituted for data checking which checked the code and made corrections if there was any mistake made by investigators while filling the code.

Data entry & analysis: Codes on the questionnaire are punched into an electronic database. Punched data are then edited through a

specially written edit program, which checks for eligibility criteria, range and logic errors.

The fieldwork of the study was coordinated by Dr. Prabhat Mohanty and Dr. Gyana Ranjan Swain in Odisha; Dr. Bhanu Parmar and Dr. Mahashweta Jani in Gujarat; Dr. Anita Agarwal and Dr. Kushal Pal in Haryana; and Dr. Veena Devi and Dr. Reetika Syal in Karnataka. The survey was designed and analyzed by a team of researchers at Lokniti. The team included Asmita Aasaavari, Arushi Gupta, Dhananjay Kumar Singh, Himanshu Bhattacharya, Jyoti Mishra, Souradeep Banerjee, Shashwat Dhar, Shreyas Sardesai and Vibha Attri.

Table A1: Distribution of the achieved sample

	Assembly constituencies	Polling station	Targeted sample	Achieved sample
Gujarat	21	84	2520	2044
Haryana	21	84	2520	1789
Odisha	21	84	2520	2064
Karnataka	21	84	2520	1873
All	84	336	10080	7770

Note: All figures are in percent.

Table A2: Profile of the achieved sample

	Gujarat		Haryana		Odisha		Karnataka	
	Census 2011	Sample survey	Census 2011	Sample survey	Census 2011	Sample survey	Census 2011	Sample survey
Women	47.8	49	46.7	39	49.4	50	49.3	48
SC	6.7	15	20.1	24	17.1	19	17.1	23
ST	14.7	16	NA	NA	22.8	25	7	7
Urban	42.6	27	34.8	36	16.6	24	38.6	33
Muslim	9.7	11	7	8	2.7	12	12.9	10

Note: All figures are in percent.

Q4. How hopeful do you feel about the way things are going in the country these days - very hopeful, somewhat hopeful or not at all hopeful?

1. Very hopeful 2. Somewhat hopeful 3. Not at all hopeful 8. Don't know/DK

Q5. In your opinion, what is the most important issue facing India today? (*Record the answer & consult the codebook for coding*) _____ **98.** Don't Know

Q6. What is the most important responsibility of a government towards its citizens? (*Record exact answer options*) _____ **98.** Don't Know

Q7. Government has initiated several schemes and programmes for the benefit of the people. Have you or your family ever availed any such benefits?

	Yes	No	Not heard
a. Employment scheme	2	1	0
b. Pension scheme	2	1	0
c. Skill-development scheme	2	1	0
d. Accidental crop insurance scheme	2	1	0
e. Crop subsidy scheme	2	1	0
f. Fertilizer subsidy scheme	2	1	0
g. Housing scheme	2	1	0
h. Medical insurance scheme	2	1	0
i. Educational scholarship scheme	2	1	0

Q8. Now I am going to name a few government policies. Please tell me whether it is good for you or bad for you. (*Probe further whether very or somewhat good or bad*)

	Good	Bad				Never tried	DK
a. Right to Information	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
b. Right to Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
c. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
d. Atal Pension Yojana	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
e. Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushal Yojna	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
f. Swachh Bharat Abhiyan	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
g. Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana	1	2	3	4	5	6	8

Q13. And what about these institutions... how much trust do you have in them?

	A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not very much trust	Not at all trust	DK
a. Parliament	1	2	3	4	8
b. State Assembly (Vidhan Sabha)	1	2	3	4	8
c. Gram Pachayat/Nagar Palika (MCD)	1	2	3	4	8

Q14. I will now name few more government officials.. Please tell me how much trust do you have in them: a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, not at all trust?

	A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not very much trust	Not at all trust	DK
a. District Collector	1	2	3	4	8
b. Tehsildar	1	2	3	4	8

Q15. And what about these institutions... how much trust do you have in them?

	A great deal of trust	Quite a lot of trust	Not very much trust	Not at all trust	DK
a. The military/National Army	1	2	3	4	8
b. Election Commission	1	2	3	4	8
c. Political Party	1	2	3	4	8

Q16. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following issues? (*Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat' agrees or disagrees*)

	Agree		Disagree		DK
	Fully	Somewhat	Somewhat	Fully	
a. Voting must be made mandatory for all Indians.	1	2	3	4	8
b. Government should punish those who do not respect the cow.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Government should punish those who do not say 'Bharat Mata Ki Jai' in public functions.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Government should punish those who eat beef/cow meat.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Government should punish those who do not stand while the national anthem is being sung.	1	2	3	4	8
f. Government should punish those who engage in religious conversions.	1	2	3	4	8

Q17. How worried do you feel about the way things are going in the country these days - very worried, somewhat worried, or not at all worried?

1. Very worried 2. Somewhat worried 3. Not at all worried 8. DK

Q18. How much trust do you have in police - a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much or not at all?

1. A great deal of trust 2. Quite a lot of trust 3. Not very much 4. Not at all
8. Don't know

Q19. In the last 2-3 years have you or your family ever been in a situation where you needed to contact the police, or the police contacted you?

2. Yes 1. No 8. DK

Q19a. *(If yes)* Did they come to your home/workplace or did you go to them?

1. I went to the police station 2. Police came to my home/workplace
3. They called me 8. DK 9. Not Applicable/NA

Q20. I am now going to read out some statements about the police and the nature of the decisions made by them. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. *(Probe further whether strongly or somewhat agree or disagree).*

	Agree		Disagree		DK
	Strong-ly	Some-what	Some-what	Strong-ly	
a. If a citizen were to report a crime to the police, quick action would be taken.	1	2	3	4	8
b. The police in the state generally take bribes.	1	2	3	4	8
c. The decisions made by the police are unduly influenced by political parties/politicians.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Police generally treats people with respect.	1	2	3	4	8

Q21. There are different reasons why people avoid interacting with the police, even when they have been in situations where they could have interacted with the police. Please tell me about your self, what was the main reason for you or your family for not interacting with the police? *(Do NOT read out answer categories)*

01. Problem could be resolved by community elders
02. Lawyers/ friends. associates suggested not to go to police
03. Didn't go to police, because it complicates the matter
04. Previous experience with police was bad

- Q31.** Now I will read out a few situations of people from different social backgrounds going to the government officials. Which group do you think the government officials will treat better?
(Ask questions one by one)
- | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------------|-------|
| a. A Rich person or a Poor person? | 1. Rich | 2. Poor | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| b. An Upper caste or a Dalit? | 1. Upper caste | 2. Dalit | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| c. A Hindu or a non-Hindu? | 1. Hindu | 2. Non-Hindu | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |
| d. A Man and a Woman? | 1. Man | 2. Woman | 3. Both treated same | 8. DK |

- Q32.** Is any of your close friends a?
- | | Yes | No | DK |
|-------------------------|-----|----|----|
| a. Dalit | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| b. Adivasi | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| c. OBC | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| d. Upper caste | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| e. Muslim | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| f. Christian | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| g. Hindu | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| h. From opposite gender | 2 | 1 | 8 |

- Q33a.** Now I am going to read out few statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?

Statement 1: Generations of unfair treatment has made it difficult for Dalits to improve their economic conditions

Statement 2: Dalits are not trying harder; if they try hard enough they will be well off.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|
| 1. Agree with Statement 1 | 2. Agree with Statement 2 | 8. DK |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|

- Q33b.** Now I am going to read out few statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?

Statement 1: Generations of unfair treatment have made it difficult for Adivasis to work their way out of the lower class.

Statement 2: Adivasi are not trying harder; if they try hard enough they will be well off.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|
| 1. Agree with Statement 1 | 2. Agree with Statement 2 | 8. DK |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|

- Q33c.** Now I am going to read out few statements. Please tell me which statement you agree with most?

Statement 1: Over the last 50 years, (name of the dominant community) has acquired large political and economic power hence they should not be given any special assistance.

Statement 2: Only few from dominant castes have acquired large political and economic power, while a majority among them are not as privileged. Hence they should be given more privileges in society.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|
| 1. Agree with Statement 1 | 2. Agree with Statement 2 | 8. DK |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|

Q34. On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely unpatriotic and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely patriotic, On which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? **SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)**

	Extremely unpatriotic					Extremely patriotic				
a. Muslims	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
b. Christians	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
c. Hindus	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
d. Sikhs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10

Q35. On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely lazy and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely hardworking, On which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? **SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)**

	Extremely Lazy					Extremely hardworking				
a. Dalits/SCs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
b. Adivasis/STs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
c. Upper Caste	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
d. Dominant community	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
e. Dominant community	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10

Q36. On a ladder of 10 steps where the 1st step at bottom stands for extremely violent and the 10th step at the top stands for extremely peaceful, On which step from 1 to 10 would you place the following communities? **SHOW THE LADDER AND EXPLAIN (If no answer is given code 98)**

	Extremely violent					Extremely peaceful				
a. Dalits/SCs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
b. Adivasis/STs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
c. Upper Caste	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
d. Dominant community	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
e. Dominant community	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
f. Muslims	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
g. Christians	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10

h. Hindus	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
i. Sikhs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10

Q37. How regularly do you do the following for News – daily, sometimes, rarely or never?

	Daily	Some-times	Rarely	Never	DK
a. Watch Doordarshan	1	2	3	4	8
b. Watch Private News Channels	1	2	3	4	8
c. Watch Local language television channel	1	2	3	4	8
d. Read Hindi Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
e. Read English Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
f. Read Local language newspapers	1	2	3	4	8

Q38. How much trust do you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, somewhat trust, not much trust or not at all trust?

	Great deal	Some-what	Not much	Not at all	DK
a. Doordarshan	1	2	3	4	8
b. Private News Channels	1	2	3	4	8
c. Local language television channel	1	2	3	4	8
d. Hindi Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
e. English Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
f. Local language newspapers	1	2	3	4	8

Q39. Of the different sources of information such as TV, newspaper, internet and radio, which source would you refer to first for reliable and accurate information?

1. TV 2. Newspaper 3. Internet 4. Radio 5. All
6. None 8. DK

Q40. Should people with the following views be allowed to express their ideas freely in public? A person who..... (*Probe further whether fully or somewhat Yes or No*):

	Yes		No		DK
	Fully	Some-what	Some-what	Fully	
a. Wants to replace democracy with military dictatorship.	1	2	3	4	8
b. Wants to replace Indian state by violent means.	1	2	3	4	8

- c. Advocates independence for any part of India. 1 2 3 4 8
- d. Makes fun of religious communities other than his/her. 1 2 3 4 8
- e. Criticises elected leaders. 1 2 3 4 8
- f. Advocates violence against people from different communities. 1 2 3 4 8

Q41. When we ask people how they would identify themselves, some say they are only (state identity) and others feel they are only Indian. While some feel they are more (state identity) and less Indian and other feel they are more Indian and less (state identity). How do you identify yourself?

1. Only (state identity) 2. Only Indian 3. More (state identity) less Indian

4. More Indian less (state identity) 5. Both equally 8. DK

Q42. Suppose there are two leaders from same political party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your **caste** while the other from a different caste. Whom would you be willing to contact first?

1. Leader from same caste 2. Leader from different caste

3. Will not make any difference 8. DK

Q43. Suppose there are two leaders from same political party and equally competent to get your work done. If one is from your **religion** while the other from a different religion. Whom would you be willing to contact first?

1. Leader from same religion 2. Leader from different religion

3. Will not make any difference 8. DK

Q44. Some people feel it is okay to speak in (respective state) language in public places while others feel that there is no problem in speaking in Hindi or English in public places. What is your opinion on this issue?

1. State language 2. No problem speaking in Hindi or English

3. Hindi but not English 4. English but not Hindi

5. I don't know both Hindi/English 6. Any language 8. DK

Q45. In many parts of India, large parts of agricultural and forest land are acquired to build a factory, a road, railway lines, bus stand, airport, pipelines, dams. Often local villagers protest against these acquisitions. Should they: **(Probe further whether strongly or somewhat agree or disagree)**

	Agree		Disagree		DK
	Strongly	Somewhat	Somewhat	Strongly	

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Give up their land in the larger interest of development. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| b. Be allowed to continue their protest in a peaceful manner. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| c. Be allowed to resist the government by violent methods. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 |

- d. These disputes should be settled by the court. 1 2 3 4 8
- e. The government should be allowed to use force to displace locals 1 2 3 4 8
- f. The government should be allowed to acquire fertile agricultural land. 1 2 3 4 8

Q46. How would you describe your social class? Are you in the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?

- 1. Lower class 2. Working class
- 3. Middle class 4. Upper class 8. DK

Q47. Compared to your parents, do you think it is easy or hard for you to move up the income ladder? (Probe whether a great deal easier, moderately easier or a great deal harder or moderately harder)

- 1. A great deal easier 2. Moderately easier 3. A great deal harder
- 4. Moderately harder 5. Neither easier nor harder 8. DK

Q48. I am now going to read out some statements about men and women and their place in the family. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (**Probe further whether strongly or somewhat agree or disagree**)

	Yes		No		DK
	Fully	Some-what	Some-what	Fully	
a. A woman should prioritise managing home over outside work.	1	2	3	4	8
b. It is up to women to decide whom to get married to.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Educating boys is more important than educating girls.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Men should be paid more than women even if it's the same job.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Women should have 50% reservations in all jobs.	1	2	3	4	8
f. Women should have the right to decide to get married or not.	1	2	3	4	8
g. Women and men should have equal responsibility for child rearing.	1	2	3	4	8

Q49. I am going to read out three statements about same sex relationship. Which one do you agree with Most? (**Read OUT all three answers**)

- 1. Same sex relationships should be punished

Z7. Total agricultural land including orchard and plantation owned by your household (*as on date of survey*): _____ (*Ask in local units, but record in standard acres. If more than 99, Code 99*)

Z8.	Do you or members of your household have the following:	Yes	No
	a. Car/Jeep/Van	1	2
	b. Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped	1	2
	c. Airconditioner	1	2
	d. Computer/laptop	1	2
	e. Washing machine/Microwave/Fridge	1	2
	f. Fan/Cooler	1	2
	g. TV	1	2
	h. Mobile phone	1	2
	i. LPG gas	1	2
	j. Motorised pumping set for irrigation	1	2
	k. Tractor	1	2
	l. Handpump inside the house	1	2
	m. Power back up (Invertor/Generator, etc.)	1	2

Z9.	Livestock	Total Number
	a. Goat /sheep/pig:	_____
	b. Cow/Oxen /buffalo/Camel:	_____
	c. Any other:	_____

Z10. Total monthly household income - putting together the income of all members of the household? (*Record exact amount in Rupees. If respondent does not give any amount then record 000000*)
Mobile/Telephone number of the respondent _____



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